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PREFACE 
FIFTY YEARS AGO several areas of the globe were little touched 
by the main currents of world affairs. Others escaped involve-
ment altogether in the rivalries of international politics. This 
era is no more. Today, the former colonial territories of Asia, 
Africa, and the Middle East comprise key arenas in which 
crucial struggles are taking place: struggles which could deter-
mine whether men will look back on the twentieth century as 
an age in which freedom flourished or was dealt a formidable 
setback. 
One of these former colonial areas is Southeast Asia, the 
subject of this book. The eyes of an entire world seemed 
focused on Southeast Asia in the spring of 1954 when the 
French fortress of Dien Bien Phu fell to the Communist Viet 
Minh in once-remote Indochina. Most of these eyes were 
turned toward Southeast Asia for the first time-but probably 
not the last. 
This book seeks to provide the reader with a brief yet com-
prehensive picture of this increasingly important region in the 
hope that he may understand more fully future developments 
in the lands which are China's southern neighbors. There are 
six chapters dealing individually with the countries comprising 
the area. Three other chapters offer a general introduction 
to the area, analyze the international relations of Southeast 
Asia, and describe the approach of American foreign policy 
toward the countries of this part of the world. A select and 
late bibliography is provided for the reader who will wish to 
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examine further the past and the prospects of Southeast Asia. 
An effort has been made to focus attention on major prob-
lems of the area and on recent important happenings. Because 
the events taking place in Southeast Asia at the present time 
are both swift and basic, the authors have sought to include 
significant developments right up to the eve of publication. 
The immense changes which were registered in Southeast Asia 
between 1939 and 1945 are continuing, and no work which 
fails to take cognizance of this fact can hope to offer a true 
picture of today's Southeast Asia. 
The authors have drawn upon the writings of the increasing 
number of scholars who specialize in the governments and 
politics of the region; to them they owe a debt of gratitude. 
They have also drawn on their own published writings. Much 
of the subject matter of this work, however, is presented for 
the first time in book form here. It is based on the research 
and observations of the authors, both of whom have traveled 
recently in Southeast Asia. A considerable debt is owed to 
those who assisted them in meeting leaders and representative 
figures of the area. 
The senior author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness 
to the Social Science Research Council for a research fellowship 
and a travel grant which enabled him to visit the countries of 
the region in 1929-1930 and again in 1950 for the purpose of 
studying their governments and politics. 
Mr. Butwell wishes to express his thanks to the United 
States Fulbright Program for providing him with the oppor-
tunity of two years of study of Southeast Asian international 
relations at St. Antony's College, Oxford University, and the 
Institute of Pacific Relations for a grant for travel in Southeast 
Asia in 1953. 
AMRY VANDENBOSCH 
RICHARD BuTWELL 
The publishers wish to acknowledge with thanks the coop-
eration of the Institute of Pacific Relations in the distribution 
of this book. 
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CHAPTER I 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
CONTEMPORARY POWER VACUUM 
NOT so LONG AGO the people of the Western world knew only 
vaguely of the existence of the countries of Southeast Asia. 
India, on the fringe of the region, had for several decades 
attracted a great deal of attention because of its heroic struggle 
for national independence under a very unusual leader. The 
Philippines were known to Americans, though in a superficial 
manner, because the United States had the responsibility for 
governing the islands. Their country's respective Southeast 
Asian colonial holdings were likewise known in a general fash-
ion to Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Dutchmen. As a whole, 
however, the people of the West knew little of the lands east 
of India and south of China. 
Today the Western world is conscious of Southeast Asia and 
of its importance in world politics. The change in attitude 
began with the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia during the 
Second World War, which dramatically emphasized the stra-
tegic importance of the region. Interest sharpened when the 
loss of China left to the free world only the fringes of the 
continent and the off-lying islands and insular countries. The 
fall of Dien Bien Phu, lending itself to colorful news coverage, 
caught virtually everyone's attention; as a result of its successes 
in Vietnam, the Communist bloc now also had a foot squarely 
in a country known as the "gateway" to Southeast Asia. 
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If the Communists gain control of Southeast Asia, the West 
is now fully aware, India will be threatened and the strength 
ot Australia will be partially neutralized. The free world can-
not afford to lose any more territory or prestige in Asia. 
A LITTLE-KNOWN REGION ENTERS WORLD POLITICS 
Southeast Asia consists of Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Malaya, and the British 
Borneo possessions. The total land area of the region exceeds 
1,600,000 square miles, and because much of it is insular, it 
covers a large expanse of ocean. Southeast Asia's significance in 
world politics is particularly due to its strategic location at the 
southeastern extremity of the great Asian land mass. A tropical 
extension of the continent, the region consists of a two-pronged 
peninsula on the mainland and a vast string of islands stretching 
along both sides of the equator for a greater distance than that 
between New York and San Francisco. The main sea route 
between the Pacific and Indian oceans passes through the area, 
which also serves as a link between Asia and Australia. With 
the important exception of northeastern Indochina, an exten-
sion of the south China littoral, Southeast Asia's boundaries 
effectively separate it from the nearest land masses on all its 
sides. In the north, high mountains divide the region from 
China and India-except for the northeast coastal region of 
Vietnam in Indochina. Southeast Asia is bordered by water to 
the east, south, and west. 
As a consequence of the events of the post-Second-World-
War years-and the headlines which chronicled them-the term 
Southeast Asia is now common in discussions about interna-
tional political, social, and economic developments. Before 
the war, however, these tropical-equatorial lands were thought 
of almost exclusively as overseas extensions of the Western 
metropolitan powers which controlled their destinies. They had 
little political identity or significance apart from their colonial 
connections. Nor was there any reason why this should have 
been otherwise. As late as the nineteen-twenties and early 
thirties Southeast Asia's was not a role of vital importance on 
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the stage of international politics, although the area produced 
most of the world's rubber and tin and more than two-thirds 
of the rice entering world trade. 
Today all the major foreign offices have, or seek to have, a 
"Southeast Asian policy." The British and the Australians, as 
examples, have resident commissioners in Southeast Asia to 
coordinate policy in this area of more than 170,000,000 inhab-
itants. Political developments in individual countries-Vietnam 
or Malaya, for instance-are no longer important only locally 
or to an imperial ruler. Ho Chi Minh's is a name known to at 
least some men in all lands; Philippine President Magsaysay 
and Indonesian President Sukarno also have international repu-
tations. 
All of this indicates a major change in the attitude of the 
world, the \Nest in particular, towards this region, which, it 
should be noted, is itself as big as all Europe. The occasion 
for this change has been the emergence of a new and dynamic 
Southeast Asia-a politically independent Southeast Asia de-
manding a greater voice in the settlements of international 
politics. The change also relates to recent developments in 
other parts of Asia-the rise of Moscow-fathered communism 
in China and the achievement of independence by India, which 
have had tremendous consequences for Southeast Asia-and to 
events in the world at large, especially as these have been 
reflected in the "cold war" of the years since the Second 
World War. 
From the point of view of the United States, one of the most 
important characteristics of contemporary Southeast Asia is the 
fact that it constitutes a power vacuum of rather sizable propor-
tions and with significant consequences. For more than forty 
years preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, South-
east Asia had comprised a series of mutually accepted Western 
colonial regimes. During these years Southeast Asia, together 
with British India and Ceylon, formed a single defense unit, 
based on the naval power of the British and part of a larger 
defense arc which reached westward as far as Suez. Stability 
at the price of national freedom was a keynote of the area. The 
postwar years, however, witnessed an eclipse of this stability 
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with the attainment of independence, if not always complete, 
by all the lands of the area except Malaya and northern Borneo. 
The old chain of defense which once extended from Suez to 
the eastern reaches of Southeast Asia was broken, as India, 
Pakistan, and Ceylon also achieved national independence, al-
though within the British Commonwealth. Stability was re-
placed by turmoil. A power vacuum followed the demise of 
Western colonialism. 
This vacuum derives importance from the existence, to the 
north of Southeast Asia, of the huge Chinese state, which has 
traditionally regarded the lands to its south as a proper outlet 
for its expansive tendencies. Its present membership in the 
international Communist coalition makes Peiping's dominating 
geographical and political position more ominous for its 
southern neighbors today than ever before. China is not the 
only power, however, which might seek to fill this important 
vacuum. To the west of Southeast Asia lies India, which has 
contributed several million immigrants to the countries of 
South Asia and East Africa in the present century and which 
also is enjoying a period of resurgence, regarding itself as the 
key power in the Indian Ocean area. And to the northeast a 
crowded and once-covetous Japan watches Southeast Asia with 
an obviously interested eye, the same Japan which in 1941-1942 
succeeded in bringing all of the region under a single ruler for 
the first time in history. 
Like other of history's power vacuums, Southeast Asia may 
not remain a vacuum long, particularly in light of the fact that 
geographically it is composed principally of islands and penin-
sulas with a high ratio of coastal area to total land surface, a 
physical condition highly favorable to external penetration. 
TRADITIONAL "LOW-PRESSURE AREA" 
It is no new thing for Southeast Asia to be subjected to pres-
sures from all sides. This, indeed, has been its historical lot, 
causing one prominent observer of the region to term it a 
"low-pressure area."1 The description is apt. 
1 Cora DuBois, in Social Forces in Southeast Asia (Minneapolis, 1949). 
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One of the most important of these pressures has been popu-
lation. Southeast Asia has been peopled for the most part by 
successive migratory waves forced to move south by ever-
increasing pressure upon them, stemming in the last analysis 
from the Chinese, who pushed down from their early home in 
north China. 
The first of the migrations of importance to contemporary 
Southeast Asia was that of the Indonesians or Malays, who, 
beginning about 2500 B.c., pressed south into the mainland 
portion of Southeast Asia and moved on to the archipelago 
beyond. The direct impetus to their migration was not the 
Chinese themselves, but other Mongoloid peoples who had in 
turn been pushed south by the Chinese. These were later to 
be pushed out of south and west China by Chinese population 
pressure, various groups of them becoming the Vietnamese, 
Thai, Burmese, and Cambodian peoples of modern Southeast 
Asia. 
Traditionally, in comparison with China to the north, South-
east Asia has been a region of low population density. It was 
this comparatively sparse settlement of the area that permitted 
the peoples now inhabiting the region to move into it. This 
situation has not basically changed. The gap, in fact, has 
greatly widened in modern times. China, with its population 
of approximately 600,000,000, continues to exert pressure upon 
the lands to its south, which have less than one-third its inhab-
itants. Southeast Asia, though possessing patches of overpopu-
lation, has vast areas of sparsely settled land. If anything, an 
increase rather than a lessening of Chinese population pressure 
is to be expected. It is highly significant that large numbers of 
Chinese have migrated to Southeast Asia during the past one 
hundred years, almost all of them coming by sea. There are 
today more than ten million of them in the area. 
Southeast Asia is faced with population pressure from an-
other direction. Indeed, it is situated between two of the 
heaviest concentrations of population to be found in the world 
-the Indian and the Chinese. The pressure of population upon 
available resources caused large numbers of Indians to seek 
their fortunes in British-held Burma and Malaya. That they 
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did not do so in greater numbers elsewhere in the area is prob-
ably due to policies designed by the colonial rulers of these 
territories to exclude them. It certainly is not due to the 
absence of a desire to move into Southeast Asia. 
Expansion of adjacent populations has been only one of 
several pressures converging upon the region. Culturally, South-
east Asia also has always been a low-pressure area. The ad-
vanced level of civilization achieved by the Indonesian king-
doms of Java and Sumatra in the eighth and fifteenth centuries 
largely resulted from the penetration of the area by Hinduism 
and associated social elements. Much that owes its origin to 
Indian cultural influence is evident today in most of Southeast 
Asia. The same might be said of Chinese-derived cultural 
factors, although to a lesser degree. The Arabs also have made 
a substantial cultural contribution to Southeast Asia, although 
Indians were the direct bearers of Islam. And though they gave 
little of substance to Southeast Asian life in the early years of 
contact, the Europeans have to an ever-increasing extent left 
a pronounced imprint on virtually all aspects of life in this 
part of the world. Although much is made of the truth that 
Southeast Asians adapted many of these borrowings to their 
own particular needs and environment, the fact remains that 
they did borrow them. Cultural influences converged upon the 
area from India, Europe, China, the Middle East, and America, 
and they were accepted. Traffic, however, was one way. No 
such influences made their way out from the area to these or 
other parts of the world. 
This was also true in the realm of economics. It cannot be 
shown that the Indian or Chinese or European economic struc-
tures were modified in any way as a result of any efforts by 
native Southeast Asians. The markets of this region were 
opened by traders from other countries; they were not the 
development of indigenous commercial enterprise. Before the 
advent of European traders, Indians, Chinese, and Arabs had 
been prominent in fostering the commerce of Southeast Asia. 
With the establishment of European power, the economic 
structure of the area underwent a revolutionary transformation. 
What had previously been a self-sufficient food-producing econ-
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omy became a raw-material supplier to the industrialized coun-
tries of the West and a leader in world trade in rice. Few events 
in economic history have been comparable to the impact of the 
Western commercial invasion upon Southeast Asia and similar 
underdeveloped regions. Historically, Southeast Asia has cer-
tainly been an economic low-pressure area. 
It has been an area of convergent political interests, too. 
China on several occasions has moved south to increase its 
power and territory. Vietnam was long under the Chinese 
yoke, and Khubilai Khan attacked Burma, Cambodia, and 
Champa (part of present-day Vietnam) and sent a punitive 
expedition to Java, which had given Champa some assistance 
in its war with China. An aggressive Chinese foreign policy 
was most evident, however, under the Ming emperor Yung 
Lo (1403-1424), who occupied much of Vietnam, acquired 
control over Upper Burma, and sent several tribute-seeking 
naval expeditions to the lands of the south to induce local 
rulers to acquiesce, either peaceably or under duress, in Chinese 
overlordship. In contrast with China, the relations of India 
with the area on the whole have been most peaceful. The 
expansionist policy of the Chola emperors of Tanjore in the 
eleventh century, however, is an example of what India could 
do, although in fact it has made the attempt only once. Japan, 
though it also struck at the region but once, would have been 
successful in that effort, had it encountered only Southeast 
Asia's resistance and not that of the allied West. The West 
in its own penetration of the area successfully and for a limited 
time took over full political control of the region. And today 
the forces of the powerful contestants in the worldwide cold 
war converge on this politically, economically, and militarily 
weak area. Simultaneous with this convergence is the impact 
of China, India, Japan, Australia, the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and the United Kingdom functioning as traditional 
influence-seeking national states, possessing objectives which 
exist apart from the present encounter between democracy and 
communism-objectives, however, frequently not perceived due 
to the shadows cast by the bigger and more novel cold-war 
interests. As much in terms of international relations as of 
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population, culture, and economics, Southeast Asia can best 
be understood in terms of a low-pressure area. 
Two factors especially explain why alien powers have been 
so successful in their numerous attempts at penetration of vari-
ous parts of the region. The first is the continuing division of 
the area into a multiplicity of small political units, partially a 
consequence of its marked geographical fragmentation. When 
the West began its penetration of Southeast Asia in the six-
teenth century, it found a "patchwork quilt of kingdoms, prin-
cipalities and tribal chieftainships, independent cities, and local 
or regional confederations."2 This division is an outstanding 
factor in explaining the ease of European conquest of the area. 
Divided, it could be, and was, taken over territory by territory. 
After a series of squabbles in which the contestants varied, the 
area was finally stabilized into several mutually accepted 
Western colonial holdings. But if it had become stabilized, it 
was still divided. There was British Malaya, the Dutch East 
Indies, French Indochina, British Burma, and the American-
held Philippines, as well as nominally sovereign Thailand. 
The existing divisions, in the sense of there being a multi-
plicity of ultimately responsible rulers, and the metropolitan 
power-imposed stability were wiped out by the Japanese inva-
sion which struck at the region in late 1941 and early 1942. 
For the first time in all its history Southeast Asia knew a 
common ruler, although in fact, for all practical purposes, 
divisions continued much as before under Japan's temporary 
overlordship. But there can be no doubt that the old stability 
disappeared. The very change of rulers, whatever their respec-
tive merits, encouraged this. The use of local puppets by the 
Japanese was fuel to the flame of incipient nationalism. And 
as the Japanese began to be forced out of the region, it became 
their deliberate policy to give active encouragement to this 
rapidly growing nationalism. Although this may have arisen 
from a reckless determination to create turmoil and confusion 
for their own sake, there can be no question that it gave con-
siderable impetus to the nationalist movements in Southeast 
2 H. J. van Mook, The Stakes of Democracy in Southeast Asia (London, 1950), 
36-37. 
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Asia. It also created conditions favorable to the spread of 
communism, which has benefited from the region's widespread 
poverty as well as its postwar political instability. 
RISE OF NATIONALISM 
Nationalism, as contrasted with more primitive hostility to the 
foreigner, dates its active existence in the region from the period 
following the First World War. An importation from the West, 
it existed in embryonic form before then, but only in the 
Philippines had it assumed substantial strength before the 
1914-1918 war. In the nineteen-twenties and thirties, although 
granted a few concessions, it continued to feed on the ever-
increasing frustrations of an ever-expanding body of sympa-
thizers, modeling itself in many respects after Indian Congress 
and Chinese Kuomintang nationalism. On the eve of the 
Japanese invasion it was still a force of limited strength, but 
it emerged from the devastations of the Second World War a 
militant movement. Taking advantage of the almost complete 
destruction of existing and accepted institutions and values by 
the Japanese occupation, the nationalists raised the standard 
of revolt. Although they met with armed resistance from the 
French and the Dutch, national independence was for the most 
part obtained. The Philippines, Indonesia, and Burma have 
joined the family of nations, and French colonialism is dead in 
Indochina, although it is not yet clear what will take its place. 
It may very well be succeeded by Communist Chinese colonial-
ism. Malaya, which until the Second World War seemed 
utterly without political consciousness, is about to take its place 
as a self-governing dominion in the British Commonwealth. 
But although the colonial powers have departed, the divisions 
solidified by their arbitrary partition of the region remain. 
The new national states for the most part follow the boundaries 
of the old colonial domains. Division continues, but the old 
stability is gone. The door perhaps is again open to external 
penetration. The situation bears a close analogy to the con-
dition of Southeast Asia at the time of the coming of the West. 
Forces exist today ready once more to converge upon the area. 
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The old pattern of division may facilitate the progress of 
these forces. 
In addition to political divisions, however, there was another 
conspicuous characteristic about Southeast Asia that facilitated 
Western penetration of the region. This was its backwardness 
in economic development. It was in part because of this 
material weakness that the several lands of the area fell under 
the sway of the powerful European imperial powers seeking 
to expand their trade. This is most important in understanding 
the region's present character and its possible future develop-
ment, for predominantly agricultural Southeast Asia today is 
still backward in economic achievement. In terms of industri-
alization, the main criterion in ascertaining economic might in 
the modern world, it is exceptionally weak. And it is very 
likely that this lack of industrial strength will continue for 
some time to come. Thus, once again a situation is observed 
comparable to the past-more specifically, to the time of the 
coming of the Westerner. As political division encouraged or 
tempted external penetration, so also did economic backward-
ness. And as political division continues today, so, too, does 
this comparative backwardness. 
NO LONGER AN OUTPOST OF WORLD POLITICS 
If there are many similarities between Southeast Asia's past 
and its present, there are also some extremely significant dif-
ferences. The world has become considerably smaller since that 
distant day in the sixteenth century when the Spanish ships of 
the daring Magellan reached the Philippines from across the 
wide Pacific, and this has had important consequences for all 
nations. To state that Southeast Asia was an outpost of world 
politics until recent times is to assume that there were no 
international relations outside of Europe till Europe expanded 
to the far corners of the globe. Such is not true, of course. As 
there was considerable intercourse among the nations of Europe 
before Europe and Asia came into continuous direct contact, 
so, too, was there such intercourse among the lands of Asia, 
although it may have differed in kind from its European coun-
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terpart. But in modern times-that is, since Europe effectively 
gained its ascendency over most of the rest of the world (how'-
ever transitory that ascendency may turn out to have been)-
it is true to say that Southeast Asia has been far from the main 
arenas of conflict in world politics. For the last one hundred 
and fifty years, if not longer, world politics has been in fact 
European politics. Southeast Asia, though an aspect of the 
rivalry between the Western states, was not a key area in the 
international struggle for power. This changed with Japan's 
rise to power in Asia in the nineteen-thirties, which was but 
one indication of the expansion of European politics into truly 
world politics and of that island nation's bid for hegemony in 
the Far East. The geography of decreasing distances among 
the nations of the world and the not unrelated expansion of 
European politics into world politics thus combined to bring 
Southeast Asia closer to the threshold of conflict in modern 
international relations. It did not, however, bring it quite 
over that threshold. 
The factor which has accomplished this more than any other 
has been the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet 
Union in the years since the end of the Second World War. 
This rivalry has taken the form, among several others, of a 
competition for control of all areas of the world which have 
not committed themselves in this titanic struggle of the mid-
twentieth century. Wherever a power vacuum has existed in 
the postwar years, these two nations have sought to fill it. Such 
was the case in Central Europe, as it was in Korea. It explains 
the ever-increasing attention which is focused today on the 
Middle East. Greece was a player in the drama in the early 
postwar years, and Africa would appear slated for a larger role 
in the years which lie ahead. 
The nationalist revolutions of the postwar years which cata-
pulted European colonialism out of Southeast Asia left a 
vacuum in the wake of the Western withdrawal. As the cold 
war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. increased in 
intensity in the years after 1945, the importance of Southeast 
Asia in world politics loomed larger. It would appear greater 
today than at any other time in modern history. It is in light 
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of its role as a "battlefield" in the Western-Communist conflict 
that its continuing divisions and its economic backwardness are 
to be appraised. China's nearness and historic pattern of dom-
ination of Southeast Asia, coupled with Peiping's present part-
nership with Moscow, only serve to intensify the complexity of 
the problems faced by the new nations of this part of the 
world. ·whether it likes it or not, and the so-called "neutralist" 
foreign policies of some of its states would seem to indicate it 
does not, Southeast Asia is today very much a part of the 
world about it. 
The world has come to Southeast Asia in yet another sense. 
Not only is this region of the world of increased importance in 
modern international politics, it has itself become "modern" in 
the sense that it is trying desperately to catch up with the world 
politically, economically, and socially. It is still a backward 
area, but the desire to transform itself has become strong. 
Democracy may not reign in Southeast Asia, but modern West-
ern political forms and ideas are at work in the region. The 
sultans and other old hereditary rulers are passing from the 
scene; they are being succeeded by the organizational structure 
of the European political units-prime ministers, parliaments, 
foreign offices, bureaus of the budget, labor arbitration boards, 
and all. Industrialization is invading the area, although on a 
modest scale, while state planning has captured the imagination 
of the region's several national leaders, even though they do 
not always understand the nature of their captor. Socially, 
class lines are shifting as a result of the new mobility, physical 
and otherwise, introduced by the West. Southeast Asia is today 
undergoing a vast and varied revolution in behalf of modern-
ization, of which the nationalist political revolt is the most 
conspicuous but by no means the exclusive symptom. This 
revolution cannot help but distinguish the Southeast Asia of 
the present from the Southeast Asia of the past. 
One thing is clear above all others in contemporary Southeast 
Asia: important changes are taking place. At the same time, 
much of the old pattern persists, so that today the region repre-
sents a combination of the traditional and the new. What kind 
of adjustment will result from the final union of the two will 
Southeast Asia 13 
not depend only on Southeast Asia itself. Too many external 
influences are today converging on the area. One of the costs 
of involvement in world politics is the impact international 
relations inevitably have on domestic affairs. This fact South-
east Asia is today learning-in some respects rather reluctantly. 
If external developments have effects on domestic politics 
in contemporary Southeast Asia, so also domestic Southeast 
Asian developments are producing reactions, some of them 
significant, on the international scene. The internal struggle 
for power in Vietnam, for instance, is carefully watched by 
Americans, Russians, and Chinese, as well as others. 
Surely, in the light of such circumstances, there can be little 
doubt that Southeast Asia today is very much a part of the 
world about it-and of the conflicts and tensions which dis-
tinguish that world. 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
Culturally the countries of Southeast Asia have many things 
in common. A majority of the inhabitants of all the lands of 
the region possess a primitive belief in animism and spiritism. 
Everywhere are to be found cultural practices and devices 
derived from the extensively felt Indian and Western social 
impacts. The entire region, moreover, is today marked by the 
disintegration of village life and the eclipse of the traditional 
social system associated with it. Wet rice agriculture is a major 
economic factor in every country of Southeast Asia. Similar 
types of food, housing, and dress, as well as almost identical 
forms of art, entertainment, and games, distinguish the several 
lands of this part of the world. 
Southeast Asia, however, also is marked by considerable 
cultural diversity. Linguistically the area is possessed of nearly 
four hundred different languages and dialects. Ethnically its 
wide variety of human species range from pygmy negritos, to 
tall, graceful brown peoples of mixed Caucasoid-Mongoloid 
stock, to virtually pure Mongoloids. Although an all-pervading 
belief in animism and spiritism seemingly lends Southeast Asia 
a large degree of unity, the region is at the same time marked 
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by four major organized religions which divide it in a far 
more decisive fashion than its common pagan practices unite 
it. While most of Southeast Asia bears the imprint of Indian 
cultural penetration, the nature of this legacy varies from place 
to place. Chinese cultural influence, for example, clearly pre-
dominates in Vietnam. Most of the area also has experienced 
the impact of Western social forces. As there is a difference 
between the British and French cultures, so, too, is there a 
difference between the imprints these cultures have left upon 
other lands. Differences among Southeast Asians of language, 
race, and religion, as well as those deriving from distinct re-
sponses to Indian, Western, and Chinese cultural forces, are 
further sharpened by the several nationalisms of the area, 
which tend to exalt the uniqueness of native culture and history. 
Southeast Asia has been described as an ethnographic mu-
seum, and probably no more fitting analogy could be offered 
to describe the complex pattern of peoples who reside in this 
region of the world. There is a relative ethnic unity among 
the inhabitants of insular Southeast Asia-Indonesia, the Phil-
ippines, and British Borneo-who are mainly of Malay or Indo-
nesian stock. For this reason, enduring racial antagonisms are 
least likely to develop in this part of the area. The native 
population of Malaya is part of this same ethnic grouping, but 
the presence of more Chinese than Malays on Malayan soil, 
including Singapore with Malaya, is sufficient reason for not 
placing these territories in the same category with Indonesia 
and the Philippines. 
The Malays and the closely related Indonesians are sharply 
differentiated from the peoples who populate the greater part 
of mainland Southeast Asia. More Mongoloid in their physical 
traits, the inhabitants of the mainland represent a later migra-
tory invasion of the region by a series of distinct groups who 
have retained their separate ethnic identity through the years 
with the help of the mountain ranges which divide them from 
one another. After their arrival in Southeast Asia many cen-
turies ago, these peoples formed and maintained separate 
pockets of settlement along the various river valleys of the 
Southeast Asian peninsula. Although there are various mix-
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tures of these main migratory groups in Southeast Asia today, 
the groups themselves remain as distinct ethnic concentrations, 
comprising the Thai, Vietnamese, Burmese, and Cambodian 
peoples. 
That ethnic differentiation is a divisive factor socially in 
present-day Southeast Asia is evident from the nationalism-
inspired pride of race which marks this part of the world. 
While racial antagonisms between the several countries of the 
area are not yet apparent, serious ethnic friction has broken 
out within almost all of the Southeast Asian lands. Burma, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines, for example, are today faced 
with serious sociopolitical problems deriving specifically from 
internal ethnic rivalries. It is difficult to envisage the pride 
of race presently marking the peoples of Southeast Asia encour-
aging closer relations among them in the near future. 
If Southeast Asia is a veritable museum as regards its ethnic 
diversity, it presents an even more complex pattern linguisti-
cally. Of the two, its linguistic diversity is the more important. 
Although it is of little consequence if men differ ethnically-
unless their ethnic groups possess diverse cultural character-
istics or men themselves think them of consequence-it is 
important if they do not speak the same language. In Southeast 
Asia they do not. 
The least complex lands of the area, from a linguistic as 
well as an ethnic point of view, are clearly the island countries, 
demonstrating again the unifying effect of insularity. None-
theless, more than 87 different languages and dialects are 
spoken in the Philippines, while some 30 languages and 250 
dialects are identifiable in Indonesia. Vietnamese, Thai, Bur-
mese, and Cambodian are the main languages to be found in 
mainland Southeast Asia, but several minor tongues also exist. 
The major languages are quite separate tongues, although they 
have interacted considerably upon one another in the past. 
The important fact, however, is that the peoples speaking these 
various languages do not understand one another. Nor does 
proficiency in Vietnamese, for example, lead to easy mastery 
of Burmese-as French does to Italian, or Dutch to German. 
Religion also divides Southeast Asia. Burma, Thailand, 
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Cambodia, and Laos adhere to Buddhism of the Hinayana (or 
Little Vehicle) School. Most of Indonesia, Malaya, and penin-
sular Thailand are Moslem, as are some islands in the Philip-
pines. The ranking faith of the Philippines, however, is 
Christianity, which also is the religion of significant groups 
of peoples in Indonesia. The religion of Vietnam represents 
the curious Chinese scrambling of Confucianism, Mahayana 
(or Greater Vehicle) Buddhism, and Taoism, the result of 
which appears to be a species of ancestor worship more than 
anything else. The Chinese themselves practice their own 
version of this blended faith, while Hinduism survives in an 
attractive form on the Indonesian island of Bali. 
While overtly offering primary allegiance to Christ, Mo-
hammed, Buddha, or Confucius, the mass of Southeast Asians 
are animists and ancestor worshipers basically. Christianity, 
Islam, and Buddhism are in a sense only new names for old 
ways of looking at life. What the Southeast Asian has done in 
the case of these imported religions is to adopt the form of the 
new faith and use it as a sort of window dressing for his age-old 
views about the world of seen and unseen things. 
Yet the form of the Southeast Asian's faith is extremely im-
portant. While Indonesians and Malays regularize a large por-
tion of their lives according to pagan concepts of spiritism, 
ancestor worship, and magic, they also regard themselves as 
devout Moslems. Thailand's Buddhists, as well as those of 
Burma, Cambodia, and Laos, may be thoroughgoing animists, 
but they think they are good Buddhists. The Philippines' 
Catholics, though they are basically animistic, consider them-
selves as highly orthodox followers of the faith of Rome. The 
claim that Islam, Buddhism, and Catholicism are of only sec-
ondary importance religiously in this part of the world today is 
one of the most misleading of the many myths about spiritual 
Southeast Asia. Most of Southeast Asia's people serve two 
masters. While the doctrinaire doubtlessly would not regard 
them as real Moslems, Christians, or Buddhists because of their 
simultaneous attachment to rival pagan practices, they never-
theless see themselves as devoted followers of their organized 
faiths. And what men think they are can be just as divisive 
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as what they really are. Moreover, since nationalism puts such 
great pride in a country's spiritual heritage and so much of 
Southeast Asia's spiritual heritage concerns its organized re-
ligions, these have gained in stature in the recent years of 
rabid nationalism in the area. 
INDIAN AND WESTERN SOCIAL IMP ACTS 
The common experience of the Indian cultural impact was 
one of the most important events in Southeast Asia. As a 
result of more than a thousand years of Indian cultural dom-
inance, the cultures of these several lands resemble one another 
in a multiplicity of ways. This :r ~semblance, on the other hand, 
is far from a complete one. Most of Vietnam never fell within 
the cultural sphere of India, being influenced instead by China, 
while Thailand and the Philippines were Hinduized mainly 
by non-Indian peoples, who had themselves, however, felt the 
direct impact of cultural contact with India. Moreover, al-
though Indian cultural influences gave the region a consider-
able degree of social unity, they served at the same time to 
differentiate key areas of it. Although Buddhism and Islam 
were both carried to Southeast Asia by Indians, they are, none-
theless, quite different creeds and so a divisive influence in 
the region. 
More important today than India's influence is the impact 
of the vVest. Each of the lands of Southeast Asia came under 
varying degrees of Western cultural as well as political and 
economic influence. However, Western influence was not 
everywhere the same. Despite the broad designation of "the 
West," Europe and North America themselves represent much 
in the way of cultural divergencies, language being only one 
example of their several differences. Since the Western coun-
tries are differentiated and since they impinged upon the even 
more strongly differentiated countries of Southeast Asia in 
different ways, at different times, and to different degrees, it 
was only natural that they should have further divided the 
peoples of Southeast Asia culturally. 
The languages in which the European colonial powers trans-
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mitted their cultural influences were different, and the insti-
tutional and administrative forms which they introduced varied 
from country to country. The political boundaries they estab-
lished cut across oldtime contacts, and the orientation of the 
peoples of the colonial lands became focused primarily upon 
different metropolitan powers: Burmese and Malays upon 
Britain, Indochinese upon France, Indonesians upon the N eth-
er lands, and Filipinos first upon Spain and then upon the 
United States. The ideological motivation of their colonial 
undertakings also varied among the imperial powers. France 
and Spain thought of colonies as devices for cultural expan-
sionism as well as in terms of trade and political power. The 
Dutch, on the other hand, were traders first and foremost; 
their cultural impact on Indonesia, not surprisingly, was less 
imposing than that of Spain on the Philippines or France on 
Indochina. Finally, for those people affected by European 
influences, the very contact itself with the West made them 
more aware of the outside world and, as a result, more con-
scious of their own identity and the distinctness of their culture 
-a tendency further encouraged by nationalism. 
On the whole, although most of Southeast Asia has felt the 
impact of Western cultural influences, the result thus far of 
this experience would appear to be more divisive than unify-
ing. The peoples of Southeast Asia have derived common 
material devices from this experience, village life has almost 
everywhere been disrupted, and similar ideas have made their 
way into all the lands of the area. Yet the most important 
ideological force contributed by Europe, that of nationalism, 
is probably the most singularly disunifying factor operative in 
Southeast Asia today. 
Southeast Asia today is a culturally divided region. Although 
social differentiation has marked its several parts throughout 
recorded times, this differentiation seems greater in many ways 
today than ever before, partially as a consequence of such 
events as the Hindu and Western cultural intrusions. This is 
important because of the roots political behavior has in cultural 
considerations. These are by no means all determining, but 
they are influential. Before the new nation . states of this part 
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of the world draw closer together politically- before introver-
sion is eliminated from their political and economic policies-
cultural horizons will have to be broadened. They are being 
broadened in many respects at the present time, but they are 
simultaneously being narrowed in other respects. Except as 
a consequence of major crisis or through external action, any 
political drawing together of the Southeast Asian peoples 
would seem to have to be preceded, or at least accompanied, 
by greater social or cultural cohesiveness among them. Unfor-
tunately, no such cultural rapprochement seems likely in the 
near future. Cultural divisions-and, partially because of them, 
political divisions-continue to characterize the several lands 
of Southeast Asia. Such divisions may well prove to be 
twentieth-century Southeast Asia's undoing. Comparable con-
ditions have caused the region's downfall in the past. 
ECONOMIC INADEQUACY 
Southeast Asia has been variously described as a rich region-
and a poor one. It all depends on the type of yardstick used. 
If one looks at the area's natural resources, which are consider-
able, Southeast Asia can be termed an area of much wealth. 
However, if attention is focused on the standard of living of 
the masses of humanity who inhabit the region, it is obvious 
that Southeast Asia is marked by widespread poverty. It is not 
that there are pockets of poverty to be found in every part of 
the area, but that the overwhelming proportion of Southeast 
Asia's peoples-not just a minority-live at a low level of sub-
sistence. The annual average family income for the region 
was only $55 in 1950. This low level of subsistence, however, 
still is relatively high in comparison with the rest of Asia. 
Compared with their neighbors the peoples of this part of the 
world eat and live quite well. 
The seeming economic paradox of Southeast Asia's con-
siderable natural resources and the low living standard of its 
peoples has produced much talk of "poverty amidst plenty." 
This would be an accurate enough analysis, if material resources 
were the only criterion in measuring an area's economic wealth. 
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They are not. Other factors also contribute to an area's eco-
nomic wealth, and many of these-for example, capital and 
technical ability-are sadly lacking in present-day Southeast 
Asia. The region's economic wealth at the present time is 
largely limited to its natural resources. 
These resources include most of the world's natural rub-
ber, tin, and hemp. Rice dominates agricultural production 
throughout the area and is a major export commodity. Copra, 
sugar, petroleum, tea, quinine, tungsten, manganese, teakwood, 
kapok, coffee, and pepper are among Southeast Asia's other 
major products. Prior to the Second World 'Var the area, then 
still under colonial rule, was of considerable economic im-
portance to the several European metropolitan powers, as indi-
cated by the scope of its exports. Burma, Thailand, and Indo-
china annually exported 6,000,000 tons of milled rice. In 1940, 
Southeast Asia grew 20 percent of all the rice grown in Asia 
and contributed more than two-thirds of all the rice entering 
world trade. Malaya and Indonesia sent about 800,000 tons of 
rubber a year into international commercial channels. From 
Burma and Indonesia 8,500,000 tons of crude petroleum were 
exported annually; from Malaya, Indonesia, and Thailand, 
90,000 metric tons of tin concentrates; and from Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Malaya, 1,600,000 tons of copra.3 
The products of Southeast Asia in the years both before and 
after World War II have been primarily agricultural or mineral. 
The area is not yet able to meet its own needs for various 
manufactured goods, being still in an early stage of industrial 
growth. This is partly due to the direction of its economic 
development as formulated during the period of Western 
colonial rule. It also is due, among other factors, to the area's 
limited coal and iron-ore resources. These two minerals were a 
backbone of European and North American industrial growth, 
and their limited occurrence in Southeast Asia is one of the 
reasons why the West did not make more of an effort to 
industrialize the area, as well as a good reason why Southeast 
3 See Frank N. Trager, "Problems of Economic Development in Southeast 
Asia," journal of International Affairs, X (1956), 60. 
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Asia's own efforts at industrialization must be limited in the 
immediate future. 
The coming of the European wrought great economic 
changes in Southeast Asia. Prior to the advent of the West, 
Southeast Asia had been marked by an economic system com-
bining subsistence agriculture with cottage industries and 
limited barter. This system was disrupted by the impact of 
Western economic imperialism. Rubber, tin, and other South-
east Asian products became the raw materials for the industries 
of the West. Sugar, coffee, tea, and other items left the region 
to meet the expanding needs of growing overseas populations. 
New products from the West invaded the area, changing the 
cultural as well as the economic life of the Southeast Asians who 
came into contact with them. A money economy was introduced 
by the Europeans. Because of the emphasis placed by the 
colonial powers on the development of agricultural and mineral 
products, Southeast Asia became highly dependent upon the 
fluctuating economic needs of distant overseas nations. These 
nations lent considerable instability to Southeast Asian life, for 
Southeast Asia had no control over the overseas demands for 
its products. 
The economic personality of Southeast Asia has not changed 
in essentials with the replacement of European colonial rule by 
the new national governments. Native governments increasingly 
direct the economic affairs of the several Southeast Asian lands, 
but although this has generally meant economic development 
by state planning rather than by foreign commercial concerns, 
it has not changed the character of Southeast Asia's primary 
reliance on the export of its agricultural and mineral products. 
The dangerous dependence of the Southeast Asian lands upon 
foreign demands for its products was amply illustrated by the 
boom in raw material prices occasioned by the Korean War-
and the subsequent rapid decline in the prices offered for these 
products. Rubber, for example, dropped from about 80 cents 
a pound in late 1950 to about 30 cents in mid-1952, quite a fall 
in price in less than two years. Copra, as another illustration, 
dropped from $261.50 per ton in March, 1951, to $112 a ton 
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in the middle of 1952, a period of little more than a year.4 
This has made it difficult for governments and individuals 
alike to plan on the economic resources available to them. This 
has been especially so in Southeast Asia, so highly dependent 
on its exports of raw materials and the import of various capital 
and consumer goods. If world prices drop and no loans or 
grants are made to a country so reliant on international price 
levels, obvious contractions in foreign purchases must follow-
even though such contractions mean reducing the already low 
living standards of the masses. 
The living standards of today's Southeast Asians, however, 
are not the only ones to be affected by such foreign-purchase 
contractions. The lives of tomorrow's Southeast Asians also are 
affected. Most of the leaders of contemporary Southeast Asia 
are cognizant of the dangers inherent in their nation's heavy 
reliance on world prices for primary products. They are seeking 
the rapid industrialization of their lands in order to remedy 
this situation as quickly as possible. Although their efforts have 
been halting to date, their plans remain ambitious. But they 
need capital goods, or heavy equipment, to achieve their eco-
nomic objectives. These must come from abroad, and all sorts 
of obstacles have greeted the efforts of Southeast Asian leaders 
to obtain such necessary capital equipment. The post-Korean-
War fall in international commodity prices has made it difficult 
for Southeast Asian governments to pay for such capital goods 
themselves. At times when they have had the money, as during 
the Korean War boom, these goods were not always available, 
and so the money was spent in other ways, not always wisely. 
Plans nevertheless are going forward for the diversification of 
Southeast Asian economic life, and definite progress has been 
registered. The road ahead, however, is still a long one. 
Foreign economic assistance, both private and governmental, 
has been, and probably will continue to be, of considerable 
help to the Southeast Asian countries in hastening their eco-
nomic advancement. There are signs that the leaders of this 
area are today better disposed towards accepting foreign aid 
4 Frederick T. Koyle, in Philip W. Thayer (ed.), Southeast Asia in the Coming 
World (Baltimore, 1953), 119. 
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than in earlier periods of their newly won national indepen-
dence. As a consequence of the long era of Western imperial 
rule, the leaders of the new Southeast Asian states have been 
fearful of economic assistance as a means of reasserting old 
controls over their countries. Both Burma and Indonesia have 
recently displayed new interest in United States economic 
assistance, however-an indication, perhaps, of emergent polit-
ical self-assurance. At the same time, the Soviet Union has 
moved into the picture as a major broker of foreign economic 
aid, a development which could prove most unfortunate to 
Southeast Asia's plans for the future in light of Moscow's known 
general policy objectives. 
The economic backwardness of Southeast Asia was one of the 
conditions which made Western domination of the area pos-
sible. The Southeast Asia of today has come a long way from 
the Southeast Asia of the days of the first European arrivals. 
But so, too, have Europe, North America-and Russia. South-
east Asia's continued dangerous reliance on foreign purchases 
of its products and its crying need for capital to effect a change 
in this situation both afford excellent opportunities for the 
extension of foreign control over these countries. It may well 
be that Southeast Asia does not possess sufficient economic 
strength for independent political survival-except at the suf-
ferance of the big powers or because of rivalries among these 
powers. It may also be that new developments in the fields of 
energy and matter will enable Southeast Asia to achieve this 
economic strength-for the first time in its history. 
CHAPTER 2 
INDONESIA 
Restless Insular Empire 
THE INDONESIAN NATION is the product of the more than 
three centuries of Dutch rule which was terminated by the 
transfer of sovereighty to the new state on December 27, 1949. 
Nationalism was, of course, bound to come to the peoples of 
the region, but under other circumstances it might have been 
Javanese, Sumatranese, or other island or island-group nation-
alism. Such feeling of unity as now exists among the varied 
peoples of the insular state has in large part come about as 
the result of the long period of common Dutch administration. 
For their population and resources the Dutch had an enor-
mous colonial task which at times appeared beyond their 
strength. At the time of Pearl Harbor the Netherlands had 
an area of 12,850 square miles and a population of over 
9,000,000; it governed an overseas territory in Southeast Asia 
of 733,000 square miles with a population approaching 
70,000,000. There were Netherlanders in the last years of the 
nineteenth century who advocated giving up some of the islands 
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of the East Indies on the ground that to administer them was 
too costly. 
The Dutch first went to the East Indies in 1595 as traders 
sent out by a large number of companies. The disadvantages 
of this unrestricted competition were so great that the States 
General in 1602 incorporated the East Indies traders in the 
United East India Company and conferred upon it divers rights 
of monopoly and sovereignty. The company's charter gave it 
a monopoly against all Netherlanders, but it had to compete 
with other European traders. This problem led the company 
involuntarily to shift from a commercial to a territorial basis, 
because it discovered that it could not trade unless it also 
governed. It took the forts and factories of its rivals, the 
Portuguese and Spanish, but found in time that this was not 
enough. Because of the chronic warfare among the native 
peoples, the company was led to a steadily deepening penetra-
tion. The East India Company was taken over by the Nether-
lands government in 1798, but even then the authority of the 
Dutch had not yet been thoroughly established everywhere in 
the archipelago. Indeed, it was to be another century and more 
before the whole region was brought under Dutch control. 
The Dutch government had deliberately abstained from pen-
etrating with its administration all of the territory it claimed, 
but because of the imperialist pressure at the end of the nine-
teenth century, an extension of effective administration to the 
whole territory of the dependency could no longer be delayed. 
In certain areas the Dutch effort to intensify their administra-
tion encountered bitter hostility. The pacification of some of 
these peoples required many years and was costly in men and 
money. This was especially true in the case of the Achinese, an 
ethnic group inhabiting the northern part of the island of 
Sumatra. Their geographic position at the northern entrance 
to the Malacca Straits made their piratical activities exception-
ally dangerous and might easily have caused international 
complications. Fanatically Moslem in faith, these people re-
sented the penetration of Western influences. In 1953 these 
same people rebelled against the Indonesian government. 
The effects of this tardy extension of governmental admin-
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istration to the remote parts of the archipelago can be seen 
today. It has given the Indonesian government considerable 
trouble in the form of local unrest and armed insurrection. 
The many different peoples of the archipelago had not reached 
the same stage of development when the Dutch came upon the 
scene, and the character of Dutch rule was not such as to reduce 
the differences much. The Dutch avoided the introduction of 
direct rule as much as possible, leaving the inhabitants under 
their sultans or the semihereditary regents and allowing them 
to continue under their local customary law. This policy of 
protecting the native customs and institutions tended to retard 
the cultural unification of the scores of ethnic groups which 
composed the population of the dependency. According to the 
1930 census, there were nearly fifty ethnic groups, most of them 
with their own separate language. The Javanese, with nearly 
half of the total population, constituted the largest group. The 
Sundanese were next, with about 14 percent, followed by the 
Madurese with 7 percent. 
The Dutch were also slow in developing educational facilities 
for the Indonesians. Closely related to their general policy of 
respecting native customs and institutions was that of differen-
tiation in accordance with need in the field of education. This 
led to a great variety of schools to meet the supposedly peculiar 
needs of the various population groups-folk and standard 
schools, Dutch-Indonesian and Dutch-Chinese and Link or 
connecting schools-while all higher education was Western, 
with Dutch as the medium of instruction. The Dutch were 
determined that all Western education should maintain the 
same standards as similar education in the Nether lands; as a 
result, many non-Dutch students quickly dropped out. More-
over, this variety of schools did not help to merge the different 
ethnic groups into a nation; rather it tended to keep them apart. 
The Indonesian educational system was thus complicated and 
the facilities were limited. In all of Indonesia there were fewer 
than 2,000 college and university students on the eve of Pearl 
Harbor. The Philippines with about one-fourth of the popula-
tion of Indonesia had more than four times as many young 
people pursuing higher education, though the standards were 
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considerably lower. Thus the young Indonesian Republic 
began its independent existence with a dearth of educated 
persons for positions of leadership. 
The situation with respect to government was similar. Stand-
ards of public administration were exceptionally high, but few 
Indonesians were found in the higher positions of government. 
Representative bodies had not yet been granted wide powers, 
and Europeans held membership in them far out of proportion 
to their numbers in the population. The Indies Civil Service 
was composed of a body of highly selected and well-trained per-
sons, who until the last two decades could carry on their work 
free from political interference and the pressure of public 
opinion. Within the limits of the system they acquitted them-
selves well. But the system did not develop a democratic 
society or government. At the time of the fall of the country 
to Japan no Indonesian had yet been appointed to the gover-
norship of a province and only one to a headship of a depart-
ment of the central government. 
The first representative body for the whole of the Indies, 
called the Volksraad, was established in 1917. During the first 
decade of its existence it had only advisory powers. After 1927 
it enjoyed colegislative powers; that is, its approval was neces-
sary for all legislation with the exception of emergency meas-
ures. Though the number of Nether landers in the Indies con-
stituted less than one percent of the population, nearly one-half 
of the seats of the Volksraad were reserved for them. In the 
provincial councils the membership was distributed in about 
the same way, but in the regency councils the Indonesians pre-
dominated. The urban councils were dominated by Europeans. 
The provincial and regency councils had functioned for only 
about a decade before the Japanese invasion. Thus when the 
Indonesians upon the capitulation of Japan in 1945 determined 
to take over the reins of government, they had had little experi-
ence in administration. 
It is generally assumed that Indonesia received a bitter and 
meager heritage from the long years of Dutch rule. While the 
inheritance was poor on the educational, administrative, and 
political side, it was good in at least three respects. In many 
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other dependencies foreigners acquired ownership of much of 
the land, which is about the only form of wealth in under-
developed countries, but Indonesia began its independence 
with no such handicap. Under the provisions of the Nether-
lands Indies' Government Act only indigenous persons could 
own land; thus the natives could not sell their land to foreign-
ers. Not even Indo-Europeans or Indo-Chinese, though their 
families had been residents of the country for many generations, 
could acquire ownership of agricultural land. The Indonesian 
Republic took over its national estate without a heavy mortgage 
on it by foreigners. 
Secondly, the Indies government owned and operated most 
of the public utilities and in addition engaged in a wide range 
of economic activities. It owned and operated pawnshops, rail-
roads, telephone and telegraph services, tramcars, bus lines, 
gold, silver, and coal mines, teak forests, and large cinchona, 
rubber, tea, and guttapercha plantations. In some years as 
much as 30 percent of the total revenue of the government came 
from this source. The government itself exploited the tin 
mines of Banka purely for profit-making purposes. The gov-
ernment was also part owner of corporations which exploited 
some of the richest oil fields in the country. The new state of 
Indonesia fell heir to all of these assets. 
Thirdly, the Dutch followed a policy of the open door with 
respect to the external trade of the Indies. Dutch goods re-
ceived no tariff preference over goods coming into the Indies 
from other countries. While the Indies' economy was "colonial" 
in that it produced chiefly primary commodities, it was not 
heavily dependent upon the market of a single foreign country, 
as was the case of its neighbor the Philippines, where an abrupt 
imposition of the full American tariff would have produced 
serious economic trouble. Indonesia had no such readjustment 
problem. 
THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE 
When the Dutch sought to return to the Indies after the 
capitulation of Japan in 1945, they were astonished and dis-
mayed at the fierceness of the Indonesian nationalism they 
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encountered. On the eve of "\Vorld War II the Indonesian 
nationalist movement was relatively mild and immature and 
seemingly under control. The forces and events which wrought 
the transformation are not yet completely known. 
The Netherlands was overrun by the Germans in May, 1940, 
and Queen Wilhelmina and her ministers fled to London, 
where they set up a government in exile. Thus abruptly cut 
off from the Netherlands, society in the Indies, Dutch as well 
as Indonesian, underwent a change. Nearly every aspect of life 
became more autonomous. Both Dutch and Indonesians felt 
their stature increased and became more assertive. The war 
had created a strong demand for the products (oil, rubber, 
tin, bauxite) of Indonesia, and as a result the economic position 
of the country was strong. The Dutch in Indonesia desired 
greater autonomy from the mother country, and the Indo-
nesians demanded political reforms which would make Indo-
nesia a parliamentary democracy with "dominion" status. These 
requests were made by moderate nationalists, and had the 
Dutch government dealt with them more constructively in the 
short time remaining before the Japanese invasion, the post-
war story might have been somewhat different. But the Dutch 
government in exile replied to all demands for political reforms 
that it could do nothing without consulting the Dutch nation, 
and that was now impossible because of the German occupation. 
Its only promise was that an imperial conference would be 
called after the war to consider constitutional reforms. This 
negative attitude disillusioned and embittered the moderate 
nationalists and tended to drive them into the camp of the 
irreconcilables. 
The three and one-half years of Japanese occupation most 
profoundly changed the Indonesian attitude and aroused the 
national consciousness to the fighting pitch. In the rapid con-
quest of the region by the Japanese the West suffered such a 
loss of prestige that v\T estern rule could never again be restored 
on anything like the old basis. The Dutch in Indonesia were 
treated by the Japanese in such a manner as to humiliate them 
before the Indonesians. "Asia for the Asians" propaganda fell 
in fertile soil, and the general idea could never be uprooted. 
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The top Dutch officials were replaced by Japanese, but the 
latter, being wholly ignorant of the local situation and con-
ditions, had to allow the Indonesian subordinates in effect to 
run the government offices. \Vhen in 1944 the Japanese leaders 
became alarmed at the American advance in the Pacific, they 
decided that their position in Southeast Asia had to be strength-
ened, and to secure the cooperation of the Indonesians, they 
promised them national independence. From that time on, 
more Indonesians were admitted to positions in the govern-
ment, including those in the top ranks. Many of these new 
officials were young men who had been especially trained in 
various Japanese youth and military organizations and were 
fanatic nationalists. After the capitulation some Japanese of-
ficers allowed the nationalists to seize stores of arms. 
The Netherlands had been completely liberated only a few 
months before the capitulation of Japan; hence the Dutch gov-
ernment was hardly prepared to meet the problems in its huge 
dependency on the other side of the world. The Indonesian 
nationalists, encouraged by the Japanese, used their opportuni-
ties and time well. A week before the surrender, Sukarno and 
Hatta were summoned by the commander in chief of the 
Japanese armies in Southeast Asia to fly to Saigon to confer 
about an immediate proclamation of Indonesian independence. 
Within a few days the Indonesian leaders returned to Batavia 
(Djakarta), and on August 17, 1945, independence was pro-
claimed. The Indonesian nationalists still had six weeks of 
unhampered freedom in which to consolidate their position. 
Not until September 29 did the British arrive with a small force 
to disarm and repatriate the Japanese troops. 
The Dutch government was prepared to grant Indonesia a 
large amount of autonomy within an imperial union, but the 
representatives of the newly proclaimed republic demanded 
recognition as a sovereign state, after which, they declared, they 
would be willing to accept close political relations with the 
Netherlands with cooperation in many fields. After three years 
of intermittent negotiations, with two "police actions" by Dutch 
armed forces, followed each time by United Nations' interven-
tion, an agreement was finally reached at a Round Table Con-
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ference at The Hague in November, 1949. On December 27, 
1949, sovereignty was transferred to the United States of Indo-
nesia. The two sovereign states agreed to enter a Netherlands-
Indonesian Union for "organized cooperation" in the fields of 
foreign relations, defense, and financial, economic, and cultural 
relations. The chief organ of the union was to be a conference 
of ministers, three designated by each member, meeting at least 
twice a year. The Union Statute also contained a vague pro-
vision for discussion between representatives of the parliaments 
in order "to effectuate good contact and regular cooperation" 
between the national representative bodies of the "partners." 
A court of arbitration composed of six members, three ap-
pointed by each government, was to have jurisdiction over 
legal disputes which might arise between them. Queen Juliana, 
and in case of death her successors, was named head of the 
un10n. 
SH;ORT-LIVED FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
The heart of the nationalist revolution was located in Java and 
in certain areas of Sumatra. These territories constituted the 
core of the 1945 Republic, which the Dutch could not crack 
even though they penetrated them deeply in their "police 
actions." Outside of Java and Sumatra the Dutch had little 
difficulty in reestablishing their authority, and there they pro-
ceeded to organize states with plans to unite them in a federal 
structure. The Republicans felt that the "Federalists" were 
pro-Dutch, not true patriots, and there was considerable hos-
tility between them. But when the Rum-Van Royen agreement, 
signed on May 7, 1949, made it clear that the Netherlands was 
about ready to grant Indonesian independence, representatives 
of the nationalist republic and of the Federal Consultative As-
sembly met in an inter-Indonesian conference during July and 
August to determine the main outlines of the provisional con-
stitution for Indonesia. The draft of the constitution was 
completed at The Hague during the Round Table Conference 
(August 23 to November 2, 1949). The Dutch were merely 
informed that the Federalists and Republicans had agreed on 
a constitution and were given a copy of the text. 
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The title assumed by the former Dutch dependency was 
"Republic of the United States of Indonesia," and the first 
article declared it to be "a democratic state of federal structure." 
The position of the nationalist Republic of Indonesia in the 
federation was somewhat like that of Prussia in the German 
Empire. The republic had over 40 percent of the population 
of the country, and Sukarno and Hatta, respectively its presi-
dent and vice president, were chosen to fill the same offices in 
the federal republic. The parliament was composed of a senate 
and a house of representatives. The former had a membership 
of 32, two from each of the 16 states and "units." The house 
had a membership of 150, with one-third of the number re-
served for the nationalist Republic of Indonesia. Nine, six and 
three members were guaranteed the Chinese, European, and 
Arab minority groups respectively, either by election or appoint-
ment. The members of the first and only federal parliament 
were not popularly elected; they were delegated by their state 
governments. The government set up by the provisional con-
stitution was a parliamentary system, but one in which the head 
of the state, the president, had far more power than is generally 
found in this type of political organization. 
It is impossible to know whether the Republicans ever 
intended to give the federal government a real trial, for the 
movement to dismantle it began immediately after the transfer 
of sovereignty. The opposition to the federal system was pow-
erfully aided by the attack on Bandung on January 22 by a 
rebel force under the leadership of a Dutch adventurer by 
the name of Captain Raymond ("Turk") Westerling. Accord-
ing to the Indonesian government's report, the force contained 
or was assisted by a number of soldiers and officers of the 
Netherlands and Netherlands Indies army. Members of this 
force later infiltrated into Djakarta, the capital, apparently with 
the object of overthrowing the government. Shortly thereafter, 
Sultan Hamid II of West Borneo, a leader among the Fed-
eralists and a member of the cabinet, was arrested as the master-
mind behind the plot. Westerling escaped to Singapore on a 
Dutch military plane. This affair fanned anti-Dutch sentiment 
and helped to discredit the federal system, which was largely 
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regarded as originally an invention of the Dutch "to divide 
and rule" and, even after independence, was looked upon as 
tainted with colonialism. The old federal states collapsed under 
hostile attacks, chiefly in the form of organized popular dem-
onstrations. The federal system was not given a decent legal 
or constitutional burial; it was just abandoned. 
A number of reasons were advanced to justify this action. 
It was asserted that the federal system was too costly, that it 
required a far larger experienced and trained personnel than 
Indonesia possessed, that the territories of the "states" and 
"units" were poorly drawn, and that the populations of the 
"units" were grossly unequal. It is certainly true that the 
federal structure as set up in the constitution had many weak-
nesses and defects, but it is difficult to escape the conclusion 
that the chief motivating force for its destruction was psycho-
logical. 
The Republican leaders felt that they had been deprived of 
a complete victory by being compelled by force of circum-
stances to go to The Hague and negotiate a settlement. The 
federal constitution was a symbol of that failure of complete 
triumph, and it had to go. Later the Netherlands-Indonesian 
Union had to go for much the same reason. All this is under-
standable but nevertheless unfortunate. For months the gov-
ernment was paralyzed when much needed to be done quickly. 
Moreover, it was a poor beginning in establishing a democratic 
government; the federal system was destroyed by undemocratic 
means in violation of the constitution. Events were soon to 
demonstrate that another important factor was the matter of 
positions. Most of the offices in the governments of the federal 
states were held by persons regarded by the Republicans as 
cooperators with the Dutch. A quick means of getting the 
"cos," as the cooperators were called, out of all government 
positions and filling them with faithful Republicans was to 
replace the federal with a unitary government. For a country 
with the geographic and ethnic structure of Indonesia, how-
ever, the creation of a highly centralized government was ill 
considered. Dissatisfaction with the centralization of the new 
regime quickly developed. 
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Indonesia as a federal state had only one cabinet. Hatta, 
who was vice president of the state, was also the prime min-
ister. Hatta probably represents the best political leadership 
Indonesia possesses, and he had in his cabinet a number of 
very able men, but his government had to work under ex-
tremely unfavorable conditions. Besides the Hamid-Wester-
ling attempted coup d'etat, it had to deal with disorders and 
an army insurrection which broke out in South Celebes and 
with a rebellion on the island of Ambon, where the people 
proclaimed a Republic of South Moluccas. The latter affair 
was especially unfortunate because it further strained Dutch-
Indonesian relations. The Ambonese were a Dutchified people 
who for generations had furnished large numbers of soldiers 
to the Netherlands Indies army; hence the plight of the Am-
bonese was bound to arouse a certain amount of sympathy 
among Netherlanders even if they did not approve of the 
Ambonese action. Many Indonesians were certain the Dutch 
had instigated the rebellion, or at least encouraged the Ambo-
nese in their defiance of the Indonesian state. 
It was probably foolish for the Dutch to hope that they 
would still be able to play a large and effective role in Indo-
nesia after independence, though the hope was understand-
able. Nether landers had large sums of money invested in the 
country, they had a profound scientific knowledge of every 
aspect of Indonesian life, and in some respects they had 
brought the islands to a remarkable development. Moreover, 
the delegates of Indonesia at The Hague had agreed to take 
over the Dutch civil servants of the former Indies government. 
To the Indonesians, however, all of these things were evil 
vestiges of colonialism, which had to be eradicated as soon as 
possible. The federal system, regarded as a Dutch imposition, 
was the first to go. The Netherlands-Indonesian Union fol-
lowed a few years later. 
In the discussions leading up to the conversion of the federal 
into the unitary state a big question was whether the old 
nationalist republic was swallowing up the federal government 
or a new republic was being formed. Though the change rep-
resented a tremendous psychological triumph for the Repub-
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licans, the new government did not, at least legally, mean the 
annexation of the whole of the country by the 1945 republic, 
for the new provisional constitution was a revision of the 
provisional constitution of the Republic of the United States 
of Indonesia. The outlines of the new constitution, except for 
the federal features, were practically the same as the old. The 
senate was abolished, but its membership was incorporated in 
the new house of representatives. The constitution contained 
a marked social and economic emphasis, but probably no 
greater than other basic political documents drafted since 
World War II. 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE UNITARY SYSTEM 
The provisional constitution of the unitary state went into 
effect on August 17, 1950, the fifth anniversary of the procla-
mation of the original republic, but not until September 6 
was a new cabinet ready to take over the government. Mo-
. hammad Natsir, the leader of the Masjumi (Moslem) party, 
the largest in the parliament, became the new prime minister. 
His cabinet represented a coalition of the Masjumi and a 
number of small parties, of which Sjahrir's Socialist party was 
one of the most important. Not a member of the coalition 
was the Nationalist party, which, after the Masjumi, had the 
largest number of seats in parliament. The general position 
of the N atsir cabinet was one of moderate liberalism. Though 
it was on the whole a strong cabinet, its life was short. It 
resigned March 20, 1951. 
The Natsir cabinet had to struggle with a number of dif-
ficult problems, nearly all of which continued to plague 
succeeding governments. There was first of all Indonesia's 
relations with the Nether lands, including the dispute over 
West New Guinea. The Dutch and Indonesian representatives 
at The Hague had been unable to agree on the disposition of 
this vast jungle area of over 150,000 square miles but with a 
population estimated at less than a million. Indonesians in-
sisted that it be included in their domain, since it was a part 
of the former Netherlands Indies, but the Dutch maintained 
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that this relationship had been only incidental and that the 
territory was not an integral part of Indonesia geographically, 
ethnically, or otherwise. In order to conclude the main busi-
ness of the conference, it was agreed that "the status quo" of 
the territory would be maintained "with the stipulation that 
within a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty . . . the 
question of the political status of New Guinea be determined 
through negotiations" between the parties. This was in effect 
an agreement to continue the disagreement, but with the 
immediate advantage with the Dutch, since the "status quo" 
was that the Nether lands was administering the territory. 
The unwillingness of the Nether lands to surrender the terri-
tory to Indonesia has embittered Indonesian-Dutch relations, 
and led to popular demands for nullification of all the agree-
ments with the Nether lands and even for reprisals against 
the Dutch. 
Other issues which caused the Natsir cabinet political dif-
ficulties were the high cost of living, a ban on strikes and 
lockouts, budget deficits, and the manner of choosing the 
members of local councils until the permanent constitution 
should be adopted. A rash of strikes broke out, threatening 
to paralyze the economic life of the country, and in February, 
1951, the government prohibited strikes and lockouts in essen-
tial industries. This was an issue which the leftists could 
exploit effectively. 
Thirty-seven days after Natsir's resignation, Sukiman of the 
Masjumi and Sidik of the Nationalist party succeeded in form-
ing a coalition government, which took office on April 28. 
Since the cabinet represented a coalition of the two largest 
parties plus a few small parties, it was expected to have strong 
support in parliament. The Sukiman cabinet was regarded as 
conservative. In August it rounded up thousands o( persons 
alleged to be subversive, including sixteen members of parlia-
ment, some for questioning, others for detention and arrest. 
It signed the treaty with Japan at San Francisco, instituted 
some monetary reforms, and devaluated the rupiah. 
The Sukiman cabinet came to grief over a matter of foreign 
policy. The foreign affairs minister signed an agreement with 
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the United States for Mutual Security Agency assistance in-
volving only eight million dollars, largely in the form of badly 
needed equipment for Indonesia's internal security forces. 
When the agreement became public, however, a political furor 
instantaneously developed, for the Mutual Security Act re-
quired all governments receiving aid under it to agree to 
contribute "to the defensive strength of the free world." 
Practically every Indonesian political leader regarded the ac-
ceptance of even such a mild, vague commitment as a depar-
ture from Indonesia's independent, or neutralist, foreign 
policy. When the two major parties of the coalition refused 
to support the agreement, the foreign minister resigned, but 
his departure failed to still the political storm. The entire 
cabinet submitted its resignation a short while later, on Feb-
ruary 23, 1952, after having held office for nearly ten months. 
On April I a new cabinet was announced. It represented 
a coalition of the Masjumi, the Nationalist, and five small 
parties. The prime minister and formateur of the new gov-
ernment was Wilopo, a Nationalist and secretary of economic 
affairs in the previous cabinet. While the new government 
represented primarily a Nationalist-Masjumi coalition, the 
most important positions in it were held by Nationalists. The 
program of the Wilopo government included general elections 
for the constitutional assembly within one year, increased wel-
fare through an increase in national production, strengthening 
the national security, improved labor legislation, moderniza-
tion of the educational system, an active and independent 
foreign policy, and termination of the Netherlands-Indonesian 
Union. 
The vVilopo cabinet lived a precarious existence for four-
teen months. Its beginning was inauspicious. A vote of confi-
dence was obtained from parliament only after forty days of 
debate, though the vote when finally taken was substantially 
in its favor. The cabinet wobbled through one crisis after 
another until it finally fell on the issue of the handling of the 
land-distribution problem on the east coast of Sumatra. But 
this was not the cause of the downfall of the cabinet, only the 
occasion. The two major parties supporting the government 
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became deeply divided on a number of issues, so that coopera-
tion between the two became difficult. Wilopo had much 
trouble with the leftwing members of his own party, who 
frequently voted with the opposition, thus putting the cabinet 
in a weak position. 
On October 17, 1952, there occurred an extraordinary affair, 
one which deeply involved the political stability of the country. 
From this event until its resignation on June 3, 1953, the 
Wilopo government existed in a "political oxygen tent." The 
background of the affair was complicated. The minister of 
defense, Sultan Buwono of Djokjakarta, aided by a military 
mission from the Nether lands, was carrying out plans for 
modernization of the army. The group of former guerrilla 
officers in the army disliked this policy, chiefly because of their 
inadequate training, and the large number of former guerrilla 
fighters within the army likewise feared the plan would mean 
their removal from the service when the strength of the army 
would be reduced from 200,000 to 100,000 men. 
The issue was politically explosive. A foreign military mis-
sion-worse still, a Dutch mission-was advising and aiding the 
sultan in carrying out the plan. Opponents of the plan charged 
that the army was losing its revolutionary character and was 
again acquiring a "colonial" status. Apparently also involved 
was rivalry between President Sukarno and Sultan Buwono. 
The former seemed to fear the role and ambitions of the 
latter. It was also charged that the top members of the Defense 
Ministry were sympathetic with the Socialist party and that 
political considerations influenced promotions. 
The issue came up in parliament. There were debates. 
Voices were raised demanding changes in the defense ministry, 
whereupon a number of army officers petitioned President 
Sukarno to dissolve parliament, since it had no mandate from 
the people and therefore no moral authority to pass judgment 
on other departments of the government.1 On October 16 
parliament passed a resolution, introduced by a member of 
1 Members of parliament were not popularly elected, but were appointed by 
the political parties according to a system of proportional representation estab-
lished by a presidential committee. 
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the Nationalist party, calling for early withdrawal of the 
Netherlands military mission and the appointment of a com-
mittee "to bring forward concrete proposals for changes in the 
top echelons of the Defense Ministry and in the Armed 
Forces." On the next day the capital witnessed a wild popular 
demonstration against parliament and in support of the de-
fense minister, with the army much in evidence. The crowds 
entered the parliament building, destroying furniture and 
finishings, and then marched to the presidential palace, de-
manding the dissolution of parliament and early elections for 
a new national assembly. With his customary skill in handling 
crowds President Sukarno succeeded in calming the demon-
strators without promising anything more than the first gen-
eral elections would be held as soon as possible. The parlia-
ment did not assemble again for a number of weeks. 
These remarkable events were followed by others no less 
strange. A few days after the October 17 affair three territorial 
commanders (in East Java, East Indonesia, and South Su-
matra) were removed by subordinate officers, apparently in 
protest against what they believed to be the actions of the 
military clique in Djakarta. The usurping officers declared 
allegiance to President Sukarno while engaged in their acts of 
insubordination. The government in a public statement 
strongly rebuked the officers who had participated in the Oc-
tober 17 demonstration and promised "to restore integrity and 
unity" in the armed forces. However, instead of disciplining 
the rebellious officers, the new chief of staff formally appointed 
them to the positions they had usurped, over the protests of 
Defense Minister Buwono. When the cabinet backed the ap-
pointments, the sultan resigned. 
The resignation of the ·wilopo cabinet was followed by a 
58-day political crisis. After several leaders had failed in form-
ing a cabinet, the president called upon "'\Vongsonegoro, the 
chairman of the United Greater Indonesian party (P.I.R.), 
with a membership of only fifteen in the temporary parlia-
ment. He succeeded in forming a coalition cabinet composed 
of the Nationalist and a number of small nationalist and Marx-
ist parties, with Ali Sastroamidjojo, at the time ambassador 
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to the United States, as prime minister and himself as vice 
prime minister. The new cabinet had only a slight majority 
in parliament, and it was apparent that its political life would 
frequently be dependent on the Communist members of par-
liament. The new cabinet was markedly leftist. Among the 
new ministers was Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, who had spent some 
time in Moscow and was imprisoned in 1946 for participation 
in the attempted Communist coup of that year. He was given 
the sensitive post of minister of defense. 
Another important factor which helps to explain the char-
acter and history of the Ali-Wongsonegoro cabinet was its pe-
culiar relation to President Sukarno. It seems clear that with-
out his influence and active support it could not have been 
formed or remained so long in power. The prime minister 
and the minister for foreign affairs were old and close friends 
of the president. An informed American observer concluded 
that the cabinet was "presidential" in everything but name. 
"In terms of effective policy control, the Ali-Wongsonegoro 
Cabinet offers the president all the advantages of a presidential 
cabinet without the responsibility of accepting blame for any 
failures."2 
The Ali cabinet remained in office two years, which was 
considerably longer than any of its predecessors. Wongsone-
goro, who formed the cabinet and served as vice premier, re-
signed toward the end of 1954 when his party withdrew its 
support. The cabinet weathered the loss of some support in 
parliament, a cabinet reshuffle, widespread corruption in ad-
ministration, deteriorating economic conditions, continued 
internal insecurity, and a revolt in North Sumatra. It won 
considerable prestige in promoting the Bandung Conference 
and serving as host to this important diplomatic meeting. It 
looked as if its life was secure, at least until the general elec-
tion, which was scheduled for the end of September, 1955. 
Suddenly it ran into political trouble and fell. 
The manner of the fall of the Ali cabinet points up the 
political instability of the country. The prime minister, flush 
2 Robert C. Bone, Jr., "The Future of Indonesian Political Parties," Far 
Eastern Survey, XXIII (1954), 23. 
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with the diplomatic festivities and honors enjoyed on an 
official visit to Communist China from which he had just 
returned, suddenly found himself and his cabinet in serious 
trouble arising when the minister of defense filled the vacancy 
caused by the resignation of the army chief of staff. When the 
appointment was announced, the deputy, serving as acting 
chief of staff, and seven colonels, all territorial commanders, 
refused to accept the newly appointed chief. The colonels 
successfully defied the prestige, power, authority, and com-
bined efforts of President Sukarno and Prime Minister Ali. 
Not only did they refuse to accept the appointee, but they 
acted as if he did not exist, and the deputy continued to func-
tion as chief of staff. They rejected all offers of compromise. 
On July 26, 1955, the cabinet handed in its resignation. 
Just what motivated the army leaders in their defiance of 
the government is not clear. They had demanded the right 
to be consulted in the appointment of a chief of staff, but had 
been ignored. They may have felt that the appointment was 
political. They stated that their aims were nonpolitical, that 
they had in view only the efficiency of the army. It has been 
suggested that the army leaders were weary of trying to keep 
the army at a high level of efficiency under the government of 
Ali and used the chief-of-staff appointment as a means of forc-
ing the cabinet out of office. 
The affair which brought the Ali cabinet and the govern-
ment to its sad plight is not incomprehensible. The govern-
ment claimed to be democratic, yet after more than five years 
after the transfer of sovereignty it was still operating under a 
provisional constitution and a nonelected parliament. The 
government no longer had moral authority. The army leaders 
apparently felt no strong obligation to respect the decisions of 
the Ali government. Whatever the explanation, the affair re-
vealed a critical situation. Natsir, the leader of the Masjumi 
party, succinctly summarized the gravity of it when he stated 
that Indonesia was confronted not only with a cabinet crisis 
but with "a crisis of authority." 
A new ministry under the leadership of Burhanuddin Hara-
hap, the chairman of the Masjumi party in the parliament, 
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took office on August 13. It was formed under peculiar cir-
cumstances. President Sukarno had nothing to do with the 
formation of the Harahap cabinet. Part of the time of the 
political crisis he was out of the country on a pilgrimage to 
Mecca, and on his return he did not assume the usual func-
tions of his office but instead went "on vacation." Moreover, 
Vice President Hatta, who was functioning as the head of the 
state, was himself considered for the role of prime minister. 
The plan to form a strong national cabinet under his able 
leadership fell through because agreement could not be 
reached on his status while premier. The Harahap ministry, 
representing a coalition of 12 of the 20 parties represented 
in the provisional parliament, was conservative in character. 
The chief points in its program were restoration of the moral 
authority of the government and the confidence of the armed 
forces and people in the government, checking of inflation, com-
bating of corruption, and continuance of the struggle to "rein-
corporate" West New Guinea into the territory of Indonesia. 
The main parties in opposition were the Nationalists and 
Communists. 
FIRST PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
At long last the first general elections were held, on September 
29, 1955 (in some outlying districts on subsequent dates). The 
voting took place fairly peacefully, with about 90 percent of 
the eligible voters going to the polls. Thirty-four political 
groups and individuals conducted a nationwide campaign for 
seats, and forty-four others tried their fortunes in restricted or 
local areas. Twenty-eight parties and individuals won seats-
twelve winning only one seat. The results of the election were 
rather surprising. It was thought that the religion of the masses 
would work to handicap the Nationalist party and would favor 
the Masjumi, the leading Moslem party. However, in the coun-
try as a whole the Nationalists' vote slightly surpassed that cast 
for the Masjumi, and on Java the vote ran three to two in favor 
of the former. On the other hand, a splinter Moslem party, the 
Nahdatul Ulama (Moslem Schoolmen's League or Moslem 
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Teachers' party), received nearly as many votes as the Masjumi. 
One of the most startling aspects of the election returns was 
the large vote of the Communist party-more than 16 percent 
of the total vote.3 Sutan Sjahrir's Socialist party made a very 
poor showing, and a number of small parties received too few 
votes to win a single seat in the new national parliament, even 
under the system of proportional representation by which the 
seats are distributed. 
The success of the Nationalist party may in part be explained 
by the support which it received from President Sukarno, while 
the large vote for the Moslem Teachers' party reflects the con-
servative character of many Indonesian Moslems. The Moslem 
Teachers' party is orthodox; the Masjumi is reformist and pro-
W estern. Though more conservative religiously, the former was 
less outspokenly anti-Communist. However, the Masjumi is the 
most national of all the parties; its votes were more evenly 
distributed over the whole country than those of any other 
party, and its representation in parliament is accordingly more 
nationwide. The Moslem Teachers' party found itself in an 
awkward position. It had unexpectedly come into a position of 
real power, but it was without experienced or strong leadership. 
On December 15, 1955, Indonesia held a second national elec-
tion, this time to elect the members of the constituent assembly 
which was to draft a permanent constitution. In this election, 
in which fewer votes were cast than in the earlier one, the 
Nationalists received a larger and the Masjumi an even smaller 
percentage of the total vote.4 The two national elections seem 
3 The number of votes cast in the election was 37,785,299. Six parties received 
more than a million votes each. The number and percentage of their votes and 
the resulting distribution of seats in parliament is as follows: 
Votes No. Seats 
No. % Pari. Prov. Pari. 
Nationalist .......................... 8,434,653 22.3 57 42 
Masjumi .............................. 7,903,886 20.9 57 44 
Moslem Teachers' .............. 6,955,141 18.4 45 8 
Communist .......................... 6,176,914 16.4 39 17 
Moslem Association .......... 1,091,160 2.9 8 4 
Christian .............................. 1,003,325 2.6 8 5 
4 The popular vote received and the seats in the assembly won by the four 
largest parties is as follows: Nationalists-9,070,218 votes, 119 seats; Masjumi-
7,789,619 votes, 112 seats; Moslem Teachers' party-6,989,333 votes, 91 seats; 
Communists-6,232,512 votes, 75 seats. There are 520 members in the constituent 
assembly. 
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to indicate a strong trend toward extreme nationalism, radical 
economic policies, and militant, orthodox Islamism. 
The elections called for a new cabinet based on the new 
parliament. On March 16, 1956, Ali Sastroamidjojo informed 
President Sukarno that he had succeeded in forming a min-
istry. After some days of hesitation the president approved the 
ministry, which was based upon the three largest parties in 
parliament-the Nationalist, the Masjumi, and the Moslem 
Teachers-and a number of smaller parties, including the Par-
kindo (Protestant) and Catholic parties. The new ministry's 
program embraced twelve points, all general in character. 
The new Ali cabinet started with a strong numerical backing 
in a parliament only recently elected by the people; it never-
theless soon found itself in difficulty. In August the army, 
under authority of martial law, attempted to arrest Foreign 
Minister Ruslan Abdulgani on charges of corruption, just as 
he was about to leave for a conference in London. A cabinet 
commission cleared him of the charges. Also under authority 
of martial law, the army jailed a leading newspaper editor for 
criticizing the government. In November an army officers' 
group in Djakarta apparently sought to overthrow the Ali gov-
ernment, and in December there were a series of military re-
volts in Sumatra. The Sumatrans are discontented because of 
the failure of the government to build up the country, and they 
demand greater local autonomy. Because of its wealth, Sumatra 
produces a large part of the revenues of the central government, 
and its exports produce over two-thirds of the country's foreign 
exchange earnings. The revolutionary councils set up in South 
Sumatra demanded the right to keep more of the revenues 
collected in the area for local use. The central government 
seems to have yielded to these demands. In January the Mas-
jumi and several small parties withdrew from the ministry, 
leaving the Ali cabinet in a precarious position. 
The response of President Sukarno to these developments 
is worth noting, as he is still the idol of the Indonesian masses. 
He has twice publicly appealed for the "burial" of Indonesia's 
political parties and the replacement of the present political 
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system by a "guided" democracy. He regards the formation of 
parties in 1945 as a grave mistake which has caused discord 
among the people. In opening the constituent assembly, he 
declared that "For the time being our democracy must be a 
guided democracy-thus not a democracy that is based on con-
ceptions of liberalism." This desire for unity was probably 
stimulated by his visits in 1956 to the Communist countries. 
He apparently is convinced that this unity is necessary for 
Indonesia, if it is to have security and prosperity. He suggested 
that once the parties were dissolved, political leaders should 
decide "whether a one party system should be formed, a mass 
movement, or some well-founded parties."5 There were reports 
that he was planning to play a more direct role in the govern-
ment by setting up a council whose approval would be necessary 
for all major decisions taken by parliament.6 He strongly as-
serts, however, that he does not want to become a dictator. 
After many weeks of expectation the president on February 
2, 1957, called on his countrymen to abandon the "imported" 
Western system of democracy and substitute for it a new one 
which he termed a "conception." He specifically proposed the 
creation of a cabinet which would comprise all the major par-
ties, including the Communists, which had seats in parliament 
as a result of the 1955 elections. This cabinet would represent 
parliament, and a second body, a national council, composed of 
a cross section of the people, would represent Indonesian society. 
The latter body, presided over by the president himself, would 
"advise" the cabinet. If his "conception" were adopted, Su-
karno said, there would be an end to the opposition which had 
paralyzed Indonesian governments; instead, there would be 
only brotherly discussion. 
The Communists greeted the proposal with joy and im-
mediately began a campaign to whip up enthusiasm for it. 
Buildings were painted with pro-Sukarno and antiforeign slo-
gans. Political leaders opposing Sukarno's proposal received 
letters threatening them with kidnapping unless they changed 
5 See New York Times, November 18, 1956. 
6 New York Times, January 16, 1957. 
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their minds. The Moslem and Christian parties and a number 
of Djakarta newspapers criticized the plan and announced 
opposition to it. 
On March 2 a dissident group proclaimed a military regime 
in East Indonesia. They announced dissatisfactions similar to 
those of the Sumatrans. The leader of the revolt in the east 
presented President Sukarno an ultimatum demanding the 
dismissal of Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo and his cabinet, 
and warning the president that they would not tolerate any 
Communists in the government. There were reports that both 
the Communists and anti-Communist factions in Sumatra had 
received arms from Malaya. 
After South Sumatra and Borneo had joined the procession 
of revolts, the Ali cabinet resigned (March 14). President 
Sukarno promptly proclaimed a state of war and seige, legally 
giving him virtually dictatorial authority, but how much power 
in fact remained to be seen in view of the involvement of the 
army in the defiance of "Javanese centralism." 
The situation has become very serious for the central gov-
ernment. Cut off from the rich tax-producing and large foreign-
trade-earning outer islands, the government, situated in over-
populated Java, would soon experience financial strangulation. 
The ideas advocated more recently by President Sukarno are 
consistent with basic ideas frequently expressed by him. In his 
view the national revolution is never completed but is continu-
ing. He once pleaded for a "Peoples Congress" in which all the 
national forces would be represented to carry on the national 
revolution. As a result of his advocacy, such a congress was held. 
The democratic parties shunned it, enabling the Communists 
and fellow travelers to dominate it. In his speech to the con-
stitutent assembly, Sukarno stated that the constitution must 
prevent the growth of a "capitalistic system in Indonesia." 
A rift between President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta 
had been developing for some time. The latter became out-
spokenly critical of ideas advocated by the president. On De-
cember 1, 1956, he resigned, presumably to have freedom to 
follow an independent political course. Hatta is known as an 
able economist, respected for his integrity, and widely regarded 
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as a strong man of judicious temperament. Some political 
groups, especially the Masjumi, strongly advocate the appoint-
ment of Hatta as prime minister. 
INTERNAL SECURITY 
If orderly and democratic government is to survive in Indo-
nesia, a number of difficult problems must be solved; and im-
provement must come soon, for the situation is grave indeed. 
There is unrest, banditry, lawlessness, and large-scale resist-
ance against the government in many areas of Indonesia. This 
is a problem which every government since 1950 has promised 
to deal with drastically, but conditions improve slowly, if at all. 
There is stealing, murder, the burning of villages. This ex-
traordinary phenomenon is the product of the Japanese inva-
sion and occupation, guerrilla activities against the Dutch, 
extreme poverty, political discontent, and religious fanaticism. 
The revolt in the South Moluccas is not difficult to under-
stand. The Ambonese, who constituted the heart of the move-
ment, are a Dutchified people who supplied large numbers of 
men to the Nether lands Indies army. Many of them found it 
difficult to transfer their loyalty to the independent Indonesia; 
several thousand Ambonese soldiers chose to go to the Nether-
lands rather than be discharged in Indonesia. Moreover, some 
of their leaders may honestly have felt tricked when the pro-
visional federal constitution was abolished for another provi-
sional but unitary constitution by means that could hardly be 
called democratic. The political leaders of the territories outside 
the nationalist republic had joined in a common front against 
the Dutch at The Hague Round Table Conference on the basis 
of the federal constitution. They feared government from 
Djakarta by Javanese and the consequent loss of local autonomy. 
The revolt seemed to have been crushed by the Indonesian 
army by November, 1950, but smoldering embers remained. 
The military disorders, guerrilla activities, and terrorization 
in South Celebes seem to be a mixture of political and social 
discontent and religious fanaticism. Some of the leaders of 
disorder in this region seem to be in contact with the Darul 
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Islam on Java and sympathetic with it. In Java the heart of 
the disorder and resistance to the government is Darul Islam, 
a group which seeks to overthrow the present government and 
set up a "pure Moslem state." Before independence the Darul 
Islamists fought alongside other groups against the Dutch, but 
steadily refused incorporation with the nationalist Republic of 
Indonesia. For them the winning of independence was merely 
a necessary step in the creation of a theocratic Islamic state. 
Violence is their method, and they have used it as vigorously 
against the Indonesian government as they did against the 
foreign ruler. They have kept a considerable area of Java in 
a state of terror. In 1953 a revolt closely allied to Darul Islam 
broke out among the Achinese in North Sumatra. 
Internal insecurity has been the central problem of Indo-
nesia during the first seven years of independence. In his inde-
pendence day speech on August 17, 1952, President Sukarno 
declared that "the state is still shaky because it is being dis-
turbed in various areas by marauding bands." That condition 
seemed chronic. In 1953 there were 4,295 persons killed in 
Java alone, and 11,494 houses burned down. The government 
reported that 137,379 persons had been evacuated from Central 
Java during the first three months of 1955 as a result of bandit 
activities. During the same period 76 villagers were killed and 
five persons kidnapped by bandits in this area alone. 
GENERAL WELFARE AND ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 
If Indonesia is to become politically stable and not fall under 
Communist control, living levels will have to rise. The nation-
alist revolution in Indonesia was in part a "revolution of rising 
expectations." Per capita and national incomes were low. About 
the only affiuent people in the country were foreigners: West-
erners, Chinese, Arabs, and Indians. It is wholly understandable 
that people living under these conditions would ascribe their 
poverty to foreign exploitation aided by foreign rule. For them 
Marxism seemed to explain nearly everything. Many of the 
nationalist leaders became strongly Marxist in their thinking, 
and moreover, they found the Marxist theories useful in arous-
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ing resentment against foreign rule. The masses were led to 
believe that with independence, living conditions would im-
mediately improve, because there would be an end to foreign 
exploitation. The fruits of Indonesian resources and labor 
would remain in Indonesia and go to Indonesians. 
Unfortunately, the lively and pleasant expectations of im-
proved living conditions have not been realized. Instead, living 
levels have declined. Needless to say, this creates a dangerous 
situation. The head of the Bank of Indonesia in his report for 
the year 1952-1953 stated that real per capita income was only 
about 60 percent of what it was in 1938, and production was 
only 65 to 70 percent of the prewar levels. There has been 
little if any improvement since 1953. In the meanwhile the 
population has increased considerably. The 1954 production 
of rubber, petroleum, and rice, however, exceeded that of 1938. 
In 1952, 760,000 tons of rice had to be imported; by 1955 
self-sufficiency had been nearly achieved. With regard to nearly 
every other commodity the story is not so favorable. Production 
of tea, coffee, cinchona bark, sugar, palm oil, palm nuts, and 
hard fiber in 1954 was considerably below that of 1938. 
Indonesia's balance-of-trade picture is not encouraging. Dur-
ing 1950, the first year of its independence, the Korean hostili-
ties broke out and the prices of rubber and tin, two of the 
country's chief exports, shot up, producing a large balance of 
trade in Indonesia's favor in 1950 and 1951. Unfortunately, 
the foreign exchange thus earned was largely squandered on 
the importation of luxury goods. In 1952 the balance was 
unfavorable. The price of tin and rubber slumped badly, and 
the price of the manufactured goods which Indonesia imported 
went up rather than down. To keep the foreign trade in 
balance, a number of measures restricting imports were resorted 
to, but this led to all sorts of difficulties. Plantations and fac-
tories were unable to import necessary supplies and equipment, 
and some factories actually had to cease operations. The rise 
in the price of rubber and tin in 1955 considerably eased Indo-
nesia's foreign-exchange position. 
If it were not for the Western-operated industries, the trade 
balance would be strongly adverse. Rubber and petroleum 
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account for over half of the total exports in value, and nearly 
all of the petroleum and much of the rubber is produced by 
Western capital and management. Exclusive of petroleum 
alone, the Indonesian trade balance is heavily adverse. If 
capital goods for economic development are to be imported, the 
great export industries will have to earn the foreign exchange, 
but the conditions under which they have to operate is discour-
aging. Labor troubles, hostility toward foreign capital, large-
scale thievery and brigandage, illegal occupation of concession 
lands by peasant squatters, heavy taxes, and exchange restric-
tions make it difficult for Western enterprises to carry on 
profitably. There is a 15 percent ad valorem sales tax, a 52 
percent tax on profits, and a 66.6 percent tax on dollar remit-
tances out of the country. Some of the large Dutch companies 
are transferring their operations to other countries, notably 
Ethiopia. This is a serious matter for Indonesia, for the Western 
enterprises are the earners of foreign exchange and a rich source 
of public revenue. Until Indonesian capital and enterprise can 
fill this role, the economic outlook will remain gloomy and the 
government's fiscal situation precarious. 
Government finances naturally reflect the unsatisfactory eco-
nomic conditions of the country. Expenditures far exceed 
income; revenue falls short of outgo by about 20 to 30 percent. 
Expenditures in 1956 were about 19,000,000,000 rupiahs and 
receipts 17,000,000,000. The deficit in 1955 was about 3,000,-
000,000 rupiahs. The national public debt practically doubled 
during the first four years of independence, having increased 
from 6,894,000,000 rupiahs in 1949 to 13,385,000,000 by the 
end of 1953. The country is caught in an inflationary spiral. 
By June, 1955, salaries had fallen so far behind the rapidly 
rising price level that they were woefully inadequate, with 
inefficiency and corruption as a result. 
POPULATION PRESSURE AND SOCIAL STABILITY 
Judged by Asian and tropical standards, Indonesia as a whole 
is not densely populated. It is nevertheless troubled with a 
serious demographic problem. It is essentially a problem of 
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underdevelopment and the concentration of the population on 
one island. Java (with the dependent island of Madura) with 
only one-eleventh of the area of Indonesia has two-thirds of the 
estimated 85,000,000 inhabitants of the country. An idea of the 
intense population pressure on Java can be obtained by com-
paring its area and population with those of the state of New 
York. The two have practically the same area, but Java has 
about 55,000,000 people to 16,000,000 for New York. Thus 
the former, which is still overwhelmingly agrarian, has nearly 
four times the population of the latter, which is highly com-
mercial and industrial. Such a population mass weighs heavily 
on the production and the available resources, and depresses 
the levels of living. 
There is no easy solution to this problem. Significant exten-
sion of agriculture is no longer possible. Intensification, includ-
ing heavier application of fertilizers and the use of higher pro-
ducing seeds, is still possible and is being achieved. Rapid 
industrialization would relieve population pressure on the land, 
but when the comparison with New York is recalled, this solu-
tion does not seem bright. It would take a tremendous indus-
trial development to draw half of the population of the island 
from the countryside into the cities within a period of two 
decades, and by that time the total population would have 
increased by at least a third, since Java has a natural increase 
of over 700,000 per year. 
There remains transmigration to the less populated islands, 
a scheme begun by the Dutch decades ago. As early as 1905 
the Netherlands Indies government encouraged Javanese to 
move to the Outer Islands, as they were called. The colonists 
were given free transportation and financial support during the 
first years of settlement. The scheme was too costly, and the 
number of migrants remained small. Some of the more difficult 
problems connected with the scheme were solved, and in the 
last years before the war the number of colonists increased 
rapidly, from 13,152 in 1936 to 55,000 in 1940. The Indonesian 
government has resumed the policy of resettlement. The num-
ber of transmigrants was 27 families with a total of 45 persons 
in 1950, 769 families (2,923 persons) in 1951, 3,829 families 
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(17,430 persons) in 1952, 9,854 families (39,284 persons) in 
1953, and 7,846 families (27,643 persons) in 1954. Plans for 
the next four years are rather ambitious. The government 
planned to resettle 40,000 families in 1955, 80,000 in 1956, 
and in the years 1957 to 1960 a total of 280,000 families, or a 
grand total of more than 2,000,000 persons for the six-year 
period. It is estimated that the cost to the government will 
run over 4,000,000,000 rupiahs. The resettlement areas are in 
Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes. 
Transmigration in such large numbers might be expected 
to relieve the population pressure on Java somewhat, but large 
as the numbers are, the total will not equal the natural increase 
of Java's millions. Moreover, the scheme does little or nothing 
to raise the level of production. The small-farm peasantry 
system is merely being spread to the Outer Islands; the con-
ditions of Java are extended over an area which should be jeal-
ously conserved for maximal production by the use of more 
capital, relative to labor, on larger tracts. Only by this means 
can per capita income be increased. 
A Dutch sociologist, Dr. J. H. Boeke, after long study of the 
problem of raising the general welfare concluded that "a real 
solution can be found only by instilling into the masses of the 
people a Western spirit which will bring forth a rationalistic 
view of sex relations and a dynamic view of production. This 
is the only conclusion that can be reached by those who desire 
to make actual a general mass-welfare policy."7 There is little 
evidence to indicate that a basic change is taking place in the 
attitude of the masses with respect to these matters. 
It is frequently asserted that Indonesia is a very rich country. 
It does possess considerable natural resources, but riches must 
always be related to the number of people who have to share 
them, and Indonesia cannot be "rich" for an unlimited number 
of people. It is generally assumed that tropical soils are very 
fertile, but this is far from the truth. In fact, tropical soils are 
generally poor, for the reason that the heavy rains leach the 
soil of its mineral elements. It is only where there has been 
recent volcanic action, as in Java, that the soils are fertile. 
7 The Structure of Netherlands Indian Economy (New York, 1942), 163. 
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A danger to which Indonesian soil is especially exposed is 
erosion. The land is hilly, frequently mountainous, and the 
average annual rainfall in some places runs as high as 250 inches. 
To prevent destructive erosion, it is necessary to keep the hill-
sides covered with vegetation. The Dutch had early learned 
their lesson in this matter. Squatters who denuded the hillsides 
which had been set aside as reserves were severely dealt with, 
and as a result the Nether lands Indies forestry service was hated 
by the peasants. During the Japanese occupation and the revo-
lution these conservation measures were neglected, with erosion, 
floods, the filling of streams, and the covering of lowlands with 
silt as a consequence. The weak, cruelly beset Indonesian gov-
ernments have not dealt with this problem as resolutely as they 
should, if the national heritage is not to be seriously impaired. 
It is not only Java that is suffering from the pressure of pop-
ulation on land. The Indonesian government is considering 
the resettlement of Balinese on the island of Sumbawa, and 
there is evidence to indicate that north central Sumatra is be-
ginning to experience difficulties. 
On the east coast of Sumatra a peculiarly difficult problem 
has arisen. In the last decades of Dutch rule this area attracted 
large Western agricultural enterprises, which acquired access 
to the soil by means of concessions of public lands for periods 
not exceeding 7 5 years. This Western plantation area became 
an important source of government revenue and foreign ex-
change, for practically the total production of the area was 
exported. 
Signs of approaching trouble appeared even before the war. 
There were complaints that the best land had been leased to 
European planters or added to the public forests, so that the 
native population was left with poor and insufficient land. The 
government, sorely in need of increased revenue, could ill 
afford to see the land transferred to native agriculture, which 
is much less productive than plantation agriculture. 
During the years of Japanese occupation and the revolution, 
thousands of illegal squatters settled on these lands. The Indo-
nesian government found itself caught between the foreign 
planters' demands for restoration of the land and its own des-
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perate need for revenue and foreign exchange on the one hand, 
and on the other, the squatters' unwillingness to move. The 
foreign operators, realizing the difficulties of the government 
and the explosive character of the situation, relinquished about 
a third of their concession areas with the understanding that the 
government would guarantee them full use of the remainder. 
The government now faced the unpleasant task of removing 
the squatters from the land that was to be returned to the 
planters. The government scheme called for the transfer of 
squatters to other areas where they received small tracts of 
land and 300 rupiahs as indemnification. This was a delicate 
operation in an area where there were many Communists 
(among the large Chinese population) and where many native 
laborers and peasants had been drawn into leftist organizations. 
Forcible removal of tillers of the soil in favor of "foreign 
imperialists" was a situation which lent itself to exploitation. 
About half of the 30,000 families which were to be moved had 
been resettled when an outbreak occurred. The police fired on 
the demonstrators, and a number of people were killed and 
wounded. Naturally the matter was discussed in parliament. 
The Communist and other leftist members of parliament united 
in support of a resolution calling for a revision of the land-
distribution policy. This was the immediate cause of the down-
fall of the Wilopo cabinet, which resigned on June 3, 1953. 
POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
Politically the early years of the republic have been marked 
by uncertainty, tension, and conflict. By June, 1955, the situa-
tion had become grave and the political life of the country 
seemed to be at a dead end. Only an early and honest general 
election offered any hope of restoring respect for, and confidence 
in, the government. The condition of the country was graphic-
ally and frankly described in an open letter to President Su-
karno in June, 1955, by his old friend and fellow revolutionist, 
Dr. Halim, former premier of the early nationalist republic of 
Indonesia and at the time head of a large government hospital 
in Djakarta. Prices had so far outrun salaries, declared Dr. 
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Halim, that a month's salary could meet family needs for only 
two weeks, or at most twenty days. As a result, capacity for 
work had seriously declined, and absence from work two days 
a week in order to earn some money on the side had become 
a common practice among government employees. If repri-
manded, these people asked why petty corruptionists should be 
arrested when big thieves were permitted to go free and remain 
"honored persons." Laborers wishing to strike were threatened 
by the government, and the general fear prevailed among gov-
ernment employees that they might be discharged at any time 
without explanation or statement of cause. While the govern-
ment declared that the security situation was improving daily, 
the opposite was the fact. More and more persons feared to 
sleep in their own homes at night, and in some districts the 
number of fugitives was increasing daily. Differences in politi-
cal views were less and less tolerated, even by the government 
radio. Dr. Halim ended his description of conditions by stating 
that he tried to see the good as well as the bad, but that he 
was convinced that at the moment far more was being torn 
down than was being built up. Many, he concluded, sought 
the cause of this in the presence of the evil influences of the 
Netherlanders and of the Western imperialists, though as far as 
he was concerned there was no difference between Eastern and 
Western imperialism. He was of the opinion that the fault must 
be sought primarily among Indonesians themselves. Because of 
envy, jealousy, and suspicion, Indonesians had not placed high-
minded, able, conscientious persons in responsible positions. 
This political crisis should cause little surprise. Indonesians 
had had little training in representative government or public 
administration under the Dutch, and they took over the gov-
ernment for the entire country after nearly a decade of war, 
foreign occupation, and revolution. The new state retained a 
large number of former Nether lands Indies officials to advise 
and help administer the public services, but the trained and 
experienced Dutch civil servants quickly dwindled away, leav-
ing some of the government services in a bad way. 
Indonesians like to compare the situation of their country 
today with that of the United States in the critical period of 
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1783-1789, but this comparison is not wholly sound. The new 
American government was simple, its functions limited, and 
the problems it faced not extremely difficult. In every respect 
the position of the Indonesian government is quite different. 
It has a relatively large, complicated machinery to regulate a 
wide variety of interests, it owns and operates large economic 
enterprises, and it is responsible for the welfare of 80,000,000 
people (as compared with the 3,500,000 inhabitants of the 
United States in 1789). The young American republic could 
work out its problems in relative isolation, but there is no isola-
tion anywhere today, least of all for a country with the location 
of Indonesia. 
Aside from such matters as corruption, administrative inef-
ficiency, and internal insecurity, Indonesia faces a number of 
political problems. Probably the chief of these is national unity. 
The country has become deeply divided on the basic issue of 
what the nature of the state should be. There are the Darul 
Islamists who wish to establish a theocratic or "pure Islamic" 
state. The fanatic adherents of this view are in open rebellion 
against the existing government. At the other end of the 
spectrum are the Communists, who are atheist in their outlook 
but who make considerable effort to conceal this. The Nation-
alist and related parties hold that the state must be secular. 
The Masjumi and other Moslem parties do not demand a theo-
cratic state, but do desire to see Islamic principles applied in 
politics as far as possible. A Catholic and a Protestant Christian 
party wish to see laws and governmental policies imbued with 
Christian principles. By 1955 the rivalry between the two big 
parties, the Nationalist and the Masjumi, had become so bitter 
and the Masjumi distrust (shared by several other parties) of 
the leftist and Communist-supported Nationalist cabinet had 
become so great that democratic government was no longer 
possible. The Masjumi leaders smarted especially under what 
they felt were grossly unfair tactics of the Nationalists in trying 
to identify the Masjumi with the Darul Islamist insurrectionists. 
Had the general elections been held under the authority of the 
Ali government, serious trouble would almost certainly have 
developed. 
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During the two years of the Ali cabinet the Communist 
party prospered. Communists were freer to carry on public 
activities and even engage in demonstrations. Party member-
ship increased. In 1953 there were reports that the government 
had yielded to Communist pressure to allow armed, Commu-
nist-led volunteer bands to enter the field against the Darul 
Islam rebels. Former Prime Minister Natsir, leader of the 
Masjumi, declared in parliament that such action might result 
in civil war. "Those who demand weapons," he declared, "must 
themselves be destroyed." 
National political unity is frequently sought by emphasizing 
the Pantja Sila, the five principles of political philosophy on 
which, according to the preamble of the provisional constitu-
tion, the Indonesian state is based. They were first enunciated 
by Sukarno in a speech on June l, 1945. These five basic prin-
ciples-"recognition of the Divine Omnipotence, Humanity, 
National Consciousness, Democracy and Social Justice" -are suf-
ficiently general to leave ample room for widely varying inter-
pretations. However, they do serve as something of a unifying 
influence. In 1955 a Pantja Sila political party was organized 
as a rallying point for all those weary of the welter of the many 
conflicting parties. However, it became merely another polit-
ical group. 
The substitution of the unitary for the federal system in 1950 
has not settled the issue of the geographic distribution of gov-
ernmental power in Indonesia. There has been much dissatis-
faction with the centralization of power in Djakarta. There 
have been demands for greater provincial autonomy. The fed-
eral idea is not dead; in 1955 a federalist party was organized. 
Federalism is one of the most important issues before the 
constituent assembly. 
The position of the president in the governmental system 
needs clarification. President Sukarno's role has been much 
greater than that customarily enjoyed by the titular head of 
a parliamentary government. His great popularity and own 
inclination to be a real political leader, as well as constitutional 
ambiguities, account for his peculiar position in the govern-
ment. Sukarno makes innumerable speeches, not all of which 
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can have been previously approved by the cabinet. Occasionally 
he makes strange statements for the titular head of a state. For 
example, in a speech at Palembang on November 9, 1954, he 
declared, "There are Indonesian leaders who actively take part 
in the effort of foreigners to set Indonesians against each other 
in the interest of these foreigners. These people have for mil-
lions of rupiahs betrayed their country and people by their 
efforts to bring this cabinet to a fall." Eighteen months later 
the opposition in parliament was still trying to get an explana-
tion of this statement, but to no avail. The only answer they 
received was that the matter was still under investigation by 
the ministry of justice. Similar statements were made by Su-
karno subsequently. The charges were vague, though they were 
declared to be based upon documents in his or the government's 
possession; but they carried the implication that the Dutch 
were plotting to regain control of the country. Members of the 
government seemed to know nothing of the documents. Rela-
tions between the Harahap ministry and the president became 
strained. 
The ambiguous position of the presidency in the present con-
stitutional system is in no small part responsible for the polit-
ical crisis which has developed. In the constituent assembly, 
which in November, 1956, began drafting the permanent con-
stitution, there may well be demands for a clearer delimitation 
of the powers and responsibilities of the presidential office. But 
whether President Sukarno can be made to fit into a more 
restricted framework is another matter. He is very popular with 
the masses and insists upon a role of political leadership. His 
obvious backing of the Ali cabinet and his equally obvious 
hostility to the Harahap ministry placed him in the role of a 
partisan and caused him to lose some popularity. In January, 
1956, Sukarno publicly endorsed the inclusion of Communists 
in future ministries. His taking a second wife was met with 
much criticism and even protest. Nevertheless, Sukarno is still 
the predominant single political force in Indonesia. 
Ever since the October 17, 1952, affair the army has been 
an uncertain quantity, plagued with intrigue and disunity. In 
giving the weak Ali cabinet the push which caused it to fall, 
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the army demonstrated what it can do in a political situation 
of confusion and weakness. After the fall of this cabinet the 
army arrested a number of high government officials on charges 
of corruption, yet without indicating any intention of taking 
over control. Unfortunately, the army itself is not free from 
corruption. In 1955 the commander of the Celebes area frankly 
admitted that he engaged in large-scale smuggling, justifying 
his act by saying that he had to do it in order to get funds to 
maintain his military unit; and the territorial commander in 
North Sumatra publicly announced that his unit was engaged 
in smuggling out rubber to obtain funds to construct necessary 
barracks. Whether the army is sufficiently unified to maintain 
order if called upon by the civil authorities in a grave political 
and social crisis, or whether its leaders plan to assume control 
over the government in case such a crisis should arise, can only 
be a matter of speculation. The army might decide to support 
a strong personality seeking to establish himself as dictator. 
In any case the relation of the army to the civil government is 
at the moment unsound and can be improved only by the 
establishment of vigorous democratic government. 
EDUCATION 
After the long recital of disintegrating tendencies, it is pleasant 
to be able to take note of real achievement in the field of 
education. The republic has tackled this problem in earnest 
and put behind it all the enthusiasm and idealism of a vigorous 
nationalism. The number of elementary schools has been enor-
mously increased; the number of children in school is now more 
than three times as great as it was in the last year of Dutch 
administration, and the number of students in the secondary 
schools is over six times as large. In higher education the 
achievements are even greater. Here a complete transformation 
has been wrought. In addition to the University of Indonesia 
a number of regional institutions have been erected, and the 
number of students is more than twenty times as great as before. 
The educational problem has not yet been solved by any 
means. There are not yet facilities for anywhere near all the 
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children of school age, and the problem of financing even the 
school system that has been erected remains formidable. Never-
theless, Indonesians have every reason to be proud of their 
remarkable achievement in this field, which in the long run 
may be the determining factor in the country's future. 
In addition to expanding the school facilities and training 
the teachers, the Indonesians had to cope with a difficult lang-
uage problem. There was no national language, unless "mar-
ket'' Malay could be called such. The Nationalists were deter-
mined to develop a national language. This was done (it is 
still in process) by using Malay as a base. Furthermore, English 
instead of Dutch was made the second language, in order that 
educated Indonesians might have command of a world lang-
uage. When it is remembered that formerly all higher educa-
tion was in Dutch, the enormous difficulties that have to be 
overcome in this transition period are apparent. In the field of 
education and language the Indonesians have shown themselves 
truly capable of constructive work in nation building. 
FOREIGN POLICY 
Though Indonesia is independent and geographically widely 
separated from the Netherlands, the chief problem of its foreign 
policy continues to be its relations with that nation. This is 
due to a number of factors. The Dutch. were psychologically 
ill prepared to accept the fact of the "loss" of the Indies. They 
had been in the archipelago for about three and a half centuries, 
and many roots had become deeply embedded in Indonesian 
soil and many institutions in the Netherlands were dependent 
upon the economic, cultural, and political relationship with 
Indonesia. Once the connection was severed, these institutions 
would wither. Large numbers of Netherlanders had made Indo-
nesia their home, either on a permanent or semipermanent 
basis, and Dutch investments in Indonesia were large, especially 
for a country of the size and population of the Netherlands. 
The Dutch therefore were insistent that some tie between the 
two countries be preserved. Prominent statesmen like H. Colijn 
believed that the Nether lands had an enduring function as 
Indonesia 63 
the supreme authority over the different islands and peoples. 
Before the war there had been much discussion of the desir-
ability of an imperial union between the Netherlands, Indo-
nesia, and the Dutch territories in South America and the 
Caribbean, and a conference with this end in view was to have 
been called shortly after the war. 
The Indonesians indicated little enthusiasm for the union 
at the Round Table Conference, and that little was thoroughly 
dissipated within a year of the transfer of sovereignty. Though 
the language of the Union Statute clearly safeguards the inde-
pendence and sovereignty of the two members, the Indonesians 
feared that their country would be regarded as the junior 
partner. They looked upon the union as in some sense a vestige 
if not a continuation of the colonial relationship, or as Sukarno 
once put it, "the Union kept too much alive the memo:ry of 
the unhappy past." A series of events occurred during 1950 
which caused a serious deterioration in the relations between 
the two countries, namely, the participation of Captain Wester-
ling and some other Netherlanders in the attempted overthrow 
of the government by Sultan Hamid of Borneo, the support of 
a few Nether landers of the Darul Islam guerrilla activities, the 
revolt of Dutchified Ambonese in the South Moluccas, and the 
refusal of the Netherlands to cede \Vest New Guinea to Indo-
nesia. 
Negotiations to settle the political status of West New 
Guinea were conducted in 1950, but led to no result. The 
Netherlands government proposed putting the territory under 
the administration of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, but 
the Indonesian government demanded transfer of sovereignty 
over the territory to Indonesia. The Indonesians were under 
the impression that the Dutch delegation at the Round Table 
Conference had insisted upon tabling the West New Guinea 
issue merely as a face-saving device which would enable the 
Dutch government to get the Round Table Agreements ap-
proved by parliament, and that once this was obtained, Dutch 
public opinion on the issue would change and permit the gov-
ernment to yield to the Indonesian demand for West Irian (the 
name given the territory by Indonesians). Instead, Dutch pub-
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lie opinion hardened rather than softened on the issue, and the 
government seems determined to hold on to the territory. On 
the Indonesian side, President Sukarno never makes a speech, 
regardless of the occasion, without including a rousing demand 
for the "restoration" of West Irian to Indonesia. A West Irian 
bureau has been established in the government to direct the 
drive for the "return" of the territory. The Dutch authorities 
in New Guinea assert that they have seized Indonesian soldiers 
attempting to infiltrate into the territory, but the Indonesian 
government denies that any such attempt was made. 
The Indonesian government bases its claim to the territory 
almost solely on the ground that it was a part of the Netherlands 
Indies, to which the Republic of Indonesia has become the suc-
cessor. President Sukarno declares that the Indonesian national 
revolution will not be completed until West Irian again be-
comes a part of Indonesia. The Nether lands government claims 
that the territory has a geological, biological, and geographical 
character of its own which cannot be classified as Indonesian, 
and that from the point of view of culture, religion, language, 
and ethnology the Papuans, as the inhabitants of New Guinea 
are called, are quite different from Indonesians. In these re-
spects they are more closely related to the peoples east of them. 
Australia has also become involved in the issue. Australians 
have not forgotten the Japanese conquest of New Guinea, both 
the Dutch and Australian administered parts, in World War II 
and the serious threat to the Australian mainland from this 
direction. Australians feel that the defenses of the region are 
stronger with West New Guinea under Dutch administration 
than they would be with the territory under Indonesian rule. 
Moreover, if the Indonesian contention that the inhabitants 
of West Irian belong to the Indonesian nation were to prevail, 
it is difficult to see why the argument could not easily be ex-
tended to include the inhabitants of the eastern part of the 
island, which is under Australian administration. 
The Indonesian government tries to win international sup-
port for its claim to the territory by asserting that the chief 
issue involved is "colonialism." On this issue it can always 
obtain a great deal of support especially in the United Nations, 
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whose membership is so largely made up of states with a colo-
nial background. Indonesia nearly succeeded in getting the 
1954 session of the General Assembly to adopt a resolution 
requesting the Netherlands government to resume negotiations 
on the matter. It succeeded in getting the African-Asian Con-
ference at Bandung in 1955 to adopt a resolution vaguely sup-
porting its position. The matter was again before the General 
Assembly at its 1955 session, but when the Indonesian and 
Dutch governments issued a joint statement announcing early 
negotiations to settle differences between them, that body 
merely expressed the hope that the problem would soon be 
peacefully resolved. A resolution sponsored by African-Asian 
and some other countries to set up a good-offices committee 
to assist in negotiations between the two countries failed to 
receive the necessary two-thirds approval in the General As-
sembly when it came up for a vote on February 28, 1957. 
Though Netherlanders have left Indonesia in droves, a con-
siderable number still live there, and these people bear the 
brunt of the Indonesian ill will toward the Netherlands. The 
arrest and long-delayed trial of a score of Dutch citizens accused 
of complicity in plots against the government, and the alleged 
unfair methods of conducting the trial, has aroused the whole 
Dutch nation. The substantial Dutch investments are, of course, 
also exposed to Indonesian pressure. 
A Dutch military mission which was in Indonesia at the 
request of the government to help train its army was withdrawn 
in 1953. Its presence in the country had become a source of 
embarrassment to both governments because of continued 
attacks made on it. In 1954 the two governments signed an 
agreement to terminate the union, which after the first few 
months of its existence had ceased to have any life in it anyway, 
but ratification of the agreement was defeated five times in the 
Indonesian parliament in a very odd manner. Every member 
of the parliament wished to see the union formally buried, but 
most of them wanted the burial accompanied by a modification 
of the economic and financial agreements signed at the Round 
Table Conference. A large number of members felt so strongly 
about this that they absented themselves from the meeting of 
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parliament whenever this item was on the agenda. In this 
manner they were able five times to prevent a quorum. 
A ministerial conference between the two governments for 
the purpose of reaching an agreement on a formal dissolution 
of the union accompanied by new economic and financial agree-
ments was begun in December, 1955, in Geneva. The confer-
ences, suspended several times, became deadlocked in February, 
whereupon the Indonesian government unilaterally denounced 
the union, including the economic and financial agreements 
signed at The Hague Round Table Conference. In August, 
1956, the Indonesian government announced the repudiation 
of the debt to the Netherlands which it had assumed in the 
Round Table Conference agreements.8 
The bad relations existing between Indonesia and the N eth-
erlands is a tragedy for both countries. Indonesia desperately 
needs Dutch capital, technology, administrative ability, and 
experience. No other people know so much about Indonesian 
conditions and problems as the Dutch, and it is a pity that 
Netherlanders are not used more extensively. Their help can 
probably be obtained at considerably lower cost than aid from 
any other country in a position to render assistance. Likewise, 
the Dutch, crowded in their small territory on the North Sea, 
would find the outlet for their energy and talents very welcome. 
Moreover, Indonesians allow their anticolonialism and the West 
Irian issue to blind them to unpleasant facts at home which they 
ought squarely to face. On the former Dutch rule and the 
continued presence of Dutch interests in the country is laid 
the blame for all of their troubles. It would be better for the 
Indonesians if this convenient escape were not at hand and 
they were compelled to examine themselves and their problems 
honestly. 
NEUTRALISM 
Indonesian foreign policy is modeled after that of India. In 
attempting to define this policy, Indonesian spokesmen use very 
much the same language employed by the Dutch in prewar days 
8 According to the announcement from Djakarta, the sum involved is 
$963,000,000, but according to Dutch figures, only $170,000,000. 
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to explain the foreign policy of their country. Vice President 
Hatta, a person of moderate views, has described the Indonesian 
attitude toward foreign policy as follows: 
"Western nations tend to hold that there is no middle 
position for the weaker countries, and that they must choose 
between the one bloc or the other. . . . The policy of the Re-
public of Indonesia is not one of neutrality, because it is not 
constructed in reference to belligerent states but for the purpose 
of strengthening and upholding peace. Indonesia plays no 
favorites between the two opposed blocs and follows its own 
path through the various international problems. It terms this 
policy 'independent', and further characterizes it by describing 
it as independent and 'active'. By active is meant the effort to 
work energetically for the preservation of peace and the relax-
ation of tension generated by the two blocs, through endeavors 
supported if possible by the majority of the members of the 
United Nations."9 
Prime Minister Ali in a statement to the press in July, 1956, 
declared that Indonesia's "independent and active" foreign 
policy was the result of the following factors: (1) the historical 
developments which lead to national independence, and the 
current problems connected with advances in the social and 
economic field; (2) the fact that the economy of Indonesia is 
dominated by foreigners; (3) the desire of Indonesia to form 
its own personality in the world; (4) the fact that in the atomic 
age the possibilities for peace are much greater if military pacts 
are changed into active cooperation in economic and technical 
assistance.10 
Indonesia has rejected membership in Seato; it signed but 
did not ratify the San Francisco treaty with Japan; it has 
refused to accept any American economic or military aid which 
involves any sort of commitment to support or strengthen the 
"free world." It has taken an active part in the Colombo 
Powers conferences and took the initiative in convening the 
Asian-African Conference of 1955 and served as host to that 
conference. The Ali government was rather cool to the West 
9 "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XXXI (1953), 444. 
10 Djakarta Nieuwsgie1·, July 13, 1956. 
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and went a long way to establish cordial relations with Com-
munist China, and its domestic policy was characterized by 
friendliness towards the Communist party. The Masjumi party, 
while basically in accord with the independent foreign policy, 
is inclined to be cooler toward the Communist bloc and more 
cordial toward the West, as well as hostile to communism at 
home. Indeed, the Harahap cabinet, which succeeded the Ali 
ministry and from which the Nationalists were excluded, dis-
played a distinctly more friendly attitude toward the United 
States and the West, but the relatively poor showing made by 
the Masjumi in the general elections makes it unlikely that this 
was more than an interim manifestation. 
Indonesians reacted violently to the French-British military 
action against Egypt. Egypt is a Moslem country and was the 
first to recognize the Republic of Indonesia. On November 7, 
1956, mobs heavily damaged the building of the British Infor-
mation Office, carried out the books and journals, and burned 
them. A demonstration was also made before the French 
embassy. The British and French flags were hauled down and 
the Indonesian flag hoisted in their stead. The government 
strongly condemned the British-French action, and after some 
delay, also censured the Russian action in Hungary. 
In May, 1956, President Sukarno made an official visit to the 
United States, where he was cordially received. In September 
and October he visited Russia and Communist China. Foreign 
Minister Ruslan Abdulgani in Moscow signed a joint com-
munique with Andrei Gromyko, Soviet deputy foreign minister, 
in which colonialism was condemned and world disarmament 
and the banning of nuclear weapon tests were called for. About 
the same time an agreement was also signed for a $100,000,000 
Russian loan to Indonesia for economic and technical aid, with 
specific projects to be agreed upon later. The joint commun-
ique was sharply criticized in the Indonesian parliament, and 
even in the cabinet, as a departure from the country's foreign 
policy. The United States has granted Indonesia a total of 
$41,000,000 technical assistance, the amount for 1956 being 
$11,100,000. In 1955 Indonesia obtained a $96,000,000 loan 
for the purchase of surplus American commodities. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE PHILIPPINES 
Showcase of Western Democracy 
THE ESTABLISHMENT of United States sovereignty over a terri-
tory many miles from the American mainland and inhabited 
by an alien people who were already engaged in a bitter struggle 
for national independence presented a new departure in Amer-
ican policy, the meaning of which was not at once apparent to 
the American nation. Assuming responsibility for the destiny 
of the Philippines was not expansion into sparsely peopled areas 
awaiting American settlement, but imperialism, and for this 
the American people were not prepared. As a result there was 
little consistency in Philippine policy. In many respects the 
distant tropical territory was treated as if it was to become a 
part of the Union. English was made the official language of 
the islands, even though another Western language, Spanish, 
already enjoyed a wide use. Much of the American legal system 
was extended to the overseas territory, and as soon as the treaty 
with Spain permitted it, tariff barriers between the two coun-
tries were removed and the economic life of the Philippines 
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thus was made increasingly dependent on the United States. 
On the other hand, there soon developed a general assumption 
that the Philippines was to be granted independence and that 
the only justification and function of the United States in the 
islands was to prepare the Filipinos for self-government as 
rapidly as possible. The Filipinos thought little of either policy, 
and the revolt begun against Spain was continued against the 
United States. It required more than two years to pacify the 
islands, causing an unfortunate delay in the establishment of 
civil government. 
For an understanding of American policy in the Philippines 
it is necessary to keep certain factors in mind. Americans never 
became conscious of their responsibility in the Philippines. 
There were reasons for this. The islands were a long way from 
continental United States-some 8,000 miles-and few Amer-
icans visited them. Moreover, the area and the population of 
the United States was large in comparison with that of the 
Philippines, and there was little pressure on Americans to seek 
outlets for people or capital in the dependencies overseas. In 
the Congress the interests of the Philippines rarely played an 
important role. But the cause of the Philippines had one 
marked advantage, which Filipino nationalist representatives in 
this country fully exploited, and that was the generally strong 
anticolonial sentiment of the American people. 
The United States had been an immigrant-receiving country 
on an enormous scale, and in order to assimilate these vast 
numbers, the American people had unconsciously come to 
emphasize cultural assimilation or uniformity. The situation 
was not one to develop sympathy for foreign cultures. In con-
trast with the Dutch, who did not try to Dutchify the Indo-
nesian peoples, Americans quite naturally followed a policy of 
cultural assimilation in the Philippines. 
EARLY HISTORY 
The Philippine Islands constitute a compact archipelago of over 
7,000 islands with a total area of nearly 116,000 square miles. 
The two largest islands, Luzon with 40,814 and Mindanao with 
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36,906 square miles, account for 67 percent of the total area of 
the archipelago, and the eleven largest islands account for 95 
percent of the total land area. Over 6,500 of the islands have 
areas of less than one square mile each; some are little more 
than rocks jutting above the sea. The islands are strategically 
situated about 200 miles south of Formosa and 700 miles east 
of Indochina. Lying between the fifth and twentieth parallels, 
they have a tropical climate. The population at the time of 
the 1948 census was 19,234,182 and is now (1957) about 
22,000,000. 
Something of the history of the country is revealed in its 
name. In 1521 Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese navigator in 
the service of Spain, came upon the islands while on the expe-
dition to circumnavigate the globe. The islands were claimed 
for Spain and named in honor of Prince Philip, later Philip II. 
Not until about half a century after Magellan's discovery of 
the archipelago did the Spanish make permanent settlements. 
As the result of an expedition sent out from Mexico under the 
command of Miguel Lopez de Legaspi, settlements were estab-
lished on Cebu in 1569 and at Manila in 1571. Gradually 
Spanish administration was extended over the archipelago, and 
Spanish culture spread widely among the people. In 1611 
there was founded the Royal and Pontifical University of Santo 
Tomas in Manila. 
As a result of the Spanish rule, the Filipinos became Chris-
tianized and the most vV esternized of the Asian peoples. Islam-
ism had come to Mindanao and the Sulu islands about two 
centuries before the Spanish arrived, and the natives of these 
islands have remained Moslems, numbering about 800,000. 
About 90 percent of the population is Christian, with 80 per-
cent belonging to the Roman Catholic church. Protestantism, 
which dates from the American occupation, has made consider-
able progress. Pagans, constituting some 5 percent of the 
population, are found in the mountain fastnesses of northern 
Luzon and Mindanao. According to the 1939 census, nearly 
3 percent of the population could speak Spanish and about 
30 percent could speak English. 
While the Spanish did practically nothing to advance or train 
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the Filipinos in self-government, they indirectly created the 
conditions which were bound to produce a nationalist move-
ment. Spain brought the peoples of the many islands under 
one administration and gave the upper classes a common lang-
uage and the masses a common religion, thus gradually welding 
the different ethnic groups into a nation. A revolt against 
Spanish rule broke out in 1896, put down only to break out 
again a few years later. It had made considerable progress 
when the United States acquired the islands from Spain in 
February, 1899. The United States government now found 
itself in the awkward position of having to put down a move-
ment for national independence which had already adopted a 
constitution and organized a government. Not until April, 
1901, did General Emilio Aguinaldo, the leader of the revolt, 
surrender. 
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION, 1899-1933 
A year before Aguinaldo's surrender, President McKinley ap-
pointed a commission to set up a civil government in the 
Philippines. On July 4, 1901, William H. Taft, the chairman 
of this commission, became the first American civil governor. 
With this event, two years of military administration and the 
first phase of American rule came to an end, although the 
islands were not yet completely pacified. 
The commission, composed of Governor Taft, four other 
Americans, and three Filipinos, served as the chief governing 
body of the Philippines for six years. Collectively the com-
missioners served as a legislative body and individually as heads 
of governmental departments. Thus Filipinos were given re-
sponsible positions in government from the first days of Amer-
ican civil administration. Though Governor Taft adopted the 
slogan "The Philippines for the Filipinos," he took a rather 
conservative view as to the time that would be required to 
prepare the people of the archipelago for independence. By 
the Organic Act of 1902, the Philippines were authorized to 
send two resident commissioners to Washington with seats in 
the House of Representatives, but without the right to vote. 
In 1904 Taft was succeeded by General Luke E. Wright, a 
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member of the commission, who characterized his policy as 
one of "making the Philippines worth something to the Fili-
pinos." During the administration of James F. Smith as gov-
ernor general (1906-1909) an elective assembly was established. 
This body, which met for the first time on October 16, 1907, 
constituted, with the Philippine commission as the appointive 
upper house, the Philippine legislature. Upon Smith's resigna-
tion Vice Governor "'\V. Cameron Forbes was appointed to the 
office, serving until succeeded in 1913 by President Wilson's 
appointee. 
The twelve years from 1901 to 1913 may be called the period 
of the Taft policy. Successively chairman of the Second Phil-
ippine Commission, first civil governor, secretary of war, and 
President of the United States, Taft throughout these years 
was in a position to formulate and direct American policy in 
the Philippines. During this period the organs of self-govern-
ment were set up and a civil service system based upon the 
merit principle was established. The latter, first created by 
act of the commission in 1900 and extended by the act of 
1907, was in its provisions much in advance of similar legislation 
in the United States. Absence of extreme partisanship also 
characterized the appointments to the highest positions. Of the 
five governors general of these years, only two, Taft and Henry 
C. Ide-who served less than six months in 1906-were Re-
publicans. 
Independence became an issue in the first popular general 
election. In the 1907 campaign for the newly created assembly 
the Nationalist party stood for "immediate independence of 
the Philippine Islands to constitute it into a free and sovereign 
nation under a democratic government," and the Progressive 
party called for increasing autonomy and eventual independ-
ence. The former, under the leadership of Manuel Quezon and 
Sergio Osmefia, won an overwhelming victory. The Nationalist 
party so increased its strength in succeeding elections that by 
1916 the Philippines had a one-party political system. In 1909 
Quezon, the tireless and resourceful young advocate of im-
mediate independence, was chosen by the assembly as one of 
the two resident commissioners to the United States. For the 
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next twenty-five years he skillfully kept the cause of Philippine 
independence steadily before the American people. 
In the campaign of 1900 the Democratic party had advocated 
independence for the Philippines. That continued to be its 
position in all of its platforms until the islands acquired com-
monwealth status in 1936. Wilson was strongly committed to 
this policy. His appointee as governor general, Burton Harrison, 
eagerly carried out the President's directive to do everything 
possible to prepare the territory for ultimate independence and 
"to move toward that end as rapidly as the safety and the per-
manent interests of the islands will permit." As an immediate 
first step the commission was reconstituted to give the Filipinos 
a majority of that body. 
In 1916 Congress provided the Philippines with a new or-
ganic act, which in the preamble declared that it always had 
been "the purpose of the people of the United States to with-
draw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to 
recognize their independence as soon as a stable government 
can be provided therein." An elective senate replaced the 
appointive commission as the upper house of the legislature. 
Directly or indirectly, however, all bills, including appropria-
tions, could be vetoed by the President of the United States. 
Governor General Harrison interpreted the Jones act, as the 
new organic act was called, very liberally in favor of Filipino 
self-government. Except in matters affecting public order and 
protection of American interests, he followed the advice of the 
council of state, composed of the speaker of the house, the 
president of the senate, and heads of the executive departments. 
The council of state became in effect a cabinet in a parliamen-
tary government. The governor general rarely exercised his 
veto power. Moreover, Filipinos replaced Americans in admin-
istration. By 1920 the government of the Philippines in all of 
its branches had been almost completely Filipinized. In his 
report for that year Harrison declared that the people of the 
Philippines were ready for independence. President Wilson in 
his last annual message to Congress endorsed this view and 
recommended that independence be granted. 
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The Republicans, who came to power in 1921, were not 
convinced that the dependency was ready for independence. 
President Harding sent a mission to the islands to make a 
survey of conditions and to ascertain the real wishes of the 
people. The mission, headed by General Leonard Wood and 
former Governor General W. Cameron Forbes, reported that 
the government was wasteful and inefficient, and that it had 
entered into a number of unsound business ventures. The 
mission found a very general desire for independence, except 
among the non-Christian peoples and the Americans, but 
accompanied with the assumption that American protection 
would be continued. It recommended that no change be made 
in the status of the islands "until the people have had time to 
absorb and master the powers already in their hands," that the 
powers of the governor general be reestablished or recovered, 
and that the United States should not permit a situation to 
develop which would leave it in a "position of responsibility 
without power." 
The appointment of General Wood as governor general im-
plied the approval by President Harding of the mission's 
recommendations, but unfortunately Wood's efforts to recover 
the relinquished authority of the office led to increasing friction 
with the Filipino political leaders. The crisis which had de-
veloped under Wood ended with his death in 1927 and the 
appointment in 1928 of Henry L. Stimson as his successor. In 
his short term of office Stimson succeeded in restoring good 
relations with the political leaders and in reestablishing much 
of the authority of the office. His Republican successors, Dwight 
Davis (1929-1931) and Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. (1931-1933), 
continued the Stimson policies. 
During these years the Filipino leaders exerted continuous 
pressure for independence. Mission after mission was sent to 
Washington requesting it. In reply to comments in the United 
States that the people of the Philippines did not want inde-
pendence, the insular legislature in 1927 passed a bill over 
Governor General Wood's veto providing for a plebiscite which 
would enable the people of the islands to demonstrate their 
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desire for national freedom. The measure was disapproved by 
President Coolidge. 
The independence issue entered a new phase with the depres-
sion. Heretofore the Filipinos ardently pressed the issue upon 
a reluctant Washington, but after 1930 the American Congress 
was determined to sever the colonial relationship with the 
Philippines, but on terms which the Filipinos were loath to 
accept. Filipino leaders, having become somewhat aware of 
the cost, were not so certain that they wanted complete inde-
pendence. Panic stricken by the deepening depression, several 
important sections of the American public wished to deprive 
Philippine products of the advantages they enjoyed on the 
American market because of the 100 percent tariff preferences 
between the two countries. Sugar-cane and sugar-beet growers 
and dairy farmers felt especially aggrieved, because of the large 
imports of sugar and coconut oil from the Philippines, though 
the latter commodity came into competition with butter only 
indirectly as an ingredient in oleomargarine. American in-
vestors in Cuban sugar production were likewise interested in 
restricting the entrance of tariff-free Philippine sugar to the 
American market. Labor also supported the movement to 
grant the Philippines independence, since Filipino laborers 
were coming to the United States in increasing numbers. It 
was generally assumed that free entry would have to be granted 
Filipinos and Philippine goods so long as the islands remained 
under the sovereignty of the United States. 
With American interest groups joining the idealists in 
demanding independence for the Oriental dependency, the 
national freedom of the Philippines was assured. Congress, on 
January 17, 1933, passed the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act over 
President Hoover's veto. The law was not to become effective 
until accepted by the Philippine legislature, but this body, 
under the influence of Senator Quezon, rejected it. Quezon 
himself headed a new independence mission (the tenth) to 
Washington to plead for more liberal terms, but Congress 
was in no mood for major concessions. Quezon won just enough 
to help him in his battle for political power in Manila. The 
Philippine Commonwealth and Independence Law, generally 
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known as the Tydings-McDuffie Act, was signed by President 
Roosevelt on March 24, 1934, and was accepted by the legis-
lature of the Philippines on May I. 
THE COMMONWEALTH ESTABLISHED 
The Tydings-McDuffie act provided for an intermediate stage 
to independence. In accordance with the provisions of the act, 
a constitution for the Philippine commonwealth was drafted 
by a popularly elected convention and ratified in a popular 
referendum. During the commonwealth period of ten years, 
foreign relations remained under the control of the United 
States government. Instead of the governor general there was 
established the office of high commissioner. Free trade between 
the two countries was continued for the first five years, but 
beginning with the sixth year the Philippine government was 
to levy an export tax of 5 percent "of the rates of duty which 
are required by the laws of the United States to be levied, col-
lected, and paid on like articles imported from foreign coun-
tries." The rate was to be increased by an additional 5 percent 
each year, and with the termination of American sovereignty 
the United States would levy the same import duties that it 
levied on goods coming from other foreign countries. For the 
purpose of the regulation of immigration the Philippines would 
immediately be regarded as a foreign country and was granted 
a quota of 50 immigrants a year. During the commonwealth 
period the President of the United States had a limited author-
ity to suspend laws, contracts, and acts of the commonwealth 
government. 
The constitution which the Philippines adopted was basically 
the United States Constitution with such changes as some 
political scientists and progressive reformers have from time to 
time suggested be made in it. Its legislative body, called the 
national assembly, consisted of only one house. The president's 
term of office was six years, but he was not eligible for im-
mediate reelection. He had the power to veto items of appro-
priation bills. He also had the power to make treaties, with 
the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the national 
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assembly. The supreme court was specifically given the power 
to declare laws and treaties unconstitutional, but only with the 
concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of the court. The 
Philippine constitution had a rather marked economic and 
social emphasis. With some changes, this is the constitution 
under which the Philippines is governed today. 
The constitution went into effect on November 15, 1935, and 
the commonwealth was inaugurated. Manuel Quezon became 
the first president and Frank Murphy, who became governor 
general in 1933 by appointment of President Roosevelt, became 
the first American high commissioner. 
THE CHARACTER OF AMERICAN RULE 
With the establishment of the commonwealth the primary 
responsibility for the government of the islands had passed from 
the American to the Filipino people. During the common-
wealth decade the United States government through the high 
commissioner was to have only a supervisory and restraining 
power. Since the direct United States administration ended in 
1935, the American achievement in the Philippines has to be 
assessed as of that year. 
First of all, the United States was generous with the Philip-
pines. It bore the total cost of defense, a burden which in most 
other colonies was borne by the colony itself. This enabled 
the Philippines to spend a larger percentage of governmental 
income for welfare and education than was the case in other 
dependencies. 
Secondly, the United States rapidly reduced the number of 
Americans in the Philippine service and replaced them with 
Filipinos, even in the highest government positions. This was 
in sharp contrast with the policy of the French in Indochina, 
of the Dutch in Indonesia, and even of the British in Malaya. 
The number of Americans in the classified service of the Phil-
ippines reached its peak in 1905, when the total was 3,307. 
By 1914 the number had declined to 2,148. Under the admin-
istration of Governor General Harrison the number shrank 
rapidly. In 1921 there were only 614 Americans in the service 
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of the Philippine government, and about half of these were 
teachers. In 1913 all but two or three of the bureaus were 
headed by Americans; in 1921 nearly all of the bureau chiefs 
were Filipinos. 
On the political side the story was the same. From a minority 
in an appointive commission in 1901, the Filipinos were granted 
in a series of acts ever greater self-government, until on July 4, 
1946, the Philippine Islands received their independence, in 
spite of the fact that the ten-year commonwealth period had 
been interrupted by war, much destruction, and over three 
years of hostile occupation. 
Good as the American record was on the political side, the 
United States shared with other colonial powers in the region 
the failure to develop the economic and social conditions which 
are necessary if real democratic self-government is to flourish. 
That American policy failed to lay the basis for a sound demo-
cratic society is evident from the data on social conditions re-
vealed by the 1939 census reports and official reports since the 
war. Over half of the wage earners in 1939 received less than 
35 cents a day, and 38 percent had no work animals. Aliens 
conducted 87 percent of the business of the country and con-
trolled over 85 percent of the invested capital. Farm tenancy 
increased during the period of American rule. In spite of the 
great effort made in the field of education, only 41.4 percent 
of the children between the age of 7 and 10 were in school. 
Moreover, the holding power of the schools was low. Half of 
the children entering the first grade dropped out of school 
before they completed the third grade, and only about a tenth 
of them remained to complete the seventh grade. 
The annual national income was low, and it was very un-
equally distributed. About half of the Filipino people received 
an annual income, largely in kind, of about $62.50 per family, 
and although only one percent of the people received an annual 
family income of over $500, their combined incomes amounted 
to about one-third of the total national income.1 
1 Shirley Jenkins, American Economic Policy Toward the Philippines (Stan-
ford, Calif., 1954), 41. Her statement is based on the Report and Recommenda-
tions of the ]oint Philippine American Finance Commission, H. R. Doc. 390 
(Washington, July 8, 1947), ll. The estimated figures are for 1938. 
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The United States did little in a positive, direct way to 
improve economic conditions. By measures to improve health 
and by releasing funds for education the American government 
indirectly did much to improve social conditions, but this was 
in considerable part nullified by the policy of preferential tariffs 
between the United States and the Philippines. Americans 
liked to call it the free-trade policy, but it was free only for 
Americans and Filipinos. For others it was a door very nearly 
completely closed: about 80 percent of the Philippine exports 
in value was artificially channeled to the United States, and 
about 60 percent of the islands' imports came from this country. 
By encouraging Filipino producers to concentrate on a few 
specialized export crops, this policy tended to keep the economy 
of the islands predominantly dependent and agricultural. Sugar 
alone accounted for over 40 percent of the exports in value, 
while the four chief export commodities-sugar, abaca (Manila 
hemp), copra, and coconut oil-accounted for three-fourths of 
the total exports in value. About 12 percent of the population 
was dependent upon the sugar industry for its livelihood. The 
country had so specialized on a few export commodities that 
it failed to produce enough food to feed its own people, even 
though it was predominantly agricultural. The "free trade" 
relationship with the United States also tended to discourage 
home industries. 
When the United States transferred direct responsibility for 
administration to the commonwealth government in 1935, it 
could not boast of what it had achieved in improving the life of 
the masses. In his annual message to the national assembly in 
October, 1937, President Quezon, speaking of the results of 
the American rule for the working man said: "His hopes have 
been raised, his vision has been broadened, and his outlook has 
been painted in bright colors. But 35 years of American 
regime has brought him only disappointment and sometimes 
despair. . . . The poor has still to drink the same polluted 
water that his ancestors had drunk for ages. Malaria, dysentery, 
and tuberculosis still threatened him and his family at every 
turn. His children cannot all go to school, or if they do, they 
cannot even finish the whole primary instruction for one 
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reason or another. Roads from his barrio or his little farm to 
the town there are none. Only trails are within his reach-
trails that have been formed by the daily pressure of his bare 
feet and not because they have been constructed. As he works 
from sunrise to sundown, his employer gets richer while he 
remains poor. He is the easy prey to the heartless usurer because 
usury is still rampant everywhere despite legislative enactments 
intended to suppress it."2 
Under the conditions, agrarian unrest was to be expected; it 
was not a postwar development.3 In 1935, the last year of Amer-
ican rule, an armed uprising occurred in the provinces around 
Manila by the Sakdalistas, a minor political party. The leaders 
of the movement charged the party in power with indifference 
and insincerity toward the demands of the poor and advocated 
a drastic reduction in the taxes paid by the poor, a more equal 
distribution of property, and a division of the large landed 
estates. 
With the economic and social conditions such as they were, 
it is not surprising that political life did not develop along truly 
democratic lines. The Filipinos had developed a one-party 
government, with President Quezon as very nearly the absolute 
boss of that party. The government became highly centralized; 
the larger cities had practically lost the right of self-government. 
The national assembly had not the prestige nor the power, and 
2 The Second Annual Report of the United States High Commissioner to the 
Philippine Islands. Covering the calendar year 1937. Manila, September 1, 1938 
(Washington, 1939). 
3 "During the period covered by the present report there was an increase in 
both labor and agrarian unrest. . . . The spread of agrarian unrest has been 
more serious than urban labor disputes. All efforts on the part of the Common-
wealth government to obtain settlements of tenancy troubles in Bulacan and 
Pampanga Provinces have been of little avail. ... Basic faults in the technique 
of agriculture, extreme parcelling of the land, resulting in tenant holdings too 
small for family subsistence, absentee-land-lordism, and a perhaps socially pre· 
mature abandonment of the paternalistic features of the hasama system, are the 
accountable roots of this very serious problem .... While the present admin-
istration of the central government has proclaimed widely the extension of a 
'social justice program' to include tenant and small-scale farmers, and has passed 
some meritorious laws, it has been unable, through lack of money, personnel, 
and the inertia of a traditional system, to arrive at a program for definite solu-
tion. Meanwhile, agrarian leaders, those of sincerity as well as many acting 
from motives of personal profit, have organized numerous country societies, some 
of which are so radical as to appear subversive of government itself." 
Third Annual Report of the United States High Commissioner to the Philip-
pine Islands. Covering the Calendar year 1938 and the first six months of 1939. 
Manila, Oct. 1, I940 (Washington, 1943), 36-37. 
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generally lacked the will, to check the president. When Quezon 
wanted the national assembly made bicameral and the presi-
dent's term reduced from six to four years, with the right of 
reelection subject to the provision that no person could serve 
more than eight years in the office consecutively, his wishes 
were granted with practically no debate. "By 1940," wrote 
Ralston Hayden in his great work on the Philippines, "Presi-
dent Quezon had taken the position that parties are not neces-
sary to democratic government. Further party organization, he 
declared, should be postponed in the Philippines."4 
Americans liked to refer to the Philippines as the showcase 
of democracy in Asia. While there is much in the record of 
the United States in its administration of the islands which is 
praiseworthy, it is not as good as most Americans like to think. 
For a number of years after the war the exhibit in the showcase 
looked very bad indeed. 
WAR AND JAPANESE OCCUPATION 
Some people in the United States were in favor of granting 
the Philippines independence out of isolationist sentiments. 
Japanese aggression in Manchuria in 1931-1932 had caused 
Americans grave concern over the possibility of a war in the 
Far East. Some believed that the danger of involvement in 
future hostilities in the Western Pacific would be greatly re-
duced by the United States' withdrawal from the Philippines. 
As Japan continued its aggression and moved southward, finally 
occupying Indochina in 1940, Americans and Filipinos became 
alarmed. General Douglas MacArthur was induced by President 
Quezon to come to the Philippines to build its defenses. How-
ever, the Philippine and United States governments disagreed 
over the responsibility for the complicated, expensive under-
taking. President Quezon argued that so long as sovereignty 
over the islands remained with the United States, and with it 
exclusive American control over Philippine foreign policy, 
accountability for any war in which the Philippines might 
become involved would rest with the United States. Pearl 
4 The Philippines: A Study in National Development (New York, 1942), 450. 
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Harbor found the Philippines inadequately prepared, but the 
fighting spirit of the American and Filipino defenders, aided 
by the favorable setting of Bataan and Corregidor, denied vic-
tory to the enemy until May 6, 1942. President Quezon and 
Vice President Osmefia had departed before the surrender and 
had set up headquarters in Washington. 
Because of the advanced stage of the Philippines on the road 
to independence, Japanese policy there differed from its policy 
in the other dependencies of the region. Japan "granted" the 
Philippines "independence" and permitted the establishment 
of a puppet government with Jose P. Laurel as president. Many 
of the Filipino leaders collaborated with the Japanese, whatever 
their motives may have been. As elsewhere, collaborationists 
sought to justify their acts or excuse themselves with the pro-
testation that their object was the protection of the Filipinos 
from worse Japanese treatment. The puppet government, no 
doubt under Japanese pressure, declared a state of war on 
the United States and Great Britain. In contrast with the col-
laboration of the leaders was the heroic conduct and resistance 
of the rank and file. 
Some of the Filipino leaders apparently succumbed to Japa-
nese propaganda of "Asia for the Asiatics" and the "Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Some of the collaborators 
proclaimed their conversion to the "true Oriental spirit" in 
perfervid eloquence, according to statements received by short-
wave radio in the United States. Jorge B. Vargas, former secre-
tary to President Quezon and later ambassador of the puppet 
government to Japan, for example, declared: "We were in 
hopeless bondage ... and Japan liberated us. We were 
deluded victims and Japan redeemed us. We were divided by 
political dissensions, weakened by imitation and frivolity, de-
luded by a sense of inferiority and Japan uplifted us." General 
Aguinaldo, the old revolutionary leader, who in all the years 
after his surrender had been friendly toward the United States, 
saw "all troublesome doubts dispelled by the light of Japan's 
rising sun, by whose rays we have found the central fact of our 
national existence, the eternal truth which eluded us, but to 
which our national soul was anchored from the beginning, 
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namely, that we are Orientals and that it is our God-given duty 
to do our part as members of that proud race."5 
POSTWAR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
President Quezon did not return to his country; he died in 
August, 1944, while in exile in the United States. He was 
succeeded by the vice president, Sergio Osmefia. The latter had 
enjoyed a long, distinguished political career, but he lacked 
the remarkable resourcefulness and force of Quezon. Osmefia 
returned to a country which had suffered severe war damages 
and was plagued with financial, economic, social, and political 
problems. Chief among the latter was the issue of collaboration 
with the Japanese. President Roosevelt had declared that the 
collaborators must be punished, and President Truman crit-
icized the Osmefia government for its failure to take action 
against the leaders of the Japanese puppet government. The 
matter was never vigorously pushed for a number of reasons. 
Except among dissident groups, there seemed to be little popu-
lar demand for it. Too many of the old-time political leaders 
were involved, and when Manuel Roxas was cleared by General 
MacArthur and in 1946 was elected president, the movement 
was robbed of logic and force. Although for the next two years 
treason trials were held, no one had been finally judged. All 
of the convictions were appealed to the supreme court, which 
had not confirmed any; on the contrary, it had granted a full 
pardon to Sergio Osmefia, Jr., son of the former president, who 
had been convicted of selling war materials to the Japanese and 
had been sentenced to a long term in prison. In January, 1948, 
President Roxas proclaimed amnesty to all Filipino citizens 
accused of political or commercial collaboration with the enemy. 
With this the issue was as good as buried. 
In the general election held in April, 1946, Manuel Roxas 
ran for the presidency as the candidate of the Liberal party. 
The chief issue in the campaign was collaboration, but in spite 
of this, Roxas received the support of the veterans, the press, 
5 Radio Reports on the Far East (Broadcast Intelligence Service, Federal 
Communications Commission, Washington, 1943). 
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the landlords, and influential Americans. He seemed to have 
convinced a majority of the voters that he could get more aid 
from the United States than Osmefia. When Roxas died sud-
denly in April, 1948, the vice president, Elpidio Quirino, suc-
ceeded him. In the presidential election of 1949 the Nation-
alists chose Jose Laurel as their candidate. Only four years 
after the end of the war the chief collaborator with the enemy, 
the man who had been president of the puppet government, 
was chosen by one of the great political parties as its leader. 
Laurel, who vigorously disclaimed being a collaborationist, 
wanted his war record vindicated by popular endorsement. 
Quirino's government had become unpopular because of al-
leged corruption and incompetence. However, by using all of 
the great powers of the presidential office and by exerting 
extreme pressure on officials and voters, President Quirino 
managed to win the election, at least officially. The Laurel 
forces charged that the election had been stolen. 
Under Quirino the government of the Philippines reached 
near collapse. Economic and financial conditions had become 
so bad that President Quirino appealed to President Truman 
for American aid. Before making any recommendations to 
Congress, Truman sent Daniel vV. Bell to the islands to make 
a survey of conditions. In its report,6 made in October, 1950, 
the Bell mission laid bare the unpalatable facts. It declared 
that the basic economic problem in the Philippines was inef-
ficient production and low incomes. Although population in 
the last decade had increased by 25 percent, agricultural and 
industrial output in 1950 was still below the prewar level and 
the standard of living of most people was lower than before 
the war. The mission declared that wages were wholly inade-
quate for many agriculture workers. The situation, it indicated, 
had become critical. Among the conclusions of the Bell mission 
were: 
"The inequalities in income in the Philippines, always large, 
have become even greater during the past few years." 
6 Report to the President of the United States by the Economic Survey Mission 
to the Philippines. Oct. 9, 1950 (Department of State, Publication 4010, Far 
Eastern Series 38). 
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"Because of the deteriorating economic situation there is a 
widespread feeling of disillusionment. Most agricultural and 
industrial workers have no faith that their economic position 
can or will be improved. Business men fear a collapse of the 
peso." 
"The Philippine farmer is between two grindstones. On top 
is the landlord, who often exacts an unjust share of the crop 
in spite of ineffective legal restrictions to the contrary. Beneath 
is the deplorably low productivity of the land he works. The 
farmer cannot see any avenue of escape." 
"Inefficiency and even corruption in the government service 
are widespread." 
"The public lacks confidence in the capacity of the Govern-
ment to act firmly to protect the interests of all the people. 
The situation is being exploited by the Communist-led Huk-
balahap movement to incite lawlessness and disorder." 
"The finances of the Government have become steadily worse 
and are now critical. The Treasury has a large mounting 
deficit, with taxes covering little more than 60 per cent of the 
expenditures." 
The Bell report examined at some length many aspects of 
the economic problems of the Philippines. It strongly recom-
mended that the budget be balanced by reforming the tax 
system and increasing revenues. It further recommended direct 
financial aid by the United States of some $250,000,000, chiefly 
on a project basis and subject to supervision in order to guar-
antee effective use of the funds. An agreement for the imple-
mentation of the Bell program was signed on November 14, 
1950, but before it could go into effect, President Quirino had 
to induce the legislature to pass the reform measures which 
the program called for. There was much opposition to the 
proposed legislation, especially to the tax measures and the 
minimum-wage law for agricultural workers. After several 
months of debate the measures were passed, though in some-
what diluted form. 
It is not surprising that there was some resentment against 
the United States among Filipinos because of the pressure 
exerted upon them to enact the reform measures. The basic 
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ills which the Bell report laid bare were of long standing. In 
the decades when the United States had the responsibility for 
governing the islands it did little to change the pattern of the 
economic life of the country; now, when it no longer had the 
responsibility, it was using pressure to induce the Philippine 
government to make the reforms which it itself had not even 
attempted. 
THE HUKBALAHAP MOVEMENT 
Smoldering discontent periodically breaking out into violence 
is an important trend in Philippine history from the earliest 
days of Spanish rule until today. There were peasant uprisings 
under American rule: in northwestern Mindanao in 1923-1924 
by a secret society known as the Colorums, in northern Luzon 
in 1931 by another secret organization called the Tangulans, 
and in 1935 in the provinces surrounding Manila by a party 
calling itself the Sakdalistas. The last-named group had elected 
three of its members to the house of representatives in the 
elections of the previous year. All of these uprisings reflected 
deep, bitter discontent among the peasants. 
Rural society in the Philippines is composed of two main 
classes, the landlords and the tenants, with the former getting 
many of the good things of life and the latter practically none. 
Moneylenders and overseers quite naturally were lined up with 
the landowners, and most of the politicians either were land-
lords themselves or dependent upon them. The government 
and its agents, the constabulary and the army, were generally 
on the side of the landlords. Tenants and agricultural workers 
deeply distrusted and even feared the constabulary. 
Ralston Hayden, foremost student of the political develop-
ment of the Philippines and the last American vice governor 
of the islands, described the social and political problem of 
the tenants, which he called "the unrepresented minority," as 
follows: "As represented by the Sakdals and Communists, they 
came from the other side of a deep political, social and eco-
nomic chasm, and had already shown that they were ready to 
resort to violence in order to overcome the handicaps placed 
upon them by the existing political system. By far the largest 
88 Southeast Asia 
portion of them are rural laborers-the common Taos who as 
tenant farmers, renters or virtually landless workers eke out 
a miserable living from the rich Philippine soil. These people 
constitute a depressed minority which has been largely left 
behind in the march of Philippine progress. Astonishingly igno-
rant, for the most part unable to use effectively any language 
save their local dialect, it is they who are the most complete 
victims of the local cacique} the remorseless usurer and the 
exploiting political or religious charlatan."7 
President Quezon became concerned about the agrarian un-
rest and in 1936 announced his program of "social justice." 
However, little of this program reached the statute books. 
Various liberal and radical groups came together shortly after 
the invasion to form a united front against the Japanese. They 
became popularly known as the Huks, an abbreviated form of 
Hukbalahap (Hukbong Bayan Laban Sa HaponJ which is 
Tagalog for People's Anti-Japanese Army). Peasants consti-
tuted the base of the group, but among the leaders were a 
number of intellectuals. At the head of it was Luis Taruc, 
labor organizer and editor of labor publications. Huk guer-
rillas were effective in operations against the Japanese, but 
throughout the war they apparently carried on hostilities against 
landowners and those associated with them with even greater 
vigor. The ideology of the movement steadily became more 
openly communist. 
After the war the H uks demanded that they be taken into 
the national armed forces as a unit with the retention of their 
identity. When this was denied them, they went underground 
again. They continued to kidnap and execute collaborators 
and traitors, and to take levies on harvests. In short, they set 
up a government within their area of control and carried on 
war against the national government at Manila. 
The Huks in the 1946 election supported Osmefia against 
Manuel Roxas for president. They regarded Roxas as a col-
laborator and friend of the landowners, but curiously, in 1949 
they backed Jose Laurel, who had headed the puppet govern-
ment under the Japanese. Roxas tried to cope with the move-
7 The Philippines, 378. 
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ment by inaugurating some agrarian reforms and by vigorous 
military action against the H uks. Quirino began a resettlement 
program and made a peace overture with amnesty to Huks. 
For a while it looked as if this move might be successful. As 
an act of good faith the Huks were expected to register their 
arms, but few did so. Taruc, who had come to Manila to take 
the seat in congress to which he had been elected in 1946, 
suddenly disappeared, and the hostilities broke out again. 
The situation had become desperate by 1950. The Huks 
seemed to be everywhere; their strength was estimated at 
40,000 fully armed members, with about 2,500,000 reserves. 
They made attacks on towns on the outskirts of Manila, and 
the capital itself seemed in danger. At this critical juncture 
(September, 1950) President Quirino appointed a young con-
gressman, Ramon Magsaysay, as secretary of defense. He re-
organized the army and got it to pursue the Huks deep into 
the jungle. He rooted out inefficiency and corruption. He was 
convinced that misery, bad government, and exploitation by 
the landlords was at the bottom of the discontent, and so he 
followed a policy of all-out friendship for all who were pre-
pared to surrender, and all-out force against the Communist 
core of diehards. Among those who capitulated was the leader, 
Luis Taruc. Surrendered Huks were resettled on small farms 
in attractive communities. "\Vithin a year the whole situation 
had changed and the Huk menace had been greatly reduced. 
In 1951 the army was called upon to police the elections. The 
fact that the Nationalists, the opposition party, won a sweeping 
victory in the midterm elections is good evidence that the 
elections that year were conducted honestly, in contrast to 
what happened in 1949. 
THE MAGSAYSAY POLITICAL REVOLUTION 
Ramon Magsaysay, the young secretary of defense who had in 
a short period broken the back of the Huk movement and 
electrified Filipinos by the vigor and honesty with which he 
administered his department, had become a national hero. 
There were suggestions that he be chosen as his party's candi-
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date for the presidency. \Vhether for this or other reasons, 
there developed a coolness between President Quirino and Sec-
retary Magsaysay. The Nationalists now became interested in 
making the defense secretary their candidate. On March 1, 
1953, Magsaysay resigned his post, justifying his action with 
the statement that "It would be useless for me to continue as 
Secretary of National Defense with the specific duty of killing 
Huks as long as the administration continues to foster and 
tolerate conditions which offer a fertile soil for Communism."8 
Magsaysay left the Liberals and became the candidate of the 
Nationalist party for president. A short time before the Liberal 
party held its convention in May, General Carlos P. Romulo 
resigned as the ambassador to the United States and permanent 
representative at the United Nations, and announced his can-
didacy for nomination for president by the Liberal party. The 
convention was firmly in President Quirino's control, however, 
and he secured his own renomination. General Romulo and 
his supporters bolted the convention and organized a new 
Democratic party, which nominated him as its candidate for 
president. In August, Romulo withdrew his candidacy and 
formed a coalition with the Nationalists. 
The election campaign was hard fought. Magsaysay carried 
the campaign into the barrios (villages), which was something 
new in Philippine politics. He charged the Quirino admin-
istration with incompetence, corruption, graft, and failure to 
carry out basic agrarian reforms and to provide education and 
welfare services. President Quirino stood on his record, stressed 
his opponent's lack of experience, and charged the Nationalists 
with seeking American intervention in the Philippine elections. 
He belittled the "new knight" of the Nationalists, he accused 
the elder statesmen Senators Jose Laurel and Claro Recto of 
tax frauds, and characterized the Magsaysay movement as one 
of "ultranationalism, foreign interventionism, pro-Communism 
and sheer opportunism."9 
Magsaysay and the Nationalists won an overwhelming vic-
tory, receiving over two-thirds of the vote cast. They carried 
s New York Times, March 2, 1953. 
9 New York Times, April 17, 1953. 
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24 of the 28 cities and 48 of the 52 provinces. Magsaysay's 
election was hailed as a triumph of the masses and a victory 
for honest government, inaugurating a new day in Philippine 
politics. After conceding the election, President Quirino in a 
radio address declared the election had proved that "a working 
democracy" had been built in the Philippines.10 Magsaysay 
had a clear mandate from the voters to carry out the reforms 
he had advocated, but he soon ran into trouble with the old 
guard of the party, who were reluctant to acknowledge his 
leadership. This was especially true of Senators Laurel and 
Recto. The president emerged from a party caucus in June, 
1954, as the apparent victor, with all in attendance signing a 
set of party principles, but Recto continued critical and unco-
operative. Congress delayed and sometimes diluted administra-
tion bills. 
As secretary of defense and as president, Magsaysay said re-
peatedly that merely killing dissidents would not solve the 
Communist problem, but that "its solution lies in the correction 
of social evils and injustices and in giving the people decent 
government free from dishonesty and graft." Corruption was 
deeply imbedded in the government, and while a profound 
change has been made in the general atmosphere, it has not yet 
been rooted out. Magsaysay invited everybody in the land, 
whatever his economic or social status, to bring his complaints 
to Malacanang Palace, the official residence of the president. 
The president himself frequently goes out into the villages to 
adjust the complaints. This has made him very popular with 
the masses, but trying to settle everybody's little problems has 
tended to leave him little time or energy to work at the large 
national problems. Magsaysay began haltingly, but he has 
gained confidence and momentum with experience. 
President Magsaysay was able to get a new law, called the 
Agricultural Tenancy act, which codifies and regulates the 
relationship of the landowner and sharecropper or leaseholder, 
giving more security to the tenant and farm worker. The law 
limits the rate of interest on loans to tenants at 8 percent. 
Later an agrarian court was created, which operates very much 
10 New York Times, November 17, 1953. 
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like the court of industrial relations. A land-tenure law was 
enacted to permit expropriation of large estates and their re-
distribution where "justified agrarian unrest exists." 
The Magsaysay administration in the 1955 election campaign 
claimed a number of other accomplishments, such as building 
many miles of roads connecting the hinterland with trading 
centers, stimulating an increase in food production, construct-
ing 3,000 public buildings and schools, completing irrigation 
projects providing 157,000 hectares with water, providing more 
credit facilities for farmers, and revising the Bell Trade Act 
agreement to give the Philippines certain economic advantages 
and benefits. 
While these are all creditable achievements, the question still 
remains whether they are enough. The basic problem of under-
production has hardly been touched; unemployment is high and 
is decreasing little, if at all. The number of unemployed in 
1956 was estimated at about 2,000,000 in a population of 
22,000,000. Budgets and foreign trade remain unbalanced. The 
international dollar reserves continued to drop in 1955 and 
stood at only $213,000,000 at the end of the year, in spite of 
considerable United States government spending. Congress is 
reluctant to pass adequate tax measures, and tax collection 
efficiency is poor. There will be a strong temptation to use 
the Japanese reparations payments to make up government 
budget deficits rather than use them on development projects 
as planned. 
FOREIGN POLICY 
The Philippine Islands became a sovereign state on July 4, 
1946, but already before that date its government had actively 
entered world politics. As president of the commonwealth, 
Quezon signed the United Nations Declaration (June 10, 
1942) . Throughout the war the Philippines, represented by 
Quezon and after his death by Osmefia, was a member of the 
Pacific War Council. The commonwealth government in exile 
signed the UNRRA agreement on November 9, 1943, and the 
Bretton Woods agreement in December, 1945. The Philippines 
also participated in the San Francisco conference which drafted 
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the Charter of the United Nations and became one of the 
original members of this organization. The chief of its dele-
gation, General Carlos P. Romulo, took an active part in the 
movement of the small states to restrict the great power veto 
and to make the provisions of the articles on non-self-governing 
territories as broad as possible. Romulo's attitude at San Fran-
cisco established the pattern of Philippine foreign policy. While 
in some matters the island republic follows American policy 
rather closely, it is quite independent in others. 
The foreign policy of the Philippines, according to Carlos 
P. Garcia, vice president and concurrently secretary of foreign 
affairs under President Magsaysay, rests on three cornerstone 
principles, namely, (l) to maintain, deepen, and broaden the 
Philippine-United States relations, (2) to maintain and con-
tinually improve her good-neighbor relations with the sister 
countries in Asia, and (3) to maintain and continually improve 
the Philippine historic relation with Spain and other Latin 
countries. To these three principles should be added active 
participation in the United Nations and adherence to the 
principles of the Charter. The third principle stated by Secre-
tary Garcia is more a matter of sentiment than of practical 
importance. It reflects a certain pride of Filipinos in the culture 
they acquired in three centuries of Spanish rule and which has 
survived five decades of American administration and influence. 
Upon the invitation of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, Presi-
dent Quirino made a state visit to Spain in 1951. The Philip-
pines joined a group of Latin American countries in 1950 in 
getting the General Assembly of the United Nations to rescind 
the resolution passed by it in 1946 recommending that the 
members withdraw their ambassadors and ministers from Ma-
drid and barring Spain from membership in the specialized 
agencies of the United Nations. 
Many Filipinos are convinced that their country has a special 
role to play in world politics, which is to serve as "the inter-
mediate means through which the West can earn the friendship 
and faith of the Asians." A Filipino newspaper editor has stated 
the argument as follows: "Geographically, in a military sense, 
politically, culturally, and even economically, the Philippines 
94 Southeast Asia 
is in a most enviable location in Asia. We are of Asia and yet 
not a part of the Asian mainland, unlike Thailand, Vietnam, 
Malaya and South Korea; kept apart and at a reasonably safe 
distance by the China sea, unlike Hong Kong and Formosa, 
which are dangerously close to a land mass that bodes ill for 
lesser territories adjoining it. vVe are equally well situated to 
serve as a base against a continental enemy or as a base from 
which to bolster the ideals of democracy and to win friends 
throughout Asia."11 
President Quirino cherished the idea of the formation of a 
regional association or union of "the little democracies" of 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific for collective defense. He 
pressed the project vigorously for nearly four years, with meager 
results. The Philippine government called a conference which 
met at Baguio in May, 1950, to which Australia, Ceylon, India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, and Thailand sent representatives. The 
conference revealed the sharp differences in foreign-policy at-
titudes of the countries of the region. In July, 1949, Quirino 
had been visited by Chiang Kai-shek, who, speaking also for 
Syngman Rhee of South Korea, had urged the formation of a 
Far East anti-Communist pact. The neutralist countries, how-
ever, were so opposed to taking a collective anti-Communist 
stand that neither Chiang's nor Rhee's government was invited 
to the conference. Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo 
reassuringly stated that the conference would not be "Anti-
Communist or anti-anybody." Resolutions on cultural, eco-
nomic, and social relations and cooperatiQn were adopted. The 
suggestion of the Philippines for a permanent organization was 
not acted upon. Romulo called the conference an "epoch-
making" event, "the first formal articulation of Asian conscious-
ness along a broad political basis," but its impact on world 
politics was somewhat less than that. In fact, the conference 
made no provision for meeting again and was overshadowed by 
11 Modesta Farolan, New York Times, July 8, 1956. President Roxas in a 
speech in the United States in 1946 declared, "We are not of the Orient except 
by geography. ·we are part of the ·western world by reason of culture, religion, 
ideology, economics .... We expect to remain part of the \Vest, possibly as the 
ideological bridge between the Occident and the Orient." See George A. Malcolm, 
First Malay Republic (Boston, 1951), 161. 
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the Asian-African Conference held at Bandung, Indonesia, in 
April, 1955, where the Philippines delegation, headed by Rom-
ulo, took an active part in diluting the strongly neutralist trend 
of the proceedings. 
After the election of Ramon Magsaysay as president, some 
Filipinos and Americans urged him to step forward as the 
leader of the Pacific countries. Senator William F. Knowland, 
at the time Republican majority leader of the upper house of 
Congress, called upon him to take the leadership in organizing 
seven Far Eastern countries "to challenge the Communist 
scheme for the conquest of the Orient."12 With rare good sense 
President Magsaysay modestly brushed aside the suggestions 
that he play the role of leader of the Asian peoples by saying 
that he had homework to do. 
The Philippines, through its very able representative Gen-
eral Romulo, has played an active part in the United Nations. 
Romulo's election as president of the General Assembly in 1949 
was a tribute to his country and to him. The Philippines has 
served as a member of the Trusteeship Council (1948-1950), 
and in 1955 after a protracted contest and many ballots it won 
a split term (with Yugoslavia) on the Security Council. In the 
United Nations as at Bandung, the Philippines has sought to 
serve as a bridge between the Asian-African countries and the 
West. 
Filipinos are trying to develop closer relations with their 
neighbors, but with only moderate success. The Philippines 
has been host to a number of regional meetings of various kinds. 
The University of the Philippines has a program known as 
Scholarship and Exchange of Professors for Southeast Asia, and 
it has also established a Center of Asian Studies, to which it is 
attempting to draw students from all the countries of Southeast 
Asia. There have been a number of exchanges of high official 
visits, but the results of all of these efforts are still rather meager. 
The truth is that the Filipinos are not generally popular with 
Asians. The latter feel that the Filipinos regard themselves as 
different, and indeed, as superior to their neighbors. The Asians 
12 New York Times, November 21, 1953. 
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regard the Filipinos as Westernized, as alienated from their 
native culture. Sometimes they are caustically characterized as 
the strange product of three centuries of life in a Spanish con-
vent followed by forty years in Hollywood. President Sukarno 
of Indonesia in his address to the congress on the occasion of 
his official visit to the Philippines in 1952 chided the Filipinos 
for their radical desertion of their indigenous culture. The 
countries of Southeast Asia which follow a neutralist foreign 
policy naturally view the Philippines with some distrust. They 
regard it as a client, or somewhat of a satellite, of the United 
States. 
An effort to develop closer relations with Cambodia took a 
queer turn. Upon invitation, Prince Norodom Sihanouk Var-
man of Cambodia made an official visit to the Philippines. In 
a speech upon his arrival at the airport in Manila on January 
3, 1956, he stated that "although we obtained our independence 
by peaceful means from France, who remains our friend, we 
had to defend it sword in hand for eight years against foreign 
Communist invasion, brutal and unprovoked." Before a joint 
session of the Philippine congress he declared: "if Cambodia 
is neutral she does not conceal that she intends to closely co-
operate with countries who have the same democratic and 
social ideals, the same aspiration for justice, liberty and well 
being of the masses," and at a reception given him by the sec-
retary of defense and the army chief of staff he remarked that 
he wished the Philippine armed forces success in defending the 
security of Southeast Asia. Upon his departure he said that he 
was "convinced" that he had obtained good results in strength-
ening the "century-old" ties existing between Cambodia and 
the Philippines, and that he would tell his people and govern-
ment that the solidarity of the Cambodians and the Filipinos 
"is once again alive, tangible." These remarks quite naturally 
led the Filipinos to think that if the prince was a neutralist, he 
was a neutralist with strong anti-Communist sympathies. Upon 
his return home, to the amazement of Manila, he charged that 
the Philippine hospitality was part of an American plot to draw 
Cambodia into Seato. Sometime later he accused the Philippine 
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government of having exerted strong pressure on him to join 
Seato. He later visited Communist China, signed a coexistence 
treaty with Peiping, and denounced Seato in the strongest terms. 
Shortly afterward, he made a visit to Moscow. 
The attempt to develop closer relations with Indonesia ran 
into a difficulty which caused some tension. An issue arose be-
tween the two countries, which though it was not serious, was 
not easily solved. Over the years a number of Indonesians had 
illegally entered the Philippines and made their home there. 
The proximity of little islands between the Sulu Archipelago 
and the groups of islets north of Indonesia, the fact that the 
natives on both sides of the boundary are Moslems, and the 
absence of an adequate patrol system encouraged illegal im-
migration. The number of Indonesian immigrants was esti-
mated at 6,000. There were unofficial reports from Djakarta 
that as many as 20,000 Filipinos were entering Indonesian 
Borneo annually, but apparently very few Filipinos have mi-
grated to Indonesia, either legally or illegally. The official 
estimate of illegal Filipino immigrants was 3,000. A reason for 
Filipino concern about the relatively small number of illegal 
immigrants involved was probably revealed by an editorial in 
the Manila Times of August 24, 1954. "It should be realized," 
declared the newspaper, "that 6,000 Indonesians with a mission 
to perform, such as the dissemination of Communist propa-
ganda, could do a lot of damage in areas where social conflicts 
are unresolved." 
After two years of intermittent negotiations an agreement 
was reached. Immigration regulations for the inhabitants of 
the frontier areas for temporary visits were simplified. With 
respect to the illegal immigrants it was agreed that those who 
had crossed the frontier before October 29, 1954, would be 
repatriated unless they satisfied certain legal requirements. 
About 1,600 Indonesians and 80 Filipinos would be repatriated 
under the agreement. All those who crossed the national fron-
tier after October 29, 1954, would be returned to their original 
homes. 
The Philippine government is solidly behind the United 
98 Southeast Asia 
States policy with respect to China. Sometimes it fears that 
the American government is not thoroughly and definitely 
committed to this policy, and may ultimately deviate from it. 
Formosa is only a few hundred miles distant from Luzon, and 
most Filipinos quite naturally fear any new Communist terri-
torial gains in their area. The Philippines strongly supported 
the American position on Korea and was one of the small 
number of countries to support the United Nations action with 
military contingents. 
The determination to support Nationalist China against 
Communist China does not mean the relations between Manila 
and Taipei always run smoothly. The Chinese constitute a 
problem in all of the countries of Southeast Asia, and though 
their number in the Philippines is relatively small, the Filipinos 
are much concerned about some of their activities. Chinese 
control a large share of the retail trade. According to the 
bureau of census and statistics, aliens (mostly Chinese) con-
trolled more than half of the retail business in 1953. A law 
designed to put all retail trade ultimately in the hands of Fili-
pinos was enacted in 1954. Foreigners doing business in the 
Philippines fear that the provisions of this law will gradually 
be extended to cover the wholesale, import, and export trade 
and other businesses. This law has been a severe blow to the 
Chinese community in the Philippines. 
Another problem which has caused some difficulties between 
the two countries is the supervision of Chinese schools in the 
Philippines. These schools were suspected of being centers of 
Communist infiltration. Charges were also made that the 
Chinese schools followed the curricula prescribed by the Nation-
alist government in Taipei and not those prescribed by the 
Philippine government. A committee appointed by the board 
of national education to investigate these schools reported the 
total absence of the Filipinization process. The children of 
Chinese immigrants were becoming Philippine citizens without 
acquiring any knowledge of the country's system of government, 
history, or the customs and traditions of the people. Taipei 
was as much concerned about Communist infiltration in these 
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schools as was Manila, and it offered to do all in its power to 
prevent it, but the Nationalist government did insist upon the 
right, under the terms of the Treaty of Amity with the Philip-
pines, of the Chinese communities to operate them. After con-
siderable diplomatic discussion China did concede the sole and 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Philippine government over all 
schools in its territory, but the latter agreed to permit the 137 
Chinese schools to operate subject to a "joint supervision" over 
them. According to the agreement, signed January 23, 1956, 
Manila will prescribe the basic curricula but the schools may 
offer additional subjects. 
Another troublesome issue between Manila and Taipei has 
arisen over Chinese who have entered the Philippines as tem-
porary visitors and have overstayed the period allowed them by 
law. The Philippine government wants to expel them all and 
has insisted that Formosa receive them. The Nationalist gov-
ernment is reluctant to yield to this demand, since most of 
the Chinese involved came from the mainland in the years 
1947-1951, and some of them presumably are Communists. 
Filipinos are much worried about the presence of Chinese 
in their country, regardless of whether the latter are Commu-
nists or not. The non-Communist Chinese are disliked be-
cause of their aggressiveness in business, and the Communists 
are distrusted because of their revolutionary activities. On 
March 27, 1955, the army announced that it had crushed a 
nationwide conspiracy organized in China to overthrow the 
Philippine government. A number of ringleaders were ar-
rested. 
The political connection with the United States, and espe-
cially the preferential tariff arrangement, prevented the de-
velopment of close cultural and economic relations between 
the Philippines and Japan. What would have been the out-
come if the Philippines had obtained its independence several 
decades earlier can only be a matter of conjecture. At long 
last, with the ratification in 1956 of the reparations agreement 
between the two countries, the road has been cleared of major 
obstacles to the development of closer relations, but as a 
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result of the war and the Japanese occupation there still re-
main psychological barriers in the way of such relations. 
The Philippine government signed the Japanese peace 
treaty at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, but it was not 
happy about it. There was strong popular opposition to some 
of the terms of the treaty. In Manila, feeling against signing 
the treaty ran high, taking the form of public demonstrations. 
Filipinos were opposed to the reparations clauses of the treaty, 
which drastically restricted Japan's obligations to pay. Fili-
pino bitterness was undoubtedly heightened by the economic, 
social, and political conditions, which at the time were bad 
and seemed to be getting worse. It was natural for Filipinos 
to ascribe all of their troubles to the Japanese invasion. This 
attitude was poignantly expressed by an indignant Filipino in 
a ·letter to the editor of the New York Times.l3 He wrote, 
""Whatever is the state of affairs in the Philippines at present, 
is the result of enemy atrocities in the new nation. Not only 
that there was physical and human devastation, but a moral 
breakdown was a natural negative result of four long years 
of enemy domination, when there was not enough food and 
no opportunity for work." 
Under the terms of the peace treaty Japan accepted the 
obligation to pay reparations, but no amounts were specified. 
This was left for determination by bilateral negotiations be-
tween the occupied countries and Japan, subject to the restric-
tion, however, that reparations were to be limited to goods 
and services. This provision made it unlikely that the Philip-
pines would get anything like the eight billion dollars in cash 
it was demanding. The Philippines originally had insisted 
also upon the branding of Japan as an aggressor in the war 
and upon a stringent limitation of Japan's capacity for resurg-
ence as an economic and military power. The sad experience 
with the reparations problem after World War I had made 
the United States and Great Britain wary of creating a situa-
tion like that again. Moreover, as a result of the developments 
in world politics, especially the triumph of communism on the 
13 Vincente D. Gabriel in the issue of August 13, 1956. 
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mainland of China, the United States could not afford to see 
economic and social conditions in Japan deteriorate further. 
Japan's economy had to be made viable, or the Japanese gov-
ernment might have to cope with a rising Communist move-
ment in the country and feel compelled to make trade and 
possibly other arrangements with Soviet Russia and Commu-
nist China as a solution to its economic problems. Japanese 
economy at the time was still at a dangerously low level. During 
the period of occupation, Japan had failed to meet its food 
and raw-material requirements by about two billion dollars. 
This huge deficit was made good by the United States. 
When the Philippine senate gave notice that it would refuse 
to approve the peace treaty until after a reparations agreement 
had been reached, negotiations on this matter began. The 
Philippine government first demanded $8,000,000,000, and 
Japan's initial offer was only $250,000,000. By an interim 
agreement signed April, 1953, Japan acknowledged the moral 
validity of the Philippines' claim and undertook the task of 
salvaging the sunken ships in Philippine waters as a first step 
in meeting its obligations. After several years of negotiations 
the Philippines had scaled its demand down to $1,000,000,000 
and Japan had increased its offer to $400,000,000. At one 
point in the negotiations, Vice President Garcia, the repre-
sentative of the Philippines, signed a memorandum providing 
for payment of the amount offered by Japan, but this was 
repudiated by President Magsaysay. 
Agreement on a reparations settlement was finally reached 
in August, 1955, but it took almost a year more to obtain the 
consent of the Japanese parliament to its terms. According to 
the provisions of the agreement, which was signed May 9, 
1956, Japan will pay $500,000,000 in capital goods, $20,000,000 
in cash, and $30,000,000 in services over a period not to 
exceed ten years, and $250,000,000 in long-term development 
loans. Although the Filipinos insisted on the reparations, they 
are not altogether happy now that agreement has been reached. 
They fear the influx of Japanese capital, goods, and services 
may reopen their country to Japanese economic penetration. 
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Ratification of the reparations agreement finally cleared the 
way for ending the state of war between Japan and the Philip-
pines. On July 16, 1956, the senate of the Philippines gave 
its consent to the Japanese peace treaty of 1951. 
POSTWAR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 
As has already been noted, the system of preferential tariff 
between the Philippines and the United States during the 
colonial and commonwealth periods had reduced the former 
to almost complete economic dependence on the American 
market. Thus when the Philippines became politically inde-
pendent on July 4, 1946, the republic had still to gain its eco-
nomic independence. Trade between the two countries had 
been completely severed during the three years of Japanese 
occupation, and much of the economy of the country had been 
badly damaged. In view of this it might have been better 
not to have reinstituted the trade preferences. The United 
States could have helped the Philippine economy make the 
adjustment to the full tariff schedules of both countries by 
means of subsidies. However, the trade preferences were re-
instituted and the colonial character of the Philippine econ-
omy perpetuated for a number of years. 
Economic relations between the Republic of the Philippines 
and the United States were regulated by the Philippine Trade 
act of 1946, passed by the United States Congress just shortly 
before the commonwealth became the republic. The act pro-
vided for reciprocal free trade until July 3, 1954, followed by 
increasing duties (5 percent each year) until July 3, 1973, 
when the full rates would become effective. However, seven 
of the most important exports of the Philippines were made 
subject to absolute quotas. The act also contained the so-
called "parity clause" which guaranteed to nationals of the 
United States the right to exploit the natural resources of the 
islands and to operate utilities on equal terms with Filipinos. 
A third restrictive provision tied the peso to the dollar. 'With-
out the agreement of the President of the United States, the 
government of the Philippines could not change the value of 
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its currency in relation to the dollar, nor suspend the con-
vertibility of pesos into dollars, nor impose restrictions on 
the transfer of funds from the Philippines to the United States. 
Filipinos had protested the institution of trade preferences 
in 1909, but pleaded for their continuation in 1945 and 1946. 
They believed that this was the surest and quickest way of 
securing the rehabilitation of their country. American capital 
would be induced to restore the old economy and create new 
industries. The "parity clause" was a high price to pay for 
the hope of American investments and caused special diffi-
culties, for it was in conflict with a provision of the Philippine 
constitution which restricted the exploitation of natural re-
sources to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations of 
which at least 60 percent of the capital was owned by Filipinos. 
There was much sharp criticism of the Trade act as being 
"non-reciprocal and one-sided." The Nationalist party de-
nounced it, declaring that it would "condemn the Filipino 
people to slavery." In spite of a growing opposition, President 
Roxas was able to get it approved by his congress. By a vigor-
ous campaign he also won the popular referendum on the 
constitutional amendment which would give American capital 
equal rights with Filipino capital in developing the country's 
resources and acquiring franchises for public utilities. An 
important factor in the referendum was the popular impres-
sion that further American aid for rehabilitation and recon-
struction was dependent on acceptance of parity.14 There was 
a provision in the Philippine Rehabilitation act passed by the 
United States Congress in 1946 which limited payment on any 
war-damage claim to $500 until the Trade Agreement act 
should go into effect, and the latter was made dependent on 
acceptance by the Philippines of the "parity" provision. 
Demands for revision of the Trade act of 1946 became more 
insistent as the time approached for the graduated imposition 
of duties on trade with the United States. Filipinos believed 
that the act was in a large measure responsible for the retarded 
condition of their economy, and that it prevented the develop-
ment of industries in the Philippines by keeping the country 
14 See Jenkins, American Economic Policy Toward the Philippines, ch. 7. 
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dependent on a few export crops. Young industries in the 
islands could not hope to compete in the home market against 
duty-free goods from the United States, the most highly ad-
vanced industrialized country in the world. 
The Philippine government first asked that the 100 percent 
preferences on trade between the two countries be extended 
for 18 months, to January 3, 1956. This request was granted 
by the United States government as preliminary to negotia-
tions to revise the Trade act. A Philippine panel headed by 
Senator Jose P. Laurel and an American panel headed by James 
M. Langley carried on negotiations in Washington during the 
closing months of 1954. A new agreement was concluded in 
December, 1954. 
Filipino leaders were determined to obtain a revision of the 
agreement of 1946, threatening trade with Communist China 
in case the United States Congress should fail to approve the 
Laurel-Langley agreement. When in May and June, 1955, it 
looked as if the agreement might be defeated in Congress, 
Senator Gil Puyat, who had been deputy chairman of the 
Philippine panel, urged the abrogation of the 1946 agreement 
and trade with China as an alternative to the existing agree-
ment. He declared that "It appears that we must now turn 
to Red China for economic survival because our democratic 
friends choose to abandon us."15 He was not alone in these 
views. Senator Claro M. Recto, in supporting Puyat's sug-
gestion, stated that he had always favored economic ties with 
Communist China because it would be beneficial to the Phil-
ippine economic stability, and Senator Edmundo B. Cea, 
chairman of the senate committee on commerce and industry, 
declared that too much dependence on the American market 
was "unwise and dangerous." The agreement was signed 
September 6, 1955, and went into effect January l, 1956. 
The new trade agreement is more reciprocal than the old, 
and its provisions generally are more favorable to the Philip-
pines. It eliminated United States control over the exchange 
rate of the peso in terms of dollars, while the so-called "parity" 
15 News From the Philippines (Division of International Information, Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs, Manila, June 6, 195rl). 
The Philippines 105 
provision, which allowed Americans to exploit natural resources 
and to operate public utilities in the Philippines on the same 
basis as Filipinos, was made reciprocal. The Philippines were 
granted the right to accelerate the imposition of import duties 
on American manufacturers, and the United States agreed to 
impose duties on Philippine goods at a slower pace than under 
the 1946 agreement. Full tariff rates will be applied by both 
countries in 1974, as in the agreement of 1946. It is hoped 
that the new trade regulations will stimulate industrial expan-
sion in the Philippines. 
A large amount of American money has gone into the Philip-
pines since the end of the war, some of it in direct aid and the 
rest in government expenditures. The total dollar receipts in 
the decade 1946-1955 have been estimated at nearly 2,500,000,-
000 as follows: military expenditures, 1,039,000,000; Veterans 
Administration, 562,000,000; economic aid, 85,000,000; and war 
damages, 768, 000,000.16 Under the military expenditures come 
such items as back pay for Philippine armed forces, civilian 
claims against the military, civil relief, and redemption of 
guerrilla currency. The Veterans Administration paid compen-
sation to Filipino veterans. 
Filipinos are not satisfied with the amount of war damages 
they have received. They argue that since the United States 
was sovereign over the islands at the time of the war, it should 
reimburse Filipinos l 00 percent for all losses sustained. They 
also have the feeling that the fact of American sovereignty at 
the time was the cause of their misfortunes. It is interesting to 
speculate on what would have happened if the Philippines had 
been independent at the outbreak of the war. The republic 
could not have remained neutral in the struggle. It would 
have had to choose between collaboration with Japan or resist-
ance to Japanese aggression. If it chose the first course, it 
probably would have been battered by the United States and 
its allies; if it chose the second, its fate would have been the 
same as in 1941-1945. In either case it would have had no 
legal claims against the United States for war damages. 
The republic also has become dependent on the United 
16 The Philippines: A Report on Business and Trade (New York, 1956). 
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States for defense. In 194 7 it signed an agreement granting the 
latter a number of naval and military bases for ninety-nine 
years. In accordance with a Military Assistance agreement 
signed in the same year, the United States undertook to aid in 
the development and training of the Philippine armed forces, 
and in 1951 the two countries entered into a mutual-defense 
treaty. They agreed "separately and jointly by self-help and 
mutual aid" to "maintain and develop their individual and 
collective capacity to resist armed attack." Unlike Nato, the 
obligation to provide military aid in case of attack is not auto-
matic. According to Article IV, "Each party recognizes that 
an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties 
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares 
that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance 
with its constitutional processes." 
Filipinos have not been happy about the clause which pre-
sumably requires action by the American Congress before the 
treaty becomes effective in case of armed attack. Both the 
President of the United States and the secretary of state have 
sought to reassure the Philippines that it would regard an attack 
upon the Philippines as an attack upon the United States, but 
Filipinos would like to have this incorporated in the treaty 
itself. 
There is also dissatisfaction with the agreement on military 
and naval bases. The opinion issued in 1954 by Attorney Gen-
eral Herbert Brownell that the United States held title to the 
base lands became the center of sharp controversy. Many Fili-
pinos regarded the opinion as in conflict with Philippine 
sovereignty. The United States government yielded on the 
title issue even before negotiations on a revision of the bases 
agreement began in Manila in August, 1956. President Mag-
saysay was being pressed by extreme nationalists to demand 
more than the United States could possibly yield, even to help 
meet the political necessities of a stanch friend. The Philippine 
house in July, 1956, passed a resolution urging the president 
to demand, among others, the following changes in the agree-
ments: that mineral, forest, and water rights within the bases 
remain with the Philippines; that the laws of the Philippines 
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be enforced on the bases and that the jurisdiction of Philip-
pine courts be extended to all offenses against Philippine law 
whether committed on or off the bases; that the period of the 
leases be reduced from ninety-nine to twenty-five years; and 
that for use of the bases during wartime Philippine congres-
sional action be necessary. The delimitation of present base 
areas and the acquisition by the United States of limited new 
areas for radar warning centers and airstrips for the dispersal 
of jet planes were problems, but the jurisdictional question 
seemed to be the key issue. On this issue the two governments 
were far apart. While the negotiations were going on, a Phil-
ippine congressional committee was investigating the whole 
scope of Philippine-United States relations, including the 
American economic aid program and military advisory group. 
However, when negotiations were suspended in December, 
1956, other important issues seemed to have been interjected. 
The Philippine panel insisted upon the right to control the 
use of the bases in the event of war, and on including the 
bases agreements as part of a "package deal" which would make 
the United States' rights to the bases contingent on an annual 
plan of military aid.17 
Filipinos were not altogether happy with the special relations 
with the United States, and least of all with the special privi-
leges which the Philippines had been called upon to grant. 
Two measures especially were resented, namely, the demand 
for "parity," already described, and the so-called 1946 Property 
act passed by the United States Congress before the Philippines 
became independent. The latter gave agencies of the United 
States government the right to acquire title to property in the 
islands. The American explanation that the act was designed 
to help the United States to discharge its commitments to the 
Philippines and its people, and that it merely reserved to the 
United States title to certain physical properties to which it 
already had title, did little to placate the feeling it aroused. 
The act evoked bitter anti-American editorials and comments 
in Philippine newspapers. 
The special relationship with the United States quite natu-
17 New York Times, December 6, 1956. 
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rally has become an issue in Philippine politics. There is 
always the temptation for a presidential candidate to claim the 
favor of the United States government and thus to be able, if 
elected, to obtain more United States aid than his opponent. 
This was a background issue in the election of 1946, and prob-
ably won the presidency for Roxas. Many Filipinos undoubtedly 
voted for Quirino in 1949 because they feared that the United 
States would not welcome the election of Laurel, a collabora-
tionist, as president. In the election of 1953 this consideration 
clearly favored Magsaysay, as he was generally regarded as 
strongly favored by Americans and their government. Mag-
saysay and his followers contended that United States aid would 
not cease if the Quirino administration was turned out. To 
counteract this, President Quirino accused American officials 
and military men of meddling in Philippine politics and the 
Nationalist party of seeking American intervention in the elec-
tion. Quirino's effort to arouse and draw Filipino nationalism 
to his support failed, but there is always the temptation in 
Philippine politics for someone to seize upon this issue. Sen-
ator Claro Recto has caused President Magsaysay much trouble 
by charging him with subservience to the United States and 
with following an American rather than a Filipino foreign 
policy. Others have chided him for not getting more aid from 
the United States.18 
At the end of the first decade of Philippine independence, 
relations between the United States and its former dependency 
had deteriorated somewhat. A number of factors explain this 
situation. The presence of foreign troops, even of close allies, 
has caused trouble all the way from Iceland to Okinawa, and 
the situation in the Philippines is no exception.19 Filipinos 
also feel that their country has not been treated as generously 
in economic aid as European or even other Asian states, and 
18 See summary of editorial in the Philippines Herald, March 12, 1955, as 
given in Editorial Trends, March 15, 1955. The latter is issued by the Division 
of International Information, Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila. 
19 Ernesto 0. Granada, who conducts the column "Behind Page One" in the 
Manila Chronicle, wrote "The observation is well worth repeating that it is the 
American soldier in these parts who is stirring anti-American feeling. For the 
average American soldier seems unaware that the country has been independent 
since 1946. He is as pompous, as abusive and as demanding as when he was 
:here last to scare off the Japanese." May 28, 1956. 
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that in wooing neutralist countries the United States has for-
gotten its stanchest friends. Domestic politics also enters the 
picture. Enemies of President Magsaysay's land and other re-
forms dare not attack him on these issues, but seek to discredit 
him by attacks on the United States and by branding him as 
too pro-American. The sugar lobby in Manila also has its ax 
to grind. It is angry and fearful because of the suggestion in 
the United States that the import quota for sugar from the 
Philippines be cut in retaliation for the restrictions on the 
import of American tobacco by the Philippines. Filipinos are 
also critical of the small annual quota (fifty) which the Amer-
ican immigration laws grant them, and they chide the United 
States for giving more economic aid "to Japan, a former enemy, 
than she has granted to the Philippines, a traditional ally."20 
While the strain in the relations between the two countries 
has become serious, it is by no means critical. 
20 Remarks by Pedro Padilla at Rizal Day banquet in San Francisco. New 
York Times, December 31, 1956. 
CHAPTER 4 
INDOCHINA 
Gateway to Southeast Asia 
THE FALL OF Dien Bien Phu to the forces of Viet Minh on 
May 8, 1954, dramatized to the whole world the growing mili-
tary and political weakness of the French in Indochina. The 
negotiations at Geneva in the summer of 1954 which resulted 
in the partition of Vietnam confirmed Western pessimism about 
the future of this section of Southeast Asia. During the next 
year the gloomy outlook of the \Vest was justified in large part 
by the fact that the north Vietnamese regime of the Communist 
Ho Chi Minh had got off to a much faster start than its 
southern rival, the anti-Communist government of Premier 
N go Dinh Diem. This pessimism was further deepened by the 
realization that the loss of Indochina would mean more than 
the enslavement of yet another distant country by the inter-
national Communist camp. As President Eisenhower had put 
it in the spring before Geneva, Indochina was "the cork in the 
bottle," and if that cork were removed, Communist aggression 
would be able to spread out through all of Southeast Asia. 
Indochina Ill 
Although conditions in south Vietnam in early 1957 were 
not such as to occasion unbridled optimism, the situation had 
improved markedly over that prevailing fifteen months earlier. 
Significant areas of the troublesome internal divisions had been 
eradicated. The Binh Xuyen, the notorious gangster clique 
which once controlled Saigon's police, had been defeated, and 
Premier Diem was in control of his own police force, which 
he had not been at the start of 1955. Moreover, not only had 
his army demonstrated its competence in defeating the Binh 
Xuyen as well as in engagements with the rebellious religious 
sects, but it also had proved its loyalty to Diem and his gov-
ernment. This, too, was a distinct improvement over conditions 
of a year earlier, when south Vietnam's strength-sapping per-
sonal rivalries had raised grave doubts concerning the army's 
reliability as a prop of the Diem regime. The threat to the 
government deriving from the activities of the feudalistic re-
ligious sects also had been eliminated. The leadership of one 
of these sects, the Cao Dai, had thrown in its lot with the 
government, and its private forces had been integrated into the 
national army. The other major rebellious religious group, 
the Hoa Hao, proved less than a match for the military arm of 
the Diem regime. Bao Dai, the anachronistic playboy emperor, 
had been ousted as chief of state, and Diem had been voted 
president (as well as premier) of the newly proclaimed south 
Vietnamese republic. On March 4, 1956, elections were held 
for south Vietnam's first national assembly. Communist ele-
ments were unable to disrupt either balloting. Communist 
infiltration of the government (including the armed forces) 
seemed to have been checked, while the rural areas-formerly 
dominated by Communist cadres-were coming gradually under 
the authority of Saigon. 
To the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem should go primary 
credit for the marked improvement in conditions in south 
Vietnam. Diem's outstanding leadership notwithstanding, how-
ever, it is certain that south Vietnam's record would have been 
less impressive without American diplomatic and financial sup-
port. In the fiscal year 1954-1955 the United States allocated 
$320,300,000 worth of aid to non-Communist Vietnam and 
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$196,500,000 the next year. American aid accounted for an 
estimated 65 percent of south Vietnam's total expenditures, 
including most of the military budget. Without Diem's leader-
ship, the United States' economic and military assistance might 
have been aid down the drain. Without this assistance, on the 
other hand, Diem would have had an even more difficult time 
keeping his portion of divided Vietnam from succumbing to 
chaos and subsequently to Communism. He might not have 
been able to do so. Progress clearly was being registered by 
the Diem regime, but would it result in an ultimate triumph 
over the Communists? This was the big question. 
FRANCE AND COLONIALISM 
French action against the Communist Viet Minh movement 
in the post-war years was primarily in behalf of the continuation 
of French colonial rule in Indochina. Political intervention by 
France in Indochina (about the size of France itself) had begun 
in 1786, when a Catholic bishop led a group of soldiers into 
Cochin China, the southernmost part of present-day Vietnam. 
France did not actually acquire territory in Indochina at that 
time, however; the three eastern provinces of Cochin China 
came under its rule only in 1862. When the century ended, 
France was in control of all of Indochina. Cochin China was 
a colony in both name and fact, but Tongking (northern 
Vietnam, including the important cities of Hanoi and Hai-
phong) , Annam, Cambodia, and Laos were called protectorates. 
The difference between colony and protectorate was more in 
theory than practice, for a powerful governor general, appointed 
by Paris, ruled over a highly centralized administration which 
included all five territories. 
Opposition to French imperial control clearly was present 
from the start of French domination. During the First World 
War this resistance began to assume the form of Western-type 
nationalism, imported to distant Indochina through the writ-
ings of its greatest French spokesmen. Nationalism as a move-
ment gained further strength as a consequence of France's use 
of more than I 00,000 Indochinese troops in Europe, where they 
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came into direct contact with Western democratic concepts and 
ideas. The next two decades witnessed ever-increasing agitation 
for the ending of French imperial rule in Indochina. 
Vietnamese nationalism constituted the core of French prob-
lems in Indochina. As it gained momentum in the years leading 
up to the Second World War, France fought primarily to 
retain its colonial domination. The native elite developing in 
Vietnam was denied political and economic responsibility, and 
so equal social status as well. The situation could hardly have 
been more explosive. 
The explosion came shortly after the conclusion of the 
Second World War. The French administration in Indochina 
had acquiesced in the Japanese occupation of the land, although 
more for reasons of expediency than affinity with Japan's aims. 
It continued nominally to govern Indochina until almost the 
war's end, but Japan was the real ruler of the country. After 
the war, Indochina was occupied by British and Chinese troops. 
The French also wanted American help in returning to Indo-
china-indeed, General Charles de Gaulle flew to Washington 
to ask this of President Truman-but the United States refused. 
Vietnam having been the hotbed of nationalism in Indochina 
during the twenties and thirties, it was not unnatural that the 
French should come to a settlement more easily with Cambodia 
and Laos, less aroused and less strong. The agreement with 
Cambodia was signed January 7, 1946, and with Laos on August 
27 of the same year. Both states were granted a degree of 
"autonomy," checked by the peculiar position of the French 
governor in the two territories, his function being simultane-
ously to "advise" the king and to represent the French Union 
and the Indochinese Federation, bodies the French envisaged 
all three Indochinese states joining. The role of past French 
governors in Indochina gave grounds for fearing that the 
promised autonomy might be without substance. 
On March 6, 1946, the French and Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh 
concluded an agreement which was supposed to establish a new 
relationship between Vietnam and the old imperial power. In 
the wake of the Japanese withdrawal in August, 1945, the Viet 
Minh, which had possessed a monopoly of the resistance to 
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Japan during the war years, had established the "Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam." When the French returned to Vietnam 
in September, 1945, they found most of the country in Viet 
Minh hands. The French were able to drive the rebels from 
the cities and to establish their rule once again in the urban 
areas, but the countryside, for all practical purposes, remained 
Viet Minh-governed territory. By the March 6 agreement the 
French recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as 
"a free state with its own government, parliament, army, and 
finances, forming part of the Indochinese Federation and the 
French Union." The two sides disagreed over whether Cochin 
China should be included as part of Vietnam, which otherwise 
consisted of T ongking and Annam, both protectorates under 
the prewar arrangements. The French, however, pledged them-
selves to hold a referendum on the question. Ho Chi Minh's 
side, for its part, agreed not to oppose the French when they 
arrived in Tongking and northern Annam to relieve the Chi-
nese occupation troops who were still located there. 
French actions after the accords with the Ho government 
leave no doubt whatsoever that there were men in key positions 
who had not the slightest intention of honoring the promises 
of their government. 
In April, 1946, the month after the agreement had been 
signed with the Viet Minh, representatives of the two sides met 
at Dalat, Cochin China, to discuss, among other matters, diplo-
matic relations between Vietnam and other states, French eco-
nomic and cultural interests in Vietnam, and the future status 
of Indochina as a whole. No real agreement was reached on 
any of these topics, although the Vietnamese did agree that 
there should be some kind of a federal assembly for all the 
Indochinese states and that there might also be a customs and 
monetary union among them. The French reiterated their 
promise to conduct a referendum in Cochin China. 
On June 1, in apparent direct violation of the French pledge, 
Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu, high commissioner for Indo-
china, announced French recognition of the "free republic" 
of Cochin China-without the holding of a referendum. 
Termed "provisional" by the French, the move was not in the 
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slightest way necessary for France's administration of the area 
pending agreement upon its fate. Representatives of the Viet-
namese republic and France met in July at Fontainebleau in 
France to discuss two of the thorniest problems facing them, 
the status of Cochin China and the position of Vietnam within 
the Indochinese Federation, a federal political grouping which 
the French envisioned as including Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, 
and possibly Cochin China. While the Fontainebleau talks 
were in session, Admiral d' Argenlieu convened a second con-
ference at Dalat in Indochina of representatives from Laos, 
Cambodia, south Annam, and Cochin China, but not the Viet 
Minh, which had not been asked to attend. So struck were the 
Vietnamese delegates at Fontainebleau by this highhanded con-
duct of d'Argenlieu's that they walked out of the conference 
in protest. 
All but one of the members of the Vietnamese delegation 
returned home. Ho Chi Minh remained behind in Paris and 
on September 14 finally signed with Marius Moutet, minister 
of France overseas, a modus vivendi providing for the cessation 
of hostilities and the settling of certain cultural and economic 
questions. To Moutet, Ho is reported to have said, "Don't 
leave me this way. Give me some weapons against the ex-
tremists. You will not regret it." Although the sly Ho probably 
was not sincere in his protestations of opposition to the "ex-
tremists," his prediction of future French regret for omissions 
of this period appears to have been vindicated by the events 
of the years which followed. 
The September 14, 1946, modus vivendi was the last agree-
ment to be signed by France and the Viet Minh until July 21, 
1954, when signatures were affixed to the Geneva documents. 
Skirmishes between the French and the Vietnamese had been 
continuing since France's return to Indochina, but they were 
a far cry from the type of warfare which was to engulf the 
unfortunate peninsula in the years which lay ahead. War broke 
out in full force after November 23, when the French bombed 
Haiphong, killing or wounding thousands of persons and indi-
cating that France's aim was not settlement with the Viet Minh 
but its annihilation. In December the Viet Minh retaliated 
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with a surprise attack on French forces in north Vietnam. 
From then through the summer of 1954, war raged in Indo-
china. 
Regardless of the political orientation of the rebels, there 
can be little doubt that the main objective of the French in 
prosecuting their long war against the Viet Minh was to retain 
their colonial hold over Indochina. That Ho Chi Minh and 
his close associates were Communists was only incidental to 
this primary French purpose. 
BAO DAI AND "ASSOCIATED STATEHOOD" 
Further indication of French intentions is to be found in 
France's action in bringing Bao Dai back to Vietnam in 1949. 
Rather than attempting to seek a settlement with Ho Chi Minh, 
the French decided to establish the abdicated emperor of 
Annam as "head of state" of Vietnam, hoping that the Viet-
namese would rally around the emperor, a personage of tradi-
tional veneration, and so cut down popular support for the 
Viet Minh. This hope was but slightly vindicated. Ho Chi 
Minh's prestige was of such stature that it would have taken 
a real patriot and politician to rival him in the affections of 
the Vietnamese people. This Bao Dai was never able to do, 
having little association with his people, lacking in political 
ability or inclinations, leading a life of luxury, and spending 
considerable periods of time away from Vietnam in the sunny 
resorts of southern France. Tainted in Vietnamese eyes as pro-
French, if not a puppet of Paris, the former emperor of Annam 
also was remembered as having abdicated in favor of Ho's 
republic in 1945 and even having served as "supreme councilor" 
to that government. The negligence and incompetence of the 
playboy emperor were not to be compared with the austerity 
and apparent national devotion of the astute Ho. 
At the same time that France enticed Bao Dai from his 
Hong Kong nightclub life to be the "head of state" in a pro-
French Vietnam, it attempted another political sleight of hand, 
the so-called "associated statehood." Abandoning earlier pro-
posals for an Indochinese federation, the French billed asso-
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ciated statehood as something akin to independence-only 
better because of its continued bond with Paris. Vietnam, 
Cambodia, and Laos were to comprise the Associated States of 
Indochina, in which they would possess "internal sovereignty," 
as the French called it. Each was to be theoretically sovereign 
in internal matters, except for affairs best handled on an Indo-
china-wide basis. Externally, control over foreign affairs and 
the armies of the three associated states was to be in the hands 
of Paris. The Elysee Agreements, ratified by the French national 
assembly in late January, 1950, made Vietnam an associated 
state, and other agreements gave a similar status to Cambodia 
and Laos. 
That associated statehood was not real independence was 
nowhere more evident than in the statements of French spokes-
men themselves. In a solemn declaration on July 3, 1953, for 
example, France expressed its formal desire to "perfect the 
independence and sovereignty of these States." Quite obviously 
if they were to be perfected, they were not already perfect, 
which more than a few French officials had declared on a variety 
of occasions since 1950. On April 28, 1954, indeed, after the 
start of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, the French and 
Bao Dai issued a "joint declaration" on the basis of which, it 
was claimed, Vietnam's "total independence" was finally se-
cured. Only a few details, it was announced, remained to be 
smoothed out. 
Despite the fact that on March 6, 1946, France had recognized 
Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam as "a free 
state with its own government, parliament, army and finances," 
in April, 1954, it still was not completely willing to accept the 
fact of the nationalist revolution. As it was announced, a few 
details remained to be smoothed out. 
Much had happened since March 6, 1946. There is little in 
the record, however, to indicate that anywhere in the long 
years of tragedy and chaos had the French given up their pri-
mary objective of retaining at least a degree of colonial hold 
on Indochina. Never were they willing to grant the reality of 
independence, even to pro-French elements, which might have 
taken much of the fire from the Communists' opposition. 
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Always there was a French foot placed in the doorway-just in 
case it might be possible to effect a resurgence of imperial 
domination in the future. Much of the blame for what hap-
pened in Indochina must be placed on the shoulders of those 
Frenchmen who set colonialism above all else in their evalua-
tion of the Indochinese problem. 
THE COMMUNIST BACKGROUND 
But even though the French were not fighting Communism as 
their primary objective, they were battling against it in pursu-
ance of their main aim, for the Ho Chi Minh-directed Viet 
Minh was a Communist as well as an anti-French nationalist 
movement. There is no doubt that Ho Chi Minh, redoubtable 
leader of the Viet Minh in its war with France, has been a 
Communist throughout the long years of his struggle against 
French imperialism in Vietnam. As early as 1917 Ho organized 
the first Vietnamese Marxist group in Paris. In 1920 he joined 
the Communist International (Comintern) , and the next year 
he organized the Intercolonial Union, which was sponsored 
by the French Communist party. Two years later the Viet-
namese revolutionary attended the Congress of International 
Peasantry (Krestintern) in Moscow. In 1925 Ho-then known 
as Nguyen Ai Quoc-appeared in Canton in south China, where 
he not only worked as translator-assistant to Michael Borodin, 
Russian adviser to the Chinese Nationalists, but also formed 
the Revolutionary Youth Fraternity of Vietnam. The uneasy 
alliance between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists 
came to an abrupt end, however, when Chiang Kai-shek turned 
on the Communists, who were out to infiltrate his movement 
as a means of taking over the Chinese revolution. Ho fled to 
the Soviet Union with many of the Russian and Chinese Com-
munists. 
In 1928 Ho Chi Minh returned to his native Vietnam, where 
he commenced active agitation in behalf of Vietnamese inde-
pendence. Two years later he organized the Vietnamese Com-
munist party at a conference of previously rival revolutionary 
groups in Hong Kong. The Ho Chi Minh-directed Vietnamese 
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Communist party was to occupy a position of prime importance 
in the country's nationalist movement until its dissolution in 
1945, a move designed to win the support of non-Communists 
for the Vietnamese revolution. 
Nor were Ho Chi Minh's efforts in the thirties confined to 
revolutionary activity in his native Vietnam. Although his 
actual position in the Southeast Asian Communist liaison is 
difficult to define because of its clandestine nature, it can be 
documented that he was on several occasions charged with 
coordination of various aspects of Communist activity elsewhere 
in this part of the world, especially in Thailand. The degree 
of Ho's devotion to Communism is indicated by the fact that 
he labored in behalf of the movement in other Southeast Asian 
lands than his own. 
The Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Vietnam Inde-
pendence League), or Viet Minh, was founded in May, 1941. 
It represented a coalition of sixteen revolutionary groups which 
had as their common objective the abolition of French and 
Japanese rule in Vietnam. The evidence in existence does not 
support the thesis that the Viet Minh at the time of its inception 
was a Communist-dominated movement. Communists were in-
cluded in it, as were a variety of other organized groups, but 
they constituted only a minority of the movement's members 
and had no more than a corresponding voice in its policies and 
activities. As the war years progressed, Ho Chi Minh emerged 
as the coalition's leader, but he led the movement as a nation-
alist-not as a Communist. Similarly, the very able General Vo 
Nguyen Giap, victor at the tragic battle of Dien Bien Phu, 
commanded the liberation army formed under Viet Minh 
auspices, but he owed his position to his nationalist rather than 
his Communist orientation. 
When avowed Communists like Ho Chi Minh and Vo 
Nguyen Giap emerge as the leaders of a political grouping, it 
is not unnatural to assume that the movement they head is 
Communist as well. Perhaps in an area of the world like 
Southeast Asia where individual leadership has showed itself 
to be so decisive in recent years, it is misleading to distinguish 
between the leaders of a movement and the movement itself, 
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including those who support it. Yet in Vietnam this differentia-
tion does appear to have considerable pertinence. The crux of 
the problem for the West in Vietnam has been-and continues 
to be-the difficulty in determining where nationalism ends and 
Communism begins. In the last five years, Communists have 
come to completely dominate the Viet Minh movement. Yet, 
even so, they receive the support of a large proportion of the 
Vietnamese people, because they are conceived of as unselfish 
and devoted supporters of Vietnamese nationalism. Ideologic-
ally, Ho Chi Minh is clearly a Communist; politically, the 
movement he heads is undeniably nationalist in terms of its 
mass support. There are those, indeed, who believe Ho himself 
to be both a nationalist and Communist. This is what makes 
Vietnam the problem it is today. 
The problem of Vietnam is not a unique one, however. It 
is in a sense the problem of China in miniature. The popular 
backing which the Chinese Communists received in their ascent 
to power in rivalry with the Kuomintang, or Nationalists, was 
not pro-Communist but ardently nationalist. The people of 
China supported Mao Tse-tung when he took over the Chinese 
government from Chiang Kai-shek because of the adept way 
in which he and his colleagues identified themselves with, and 
generally utilized, Chinese nationalism. The same is true of 
Vietnam. Ho's popular appeal stems not from his position as 
a Communist but from his role of leadership through the years 
of the Vietnamese nationalist revolution. 
A major result of French efforts against the Viet Minh move-
ment was to drive the non-Communist moderates from positions 
of influence within the movement and replace them with 
Communist extremists. What had once been a predominately 
nationalist coalition with important Communists in some key 
positions became in the years between 1945 and 1954 an over-
whelmingly Communist organization which played upon the 
nationalist sympathies of the Vietnamese people. There is no 
doubt whatsoever that the Viet Minh today is a thoroughly 
Communist body. 
Had the French not opposed so vehemently the tide of Viet-
namese nationalism, it is possible that the Bao Dai experiment-
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but with a more adroit figure than Bao Dai-might have under-
mined Ho's leadership. But France was never quite ready to 
make the requisite concessions. The whole objective of the 
Bao Dai experiment, if the French view is accepted, was to 
build up non-Communist-directed nationalism as an alternative 
to Communist-led nationalism in Vietnam. But when non-
Communist nationalism began to assert itself in Vietnam, as 
it did in the fall of 1953 in the form of two congresses, the 
French flouted it. The first congress, organized unofficially by 
the brother of Ngo Dinh Diem, demanded independence, and 
so a second was called, its membership carefully selected by 
Bao Dai. This second congress, however, declared that Viet-
nam, when independent, should leave the French Union. 
French Premier Joseph Laniel retorted that if Vietnam had 
such an intention, there would no longer be any reason for 
France to keep on fighting against the Viet Minh-an unmis-
takable indication that colonialism, not anti-Communism moti-
vated the French in Indochina. 
THE POST-GENEVA ERA IN SOUTH VIETNAM 
Principals in south Vietnam's demoralizing rivalry for power 
in the first stages of the post-Geneva era were American-sup-
ported Premier Ngo Dinh Diem, a sincere but administratively 
inexperienced nationalist of long standing, and a pair of prom-
inent military figures. These latter were General Nguyen Van 
Hinh, former army chief of staff and son of former Premier 
Nguyen Van Tam, who started out with Bao Dai's support in 
his clash with Diem, and General Le Van Vien, an old friend 
of Bao Dai and head of the Binh Xuyen, a gangsterlike outfit 
which controlled both Saigon's police and gambling houses. 
General Hinh, by no means as reactionary as some Western 
observers painted him, was backed by considerable military 
support, and General Vien was reported as having about 2,000 
troops under his command, a figure which turned out to be 
somewhat exaggerated. Premier Diem, on the other hand, 
counted among his allies at this time two unique and powerful 
religious sects, the syncretist Cao Daists and the allegedly 
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reformed Buddhist Hoa Hao, both possessing private armies. 
As if this rivalry for power among the non-Communists were 
not enough to sap the limited stability of the country, there 
also were the continuing Viet Minh efforts to organize local 
governments and committees to support the Communist cause 
in south Vietnam. The Geneva agreement had stipulated that 
the Viet Minh withdrawal from this part of the partitioned 
state be complete, but the Communists left large numbers of 
political cadres behind them. Their activities only accented 
the political instability stemming from the disunity among 
rival non-Communist south Vietnamese forces. 
The threats which faced the inexperienced Diem at the start 
of the post-Geneva period were partially resolved-only to be 
succeeded by new threats, stemming in part from the very 
successes which seemed at times to strengthen the premier's 
hand. In his rivalry with General Nguyen Van Hinh, for 
example, Diem emerged apparently victorious, although not 
wholly as a consequence of his own actions. Backed at first by 
Bao Dai, highly incensed at Diem's attempts to unseat him as 
head of state, General Hinh was subsequently abandoned by 
the playboy titular ruler of Vietnam. Pressured apparently by 
the United States, Bao Dai dismissed the former leader of the 
Vietnamese national army on November 29, 1954, from his 
residence in southern France. General Hinh, whose rivalry 
with Premier Diem had resulted in several bloody clashes 
between factions supporting the two men, had-according to 
Bao Dai-"made regrettable statements." 
At first it appeared that Bao Dai's action had considerably 
improved the position of the premier. Not only was General 
Hinh removed as a rival to Diem, but Bao Dai also acquiesced, 
however reluctantly, in a move which strengthened the premier. 
Premier Diem's hour of triumph, however, was very short lived. 
General Le Van Ty, whom Diem appointed as the new chief 
of staff of the Vietnamese national army, and General Nguyen 
Van Vy, who became inspector general of the army, accepted 
their posts only after the premier "had agreed to grant 'virtual 
autonomy for the Army as a semi-independent corps' and to 
pardon all officers and men who had rebelled against the 
Indochina 123 
government."1 Such developments undoubtedly played a prom-
inent role in the decision by Diem to reduce the 270,000-man 
Vietnamese national army to a 90,000-man "security force." 
The settlement of the Hinh affair, permitting a virtual formal-
ization of the army's almost independent status in south Viet-
nam, can hardly be said to have increased unity in the disunited 
territory governed by Premier Diem. 
The Binh Xuyen of General LeVan Vien, an early opponent 
of Diem's after the signing of the Geneva accords, were river 
pirates who dominated both the police and gambling establish-
ments of Saigon, capital of the free Vietnamese territory. Seek-
ing power for the rewards it thought would come its way 
materially if it toppled the Diem regime, or if a situation could 
be brought about whereby Diem remained as premier partly 
at its sufferance, it was more akin to oldtime oriental warlordism 
than to a movement of truly political proportions like the Viet 
Minh. Premier Diem, displaying the sort of strength that 
justified the high hopes many Americans had in him, moved 
with vigor against these unscrupulous river pirates, as he closed 
down the Saigon gambling dens they ran, removing a major 
source of their financial support. He also battled the Binh 
Xuyen for control of Saigon's police, in which struggle he 
emerged triumphant. His army, moreover, showed favorably 
in victorious clashes in April and May, 1955, with the once 
powerful gangster clique. The consequence was that Binh 
Xuyen strength diminished drastically-although it never had 
been quite as imposing as some observers have suggested. In 
late 1955 a government spokesman announced that only 600 
irregular forces of the original Binh Xuyen rebels remained 
in action against the army. The Diem regime was subsequently 
successful in wiping out the Binh Xuyen insurgents. 
If Diem was successful in his efforts to reduce the trouble-
making power of one of the groups which divided unfortunate 
south Vietnam, he was faced with increasing difficulties from 
two other groups which originally supported his government. 
These were the colorful religious sects known as the Cao Dai, 
1 Bernard B. Fall, "Indochina since Geneva," Pacific Affairs, XXVIII (March, 
1955), 7. 
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a syncretist movement which includes Victor Hugo and Jeanne 
d'Arc as well as Christ, Confucius, and Buddha among its 
"saints," and the reformed Buddhist Hoa Hao. 'Without paral-
lels in the political groupings of the \Vest, even in earlier days, 
these sects combined at least a superficial devotion to religious 
principles with the opportunism and cunning of Chinese-style 
warlordism. The Cao Dai, influenced in many ways by Roman 
Catholicism though by no means even a distant relative of that 
church, has its own "pope," whose seat is at Tay Ninh, south 
Vietnam, religious headquarters for an alleged two million 
believers. The Buddhism-professing Hoa Hao was in reality 
a federation of several wardlord-led bands. Both sects, signif-
icantly, possessed private armies, which showed themselves at 
times to be very effective. Resentful of the efforts of Premier 
Diem-whom they first supported, if unenthusiastically and for 
their own material ends-to limit their influence in south Viet-
nam, these religious groups and their private armies engaged 
in determined warfare with the premier's troops, who even-
tually eliminated the sects as a serious threat to his regime. 
At the same time that Premier Diem was plagued by his 
troubles with the Binh Xuyen, Cao Dai, and Hoa Hao, he also 
was bothered by the instability lent his regime by the continu-
ing Viet Minh control of much of the countryside in south 
Vietnam. Americans in Indochina in the spring of 1955 claimed 
that from 40 to 70 percent of the villages outside the areas 
controlled by the religious sects were under de facto Viet Minh 
jurisdiction; some French estimates placed the figure as high 
as 90 percent.2 Indeed, the attempts at land reform made by 
the Diem government sometimes met almost open resistance 
from villagers, who followed instructions of Viet Minh agents 
because they believed it would not be long before the Viet 
Minh operated the government in south Vietnam and they had 
no desire to face later reprisals for cooperation with its enemies. 
The Diem government moved to counter such feelings on the 
part of the peasantry, but its efforts to convince the villagers 
of its stability met only limited success when confronted by 
2 See Joseph Alsop, in New York Herald Tribune, March l, 1955. 
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the presence of courts operated by the Viet Minh in various 
areas of south Vietnam more than two years after the signing of 
the Geneva agreements. 
In late 1955 organized units of the Viet Minh army began 
to penetrate repeatedly into southern territory. According to 
one such report in early 1956, for example, four battalions of 
Communist soldiers in the guise of anti-Communist refugees 
crossed into the south to set up military strongholds.3 In late 
I 955, indeed, one southern official reported that an entire Viet 
Minh regiment had appeared on the road joining the important 
cities of Saigon and Dalat, more than 350 miles south of the 
partition line. At the same time the Communist radio at 
Hanoi hurled forth at the world variegated charges of south 
Vietnamese violations of the July, 1954, armistice accords in 
which, for some important non-Communist areas, it clouded 
effectively the Communists' own and more numerous infrac-
tions of these same agreements. 
Concurrently with its military infiltration, the Viet Minh 
increased its overt efforts to win friends among the population 
of south Vietnam. A new "front" organization, the "Fatherland 
Front of Vietnam," was formed by the north Vietnamese Com-
munists ostensibly to promote the unification of the divided 
country's two parts. The Communist national assembly of 
north Vietnam, in an obvious effort to strike at the morale of 
the south Vietnamese government and people, adopted a resolu-
tion calling on all south Vietnamese to join with their northern 
comrades in a struggle for a united homeland under the Father-
land Front. Although some non-Communists were included in 
the organization, the key officers of the front gave away its 
sinister intention. The venerable Ho Chi Minh was honorary 
chairman of the organization, and its president and vice presi-
dent were both veteran Communists. 
As it had done so skillfully in the past, the Viet Minh sought 
to cloak its real purpose in the garb of nationalism. It was 
for this reason that the leadership of the Fatherland Front in-
cluded several prominent non-Communists-Duong Due Hien, 
3 See Christian Science Monitor, January 23, 1956. 
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head of the Vietnamese Democratic party; Cao Trieu Phat, 
leader of a group of Cao Dai dissidents; and the Reverend Vu 
Xuan Ky, a Roman Catholic priest, among others. 
Nationalism also was being employed for a similar purpose 
within north Vietnam, where several non-Communists received 
minor posts in the government shuffle of mid-1955. The Com-
munists quite obviously wished to continue to appear as Viet-
namese nationalists first and foremost. 
Not all of Premier Diem's woes stemmed from Viet Minh, 
Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, or Binh Xuyen activities. Some of them 
resulted from the personality and actions of Diem himself. An 
ardent Roman Catholic, he had an obvious handicap in a 
country where Christianity was an import from the suspect 
West and where most of the population professed belief in a 
Chinese-derived syncretist faith combining elements of Bud-
dhism, Confucianism, Taoism, and traditional animism. His 
popularity did not increase when he made some rather pointed 
political appeals to his fellow Catholics on religious grounds. 
Moreover, despite his acknowledged longtime devotion to the 
cause of Vietnamese nationalism, Diem began his premiership 
comparatively inexperienced in political and administrative 
matters. More French than Vietnamese in many of his traits, 
including his dress, he was a colorless figure, lacking-at least 
during the first year and a half of his regime-in contact with 
the masses of Vietnam. Diem was further handicapped in his 
first year in power because, as an appointee of the thoroughly 
discredited Bao Dai, he had difficulty saying that he spoke for 
the people of Vietnam. Although he had promised elections 
in south Vietnam-as on April 23, 1955, for example, when he 
delivered a forthright defense against attacks on his right to 
speak for the people of free Vietnam-the months passed and 
elections were not held. Major obstacles, particularly the 
warfare against the sects, stood in the way of polling, but 
although these may explain why elections were not possible, 
they did not supply the premier with evidence that when he 
spoke, he did in fact speak for free Vietnam. 
Diem's seemingly genuine moral fervor in opposition to 
Communism was inspiring; the ruthlessness with which he 
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went about building his anti-Communist state was frightening. 
If totalitarian government was what Diem opposed, it also was 
the kind of government he was constructing in the territory 
he ruled himself. Diem, on the basis of his performance as 
premier during the first two years of the regime, was an autoc-
rat in the best oriental traditions of craftiness and unscrupu-
lousness. Of freedom of the press, speech, or political oppo-
sition there was little in late 1956 in south Vietnam. Of the 
eleven political parties opposing Diem, only two, the weak 
Socialists and Republicans, operated in the open. The others, 
including the Communist party (called the Viet-cong), opposed 
the government in a variety of illegal and extralegal ways. 
Political prisoners, held without charges or trial, were not an 
unknown commodity. 
"The most serious mistake of Premier Diem," a generally 
respected Vietnamese opposition leader told a visiting Amer-
ican editor early in 1956, "is to crack down so hard on those 
nationalist groups which are not Communist and which are 
frustrated by his dictatorship. His strategy is pushing them 
over into the other camp. If we continue with a tight dictator-
ship like this, the word will get around the country that things 
under Diem are not much better than things under the French, 
and then Ho Chi Minh and his fifth column will have another 
real wave of popular discontent to exploit."4 
If Diem did not seem to be setting up a democratic govern-
ment in south Vietnam, he was establishing an increasingly 
efficient one. Little by little he was conquering those who 
opposed him. The achievements of the Diem regime in con-
solidating itself resulted from totalitarian tactics not much 
different from those used by the Viet Minh in the north. Diem's 
very successes seemed to underscore his primary weakness-his 
was an authoritarian, not a popular government. 
The first step toward eliminating this handicap was taken 
by Diem on October 23, 1955. On that day, for the first time 
since the Geneva accords, a referendum was held throughout 
south Vietnam to choose between Diem and the absent Bao 
Dai as head of state. When the ballots were counted, Diem 
4 Saville R. Davis, in Christian Science Monitor, January 10, 1956. 
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was declared the victor-with more than 98 percent of the vote. 
The election left much to be desired from a strictly democratic 
point of view. Critics claimed that neither Diem nor Bao Dai 
was nominated by the people to stand for office, that the elec-
torate resultingly had only the choice of voting for the premier 
or the almost universally disliked Bao Dai, that Bao Dai in 
effect forfeited any chance of victory by his nonparticipation 
in the prereferendum campaigning, and that the government'i 
several-sided efforts to insure a maximum turnout at the polls 
made even absention from the balloting difficult. Although 
there is considerable truth to some of these charges, the incon-
testable fact remains that Diem had taken the first step toward 
popular approval of his government. Considering Vietnam's 
recent history, the widespread disruption caused by the warfare 
against the sects, and the country's lack of a democratic tra-
dition, this was a bigger step than many realized. 
As a consequence of the outcome of the October 23 refer-
endum, Diem became president as well as premier of south 
Vietnam, which itself became a republic-proclaimed by Diem 
shortly afterward. He was not to be content with the results 
of the October referendum, however. On March 4, 1956, 
elections were held throughout the southern portion of Viet-
nam to select a 123-member national assembly. The new presi-
dent clearly was moving quickly in his efforts to secure popular 
endorsement of his government. 
The electoral ordinances establishing the national assembly, 
south Vietnam's first, provided for each member of the legis-
lature to represent 60,000 voters, with each province of the 
Diem-ruled territory having at least one deputy. In addition, 
there were provisions for the election of nine representatives by 
the various ethnic minority groups and twelve by the 800,000 
refugees from Communist north Vietnam. All citizens of south 
Vietnam of eighteen years of age or older were legally per-
mitted to vote, with all south Vietnamese of twenty-five or over 
eligible to be candidates, provided they had been residents of 
south Vietnam for the six months preceding the election. 
The opposition to the elections comprised two groups. The 
first of these, not unexpectedly, was the Communists, who were 
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opposed to the voting primarily because of the increased popu-
lar quality it would give the Diem regime. They urged the 
population to abstain from voting, and in various areas they 
engaged in acts of physical sabotage, such as the burning of 
school buildings in which polling was to take place. On the 
whole, however, the voting was not seriously affected by Com-
munist interference. Also opposed to the assembly elections 
were the non-Communist south Vietnamese foes of the Diem 
government. These elements, poorly organized and suffering 
from Diem's control of communication media as well as from a 
large number of legal restrictions, maintained that the elections 
were unfair and were merely designed to give Diem a puppet 
legislature which he could dominate. 
The supporters of President-Premier Diem scored a solid 
victory in the March 4 balloting. As in the case of the October, 
1955, referendum, charges were advanced by opposition ele-
ments that the national assembly elections were not conducted 
in the true spirit of democratic government. Nonetheless, the 
elections marked a step forward toward stable and responsible 
government in south Vietnam. 
The March 4 south Vietnamese balloting was not the only 
election to attract public attention-and stimulate controversy-
in the second year of Vietnam's partition. According to the 
July, 1954, Geneva agreements, preparations for elections for 
a unified Vietnam were supposed to commence by July 20, 
1955. When then Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Phan 
Van Dong of Communist north Vietnam proposed talks to 
begin these preparations in the summer of 1955, Premier Diem 
came out unequivocably against such conversations. Indeed, the 
south Vietnamese leader stated in October that he interpreted 
his referendum victory over Bao Dai as a popular mandate 
not to proceed with unification elections in divided Viet-
nam until "true liberty" was established in the Communist-
ruled north.5 Replying to the Communist charge that his stand 
was in violation of the Geneva accords, the determined Diem 
retorted that free Vietnam was not a signatory to the agree-
ments of July, 1954, and so was not bound to honor them. 
5 New York Times, October 26, 1955. 
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The premier's opposition may well have been based on the not 
unreasonable fear that, even given free polling, the Communist 
Viet Minh would emerge victorious in any electoral contest in 
which a majority of the Vietnamese people participated. As a 
consequence of Diem's opposition, which had both American 
and British diplomatic backing, nationwide elections were not 
held, as originally intended at Geneva, in July, 1956. 
The Diem policy of condemning the 1954 conference on 
Indochina and the agreements resulting from it may be a 
temporarily necessary one, but it is not without definite 
dangers. Already the northern Communist government has 
seized the initiative and is posing as the champion of Viet-
namese unification against what it terms "the American im-
perialist regime of south Vietnam." The July, 1956, elections 
were not held as envisaged at Geneva in 1954, the Communists 
say, because of Diem's opposition. Ho Chi Minh, they claim, 
strongly desired such elections. 
President Diem may be digging his own political grave with 
his policy of opposition to nationwide elections. The urge 
toward reunification may be expected to increase in south 
Vietnam in the future, especially now that the security problem 
has been greatly eased. If Diem does not adopt a more positive 
policy than his present "not now" approach, he may find him-
self playing right into the hands of his astute Communist 
opponents in the north. 
"\Vhile fear was expressed in some quarters that the Commu-
nists might resort to force to unite Vietnam in lieu of the 
Geneva-envisioned elections, there were no indications that the 
Viet Minh intended to pursue such a course. Fear of Western 
intervention, particularly by the United States, and the Com-
munist worldwide air of cordiality-as evidenced at the meeting 
of the Big Four heads of state in July, 1955, the Khrushchev-
Bulganin tour of South Asia in the fall of the same year, and 
the twentieth congress of the Soviet Communist party in early 
1956-probably were factors influencing the Viet Minh decision. 
The Communists, always seeking for choice ingredients for 
their propaganda fare, were not going to let Diem escape par-
ticipation in all-Vietnamese elections without maximum dimin-
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ution of the international prestige of his regime. Efforts were 
made by the Communists in the first half of 1956 to convene 
a second Geneva conference on Indochina to insure that the 
Vietnamese elections envisaged by the first parley were held on 
schedule. Chou En-lai, premier and foreign minister of Com-
munist China, called on January 30 for the reconvocation of 
the 1954 conference on Indochina to "insure implementation 
of the agreeement" on Vietnam.6 Not to be outdone by their 
Chinese Communist "big brothers," the north Vietnamese Com-
munists two weeks later sent a letter to London and Moscow 
also proposing that the 1954 parley be reconvened. In early 
March, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd sent an invita-
tion to Foreign Minister Molotov to hold talks on the Viet-
namese situation-talks which went badly for the Soviets. That 
Moscow remained very much interested in the struggle for 
Vietnam, however, was only too evident in the March 3 issue 
of Izvestia) official newspaper of the Soviet government. Izvestia 
declared that the preservation of peace required the convoca-
tion of a new international conference on Indochina. On July 
14, 1956, the British foreign office announced that north and 
south Vietnam had agreed to continue to respect the 1954 
armistice agreement despite the breakdown in its political 
prOVISIOnS. 
On October 26, 1956-one year to the day from the election 
which made south Vietnam a republic and Ngo Dinh Diem its 
first president-a constitution was promulgated for the southern 
half of divided Vietnam. This constitution gave broad powers 
to President Diem and specifically outlawed Communism. 
South Vietnam's constitution follows the American model in 
providing for a division of authority among three separate 
branches of the national government: executive, legislative, and 
judicial. The executive, however, is clearly endowed with a 
preponderance of the power given the national government. 
The constitution seeks to protect individual citizens from abuses 
of this power by a number of democratic safeguards-such as 
the right of free speech and assembly and procedures for pro-
tection from administrative arrest. These safeguards, however, 
6 New York Times, January 31, 1956. 
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will not come into full effect for some time, for the constitution 
specifically provides that during the term of the first national 
legislature the president may suspend the exercise of freedom 
of press, speech, association, and circulation and the right to 
strike. The first legislature's term extends until late 1959. 
The president and national assembly of south Vietnam are 
elected by universal secret ballot. The president's term is 
five years, and he is eligible for three terms. The chief executive 
has veto power over all legislation of the parliament (which is 
a one-chamber body) , and his veto can be reversed only by 
a three-fourths majority. The president, moreover, can rule 
by executive ,decree during the five months of the year when 
the assembly is not in session. 
The south Vietnamese constitution is a step in the direction 
of democratic government, despite the sweeping powers it 
gives President Diem. Diem probably will work for greater 
democracy in south Vietnam, if security conditions permit. 
It may be, however, that he will decide that security conditions 
do not permit greater democracy in the near future. If Diem 
comes to such a conclusion, it probably will not be for reasons 
of personal power, but because he thinks it best for Vietnam. 
POST-GENEVA DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NORTH 
Although by no means free from troubles of its own, the gov-
ernment of north Vietnam appeared two years after partition 
to be in a stronger political position than its southern rival. 
With real power located in the Communist or Lao Dong party, 
revived after its dissolution in 1945, President Ho Chi Minh's 
regime tolerated no opposition to its rule. The government 
reshuffle of mid 1955 was not evidence of instability. It would 
seem that Foreign Minister Phan Van Dong became premier 
and Army Commander Vo Nguyen Giap deputy premier to 
ease the burden of leadership carried by the aging Ho Chi 
Minh. At the same time, several non-Communists received 
minor posts in the government, as the Viet Minh sought to 
broaden its regime to give it the appearance, if not the reality, 
of nationalist rule. In late 1956 Ho Chi Minh's rule over 
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northern Vietnam appeared to be firmly established. His sub-
jects, used to traditional autocracy and arbitrary colonial rule, 
were adapting themselves rapidly to the hard facts of life under 
Communism.' 
Another reason for Viet Minh stability was the fact that it 
had operated a de facto government over much of Vietnam long 
before it assumed legal rule. In those parts of the north under 
effective French control prior to Geneva, the Viet Minh had 
only to bring out into the open a governmental apparatus 
which previously functioned clandestinely, and as the symbol 
of nationalist resistance to French domination, it commanded 
considerable popular support. 
Reinforcing its stability were the increasingly close relations 
the Ho government enjoyed following Geneva with the Soviet 
Union and Mao Tse-tung's Peiping regime. Ho Chi Minh's 
visits to Moscow and Communist China in the summer of 1955 
provided the most conspicuous indication of this growing soli-
darity. Not only did Ho thus bolster his prestige at home, but 
he also was successful in negotiating more than $300,000,000 of 
long-range industrial credits. In addition, north Vietnam's 
tottering economy was buttressed by an emergency loan to buy 
from the U.S.S.R. 150,000 tons of rice which Moscow had pur-
chased from Burma in a barter agreement. 
The importance of the Soviet Union's rice loan to north 
Vietnam should not be underestimated. First of all, it strength-
ened the northern Communist regime at one of its most vulner-
able points, its chronic food situation. At the same time a 
demonstration was given the people of both parts of Vietnam 
that the Soviet Union had the capacity to assist its friends and 
that Ho Chi Minh was such a friend. 
The loan was not a long-range solution to the threat of 
famine, however. The partition had cut off the importation 
of more than 100,000 tons of rice annually from the south, and 
north Vietnam lacked sufficient foreign exchange to buy rice on 
the world market. A large portion of the irrigation system 
upon which north Vietnam's own wet-rice agriculture depended, 
moreover, was ruined as a consequence of eight years' warfare 
7 See Christian Science Monitor, August 9, 1956. 
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against France. A further complication was the drought which 
afflicted food-producing sections of the Communist-ruled terri-
tory in 1955 and 1956. The Viet Minh's own efforts to solve 
this food problem resulted in a 10 to 15 percent increase in 
rice production between 1954 and 1956, but not anywhere 
near enough for self-sufficiency. 
Food shortage was but one aspect of the disturbed economic 
state of the Viet Minh territory. The greater part of the fight-
ing in the war with France had taken place in north Vietnam, 
and almost all phases of its economy-from mines to factories-
showed marks of this experience. Compounded with this was 
a critical shortage of trained personnel to run the factories and 
mines inherited from the French. This condition has been 
somewhat alleviated by technicians and managerial personnel 
from the Soviet Union and Communist China, but these have 
not been sufficient in either number or experience to replace 
the departed Frenchmen. 
The Viet Minh's efforts to continue collectivization of agri-
culture in the territory under its jurisdiction-to note another 
of the Communists' economic difficulties-proved increasingly 
unpopular as the post-Geneva era progressed. Even more un-
popular was the use of forced labor to effect much of the 
reconstruction deemed necessary by Ho and his associates. 
A major barrier to the economic rehabilitation of north Viet-
nam was the badly disrupted transportation system. The greater 
part of the north's railroad system had been destroyed during 
the eight-year war. For those lines which had been restored, 
moreover, there was a serious shortage of railway locomotives 
and cars. Trucks and automobiles also were scarce, and roads 
for such vehicles to travel on still were in bad shape in late 
1956. Draft animals and human carriers, as a consequence, 
were the chief means for transportation of many of the goods 
entering the country from north Vietnam's richer Communist 
cousins, although in August, 1956, the Communist radio an-
nounced that Ho Chi Minh's government had completed the 
reconstruction of the rail line linking its capital city of Hanoi 
with Communist China's Yunnan Province, giving the im-
portant southern Chinese city of Kunming an outlet to the sea. 
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The north Vietnamese Communists attacked their economic 
troubles with a two-year version of the Moscow-Peiping type 
five-year plan. As the primary objective they envisioned rice 
production increasing by 22 percent in 1956 over the previous 
year-an increase, however, still not sufficient to permit the 
Viet Minh to meet its food consumption needs without large 
rice imports from outside the country. 
Second on the list of Communist economic objectives in the 
national plan was the progressive industrialization of the north 
Vietnamese economy, calling for the output of coal to be 
increased by 128 percent in the two-year period of the plan's 
operation, that of tin by 229 percent, and that of phosphates 
by 329 percent. The Communists also envisaged a 152 percent 
gain in electric-power production. 
A third objective was an increase in trade with "friendly 
democracies," aiming specifically at doubling the 1955 volume 
of such trade in 1956. 
Although the first two years following the July, 1954, Geneva 
agreements were marked by more overt antiregime activity in 
south Vietnam than in Ho Chi Minh's half of the partitioned 
former French colony, there was opposition to the Communist 
government of north Vietnam. This opposition grew as time 
passed. The north Vietnamese Communist government itself 
announced that serious "disturbances" broke out on November 
13, 1956, in Nghe An province, south of Hanoi. The Commu-
nist radio described the revolt (which was put down) as "pre-
pared long in advance" by "reactionary hooligans ... taking 
advantage of our mistakes in the application of land reform." 
Conducted by longtime Lao Dong (Communist) party stal-
wart Truong Chinh, the Viet Minh land reform program had 
resulted in the loss of their land by many small holders as well 
as by the once powerful large landlords. These small land-
holders objected to their property being taken from them, and 
thousands were jailed or executed. The result was unrest and 
barren rice fields. 
This was a situation which the Communists could not long 
endure, especially in light of north Vietnam's traditional rice 
deficit. President Ho Chi Minh, therefore, dismissed Truong 
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Chinh as general secretary of the Lao Dong party, took over 
the post himself, and promised a drastic liberalization of his 
regime in general and the land-reform program in particular. 
Ho's moves had quite the opposite results from those antici-
pated, however, for it was little more than two weeks after the 
announced changes that the disturbances in Nghe An province 
took place. 
It was not immediately clear how isolated an event the 
November 13, 1956, uprising was or whether Ho's changes 
would have their desired results over a longer period of time. 
One thing was certain, however: the Nghe An revolt worried 
the Chinese Communists, for Chou En-lai suddenly appeared 
in Hanoi. With only two days' notice of his intentions, Chou 
stopped in Hanoi on his way to Cambodia, which he had been 
scheduled to visit for some time and concerning which there 
had been considerable fanfare. The Hanoi visit clearly was 
decided upon at the last minute and undoubtedly was related 
to the Nghe An uprising, which may have been a bigger out-
burst than indicated by the Communist radio and press. 
CAMBODIA AND NATIONALISM 
The problems of the other two Indochinese states, Cambodia 
and Laos, were overshadowed by more spectacular activities in 
neighboring Vietnam. Despite the scanty attention accorded 
them, however, Cambodia and Laos are of considerable stra-
tegic importance as a buffer between pro-American Thailand 
and Communist-dominated north Vietnam. 
Unlike the situation in south Vietnam, the present govern-
ments of Cambodia and Laos are considered representative by 
important fellow Asians, particularly heartening evidence of 
which was provided in December, 1954, with neutralist India's 
recognition of the legally constituted administrations. On the 
other hand, as the Communist-sponsored Vietnam-Khmer-
Pathet Lao alliance of March, 1951, clearly showed, the Viet 
Minh has its eyes on all of Indochina. 
Cambodia came under French rule in 1864, when it became 
a protectorate two years after France's first acquisition of Indo-
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chinese territory in Cochin China in south Vietnam. For all 
practical purposes, there was no nationalist movement of any 
consequence in Cambodia until after the Second "\Vorld War, 
and even then, Cambodian nationalism lacked the depth of 
the movements in such other Southeast Asian lands as Burma, 
Indonesia, or adjacent Vietnam. The French h~d asserted their 
colonial control over the country with the acquiescence of its 
king, who feared both Thai and Vietnamese encroachments on 
his territory, with the result that Cambodia's ruling and edu-
cated elite were slow to attack imperial rule. However, nation-
alism received considerable impetus from the period of Japa-
nese control in Indochina, during which the volatile Son Ngoc 
Thanh served as premier, and after the Japanese withdrawal, 
the Cambodians voted to end the French protectorate. The 
French shortly afterward returned to the country, deported 
the premier, and installed a new administration under King 
N orodom Sihanouk. On January 7, 1946, an agreement was 
signed between Cambodia and France reestablishing French 
control over the country. 
The king was not to turn out to be a French puppet-nor, 
unlike many of the leaders of Vietnamese nationalism, was he 
to turn to Communism as an alternative to rule by France. 
Assuming the leadership of Cambodia's growing nationalist 
movement, he agitated for greater freedom from French rule, 
and on May 9, 1953, signed a series of protocols with France 
which, while they did not give his country complete independ-
ence, provided for full Cambodian sovereignty in military, 
judicial, and economic affairs. The agreements permitted 
Frenchmen, both military and civilians, to remain in Cambodia 
as advisers, but French troops were required to leave Cam-
bodian soil. 
If Sihanouk was devoted to the cause of Cambodian national-
ism, he was-partly because of the ways in which he chose to 
dramatize his devotion-a most controversial political figure. 
Regarded as immature and erratic by many foreign observers, 
by some of the very moves which earned him this description 
he edged Cambodia closer to full independence. 'Vhen Siha-
nouk sought exile abroad in an effort to publicize his country's 
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efforts to rid itself of French colonialism, he was criticized 
by some as irresponsible and naive. But he did successfully 
dramatize his country's plight-as well as his own devotion to 
Cambodian nationalism-at home as well as abroad. When in 
1955 he stepped down as king of his country in favor of his 
father, the question of his political competence again was raised. 
But when he later emerged as Cambodia's premier with a 100-
percent majority in the national legislature, it was quite obvious 
that he was possessed of considerably more shrewdness than 
generally believed. To be sure, as king he had made-and 
unmade-premiers as he wished. But in an age when demo-
cratically elected prime ministers were far more fashionable 
than kings, Sihanouk's action could not be considered politically 
unwise. 
Unlike Vietnam, Cambodia was not plagued in the postwar 
years by a serious Communist problem-through no fault of the 
Communists. That the Communist Viet Minh in neighboring 
Vietnam was clearly interested in succeeding to the French 
position in Cambodia, however, was evident from the links it 
maintained with the country's indigenous Communists as well 
as by the guerrilla bands it dispatched to harass the Cambodian 
government. If it had not been for the fact that its full efforts 
were required in the war against the French in Vietnam, the 
Viet Minh probably would have given the Cambodian Commu-
nists even greater assistance. As it was, the "Khmer Issaraks" 
-a revolutionary outfit led by Son Ngoc Thanh-received a 
significant amount of military help from the Viet Minh, with 
whom they were linked by the Vietnam-Khmer-Pathet Lao 
alliance. The Geneva agreements of July, 1954-from which 
Cambodia probably benefited more than either Vietnam or 
Laos-reduced the Communist threat to the government con-
siderably. By the terms of the accords, foreign troops, including 
the Viet Minh guerrilla bands, were required to leave the 
country within ninety days, while the Khmer Issaraks were to 
give themselves up within thirty days and be incorporated into 
either the Cambodian army or police. Although the Geneva 
agreements were by no means flawlessly adhered to by the Com-
munists in Cambodia, they were for the most part honored, 
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with a resulting significant decrease in overt Communist activity 
in the country. 
Communist hopes for gaining control of Cambodia by peace-
ful means received a sharp jolt in early September, 1955, when 
the Popular Socialist Community party of former King N oro-
dom Sihanouk, founded after his abdication in March, 1955, 
captured all ninety-one seats in elections for the national as-
sembly. Opposition-inspired charges that Sihanouk, an excep-
tionally independent young man, had "sold" Cambodia to the 
United States for financial assistance apparently failed to con-
vince the country's electorate, voting in the first post-Geneva 
election in Indochina and the third in Cambodian history. 
Far less strong at the polls than expected were the National 
Democrats, led by Son Ngoc Thanh. The Communist-oriented 
People's party, making an open bid for power in the former 
French protectorate, also showed poorly in the balloting. 
Shortly after the elections, Son Ngoc Thanh took to the bush 
again, but in early 1956 the Cambodian army inflicted a heavy 
defeat on his rebel forces, although Thanh himself escaped. 
Communism would therefore not appear to constitute a 
major internal threat in the near future. Were a Communist 
military attack from north Vietnam to be mounted against 
Cambodia, however, the former French protectorate's 35,000-
man army probably would not be capable of more than the 
most limited sort of holding action. 
That Sihanouk would dominate the new government to be 
formed by his party soon became obvious. Although he had 
declared earlier that he would not become premier under any 
circumstances, he relented sufficiently to take over not only 
the post of prime minister but also that of foreign minister. 
Sihanouk remained Cambodia's premier until early 1956, when 
he resigned to travel abroad as a private citizen-his travels 
taking him, among other places, to Communist China. He 
returned to Cambodia in time to resume the premiership on 
the last day of February, but resigned again a month later. 
Sihanouk told his people in a radio address that he was resign-
ing because the American press had distorted and attacked his 
neutralist foreign policy, but a government communique indi-
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cated he was stepping down because of "difficulties" between 
Cambodia and neighboring nations. These "difficulties" pre-
sumably were border disputes with Thailand and south Viet-
nam, who charged lawless acts against their territory by 
Cambodian nationals. Sihanouk's successor was Khim Tit, a 
supporter of the former king, who in turn resigned in August, 
1956, amid rumors of a return of Sihanouk as prime minister. 
Sihanouk himself, however, for some time steadfastly refused 
to become premier again to end the cabinet crisis caused by 
Khim Tit's resignation, although his father, King Sura Marit, 
reportedly had ordered him to do so. Finally he did relent, 
and a new government under his leadership was formed in 
mid-September. The "on again, off again" premierships of 
Sihanouk did little to diminish his reputation as an erratic 
political figure. 
If Sihanouk kept changing his mind over whether to be, or 
not to be, Cambodia's prime minister, he apparently experi-
enced no change of mind concerning one of the key planks in 
his party's campaign platform: to do everything possible to 
stimulate the development of democracy in Cambodia. Hardly 
a month after the elections which swept his party to power, 
Sihanouk as premier was taking his cabinet "on tour" of the 
country's provinces in an effort to bring government as close 
as he could to the Cambodian people. At public meetings 
attended by the prince and his entire cabinet, members of the 
government explained its policies as well as answered com-
plaints. In implementation of his "democratization" drive, the 
former king unfortunately displayed his usual singularly erratic 
qualities. In February, 1956, for example, he announced a 
lengthy list of "undemocratic" things members of his govern-
ment must not do: use official cars for private purposes, benefit 
from special housing, wear a uniform except at official cere-
monies, permit themselves to be addressed as "excellency"-
and frequent places of entertainment! 
It is not likely that the immediate future will bring closer 
relations between Cambodia and the United States. Cambodian 
foreign policy now follows along the lines of the Asian neutral-
ist views espoused by Indian Premier Jawaharlal Nehru, al-
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though it is more realistic in its appraisal of the Ho Chi Minh 
government of north Vietnam. The threat posed by Peiping 
leadership is largely unperceived, however. Simultaneous with 
the growth of closer relations with Communist China has been 
an increase in the number of anti-American statements and 
actions by Cambodian leaders, particularly Sihanouk's rejection 
of Seato and his untruthful remarks in France that his country 
had refused American aid. 
During his visit to Communist China in February, 1956, 
Sihanouk signed a friendship pact which embodied nonaggres-
sion, mutual respect for national integrity and sovereignty, 
noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, peace-
ful coexistence, and equality and mutual benefit. Cambodia 
and China also agreed to strengthen relations in economics and 
culture and to work for the "removal of doubts" in inter-
national relations. In March, Cambodia sent a delegation to 
negotiate commercial agreements with the government of Mao 
Tse-tung. Under the terms of an agreement signed in Peiping 
on June 21, China was to invest $22,400,000 in the construction 
of textile, cement, paper, and plywood factories in Cambodia, 
with work on the several projects to begin before the end 
of 1957. 
Sihanouk next made an "unofficial" visit to the Soviet Union, 
where an agreement for economic and industrial aid to Cam-
bodia also was concluded. The Soviets agreed to supply indus-
trial equipment and technician-instructors to Cambodia, and 
to build, equip, and staff a hospital in the Cambodian capital 
of Pnompenh. Sihanouk manifested his appreciation of the 
Soviet promises by declaring that the hope of his people "rests 
in the Soviet Union for the realization of our desires for peace 
and prosperity." 
Meanwhile, prominent Cambodian spokesmen were criti-
cizing United States assistance as designed to "buy the country." 
On a trip to the Philippines in early 1956, as an example of 
the Cambodian attitude, the easily aroused Sihanouk openly 
declared that the hospitaiity the Filipinos had heaped upon 
him was part of a United States plot to woo his country into 
the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization. Upon his return to 
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Cambodia, the prince declared that in the Philippines he had 
seen many tractors and wonderful hospitals built with United 
States aid. To Cambodia, however, the prince told his people, 
the United States gave only refrigerators and automobiles. He 
ignored the fact that the United States had equipped and was 
then paying three-quarters of the salary of the Cambodian 
army; that the United States had started irrigation, school, 
health, and road projects in his country; that when the Cam-
bodian rice crop had failed, the United States had rushed 
20,000 tons of rice to the onetime French protectorate, and 
that in the fiscal year of 1956, American assistance totaled 
$50,000,000, slightly more than half of which was in the form 
of military aid to build up the newly organized army. The 
prince later retracted his statement that United States assistance 
consisted mainly of luxury items, but he already had put 
himself on record for the Communist propagandists to quote. 
The explanation of Sihanouk's behavior would seem to lie 
in his erratic political personality. Lacking in experience in 
international affairs, Sihanouk was playing one side against 
the other, in his own inimitable crude way, in an effort to reap 
the maximum economic benefits for Cambodia. In domestic 
politics, however, he stanchly rejected the efforts of Cambodian 
Communists to form a "united front" with his Popular Socialist 
Community party. Indeed, at an April, 1956, national con-
gress of his party, Sihanouk declared that Cambodia aspired 
to a decentralized democracy modeled after the United States. 
There is considerable evidence that Sihanouk meant what he 
said-but he also knew it would please American ears. He also 
was quoted as saying that Cambodia "wishes to continue re-
ceiving from America economic and military aid that are indis-
pensable to prevent Cambodia from falling under Communist 
influence." In the spring of 1956 Sihanouk announced that 
Cambodia's two-year economic development plan was ready to 
get under way, thanks to "promised aid" from the United 
States, France, India, certain British Commonwealth countries, 
"and from new friends such as continental China, Poland, and 
Russia." The main aim of the plan was an increase in agri-
cultural output and timber, the products of these two sectors 
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of the national economy being the main items of Cambodia's 
export trade. This two-year plan was to serve as a prelude to 
a later and more ambitious four- or five-year plan. That Siha-
nouk appreciated the benefits of a neutralist policy was evident 
in September, 1956, when he told the national assembly that the 
country's neutrality should be proclaimed "officially in law."8 
LAOS: NATIONALISM AND NEUTRALISM 
Laos, most of whose 1,300,000 inhabitants are ethnically related 
to the neighboring Thai, was established as a French protec-
torate in 1893, the last of the Indochinese territories to come 
under the rule of France. Like Cambodia, it was mostly 
untouched by nationalism until after the Second World War, 
and even now it cannot be said that nationalism has inflamed 
the sparsely settled Laotian countryside. Members of the ruling 
and educated elite have felt the impact of nationalism, but their 
initial contact with this imported political concept came at a 
much later date than in adjacent Vietnam. As was the case 
with Cambodia, the pre-French Laotian government welcomed 
the establishment of a French protectorate in the nineteenth 
century, because it feared being swamped by the then expand-
ing Vietnamese and Thai populations. 
Anti-French feeling grew during the period of the Japanese 
occupation of Indochina in the Second World War. Shortly 
after the Japanese broadcast a declaration that "the colonial 
status of Indochina has ended" on March 10, 1945, the king 
of Luang Prabang (which forms part of present-day Laos) 
issued a declaration of independence. King Sisavong Vong, 
however, was not a leader of the Laotian nationalist movement. 
Indeed, during the early postwar Chinese Nationalist occupa-
tion of the protectorate prior to the French return, a free 
Laotian movement forced the abdication of the king. Sisavong 
Vong later returned to his throne at the leave of the revolu-
tionaries, who brought him back as a constitutional monarch. 
On August 27, 1946, the French concluded an agreement with 
the king of Luang Prabang, who thus legally became king of 
8 Christian Science Monitor, September 17, 1956. 
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Laos in French eyes, reestablishing the domination of France 
over the country. Contrary to their actions in other Southeast 
Asian lands, the Japanese did give virtually full self-government 
to Laos and Cambodia during their Second World \Var occupa-
tion, and the Laotian nationalists, having felt the exhilaration 
of this self-rule, were not to be denied by France. Some of the 
nationalist elements took to the bush under Communist leader-
ship in hopes of duplicating the Viet Minh feats in neighboring 
Vietnam. Other nationalists agitated for freedom from imperial 
rule under non-Communist leaders, fully aware that "independ-
ence" under Communism was no more independence than 
continued French colonial rule. As a consequence of the efforts 
of the latter group primarily, Laos moved slowly forward on 
the road to self-government. On October 22, 1953, it signed 
with France a treaty giving it "full independence" within the 
French Union. Laos was still not a completely sovereign state, 
but it appeared headed in that direction. 
The main barrier to full realization of Laotian national 
aspirations would seem to come, not from the retreating French, 
but from the Communists. That the Viet Minh harbors designs 
on Laos was most evident in its unprovoked thrusts into Laotian 
territory in 1953 and 1954 as well as in the March, 1951, alliance 
between the Viet Minh and its satellite movement in Laos, the 
Pathet Lao Issaraks. In addition, the insurgent Pathet Lao of 
Prince Souvanna Vong, a relation of the Laotian royal family, 
received much material aid from their Communist colleagues 
in Vietnam, without which they would never have been able 
to make as strong a showing as they did. 
As a result of accords reached at the July, 1954, Geneva 
conference on Indochina, the Pathet Lao on November 6, 1954, 
allegedly submitted to the political control of the royal Laotian 
government, although retaining possession of the northern prov-
inces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua. The hollowness of this 
move was revealed by later armed attacks against royal army 
units by Pathet Lao bands, operating from the two excluded 
provinces. In mid 1956, two years after the signing of the 
Geneva agreements, limited military activity continued, though 
sporadically, between Communist and government forces. 
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The result of Pathet Lao control over the disputed northern 
provinces was a de facto partition in Laos. On November 9, 
1955, a royal Laotian government delegation which had been 
negotiating with the Pathet Lao in Vientiane, capital of Laos, 
informed the international commission charged with observing 
the carrying out of the Geneva accords in Laos that it had been 
unable to reach a political settlement with the rebels and would 
hold national elections without their participation. These elec-
tions were held on December 25, 1955, with more than 300,000 
out of approximately 360,000 Laotian electors going to the 
polls, according to the royal government, in spite of Communist 
propaganda urging voters not to participate in the balloting. 
In only one area, the village of Muong Peun in Sam Neua 
province, did the Communists actually prevent Laotian voters 
from participating in the election. There about 1,000 Pathet 
Lao troops used mortar and machine-gun fire to keep govern-
ment soldiers from casting their votes. A government spokes-
man charged that these Pathet Lao troops included north 
Vietnamese soldiers. 
As a consequence of the elections, the ten participating prov-
inces came under the national government, and the other 
two-the disputed northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam 
Neua-were held by the Communists. Such partition clearly 
was not the intent of the Geneva agreements. The submission 
of the Pathet Lao to government political control was supposed 
to have set the stage for the resumption of government jurisdic-
tion over the northern provinces, but subsequently military 
activity by the Communists made this impossible. In November, 
1955, the Pathet Lao leaders once again had publicly voiced 
their willingness to recognize the right of the government to 
extend its control over the disputed provinces, if this were 
done "progressively." The Pathet Lao also indicated a willing-
ness to permit elections in the two provinces-on its own terms. 
The fact that elections were held in Laos in December, 1955, 
with such a large turnout under strained conditions in such a 
primitive country, was a tribute to the resourcefulness of 
the non-Communist elements, particularly veteran nationalist 
Kathay Sasorith. But not until mid-March, 1956, were non-
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Communist politicians able to agree on a government to succeed 
Premier Kathay and his cabinet. On March 21, however, a new 
Laotian government headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma was 
voted into office, ending the longest cabinet crisis Laos had 
known. 
Meanwhile, Pathet Lao attacks in northern Laos continued. 
On November 11, 1955, the Laotian foreign minister declared 
that the Viet Minh had attached both political commissars and 
military cadres to the Pathet Lao forces, which were, he said, 
receiving military and food supplies from the Vietnamese Com-
munists. In addition, he charged that Ho Chi Minh's north 
Vietnamese government had broken the promise it gave at the 
Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian powers in April, 1955, not 
to interfere in the internal affairs of Laos.9 In December more 
than 2,000 Pathet Lao troops took part in the strongest offensive 
for half a year, but they were easily defeated, and except for 
early February, 1956, the next months were comparatively free 
of Communist military activity. 
Despite the Pathet Lao insurgency problem, the last half of 
1955 witnessed considerably greater stability in Laos than was 
evident in the immediate post-Geneva period. The Geneva con-
ference on Indochina had been followed in Laos by a series of 
violent cabinet crises which appeared at times to threaten the 
advantages derived from the peace settlement. Fortunately, the 
situation was stabilized by Premier Kathay, long identified with 
the Laotian nationalist movement. 
The first indication that Laos' newly acquired political 
stability might be short lived came with Kathay Sasorith's 
replacement as premier by Prince Souvanna Phouma. It soon 
became evident that Souvanna Phouma's government was by 
no means as vigorously anti-Communist as that of Kathay 
Sasorith. This was indicated by two major developments: a 
political settlement with the rebel Communist Pathet Lao 
movement on generous terms, and the emergence of neutralism 
as a vital force in the formulation of Laotian foreign policy. 
A major reason for the decision by the Pathet Lao to call 
off their rebellion probably was a realization that their con-
9 New York Times, November 12, 1955. 
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tinued occupation of the northern provinces was driving the 
government into the camp of the anti-Communist West. The 
Pathet leadership also undoubtedly realized that the Commu-
nist charge that failure to hold unification elections in Viet-
nam was a breach of the 1954 Geneva settlement could be 
countered with the accusation that what the Pathets were 
doing in Laos was equally illegal. 
As a result of negotiations between Premier Souvanna 
Phouma and his half-brother and leader of the Pathet Lao, 
Prince Souvanna Vong, agreement was reached in early August, 
1956, for the cessation of all hostile acts by each side toward 
the other. The two northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam 
N eua, it was agreed, would pass from control of the Pathet 
Lao to the jurisdiction of the royal government. The military 
arm of the Communist Pathets, moreover, would be integrated 
into the royal Laotian army. The communique issued by 
Princes Souvanna Phouma and Souvanna Vong also noted that 
the Laotian government would be guided in its various policies 
and actions by the five principles of coexistence outlined by 
Communist China's Chou En-lai and Indian Prime Minister 
Nehru. Details of the agreement, including those relating to 
the integration of Pathet Lao elements into the royal govern-
ment, would be worked out by joint military and civilian 
committees. 
In late December, 1956, the government of Premier Souvanna 
Phouma announced the signing of an agreement for the inte-
gration of the Pathet Lao into Laotian national life. According 
to this agreement, the Pathets would not only be accepted back 
into national life as individuals and given full rights as citizens, 
as provided for in the 1954 Geneva settlement, but Pathet rep-
resentatives also would receive posts in the government (includ-
ing the cabinet and the army) . The Communists, in addition, 
would be allowed to set up workers', students', and women's 
organizations throughout Laos. The agreement was not im-
mediately submitted to the national assembly for ratification, 
but this was expected to follow and to be successful. The 
Communists clearly were making progress towards their goal of 
eventual assumption of power in newly independent Laos. 
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They were making greater progress, it seemed, than in their 
period of armed opposition to the government. 
Simultaneous with the rapprochement between the royal 
government and the Pathet Lao leadership was the emergence 
of neutralism as a major factor in the determination of Laotian 
foreign policy. This will be different from the neutralism of 
India, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon, Premier Souvanna 
Phouma has stated. "Our country," Laos' prime minister de-
clared in mid 1956, "has no intention of joining any bloc, 
even the neutralist bloc." "Neutrality," according to Souvanna, 
"is even more neutral than 'neutralism'." Laos, he said, aspires 
to be truly the Switzerland of the Far East (not the India of 
Indochina). In mid-August, 1956, following his negotiations 
with Prince Souvanna Vong, Laotian Premier Souvanna 
Phouma visited Peiping, where he undoubtedly pleased his 
Chinese Communist hosts by declaring that his country would 
not join any military alliance-that is, the Southeast Asian 
Treaty Organization-as long as there was no interference with 
its security. He further promised that his kingdom would bar 
new foreign military installations from its territory. For its 
part, Communist China promised to "respect and wholly sup-
port" the neutral position of Laos.10 Laos' premier went further 
than signing a declaration espousing neutralism; he also ac-
cepted the principle of Chinese help to his country in meeting 
the economic goals it had drawn up for itself, becoming the 
second non-Communist country to accept such aid from Peiping. 
The Laotian leader's action had implications for his coun-
try's relations with Communists elsewhere in Southeast Asia-
as evidenced by his visit to north Vietnam on his way back from 
Peiping. Souvanna Phouma signed a declaration of peaceful 
coexistence with the Viet Minh and said his nation would have 
economic and diplomatic relations with north Vietnam shortly. 
Back in his native Laos, Souvanna Phouma seemed to sing 
a different song than he had sung in Peiping or north Vietnam. 
He told a news conference upon his arrival at Vientiane that his 
government was "not ready to establish diplomatic or economic 
relations with either" the Chinese Communists or the Viet 
10 ·washington Post and Times-Herald, August 26, 1956. 
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Minh.U He admitted that his country had been offered eco-
nomic aid by the Communists during his Peiping visit, but 
he said that he was not yet ready to accept more foreign help. 
He also announced that he was asking for a revision of United 
States aid with an eye toward obtaining more economic develop-
ment assistance and less military help. For all his naivete, 
Souvanna Phouma obviously knew how to put on the eco-
nomic "squeeze." Yet Peiping could not have enjoyed every-
thing Souvanna Phouma said upon his return from Commu-
nist China. "A Communist government will not work in 
Laos," he declared, "and I would not hold office under such 
a government." Moreover, despite the joint Sino-Laotian 
communique of 1956, Laos still maintained formal military 
links with the West through French bases at Seno and Xieng-
Khouang and a mutual defense treaty with France, a charter 
member of Seato. 
THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM IN INDOCHINA 
The political problems raised by the postwar fighting in 
Vietnam, and the related agitation for greater freedom in 
neighboring Cambodia and Laos, have obscured economic 
conditions prevailing in Indochina since 1945. In 1940 Indo-
china was able to export 1,500,000 tons of rice, but in 1951 
it sent only 303,000 tons to the world market. Similar export 
drops took place in rubber and coal. It was presumed that 
the Geneva-established peace would be accompanied by an 
economic revival in both free and Communist Indochina. 
To a certain extent such hopes have been justified, but the 
long road to economic recovery and rehabilitation still has 
been only partly traveled, particularly in the two Vietnams. 
A key area of economic competition between the two Viet-
namese regimes is land reform. In most of the territory they 
occupied prior to the Geneva settlement the Communists car-
ried out land-reform programs, including many areas of south 
Vietnam. In the north, following Geneva, Ho Chi Minh and 
his associates continued their efforts in behalf of land redistri-
11 See New York Times, September 5, 1956. 
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bution, at the same time embarking on a more unpopular 
program of agricultural collectivization. In the south in the 
early months of the Diem regime, land previously distributed 
by the evacuated Communists was taken back by the dis-
possessed landlords-which did not increase the popularity 
of the Saigon government. 
The south Vietnamese government of Premier Ngo Dinh 
Diem had good intentions for land reform, although it ex-
perienced considerable difficulty in translating these intentions 
into action as long as it was preoccupied with military actions 
against dissident groups like the Binh Xuyen, Hoa Hao, and 
Cao Dai. Fighting in the provinces interfered extensively 
with rice plantings in south Vietnam in the spring of 1955, 
for example, which could not help but have undesirable 
consequences at harvesttime. Diem tried, however-though 
possibly not hard enough-to effect important land reform 
changes in the territory he ruled. The land-reform law signed 
by the premier early in 1955 provided that rentals on farms 
should not exceed 15 to 25 percent of the value of the crops 
grown on them, a considerable improvement over past prac-
tices under which rentals frequently soared as high as 70 per-
cent of the crop. This measure has been successfully imple-
mented in only a few areas of the Diem-governed territory, 
partially as a result of the lack of trained, efficient, and honest 
personnel to administer the program. In addition, the pre-
mier's economic program has met opposition from the land-
lords, who resent not only the lower rentals, but the imposition 
of taxes-conveniently overlooking the fact that although the 
Viet Minh "eliminated" taxes, they substituted far heavier 
economic exactions and, where they were able, took the land 
away from its owners. 
That N go Dinh Diem would push forward with an agrarian 
reform program was evidenced in October, 1956, by the issu-
ance of a government decree under which absentee landlords 
were to be dispossessed of their lands (with compensation) 
and landless peasants were to be given an opportunity to 
buy such lands for their own plots. The October land-reform 
decrees produced an instantaneous reaction against Diem on 
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the part of powerful landed interests and presaged probable 
future trouble for the south Vietnamese leader. Diem seemed 
determined, however, that he would not retreat in the face 
of this opposition to his reform efforts. 
Undaunted by the opposition of vested interests, Premier 
Diem announced on September 18, 1955, what he termed his 
"new long-range economic program," aimed at "perfecting 
the independence of the country in the economic field" by 
eliminating colonial monopolies and giving the Vietnamese 
businessman and farmer alike a dominant role in the country's 
economic life, increasing credit facilities, "modernizing" agri-
culture, and creating new light industries to meet the country's 
internal needs. 
Not only did Diem desire a reduction in French economic 
influence in south Vietnam, but he also wished to limit the 
role of the Chinese in his country's commercial life. South 
Vietnam's Chinese minority, like the overseas Chinese in the 
rest of the countries of Southeast Asia, have played a major 
role in national economic life. In south Vietnam, where the 
Chinese comprise only one-tenth of the population, they 
have controlled an estimated two-thirds of the country's eco-
nomic activity. In October, 1956, President Diem moved to 
alter this situation by declaring it illegal for noncitizens to 
own businesses in eleven important categories, including trans-
port and many retail trades, previously dominated by Chinese 
nationals. Vietnam-born Chinese were to be regarded as 
Vietnamese citizens, but Chinese born outside Vietnam were 
designated foreigners and, therefore, were forbidden to par-
ticipate in the eleven restricted businesses. The Chinese 
minority responded with a campaign of economic retaliation. 
Rice exports, which provide south Vietnam with a major per-
centage of its foreign exchange, came to a virtual halt (for-
tunately only temporarily) as a result of Chinese reprisal 
activity. The long-term consequences for the Diem govern-
ment of the October, 1956, anti-Chinese decrees probably 
will be similar to those resulting from like moves in Thailand 
and the Philippines. In these countries such discriminatory 
action served only to intensify resentment of the Chinese 
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toward the land of their domicile and increased the potenti-
ality for Chinese Communist exploitation of overseas Chinese 
communities in Southeast Asia. The south Vietnamese Chi-
nese minority's retaliation campaign clearly revealed the power 
which the overseas Chinese hold over the Vietnamese economy. 
Rather than surrendering this power, the Chinese probably 
will seek ways of circumventing the October, 1956, decrees. 
A major step toward economic rehabilitation-and the solu-
tion of one of south Vietnam's leading social problems-was 
taken by Premier Diem in late December, 1955, when he 
announced plans to settle one hundred thousand of the refu-
gees from the north on rich abandoned rice land in south-
western Vietnam. The Cai San project, as it was called, was 
designed to reclaim lands formerly under Hoa Hao domina-
tion and to give refugees from the north, many of whom lived 
under almost intolerable conditions, an opportunity to estab-
lish their own farms and homes and to provide for their own 
subsistence and that of their families. In the north the refu-
gees, on the average, had rented holdings of less than two 
acres. Under the Cai San permanent settlement project it was 
planned that each family would rent eight to ten acres. During 
the first year of occupancy the farmer would pay no charge 
for the land he tilled. In the second year he would begin 
paying rent-but only one-quarter of the normal amount. The 
third year of his occupancy, the farmer would pay one-third 
of his rent, while in the fourth year he would start paying 
full rent. Although no plan was announced whereby tenants 
might eventually own the land they tilled, the Diem govern-
ment did indicate its hope that a way might be worked out 
whereby the rice tenant farmer could in time possess his own 
land. Diem and his aides were most enthusiastic over the Cai 
San project, the government stating in February, 1956, that if 
this project were successfully carried out, efforts would be 
made to resettle similarly the remainder of the eight hundred 
thousand refugees from the north. The task, however, was 
a big one. 
Fortunately, President-Premier Diem realizes the impor-
tance of the economic factor in his battle with the Viet Minh. 
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"The shooting for the moment has ended," he stated in June, 
1956, "but a fresh danger has emerged" -an economic war 
between the Communist north and the democratic south. 
Diem declared that the most humble rice farmer in his country 
must receive benefits from being a citizen in the new republic. 
Then he would appreciate the republic, the south Vietnamese 
leader said, and be willing to support and defend it. Commu-
nist China and the Soviet Union were trying to dress up north 
Vietnam as an economic showplace, according to Diem. 
Although occupied with internal security problems during 
most of its first two and a half years of existence, the Diem 
government in south Vietnam has been fully aware of the 
need for economic reform and progress if it is to compete 
effectively with its northern Communist rival. The main 
device chosen by Diem to fight this economic battle is a 
five-year plan similar to that in operation in India (though 
much less spectacular) . This development program, scheduled 
to be launched in 1957, will attack the problem of economic 
progress from several approaches-including a considerable in-
crease in the country's power resources and the establishment 
of small manufacturing industries. 
It is none too early for the south Vietnamese government 
to be turning a major portion of its attention to development 
projects, for the economic problems facing the Diem regime 
are sizable (although less formidable than those confronting 
the Viet Minh in the north). South Vietnam's economic prob-
lems stem in large measure from the breakdown of the old 
French commercial structure. They also derive, however, from 
the impact of American economic assistance, which has not 
always been used in the wisest ways. Financial help from the 
United States, indeed, has tended to help perpetuate the old 
system of small-scale importers of luxury goods-which still 
can be purchased, despite the French withdrawal. Although 
there has been governmental economic assistance from abroad 
(mainly the United States), there has been a glaring lack of 
private foreign investment in south Vietnam. This has re-
sulted from uncertainty concerning the ultimate form of the 
country's economy-and who will comprise its future political 
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leadership. The seriousness of south Vietnam's economic situ-
ation is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that, according to 
the National Bank of Vietnam, in the first four months of 
1956 only 18 percent of the country's imports were paid for 
by exports. There were signs of improvement in the second 
half of 1956, but the basic economic situation in south Viet-
nam remains serious. South Vietnam has the ingredients for 
a healthy future economic development, but hard work and 
continued foreign assistance will be required. 
Both the south Vietnamese and the Communists have in 
fact received considerable economic help from the two rival 
camps which support them on the international scene. The 
United States, a much interested party in the outcome of the 
internal political struggle in Vietnam, allotted $385,000,000 
for use in Vietnam in 1954. The Viet Minh, for its part, re-
ceived considerable assistance from the Chinese and Russian 
Communists-culminated by the promises of greater help 
made to Ho Chi Minh in Moscow and Peiping in 1955-as 
well as some aid from the satellites. China would like very 
much to have a Communist country on its exposed south-
eastern flank and can be counted upon to continue to aid 
the Viet Minh economically, as it helped Ho Chi Minh's side 
with both material and technical assistance in the war against 
the French. Nor has Moscow forgotten Lenin's dictum that 
the shortest route to Europe was by means of the backward 
territories upon which Europe allegedly was so dependent. 
That the United States and its allies-and the Chinese and 
the Soviets and the other Communist states-should have been 
so willing to assist the two rival sides in Vietnam was indicative 
of the importance both major camps in the cold war placed 
on once little known Indochina. For the Communists, control 
of Vietnam would mean not only additional territory added 
to their bloc, but also protection for China as well as a possible 
jumping-off point for additional expansion in Southeast Asia, 
not to mention a further dimunition of Western prestige in 
the Far East and the world in general. The United States 
and its allies, conversely, sought ardently to prevent the fall 
of Vietnam to the Communists in order to keep the inter-
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national Communist coalition from continuing its growth of 
the postwar years. All of Southeast Asia would be threatened 
in Washington's eyes, should the Viet Minh take over the 
whole of Vietnam. :Moreover, the West would have suffered 
still another setback in a string of Far Eastern foreign-policy 
defeats, which already allegedly included the fall of China to 
Communism and the Korean stalemate. 
The stakes are high in Vietnam and Indochina in general. 
The eventual outcome of rival efforts to unify Vietnam will 
have the most important of consequences for international 
politics as well as for the Vietnamese themselves. Besides the 
struggle between the Communists and the non-Communist 
nationalists of Vietnam, there is the continued interest of the 
United States, the Soviet Union, China, and other nations 
in the final solution of the Vietnamese problem. The French 
interest would seem to be a diminishing one, especially in 
light of the agreement by Paris in February, 1956, to withdraw 
its remaining troops from Vietnamese soil.12 
The peace which returned to Indochina in July of 1954 
was an uneasy peace. How long it will continue to reign over 
Indochina depends not only on the people and politicians 
of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, but also upon those who 
sit in seats of power in Moscow, Peiping, and Washington. 
Peace came to Indochina in the summer of 1954 only with 
the acquiesence of these powers. One or more of them could 
have a change of heart. 
12 Washington Post, February 22, 1956. The peculiar post-Geneva position of 
France in Indochina was illustrated in October, 1955, by the announcement that 
the French had signed a three-million-dollar, one-year trade agreement with 
Ho Chi Minh's north Vietnam government. It would appear from this agree-
ment that France does not intend to abandon economic ties with that part of 
Vietnam under Communist rule. Although the influence of France in Vietnam 
is decreasing rapidly, a few Frenchmen seem still not to have given up all hope 
of a turn in their fortunes in Indochina. Their ranks are thinning, however. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THAILAND 
Diplomatic and Political Phenomenon 
PoLITICS IN Thailand since the bloodless revolution of 1932 
has been a rough-and-tumble struggle dominated by colorful 
personalities who have jockeyed with one another for control 
of the state. This competition involves serious implications 
for the whole world, particularly as it increases political 
instability in Thailand and so reduces the country's capacity 
to resist Communist pressures. 
Central among Thai political personalities of the last quar-
ter of a century has been Phibun Songgram, a field marshal 
who led the military faction against the Chakri dynasty in 
1932, and who now is premier. His arch foe is Pridi Ban-
omyong, a civilian politician, who masterminded the 1932 
coup and who now from Communist China attempts to rally 
dissident Thai elements to revolt. The period since 1947 
has witnessed the apparent eclipse of Pridi and the rise of 
a new rival, ambitious and scheming Police General Phao 
Sriyanon. Phao, generally regarded as Phibun's heir appar-
ent, boldly increased his strength during these years to the 
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point where he appeared to many to be the chief man in the 
country-in fact if not in title. In early August, 1955, how-
ever, Phibun struck out at Phao's growing strength, stripping 
him of a key cabinet post and moving to cut off the sources 
of his lucrative income. As a result, it may well be that the 
prime threat to the Thai premier at the present time comes 
once again from his old opponent, Pridi Banomyong. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Thai, descended from a racial group closely related to 
the Chinese, came down from south China. By 800 a formid-
able Thai kingdom had emerged, but rival kingdoms rose 
and fell during the succeeding centuries. The Thai accepted 
Chinese suzerainty, though not without repeated assertions 
of independence. Repeatedly the Thai sought to conquer 
neighboring peoples, especially the Shans and the Laotians, 
who are racially closely related to them. 
During the latter half of the nineteenth century, when a 
recrudescence of Western imperialism threatened the inde-
pendence of Siam,1 the country was fortunate in having very 
able kings in Mongkut (1851-1868) and Chulalongkorn (1868-
1910). King Mongkut opened his country to Western influence 
by signing a treaty of friendship and commerce with Britain 
in 1855. Similar treaties were negotiated with the United 
States and France in 1856, and with a number of other Euro-
pean countries in the next few years. Mongkut saw the need 
of modernizing his administration if his country was not to 
fall a prey to Western imperialism. He brought in Westerners 
as advisers and teachers, who in many cases actually served as 
department heads. Most of his advisers were retired British 
officials from India and Burma, but he was careful to avoid 
getting too many from any one country. Belgians, Danes, 
Dutch, Italians, and Americans served in this capacity. 
King Chulalongkorn was a progressive and reformer like 
his father. He abolished slavery, ended the practice of prostra-
tion in the royal presence, set up schools for the education of 
1 The official name of the country was changed from Siam to Thailand in 
1939, back to Siam in 1945, and to Thailand again in 1948. 
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the children of the nobility, modernized the postal system, and 
reformed provincial administration and the administration of 
justice. The king traveled extensively and sent young aristo-
crats abroad for study. 
Siam is the only country in Southeast Asia which escaped 
becoming a vVestern colony. This can be explained in part 
by the desire of both Britain and France for a buffer state 
between their respective territories in the region. Nevertheless, 
the story might have been different if the Siamese had not 
displayed a remarkable cleverness in diplomacy. France put 
heavy pressure on Siam to renounce control over Laos, Luang 
Prabang, and the provinces of Battambang and Siemriep, which 
had once belonged to Cambodia. In 1883 it blockaded Bangkok, 
after which Siam yielded to most of France's demands. Other 
concessions were made in 1904 and 1907. As a result of "the 
long drawn-out series of diplomatic contortions" Siam suc-
ceeded in retaining its independence, but at the cost of 
90,000 square miles of territory. 
Siam emerged from the diplomatic struggle with a territory 
of nearly 200,000 square miles. A small strip of Burmese and 
Laotian territory in the north separates Siam from China; in 
the south its territory extends almost two-thirds down the 
Malayan Peninsula. Northern Siam is mountainous, and the 
eastern part of the country is an infertile plateau. The large 
alluvial plain and rich delta of the Menam River constitutes 
the heart of the country. The population of Thailand is far 
from homogeneous; its 20,000,000 inhabitants include some 
750,000 Malays in the south and 2,500,000 persons of Chinese 
blood. Outside of the country's boundaries are two peoples 
ethnologically closely related to the Thai, the Shans of northern 
Burma and the Laotians. These three groups constitute 
material for potential irredentism. 
THE PRIDI-PHIBUN RIVALRY 
Until 1932 the government of Thailand was an absolute mon-
archy, with government positions a practical monopoly of 
members of the numerous Thai noble families. Discontented 
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young intellectuals joined leaders of the armed forces in a 
bloodless revolution which ushered in the constitutional mon-
archy. The political history of the country since then has been 
one of revolution and counterrevolution-some successful, more 
abortive. During this period Thailand has had five constitu-
tions, but most of this time the government has been a thinly 
veiled dictatorship. 
The political life of Thailand since 1932 has largely centered 
around two rival personalities: Pridi Banomyong and Luang 
Phibun Songgram. Both studied abroad under government 
scholarships in the years immediately following the First World 
War; Phibun studied military science in France, and Pridi, 
law in Paris. Pridi was one of the leaders of the 1932 revolu-
tion, but it was not long before he was suspected of holding 
Communist views and was forced into exile. After about six 
months abroad he returned to Bangkok, declared under oath 
that he neither was the head of a Thai Communist party nor 
had Communistic ties. He was officially cleared of the charge 
of being a Comm,unist and quickly recovered political influence, 
but he lost in the struggle for political power to Phibun, who 
had the backing of the army. The latter had acquired a favor-
able reputation by reestablishing order after an abortive royalist 
attempt to take over the government in 1933. Phibun became 
prime minister in December, 1938. Although nominally a 
constitutional, semiparliamentary monarchy, the government 
under Phibun was actually a dictatorship. A large number of 
the appointed members of the assembly and of the ministers 
were army or police officials, and officers of the armed forces 
held the chief positions in the civil service. The press was 
rigidly controlled. Just enough debate in parliament was per-
mitted to create the impression that there was a semblance of 
democracy. In January, 1939, a plot to overthrow the Phibun 
regime was uncovered and ruthlessly suppressed. 
As the Phibun government became increasingly fascist in 
character, its policy became more and more pro-Japanese. Under 
Japanese aegis it succeeded in obtaining the session of a con-
siderable area from Indochina, and with Japanese consent it 
annexed four Malay states and two Shan states of Burma. Thai-
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land offered only a token resistance to Japanese invasion and 
thus opened the way for the land attack on Malaya. After a 
few days it entered into an alliance with Japan, and shortly 
thereafter declared war on Great Britain and the United States. 
The United Kingdom answered in kind, but the American 
government chose to ignore the Thai declaration of war and 
to treat Thailand as a victim of Japan. 
The next phase is one of the strangest in all political and 
diplomatic annals. A "Free Thai" movement was organized 
among the few Siamese abroad, which with the cooperation and 
aid of Great Britain and the United States gave aid to an 
underground resistance movement which developed under the 
leadership of Phibun's bitter rival, Pridi. In August, 1944, 
while Japanese troops were still in the country, Marshal Phi-
bun's regime was overthrown and a new government, secretly 
sympathetic with the "Free Thai," came to power. Immediately 
after the collapse of Japan the Thai government issued a "Peace 
Declaration" in which the declaration of war against Great 
Britain and the United States was proclaimed null and void 
because made against the will of the Thai people. Seni Pramoj, 
minister to the United States and organizer of the "Free Thai" 
abroad, became prime minister, and a new, more democratic 
constitution was adopted. Marshal Phibun was arrested as a 
war criminal, but was released after spending a few months 
in jail. 
Pridi, who was the logical person to head the government 
after the overthrow of Phibun, held back until after the general 
election in 1946. On March 24 he became premier, and on 
June 9, 1946, occurred the death, by bullet wound, of King 
Mahidol. As a result of rumors, probably set afloat by Pridi's 
political enemies, the prime minister's name became widely 
associated with the death of the king. His government was also 
charged with unbridled corruption, and the pressure became 
too great for him to withstand; in August, 1946, he resigned 
the premiership in favor of Admiral Thamrong. On November 
8, 194 7, leaders of the armed forces overthrew the Thamrong 
government in the third successful coup d'etat since 1932. 
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Pridi fled into exile, and Marshal Phibun, who had engineered 
the plot, took over the reins of government five months later. 
Thus "the man who declared war on the Allies" was back in 
the saddle. Pridi's forces twice attempted to overthrow the 
Phibun regime, but failed. General Luang Kach, one of the 
chief agents of Phibun in the 1947 coup d'etat, was himself 
later accused of plotting against the Phibun government and 
was sent into exile in January, 1950. 
How are these events to be interpreted? A cynic might con-
clude that in the Second World War the Thai again outwitted 
the Great Powers. With the Phibun government linked up 
with Japan and the "Free Thai" in association with the Allies, 
Thailand could not lose much, no matter what the outcome 
of the war. After the war the United States government oblig-
ingly intervened on behalf of Thailand with the British, who 
quite naturally did not feel kindly disposed toward Thailand, 
which, because of its collaboration with Japan, had contributed 
to British woes in Malaya. Malaya was in desperate need of 
rice, and the British government thought it not unreasonable 
to demand that Thailand contribute its surplus of that com-
modity. The British were outmaneuvered; Thailand got off 
very lightly, in spite of its declaration of war on the Allies. 
There were rumors among the Thai that the struggle between 
Pridi and Phibun was mere show, and that they were actually 
in collusion. According to these rumors, Phibun in the postwar 
crisis was taking the side of the Western powers, as that seemed 
to be the best policy at the moment, but with the knowledge 
that in case this policy failed, Pridi could step forward to make 
peace with Communist China. This is fantastic, of course, but 
it does indicate something of the Thai mentality. This policy 
of diplomatic reinsurance does not seem at all unreasonable 
to them. 
Marshal Phibun has definitely committed his country to the 
side of the non-Communist nations. A few Thai have frankly 
stated that Thailand cannot repeat the performance of the last 
war. "The doctrine of extra-legality will not appear in the 
Thai dictionary for future use," states a Thai nationalist paper, 
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and it warns the Thai not "to hope for a hopeless chance of 
remaining neutral." The only sensible policy now is to take 
sides from the beginning, according to this view. 
RETURN OF PHIBUN 
The coup of November, 1947, did not result in Phibun's im-
mediately becoming premier. Khuang Aphaiwong, who could 
be a friend of both sides, was selected by Phibun and his asso-
ciates to be prime minister for the third time in a little more 
than three years. On April 6, 1948, however, a supreme state 
council set up by Phibun named its creator premier once again. 
Pridi, meanwhile, was not to be counted out of the Thai 
political picture. On the night of February 26, 1949, the 
former law professor tried to return to power in a dramatic 
coup d'etat, which misfired when a premature radio broadcast 
warned Phibun and his supporters that a revolution was about 
to be attempted. Reaching tank and armored-car headquarters 
in advance of Pridi's tank-corps associates, they saved the day 
for the government. Reprisals of an ugly sort followed, giving 
indication of the political climate of Bangkok and the morality 
of those who ruled Thailand. Not only were a number of 
arrests made, including Pridi's brother, but within the first 
four days of March six known supporters of Phibun's opponent 
were killed. 
In June, 1951, still another attempt was made to seize the 
reins of government from Phibun. Before many of Thailand's 
dignitaries and the entire diplomatic corps, a small naval vessel, 
the Sri Ayuthia) pulled up beside the American dredge Man-
hattan) which at the moment was being ceremonially transferred 
from the United States to Thailand, and kidnapped the Thai 
premier. "\\Then the Royal Thai Air Force later bombed and 
sank the Sri Ayuthia) Phibun had to leap for his life and swim 
to shore. 
Was this still another instance of the Phibun-Pridi rivalry? 
The evidence is conflicting. First reports were that this was 
a routine Thai coup, differing only from past coups in that 
this one was very bloody compared to its predecessors. Pridi, 
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it was reported, was the power behind the rebellion, although 
for safety's sake he did not put in a personal appearance. 
However, the naval officer who headed the group which kid-
napped Phibun vehemently denied Pridi's leadership of the 
revolt, and some observers termed the "Manhattan Affair" a 
last desperate attempt on the part of the Thai navy to wrest 
some power from the army and police. 
In terms of the scanty evidence presently available, there is 
reason to think that the "Manhattan Affair" was the work of 
an underground Communist body known by its abbreviated 
title Ku-Sap-Be, the translation of the full name of which 
means "Liberation Party for the Salvation of the Fatherland: 
Vietnam-Laos-Cambodia-Thailand-Burma." Founded in 1944 
at Sakorn Nathorn in northeastern Thailand by a very able 
Viet Minh agent, Moscow-trained Nguyen Van Long, the Ku-
Sap from the start sought to enlist persons who might not 
consider direct affiliation with the Communist party itself. It 
was claimed by many in Bangkok that the "Manhattan Affair" 
was in fact a Ku-Sap revolt.2 The would-be new regime's pro-
gram, as broadcast over the captured Thai radio at the time, 
coincided with the Ku-Sap program, even in many cases down 
to exact words.3 Moreover, the Viet Minh radio just three 
months earlier had predicted an early "civil war" in Thailand.4 
PRIDI AND COMMUNIST CHINA 
'Vhether or not Pridi was a partner to the 1951 coup attempt, 
he is still a factor of significance in Thai politics today, sup-
porting a Thai irredentist movement from Peiping as part of 
Chinese Communist foreign policy in Southeast Asia. His 
defection came as a great surprise to most of his friends outside 
Thailand. Some immediately recalled the charges of Commu-
nist leanings made against him in the 1930's, but most regarded 
2 See Denis Warner, "Communist Techniques in the Attempt on Siam," 
London Daily Telegraph, July 10, 1953. 
3 Copies of the Ku-Sap program and the text of the broadcast in question 
were both available at C.I.D. headquarters in Bangkok in August, 1953, when 
one of the authors of this book was in that city. 
4 New York Times, March 8, 1951. 
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his earlier economic policy and his present conduct as unre-
lated events. Although Pridi may be a real Communist today, 
perhaps convinced that such a course is the only alternative to 
the dictatorial rule of Phibun, it seems more likely that he is 
using the Chinese Communists to pave the way for his own 
return to power in Bangkok. 
The appearance of Pridi in mid 1954 as an ally of the Chi-
nese Communists in Asia followed the announcement in late 
January, 1953, that Peiping had set up a "Thai Autonomous 
Peoples' Government" in the southern province of Yunnan in 
China, bordering on Burma and Laos. The apparent objective 
of the establishment of this "nationality autonomous area" was 
to appeal to irredentist feeling of the fourteen million Thai in 
Thailand and the more than two million Thai in the Shan 
states of neighboring Burma and in adjacent Laos. 
If Pridi is not really a Communist, he is nevertheless part 
of Peiping's policy toward Thailand. In the same sense, Phibun 
is the democratic camp's ally in Thailand despite his lack of 
affinity with the basic precepts of democratic government. Thai-
land at the present time is an oligarchy pure and simple, and 
there is little real evidence that it is moving in the direction 
of democracy despite Premier Phibun's assertions following 
his return from the United States in the summer of 1955 that 
the time was at hand for the democratization of his country. 
The early postwar years did see the emergence of a number 
of political parties in the country as well as the establishment 
of a bicameral national legislature with all the members elected. 
Traditional Thai political apathy, however, continued to plague 
those who would provoke popular interest in government. Only 
22 percent of the electorate went to the polls in the election 
which followed the November, 1947, coup, but the victor was 
the Democratic party, a group of liberals who opposed both 
Phibun and Pridi. Phibun's personal assumption of power 
again in April, 1948, served to disillusion the Thai people 
further, with the result that less than half as many persons 
turned out to vote in 1949 as had gone to the polls in 1947. 
In 1951 democracy's prospects in Thailand were further 
dimmed by the abrogation of the new constitution with limited 
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advances toward popular government. The two-house national 
assembly was replaced by a unicameral parliament comprising 
123 appointed members and 123 elected ones. In the elections 
of February, 1952, approximately thirty opposition candidates 
won seats-weak voices to serve democracy. 
A subsequent so-called democratization drive of Premier 
Phibun seemed to gain new impetus in November, 1956, with 
the announcement that the Thai cabinet had accepted the 
prime minister's proposal for elimination from the constitution 
of "second category," or appointed, members of the national 
assembly. The constitutional revision proposed by Phibun 
would also establish a bicameral parliament, comprising a sen-
ate and a house of representatives, but this was not due to 
become effective until after the February, 1957, elections. These 
elections were for the purpose of filling half the seats in the 
existent one-chamber national legislature, whose total mem-
bership had been increased from 246 to 320. 
Just how soon after the February, 1957, elections these re-
forms would take effect was the big question. Phibun was 
quoted in December, 1956, as stating that elections for national 
assembly seats then filled by nominated members would prob-
ably be held in May, 1957, only three months after the February 
voting.5 There were those who wondered, however, why Thai-
land would go to the bother of electing one-half of its national 
legislature in February and the other half in May. Phibun's 
November announcement that the electoral reforms would 
not become effective until after the February voting was inter-
preted by many to mean that they would not actually come 
into being until four years later, 1961, when national elections 
again would be held. A lot could happen before that time, 
including Phibun's own departure from the scene as Thai 
premier. 
RIVALS WITHIN PHIBUN'S REGIME 
In spite of the fact that Phibun has remained at the head of 
the Thai government since 1948, he has not been as complete 
a master of the political situation as during the time of his 
5 The Economist (London), December 15, 1956. 
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earlier premiership. The men who staged the November, 1947, 
coup d'etat formed a junta to govern the country collectively. 
Phibun was but one leader of the Coup party, as the junta 
came to be known, possessing a strong voice in its councils, 
but not so strong that it could not be overruled. 
In the years after 1950 three men in particular in the Coup 
party markedly increased their strength and so vied with one 
another, as well as with the premier, to increase their influence 
over affairs of state (and business) in Thailand. Participants 
in this struggle for power were ambitious and scheming Police 
Director General Phao Sriyanon, who also has served as deputy 
minister of interior and deputy minister of finance; General 
Sarit Thanarat, commander in chief of the army; and aging 
Field Marshal Phin Chunhawan, Sarit's predecessor as head 
of the army, whose positions also have included deputy defense 
minister, minister of agriculture, and deputy premier. These 
men so increased their personal strength between 1950 and 
1955 that Phibun at one time appeared to survive as premier 
only because he represented a balance among the various fac-
tions attempting to succeed to his power. 
Although Field Marshal Phin, father-in-law of General Phao, 
possessed both considerable power and marked ambitions, espe-
cially in the economic field, it was between Generals Phao and 
Sarit that the real contest existed. As the prestige and power 
of General Phao grew, Phibun's position clearly was threatened. 
In the first week of August, 1955, Phibun struck out at the 
increasing power of his foremost rival. Phao, on a financial 
mission to the United States, was removed as deputy minister 
of finance. This coincided with announcement of the details 
of the police director general's involvement in a sensational 
opium scandal in which a $1,500,000 reward was concerned.6 
At the same time, Phibun removed several Phao followers 
from prominent posts in his government, including the ven-
erable Field Marshal Phin, who lost his deputy defense min-
istership, while keeping his portfolios of minister of agricul-
ture and deputy premier. Other pro-Phao casualties included 
a deputy communications minister, a deputy premier, and a 
6 See New York Times, August 7, 1955. 
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deputy minister of cooperatives. Admitted to cabinet ranks for 
the first time were two prominent supporters of General Sarit. 
Relinquishing his post as minister of culture, Phibun himself 
assumed the portfolio of minister of interior, under whose 
jurisdiction fell the national police network previously con-
trolled exclusively by General Phao. 
Phibun did not content himself with a cabinet shakeup. On 
September 2, 1955, he stripped from military and police com-
manders the authority to mobilize Thailand's armed forces and 
police, declaring that only he, in his joint capacity as minister 
of interior and minister of defense, would possess such power 
in the future. A day previously the premier had taken two 
other moves of considerable political significance: he had with-
drawn from the police the power of press censorship and had 
announced the dissolution of the legislative study commission, 
before which bills had previously been examined prior to being 
presented to the national assembly. General Phao had been 
secretary general of the commission and, consequently, had 
exercised considerable influence over legislation.7 And two 
days before these actions, Phibun appointed a new chief of the 
police central investigation bureau, the first indication that 
the premier intended personnel changes in Phao's agency. 
Political tensions in Thailand mounted in the weeks follow-
ing. By late November, 1955, the political atmosphere in 
Bangkok was described as being near the "boiling point."8 
Hardly a newspaper appeared which did not headline violent 
denunciations of high-ranking cabinet officials. Rumors were 
widely circulated that Phibun was on the verge of effecting a 
drastic reshuffling-one which would result in the complete 
removal of General Phao and Field Marshal Phin from the 
government. Sidewalk orators and the press openly attacked 
Phao and his police followers for their past oppressive activities. 
Although the premier seemingly went out of his way to dis-
sociate himself from these attacks on the Phao faction, it is 
most significant that some of the strongest criticisms of this 
group appeared in Phibun's own newspapers. The November 
7 See New York Times, September 3, 1955. 
8 New York Times, November 23, 1955. 
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political tensions reached their high point when word spread 
about Bangkok that Police Director General Phao had been 
arrested at the instigation of Phibun. 
The reports of Phao' s arrest were not true. On the other 
hand, they most likely were not as wild a set of rumors as the 
government subsequently sought to suggest. Tensions among 
Thailand's leading political figures decreased, however, follow-
ing a meeting on November 28 attended by Phibun, Phao, 
Sarit, and Phin. While it is not known what specific discussions 
and bargaining took place at this secret session, it is obvious 
that a political rapprochement of some sort was reached among 
the top Thai politicians. It was only a matter of time, however, 
until a new crisis would emerge. 
Such a crisis appeared sooner than was generally anticipated 
-indicative, perhaps, of the seriousness of the stresses within 
the Thai political hierarchy. On December 23, 1955, Field 
Marshal Phibun announced his intention to resign as premier 
in early 1956 to make way, as he put it, "for greater democ-
racy."9 "I have heard," he said, "many criticisms from the 
people and I think the Government should resign and permit 
the political parties to decide on a new Government." Seem-
ingly, the purpose of Phibun's announced plans to resign was 
to get rid of certain cabinet ministers he might not otherwise 
be able to remove from the government-using as an excuse 
for their exclusion from a new government "democratic crit-
icism" of their actions. The prime minister blandly admitted 
that if he resigned, he probably would be asked to form a 
new government, and that he very likely would do so and 
would include in his new cabinet men whom he felt the 
people trusted. The Bangkok Tribune, Phibun's own paper, 
quoting "inner circles," openly attributed the premier's decision 
to resign to the refusal of certain ministers, recently under 
public attack, to give up their posts in the government. The 
chief target of this public criticism, of course, was Phao. 
On January 4, 1956, somewhat surprisingly, the Thai pre-
mier announced that he no longer intended to resign his 
office as previously planned. He said that he had talked the 
9 See Christian Science Monitor, December 23, 1955. 
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matter over with members of the Seri Menangkhasila party, 
which he heads, and that they did not wish him to resign.l0 
Phibun's party, formed after the 1955 legalization of polit-
ical parties in Thailand, is composed mostly of the military 
leaders-including Phao, Sarit, and Phin-who helped him 
return to power in 1948 and who have dominated key public 
positions since that time-in other words, the 1947 Coup 
party. The explanation behind Phibun's change of plans 
about resigning the premiership would seem to lie in a suf-
ficient show of strength within the party to indicate to Phibun 
that if he proceeded with his announced plans, he would do 
so virtually without allies. It is possible that the likelihood 
of bloodshed also was mentioned. 
That the Thai political situation continued in a state of 
flux was evidenced in April, 1956, when Phibun announced 
a new cabinet shakeup in which Phin Chunhawan lost his 
deputy premiership while retaining his agriculture portfolio. 
The balance of contending forces was maintained by the 
appointment of the ousted deputy communications minister 
as minister of industry. 
The February, 1957, election turned out to be a far more 
hectic affair than Phibun probably envisaged. The Seri Men-
angkhasila party won a majority-but not without opposition 
charges of widespread electoral irregularities. The most torrid 
of a number of close contests was in Bangkok, where Phibun's 
party emerged with seven of nine seats. Phibun himself led 
the field, but second in the race was the more democratically 
inclined Khuang Aphaiwong, a former prime minister and 
leader of the Democratic party. 
The charges of irregularities in the Bangkok voting resulted 
in demonstrations by students and the political opposition, 
followed by the declaration of a state of national emergency 
on March 2. The government claimed that this action was 
necessary because there were organized groups "with foreign 
support" which were attempting to incite unrest in order to 
overthrow the government. A high government spokesman 
identified the "foreign support" as Communist, but not "Com-
10 See New York Times, January 5, 1956. 
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munist China, the Soviet Union, or Czechoslovakia"-"It just 
means Communist support in the form of morale, subversive 
and financial help." 
To make sure the government was ready militarily in the 
event of a coup attempt, Phibun named Commander in Chief 
Sarit Thanarat to be commander of all of Thailand's armed 
forces, including Phao's police. Sarit, addressing demonstrating 
students on March 2, told them that the election was "com-
pletely dirty from all sides." This was an unusual position for 
a spokesman of the government to take and most likely was 
a bid by Sarit for popular support for himself. 
Although the elections left much to be desired by Western 
democratic standards, they did represent a step forward along 
Phibun's alleged "road to democratization" in Thailand. The 
campaign was a spirited one, there was a surprising degree of 
free speech, and government corruption and inefficiency were 
subjected to constant attack. Probably equally significant, at 
least in the short run, was Sarit's emergence as the leading 
administration spokesman in an hour of crisis. The first days 
of March, 1957, indicated that he might have become more 
than his chief rival's equal. 
Although confusion dominated the Thai political scene in 
the last two years, two facts above all others are clear: the 
relationship among the three leading figures in Coup party 
rule of Thailand is in delicate balance, and Phibun is an 
exceptionally clever politician. Both Phao's police and Sarit's 
army are self-contained military organizations which still might 
strike out at one another or at Phibun. Thailand's peace is 
a peace of accommodation, not of acceptance. As for Phibun, 
the very fact that he survived in Thailand after nearly a 
quarter of a century of coup and countercoup is testimony to 
his political adroitness. 
THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THAILAND 
The present instability in Thailand is by no means entirely 
political. A major part of it also stems from economic adjust-
ments following decreases in the international price of rice, 
Thailand 171 
which provides nearly two-thirds the value of Thai exports, 
and changes in demand for other Thai primary products as 
a result of the ending of the Korean war. With more than 
enough resources to support its present population, Thailand 
has been traditionally pictured as a pleasant, happy-go-lucky 
country where everybody has enough to eat, this being offered 
as a partial explanation for the Thai lack of interest in politics. 
But Thailand, like other backward countries in this and other 
parts of the world, is changing. Economic discontent is begin-
ning to appear, especially in the traditionally restive north-
eastern part of the country. Thailand may have at least one 
million tons of surplus rice to sell on the world market each 
year, but with rice prices off, this is not the all-sufficient eco-
nomic bulwark it was once thought to be. Moreover, the 
considerable drop in rice production in 1952-1953-6,500,000 
tons in that season as compared with 7,310,000 tons in 1951-
1952-gave vivid evidence that the country's rice supply was 
subject to significant variation. As a consequence of this drop 
in production, the southern provinces actually experienced a 
seasonal rice shortage-an almost unheard-of event in Thailand. 
Several factors have contributed to Thailand's budding eco-
nomic discontent. Foremost among these has been the drop 
in the price of rice. Thai rice is of high quality, and through 
mid 1956 at least, Thailand, unlike Burma, had been able to 
sell its surplus of the grain.11 But the price which Thailand 
was able to obtain for its rice in 1955 was $18.00 a ton below 
what it had received in 1952. This total drop of $50,000,000 
in export value provides a partial explanation for Thailand's 
present adverse balance of overseas payments, which began in 
1953. In 1954 the government tried to reduce its trade deficit 
by tightening exchange and import controls, but this served 
primarily to discourage private commerce and to introduce 
further complications into the country's foreign-trade position. 
Another factor contributing to Thailand's newborn economic 
discontent has been the increasing desire of the Thai peasant 
to buy a variety of consumer goods which he does not produce 
for himself. Prices for such goods, however, are today high, 
11 See New York Times, May 24, 1956. 
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partly because many of them have to be imported and partly 
because a large percentage of the cost of all items for sale in 
Thailand includes bribery for import licenses. 
The fact that Thailand is dependent on imports for so many 
commodities also is the cause of discontent among more en-
lightened elements. Money flowed into Thailand during the 
period 1948-1953 when world demand for the country's products 
was at an alltime high. Little of this wealth, however, made 
its way into capital investment for industrial development, 
hydroelectric plants, and the like. Most of it was squandered 
on conspicuous spending among the ruling elite, a fact which 
agitators do not neglect in telling the farmers why there are 
no modern irrigation projects to permit crop diversification 
when rice prices are low. The mounting popular discontent 
with the present government of Premier Phibun, reported in 
mid 1956, would seem to indicate that the words of such agi-
tators are not falling on infertile ground.12 
Fundamentally, however, Thai economic discontent is mild, 
compared to its counterparts elsewhere in Asia. Thailand is 
not marked by the hunger or extreme poverty so common in 
many lands of the Far East. Total annual rice consumption, 
as an indication of the comparative well-being of the Thai 
people, is the same as for Indonesia, which has four times the 
population of Thailand. Fish, Thailand's second food staple, 
also is in plentiful supply. Moreover, Thailand is not afflicted 
with a land tenure or ownership problem such as exists in the 
Philippines. The great majority of those engaged in agriculture, 
which provides approximately one-half of the Thai national 
income, own their farms, small though these may be in many 
instances. This absence of a land-tenure problem may yet 
turn out to be one of Thailand's strongest economic bulwarks. 
Although economic discontent is stronger in Thailand today 
than at any other time in its recent past, and although the 
country's leaders seem less responsive to such discontent than 
does, for example, the leadership of Burma and the Philippines, 
it cannot be said that they are unaware of its existence or that 
they are not tackling the problem in a number of ways. In 
12 See, for example, New York Times, May 24, 1956. 
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July, 1956, for example, General Phao Sriyanon as a spokes-
man for the government pledged a broad program of rural 
reforms to the Thai peasantry, including an increase in the 
income of the average family, which in 1955 was only about 
fifty dollars a year, and vast improvements in the country's 
roads so that the farmer might bring his products to market 
more easily. The response of the Thai government to economic 
discontent, however, has generally been controlled by ex-
pediency rather than by a genuine desire for improvement. 
The welfare activities of the Thai government relate particu-
larly to housing and agriculture, but extend also to land reform 
in those comparatively limited areas where it is required. The 
present large-scale housing program tackles a major social 
problem in an enlightened manner, providing, as it does, for 
government mortgages for the building of new houses or the 
renovation of old ones and for the rental or purchase from 
the government of both houses and land. The self-help settle-
ment scheme, if fully implemented, also offers the promise 
of a brighter future to many Thai peasants. By this scheme 
the government undertakes the responsibility for setting up 
whole new communities, surveying the sites for them, con-
structing roads and irrigation systems, and providing their 
inhabitants with public utilities, basic machinery, and medical 
care. Settlers are advanced loans by the government to be used 
for building homes and acquiring farming implements, feed, 
and livestock. Under the scheme, settlers are given ten acres 
of land, which becomes their own at no cost if they repay the 
government's loan in eight years and if three-fifths of the land 
is cultivated at that time. Several such settlements already 
exist, with more promised by the government. 
These housing and settlement schemes do not represent the 
full extent of the Thai leadership's moves to reduce economic 
discontent in the land. In a somewhat belated attempt to 
encourage crop diversification, efforts now are being made to 
increase the output of jute, cotton, and sugar, among other 
products. In 1954, moreover, plans were announced for an 
agricultural bank offering farmers credit at low interest rates. 
In addition, the traditional problem of usury is being dealt 
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with by not renewing pawnbroker's licenses upon expiration. 
Although much more could be done in the field of irrigation, 
work is proceeding, nevertheless, on the large-scale irrigation 
project at Chainat, financed by a loan from the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. On another social 
welfare front, free medical treatment-already existent in Bang-
kok and other towns-is being extended, although not as rapidly 
as it could be. 
The Thai government also is seeking to increase the indus-
trialization of the country as well as to develop its basic 
resources. The government has made extensive attempts to 
discover and develop adequate resources of fuel and power, 
although its efforts to date have not fulfilled the high hopes 
entertained for such projects. Industrialization is severely 
hampered by a serious lack of capital; neither foreign nor 
domestic capital is eager to invest in a land where corrupt 
business and governmental practices inflate the costs of opera-
tion to levels equaled in few other countries in the world. 
Domestic capital, moreover, tends to be channeled into various 
areas of short-term investment-loans covering limited periods 
of time and bearing high interest rates. In spite of this uninvit-
ing climate for capital investment, a new cement plant has been 
constructed, for example, and the port of Bangkok is being 
rebuilt, the country's inadequate railroad system rehabilitated, 
and production of electric power increased. In most of the 
major projects foreign loans have played a leading role. 
One bright spot in the Thai economy is the increase in 
rubber production, which by 1955 had reached 130,000 tons 
a year and brought Thailand about $75,000,000 in foreign 
earnings. This accounted for 30 percent of the country's total 
foreign-exchange receipts as contrasted with 10 percent of such 
earnings two years earlier. The loss in rice revenues, therefore, 
has been partly compensated for by the growth in rubber 
earnings. In addition, Thailand's two other leading exports-
tin and teakwood-have remained in demand. 
For all the economic changes of the past five years, however, 
Thailand has remained a primarily agricultural country, highly 
dependent upon the whims of world demand. Until major 
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changes are made to reduce this dangerous reliance on the 
demands of distant lands, the country will continue to be in 
a vulnerable position economically. 
THAILAND'S CHINESE MINORITY 
If the Thai farmer has become increasingly discontented in 
recent years, the 2,500,000 Chinese of Thailand have long been 
dissatisfied with the Phibun regime. Ever since Phibun first 
became premier in 1938, they have been subject to legal 
discriminations seeking to reduce the economic stranglehold 
they are believed to have on the country and to increase Thai 
participation in business and commerce. With the consolida-
tion of the power of the Chinese Communists in Peiping, fear 
has increased in government circles concerning the dangers to 
the state inherent in the presence of such a sizable minority 
which is both unassimilated and discontented. The present 
government, however, is doing little to win the Chinese over 
to its side. The twentyfold increase in 1952 in the alien 
registration fee, for example, was not designed to increase 
loyalty among Thailand's Chinese. 
The drive to decrease the Chinese (and European) hold on 
the Thai economy and to induce more Thai to enter com-
mercial and business pursuits is Thailand's own version of the 
nationalism which has swept Southeast Asia with such furor 
in recent years. Thailand never having been a colony of a 
""Western power, the developing nationalism of the Thai, as 
spearheaded by the ultranationalist Phibun, directed itself 
against the most conspicuous example of foreign domination 
in the country, alien control of the nation's economy. Nor 
did the Chinese, who bore the brunt of this attack, really 
attempt to reduce the furor of this emotionally potent eco-
nomic nationalism. Increasingly nationalistic themselves, they 
continued their open allegiance to China, under Chiang Kai-
shek as well as Mao Tse-tung, with the result that they further 
stimulated Thai nationalism. This anti-Chinese discrimination 
could provide an excuse for intervention by Peiping in the 
country's affairs. 
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In late 1956, indications were that the Communists were 
tightening their grip on Thailand's Chinese, '\vho represent 
20 percent of the population of the country and 30 percent of 
the inhabitants of the capital city of Bangkok. The Commu-
nists, as their influence expanded, were gaining control of 
many organizations which were once pro-Nationalist. Five of 
Thailand's six Chinese newspapers, for example, look with 
favor on the Peiping government. 
There were several reasons for the growth of Communism 
among the Chinese of Thailand. Chief among these was a 
swelling nationalistic pride in a China which was once more 
laying claim to great-power status. The fact that the leadership 
of this new China comprised totalitarian Communists made 
little difference to many Chinese who were more concerned 
with the fact that the soldiers of Mao's China had held the 
powerful West at bay in Korea. Many Chinese also were proud 
of the cheap serviceable goods which began to flow into the 
Bangkok market from mainland China in 1955. The psycho-
logical effect of Chinese-made goods competing with the manu-
factures of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and 
other Western countries should not be underestimated. Large 
numbers of young Chinese, moreover, frustrated in their efforts 
to retain their Chinese citizenship while seeking higher educa-
tion and important positions in Thailand, turned to Commu-
nist cells as a means of furthering their ambitions. Here they 
were indoctrinated in Maoist-Leninist dogma, helped to escape 
to mainland China for further education, and frequently 
smuggled back into Thailand to serve themselves as carriers 
of the Communist propaganda. 
Fear also played a major role in the growth of Communism 
among Thailand's Chinese minority in the years after 1950. 
The Communists were ruthless in their efforts to play upon 
the fears of those Chinese who still had members of their 
family living in mainland China. All weapons were employed 
in the campaign to intimidate Thailand's Ghinese into sup-
porting the Mao regime. In mid 1956 the president of the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce sought to resign his office; he 
said he was overburdened with business activity, but friends 
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said he was mainly influenced by the fact that the two previous 
presidents had been murdered. Many Chinese join Communist 
front organizations for safety's sake alone. "It is all right for 
you Americans to speak against Communist China," one Chi-
nese told a New York Times reporter. "If Communist China 
is recognized, you will be personally safe."13 
Another cause of anxiety to Thailand's leadership-and, like 
the Chinese, a source for Communist exploitation-are the 
estimated fifty thousand Vietnamese refugees who inhabit the 
Thai side of the Mekong River, which separates Thailand from 
adjacent Laos. Residents of Thailand since 1946, when they 
fled from the French who were then reoccupying Indochina 
after the defeat of the Japanese, they are overwhelmingly Com-
munist in their political orientation. In their homes are to be 
found pictures of their venerated hero, Ho Chi Minh, leader 
of Communist north Vietnam. Located in Thailand's tradi-
tionally most troublesome area in the northeastern part of the 
country, these Vietnamese afford excellent opportunity for 
subversive activity of a variety of sorts. The Communist gov-
ernment of north Vietnam, indeed, has made overtures to the 
Thai government to permit it to open a consulate in Thailand 
to handle the affairs of these refugees. The Thai, however, 
have replied in the negative, fearing Ho and his associates were 
using the refugee issue to obtain a diplomatic foothold. 
Since it would appear that Communism's offensive in the 
future against Thailand probably will take the form of an 
intensified effort at infiltration and subversion, rather than 
overt aggression, the existence of discontented minorities, like 
the Chinese and Vietnamese, does not augur well for the 
Phibun government's hopes for future internal tranquillity. 
A major source of stability, on the other hand, is the over-
whelmingly dominant religion, Buddhism. As in Burma, Laos, 
Cambodia, and Ceylon, the form of Buddhism adhered to in 
Thailand is Hinayana or Little School Buddhism. Antagonistic 
as Communism is to all religions, it would appear that this 
faith constitutes a major social barrier to Communism's future 
development in Thailand, particularly in light of the strong 
13 Quoted in New York Times, May 18, 1956. 
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hold it has on the hearts and minds of the Thai common people. 
The Buddhist priests of Thailand, moreover, have been his-
torically apolitical, which would seem to make it unlikely that 
they will become active workers for Communism, should they 
ever fall for its glib promises. On the other hand, Buddhist 
monks in other lands have been far from politically inactive 
in the past-as, for example, Burma's Buddhist priests, who 
strongly supported their country's nationalist revolution in 
the 1930's. 
FOREIGN RELATIONS 
It is in the realm of foreign relations, rather than domestic 
affairs, that Thailand has most recently captured the world's 
headlines. The defection of Pridi Banomyong to the Chinese 
Communists and the emergence of Phibun as one of the United 
States' chief allies in the Far East have already been noted. 
The importance of these events stems in large part from the 
rise to power of the Communist Mao Tse-tung in China and 
the considerable attention which his Peiping government is 
giving to Southeast Asia. The establishment of the Asia-
Australasian Liaison Bureau of the World Federation of Trade 
Unions in late 1949 and the Peace Liaison Committee of the 
Asian and Pacific Regions in 1952 are examples of the role 
Communist China is assuming with respect to the other peoples 
of Asia. The report made on the various Asian "working class 
liberation movements" at the 1949 Peiping conference of the 
A.A.L.B. indicates that China is seeking to assume the leader-
ship of Far Eastern Communism, an objective which many say 
it has already attained. In addition to the contacts China pos-
sesses with sympathetic overseas Chinese elements in Thailand 
today, it also is trying to play on Thai irredentist feelings 
through its "Thai Autonomous Peoples' Government," set up 
in early 1953 in the province of Yunnan in south China. The 
broadcast support from Peiping of Pridi Banomyong for the 
Chinese Thai state in 1954 was part of Communist China's 
policy of seeking to control, or at least neutralize, the Thai 
kingdom through an appeal to irredentist sentiments. 
The Chinese moves have alarmed both Phibun Songgram 
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and the United States, which is the main reason for the present 
alliance between these onetime enemies. This alliance, which 
was all the easier to arrange because of Thailand's lack of a 
colonial past with its resulting hatred and suspicion of the 
West, took formal shape in October, 1950, when Thailand 
signed a military assistance agreement with the United States. 
Since that time Phibun has assumed an increasingly larger role 
in American Far Eastern "cold war" strategy, as witnessed by 
an American economic aid contribution of $111,900,000 be-
tween 1950 and 1956 and "hundreds of millions" of dollars of 
military help.14 In September, 1954, Thailand was among the 
eight nations represented at the Southeast Asian Treaty Organ-
ization founding conference at Manila. Much had happened in 
Southeast Asia between August, 1944, when Phibun stepped 
down from the premiership, and September, 1954. The fact 
that a Phibun-premiered government was a participant at 
Manila was one indication of these changes. Thailand was 
subsequently the first nation to ratify the Southeast Asian Col-
lective Defense Treaty. 
The friendship of the United States has brought many major 
benefits to the Thai people, aside from the considerations of 
international politics. Deadly malaria, for instance, has been 
eliminated as a consequence of American aid. The United 
States has given Thailand, which depends so vitally on its rice 
production, a new rice seed which will raise yield threefold. 
New roads and railroads have been built, and many acres of 
arid land have been irrigated. A major consequence of Amer-
ican economic and technical assistance to Thailand is the fact 
that the Thai people today are as friendly toward the United 
States as are the people of any land in the Far East. 
Thai-American cooperation has been evidenced in many 
ways. Militarily, for example, Thai troops participated in 
"Operation Firm Link," the first joint maneuvers of the South-
east Asian Treaty Organization powers. Held in February, 
1956, the exercise comprised a mock landing in the vicinity 
of the Thai capital of Bangkok and provided clear evidence of 
14 See report of Bangkok press conference of United States Ambassador Max 
W. Bishop in New York Times, March 4, 1956. 
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Thai willingness to cooperate with the United States in main-
taining a sturdy defense posture against aggression in Asia. 
On another level of joint endeavor, the government of Phibun 
Songgram has cooperated with the United States in carrying 
out an ambitious anti-Communist indoctrination program 
among the Thai peasantry. Instruction teams associated with 
this program have gone into almost every corner of the 
country in order to bolster the spiritual barrier against the 
spread of Communism, and while some have criticized the 
program for introducing Communism to many peasants who 
had not heard of it previously, the record would seem to be 
one of genuine accomplishment. 
The rise of the Chinese Communists to power was only one 
of two developments to bring Thai and American foreign 
policies closer together in the postwar years. The other was 
the increasing success which greeted the efforts of the Viet 
Minh to achieve power in adjacent Indochina and the infiltra-
tion of Thailand by agents of Ho Chi Minh. The Geneva 
Agreements of 1954, which established the Viet Minh in 
northern Vietnam and permitted the Communists to maintain 
an enclave in Laos (the part of Indochina which borders Thai-
land on the greater part of its eastern boundary) alarmed Phi-
bun and his foreign minister. Viet Minh infiltration into the 
troublesome northeastern sector of the country has particularly 
worried the government, but this by no means represents the 
extent of the Indochinese Communists' efforts to bore away at 
Thai stability. The Ku-Sap-Be, which appears to have directed 
the Manhattan revolt of June, 1951, was clearly inspired by 
the Viet Minh, and another body, the Southeast Asia League, 
existed briefly just before the coup of November, 1947, as a 
cover for various forms of assistance to Ho's insurgents, includ-
ing the shipment of military supplies. Few events in the present 
century, however, have alarmed the Thai government more 
than the Viet Minh thrusts into relatively defenseless Laos in 
1953 and 1954, which dramatized to Phibun and his associates 
the precarious position in which their country was situated. 
The reality of this position was brought home at the same time 
to the United States, which has steadily increased its aid to 
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Phibun. The collapse of French fighting against Ho in Viet-
nam, climaxed by the Geneva Agreements, was primarily re-
sponsible for the haste with which Washington engineered the 
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization meeting in September, 
1954, attended by Thailand, the United States, and six other 
nations. 
Despite Thailand's record of strong opposition to Commu-
nism, reports began to appear in the fall of 1955 of a creeping 
trend toward neutralism in Thai foreign policy. The Thai 
reportedly were having second thoughts regarding their hith-
erto uncompromising stand against Communist China, in large 
measure as a consequence of the direct negotiations then taking 
place between Peiping and the United States at Geneva on 
various matters of dispute between them. The Thai leadership 
allegedly feared that if Washington made its peace with the 
Chinese Communists, this might leave Bangkok in an extremely 
awkward position. As one Western diplomat in Thailand put 
it, "Thailand is afraid that it is going to be caught way out 
on a limb alone in Asia."111 
At about the same time Thai foreign policy was claimed to 
be veering toward neutralism, the stores in Thailand's capital 
city of Bangkok were being flooded by a flow of indirectly 
imported goods from Communist China. The Communist 
products included such items as bicycles, fountain pens, sewing 
machines, radios, and alarm clocks-these having reached Thai-
land through the British crown colony of Hong Kong. Some 
thought it more than a coincidence that talk of Thai neutralism 
and large-scale imports from Communist China were occurring 
almost simultaneously. There was no question, however, re-
garding Chinese intentions in flooding the Thai market with 
low-cost, serviceable goods. So cheaply priced were the Com-
munist products that Peiping clearly was losing money on 
them. China's purpose obviously was political, not economic. 
Some observers believed that Thai foreign policy had begun 
to feel the impact of neutralist sentiment at the Bandung con-
ference of Asian and African nations in Indonesia in the spring 
of 1955. Reports that a neutral foreign policy was under dis-
liS Quoted in New York Times, November 19, 1955. 
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cussion by the Thai cabinet were alleged to be a logical develop-
ment of seeds sown at Bandung. The personal overtures made 
to the Thai foreign minister by Chinese Communist Premier 
Chou En-lai were said to be enjoying a natural flowering. 
Thai Premier Phibun, however, denied emphatically that 
his country was drifting in the direction of the sort of neutralist 
foreign policy pursued by the Indians and the Burmese. Speak-
ing at a press conference following American newspaper reports 
that neutralism was on the rise in Thailand, Phibun not only 
declared that "we still adhere to SEA TO," but also noted that 
"the world situation presents no basis for optimism." "Bulganin 
is visiting Burma and India and he still adheres to his policy 
of world domination," the field marshal stated; "so our Army 
must be ready for any emergency." 
The prime minister's words were in harmony with the re-
marks of General Sarit Thanarat, commander in chief of the 
Thai army, made three weeks earlier before the national as-
sembly. Discussing the 1956 budget bill, which allocated 
$41,000,000 to the ministry of defense, General Sarit called for 
an army and air force "three times the present strength and 
a Navy four times as strong." Sarit said such a military expan-
sion was necessary, because "Thailand is being subverted more 
and more by our enemy." 
In Sarit's November 11 speech also was to be found a 
possible indication of why Bangkok had suddenly produced 
a spate of rumors regarding a rise in neutralist sentiment among 
Thai officials. "Our Army today could not stop any aggressor," 
Sarit had told the assembly. "Our Navy could not even keep 
our gulf clear of mines," he had declared. "I cannot wait for 
United States aid," he said; "we shall use our own money to 
make our Army stronger." 
The alleged proneutralist turn in the Thai foreign outlook 
in 1956 and early 1957 could be a mid-twentieth-century in-
stance of the truth of the old Thai saying: "Like the bamboo, 
we bend with the wind." The Thai did bend with the wind 
of growing Japanese importance in the Far East in the nineteen-
thirties and of increased American influence in the second half 
of the nineteen-forties and the first half of the fifties. The 
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newest winds are those of Asian neutralism and national sensi-
tivity, and there are those who claim to see signs of the begin-
ning of a "bending with the wind" in Thailand. In September, 
1956, for example, there were no less than fifty-five anti-Amer-
ican editorials in Bangkok newspapers (including those owned 
by Phibun, Phao, and Sarit), compared to only three in the 
same month of the previous year. In the campaign for the 
1957 national assembly elections the charge that United States 
aid was an expression of "imperialism" was a major platform 
issue. The governing Seri Menangkhasila party defended its 
acceptance of American assistance, and the other main campaign 
participant, former Premier Khuang Aphaiwong's Democratic 
party, supported United States help but questioned the need 
for more military than economic aid. The small opposition 
parties and much of the Thai press, however, were frequently 
violent in their attacks on United States assistance to Thailand. 
The criticism leveled at the American aid program by respon-
sible elements, who also were those in power or who had once 
held power (like Khuang) , seemed designed to get more assist-
ance from the United States. There was a growing, very vocal 
but still very small group of Thai, however, who inclined 
toward neutralism-and it was this group, which was not part 
of the ruling elite, which attacked the concept of American aid 
(rather than the amount) . Despite its size and present insig-
nificance, this small anti-American minority will bear watching 
in the future. 
The most likely explanation of Thailand's reported tendency 
toward neutralism in late 1955 was that the United States was 
being reminded that Thailand, one of its major Far Eastern 
allies, was not to be taken for granted. The fantastic expansion 
in the Thai military services proposed by Sarit was most likely 
an instance of hyperbole in the service of foreign policy. The 
Thai leadership felt that the United States was too much con-
cerned with winning over such avowed neutral states as India 
and Burma, and in the process was neglecting faithful Thailand. 
The Thai also were genuinely concerned over a possible Amer-
ican-Chinese Communist rapprochement at Geneva. 
If in late 1955 the Thai leadership seemed to be seeking to 
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convince the United States that Thailand might go neutralist 
if Washington did not pay more attention to it, there were 
signs a year later that a mild but real revision of Thai foreign 
policy was taking place. However, Thailand still was a stanch 
ally of the United States and still a strong foe of Communism, 
as evidenced, for example, by the July, 1956, police roundup 
of Chinese newspapermen in Bangkok believed to be Commu-
nists. At the same time Thailand seemed to be moving away 
from its previous inflexible policy of rejecting all Communist 
overtures. The most conspicuous exam pie of this change in 
policy was Thailand's lifting of its ban on nonstrategic trade 
with Communist China and North Korea in the summer of 
1956. The announcement of the lifting of the ban, significantly, 
came only four hours after a Chinese Nationalist good-will 
mission, headed by Taiwan's foreign minister, had landed at 
the Bangkok airport. Included in the list of nonstrategic goods 
which may now be traded with Communist China are rice, 
timber, industrial tools, agricultural implements, pharmaceu-
ticals, chemicals, cement, fuel oil, lead, and zinc. 
The lifting of Thailand's ban on trade in nonstrategic goods 
with Communist China followed a long and clever campaign 
for such action by certain Thai opposition assemblymen and 
the leftist press in Bangkok. These elements, who also called for 
Thai recognition of Communist China, claimed that China had 
solved its own economic problems and was now in a position 
not only to sell cheap goods to Thailand but also to supply 
technicians to help Thailand in its efforts to industrialize. 
Some of those who took this line undoubtedly were Commu-
nists or Communist sympathizers, but most of the opposition 
politicians and newspapers backing direct trade with the Chi-
nese Communists showed no signs of being ideologically pro-
Communist. Their views did not seem to be shared by Premier 
Phibun, however. 
In March, 1956, Phibun told American Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles, visiting Bangkok, that "it is not possible 
in the world of today to be neutral." General Phao, however, 
told a press conference in July that the reason the Thai press 
seemed so sympathetic to Communist China was that the Thai 
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people felt a certain closeness to the Chinese and that, "after 
all, for the Thai people, mainland China is China." 
Former Premier Seni Pramoj put it this way: "Communism 
is dynamic. Check it in the West and it expands in the East . 
. . . Adherence to Marxism-Leninism by the Soviet Union 
means no peace for the world until and unless the whole world 
is Soviet. The Communists pose a long-range threat to us. The 
question is not whether, but when."16 There were indeed signs 
of new Communist pressures in the states to Thailand's im-
mediate east and west. In July, 1956, Chinese Communist 
troops had crossed over the Sino-Burmese border; in August, 
1956, the Laotian government entered into an agreement with 
the Communist rebel Pathet Lao movement. 
The meaning of the Communist moves have not gone unper-
ceived by the Thai premier. Thailand has relaxed its foreign 
policy a little bit-possibly to test the outcome of such a relaxa-
tion. There are no indications that Phibun and his associates 
will seek to send strategic goods to China, or that they are less 
firm in their backing of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organiza-
tion, or that they will not seek to continue their support of 
United States policy in Asia and the Far East. If the pressures 
are increased, Thailand may move in the direction of the sort 
of neutralism espoused by India, Indonesia, and Burma. There 
is greater likelihood, however, that such a move on the part 
of the Communists will serve to reinforce the presently close 
Thai-American defense cooperation. Collaboration between 
the two states would seem to be firmer today than at any other 
time in history, despite the recent relaxation in a hitherto 
inflexible Thai foreign policy. 
Postwar Thailand's international relations clearly owe their 
complexion to the tensions and urgencies of the cold war 
between the Sino-Soviet bloc and the United States and its 
allies. The country's future, moreover, will probably be de-
termined by the outcome of that competition. 
16 Quoted by Arnold C. Brackman in Christian Science Monitor, September 
19, 1956. 
CHAPTER 6 
MALAYA 
A Problem zn Nation Building 
THE SITUATION in Malaya is quite different from that in any 
of the other countries of Southeast Asia. Before the Second 
World War, Malaya was politically asleep. For most of the 
area the governmental structure was feudal-sultanates under 
a complicated system of British protection. The native popula-
tion had become a minority as a result of immigration chiefly 
from China and India. As if to make up for lost time, the 
political tempo since the war has steadily accelerated. The 
British government has now promised the people of the Malay 
Peninsula self-government within the Commonwealth in 1957, 
but the three main population groups-Malayans, Chinese, 
Indians-are still a long way from having merged into a nation. 
How to unite these culturally divergent groups into a national 
community on which a democratic political superstructure can 
be built, and that in a relatively short time, is the formidable 
and urgent problem of Malaya. 
The Portuguese were the first Europeans to establish them-
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selves in Malaya. They set up a trading post and built a fortress 
at Malacca, where they remained for over a century. The Dutch 
conquered Malacca in 1641, but they did not extend their 
control over the peninsula; in 1824 they traded Malacca for 
Bencoolen in Sumatra, a post which the British had retained 
after returning the East Indies to the Netherlands in 1816. 
Earlier, in 1786, the British had obtained the cession of the 
island of Penang from the sultan of Kedah, and in 1800 they 
obtained from the same ruler some territory on the peninsula 
opposite Penang. In 1819 the British acquired the island of 
Singapore, just off the tip of the peninsula, from the sultan of 
J ohore. This strategic point was secured by Sir Thomas Stam-
ford Raffles, who had been governor of Java during the British 
occupation of the Indies (1811-1816) and who at the time he 
obtained the cession of the island was governor of Bencoolen. 
Raffles realized the strategic importance of the island for both 
trade and defense, and was determined to get control over it 
for his country. 
After establishing themselves at these key points, the British 
did nothing for half a century to extend their control. How-
ever, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the British 
government induced a number of Malay sultans to accept its 
protection, and in 1909 Thailand by treaty transferred to Great 
Britain "all rights of suzerainty, protection, administration and 
control" over the sultanates of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and 
Trengganu. In 1914 the sultan of J ohore accepted British 
protection, and with this agreement all of the Malay states 
except Patani, which was under Thailand, had been brought 
under British indirect rule. 
British Malaya before the war was composed of three different 
parts, the Straits Settlements, the Federated Malay States, and 
the Unfederated Malay States. The Straits Settlements included 
the island of Singapore, Penang with Province Wellesley, and 
Malacca, together with Christmas Island and the Cocas-Keeling 
group in the Indian Ocean. These areas were British territory 
and were directly governed as a crown colony. The Straits 
Settlements had an area of only 1,260 square miles, but had 
a population of 1,114,015 (1931 census). At the head of the 
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administration was a governor who acted under instructions 
from the secretary of state for the colonies in London. He 
was assisted by an executive council which was composed of 
eight official and three unofficial members, the latter nominated 
by the governor. The executive council had only advisory 
powers. There was also a legislative council composed of the 
governor as president and thirteen official and thirteen unof-
ficial members, eleven of whom were nominated by the gov-
ernor. The remaining two unofficial members were elected by 
the British members of the chambers of commerce at Singapore 
and Penang. There was little evidence of a desire in the 
Straits Settlements for a more democratic constitution. 
The Federated Malay States were composed of the sultanates 
of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang. They had 
a combined area of 27,540 square miles and a population in 
1931 of 1,713,096. The division of so small a country as Malaya 
into so many separate administrations was an obvious dis-
advantage. By agreements with their rulers these four states 
were federated in 1895 under a resident general. It was 
hoped that all of the states would eventually enter the federa-
tion, but when the nonfederated states saw that membership 
involved considerable loss of freedom, they were not attracted 
by it. In 1909 a federal council was established, with the 
governor of the Straits Settlements as president under the title 
of high commissioner, and with the president general trans-
formed into the chief secretary. The state councils now lost 
nearly all of their powers. In 1935 the British introduced a 
policy of decentralization, and the state councils recovered 
much of their former authority. 
The Unfederated Malay States were five in number, namely, 
Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu. They had 
an area of 22,080 square miles and a population in 1931 of 
1,526,604, about half of which was found in the single state 
of Johore. 
All of the Malay states were protectorates of the British 
crown. The rulers had agreed to accept the advice of a British 
adviser or resident except in matters connected with Malay 
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custom or the Mohammedan religion. The sultans or rajas 
were assisted by councils composed of official and unofficial 
members, with the former in a majority. The rule was in 
form "indirect," but most of the services were under a united 
British Malayan civil service responsible to the governor of the 
Straits Settlements, who served simultaneously as high com-
missioner for the Malay States. 
The British rule in Malaya was successful, especially in 
view of the situation which had developed. A great influx 
of foreign capital and of immigrants into a country with a 
feudal society created a large number of problems, but the 
administration ran smoothly and was highly efficient. The 
social services, judged by Asian standards, were very good. 
Much of the credit for this goes to the Malayan civil service, 
but it was made possible by the high level of prosperity which 
Malaya enjoyed. 
THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION 
Before Pearl Harbor, Malaya was placid; during the war it 
completely lost that character. This was in large part due to 
the impact of the Japanese occupation. The defeat of the 
British and the imposition of a new foreign rule caused shock 
and brought upheaval. The Japanese treated the three main 
population groups, the Malays, the Chinese, and the Indians, 
differently; hence the effects of the occupation varied widely. 
The experience did not make for national unity but for in-
creased antagonism between the three races. However dif-
ferent the treatment of the various races by the Japanese, all 
were exposed to anti-'Western and pro-Asian propaganda. Many 
acquired habits of violence. 
The Malays continued to carry on the government under 
the Japanese as they had under the British. They were en-
trusted with higher positions, if not always more responsible 
ones, than they had held under the British. They acquired 
a taste for the top positions and won confidence in themselves. 
The Japanese also indoctrinated the Malays with patriotic 
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sentiments for Malaya, the Coprosperity Sphere and Japan. 
Feeling for the last two did not take or was quickly lost, but 
the first found fertile ground. 
The Chinese community suffered severely in the war. The 
Japanese were bent on destroying active supporters of the Kuo-
mintang, active Communists, and members of the volunteer 
forces who had not surrendered. Chinese were massacred in 
the early days of the occupation. The British had trained and 
armed a nucleus of guerrillas before Singapore fell, and as a 
result of Japanese brutality their number increased. Organized 
as the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, they became 
strong and were very effective in disrupting Japanese supply 
lines, but they became more and more under the control of 
Communist leadership. They punished collaborators, levied 
contributions on whomever they could, and collected them by 
fair means or foul. They were joined by persons who had no 
political motives but who resorted to terrorism and extortion 
as a means of making a living in the prevailing economic chaos. 
The effects of the period on the Chinese is succinctly sum-
marized by two Malayan scholars as follows: "No one is likely 
to underrate the importance of the Occupation period in stim-
ulating guerilla organization among the Chinese. But other 
effects may have been in the aggregate more important: the 
inculcation of the habit of paying extortion money; the vast 
increase in bribery and irregularity of all kinds; the under-
mining of the pre-war respect for Government and law; and 
the stimulation to fantastic extremes of the tendency among 
the South Seas Chinese to be steadfastly neutral on all political 
issues and concentrate on personal advancement."1 
The Indians were likewise stirred up by the Japanese occupa-
tion, but in a quite different manner. They were used by the 
Japanese as a base and instrument for a drive to "liberate" In-
dia. An "Indian National Army" was recruited, often by duress, 
from the Indians in Malaya and financed by extortion levied 
on wealthy Indians with the protection of the Japanese authori-
1 T. H. Silcock and Ungku Abdul Aziz, Nationalism in Malaya (Secretarial 
Paper No. 8, Eleventh Conference, Institute of Pacific Relations, Lucknow, India, 
October 3-15, 1950) (New York, 1950). 
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ties. No doubt many of the leaders in the movement were 
sincere Indian patriots, and they may have thought that they 
were using the Japanese for their own cause. The "Indian 
National Army" was defeated, and the movement came to 
nought. However, the Indians became more politically con-
scious, they learned how to organize, and they acquired a sense 
of importance. 
Much of what happened in postwar Malaya can be better 
understood if it is remembered that the war ended abruptly 
and in a quite unexpected manner. The British believed that 
the liberation of the country would require a campaign fought 
in Malaya. They planned a series of troop landings on the 
coast combined with attacks on the Japanese forces by guerrillas 
operating from the jungles. But Japan capitulated before the 
campaign got under way, and unfortunately, the British were 
unable to reoccupy Malaya for several weeks. Into this power 
vacuum the Communist guerrillas, previously armed and sup-
plied by the Allies, moved rapidly and expanded. They organ-
ized labor unions in all the chief centers and in practically 
every trade. Where necessary, they used intimidation and 
terrorism. The British army which finally moved in was unpre-
pared for the task of reoccupation. The conduct of some of 
the troops and of some members of the military administration 
did little to restore British prestige. Small wonder that the 
peoples of Malaya at long last began to think about governing 
themselves. 
POSTWAR POLITICAL REORGANIZATION 
It will be helpful, before turning to the specific plans for 
governmental reform, to have a good look at Malayan society. 
According to the 1947 census, Malaya, including the Straits 
Settlements, had a population of 5,848,910. Of this number a 
little more than 38 percent of the total were Malays; about 
5.5 percent were Malaysians (chiefly Indonesians) ; nearly 45 
percent were Chinese; about 10.5 percent were Indians and 
Pakistanis. Europeans and Eurasians accounted for 0.3 percent 
each. These figures were for the whole of Malaya. The racial 
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complexion of Malaya and Singapore separately was quite dif-
ferent. In Malaya exclusive of Singapore the Malays and Malay-
sians accounted for nearly 50 percent of the total population, 
the Chinese for a little more than 38 percent, and the Indians 
and Pakistanis for a little less than 11 percent. In Singapore 
the Chinese constituted nearly . 78 percent, the Malays and 
Malaysians slightly more than 11 percent, and the Indians about 
7.5 percent of the population. Singapore, with a population of 
941,000 in 1947, and estimated at about 1,200,000 in 1957, is 
predominantly a Chinese city. Penang is also strongly Chinese, 
with over 55 percent of the population of that urbanized island 
belonging to that race. 
The population of the country was growing rapidly, even 
though Chinese and Indian immigration during the depression 
and since the war had almost ceased. The rate of population 
growth was well over 2 percent-highest among the Chinese 
and lowest among the Malays. The fertility of all the com-
munities was high, but the death rate among the Malays was 
much higher than among the Chinese and Indians.2 
About 60 percent of the Chinese in Malaya and about 50 
percent of the Indians were locally born. The number return-
ing to their native country was considerably greater among the 
Indians than among the Chinese. Since the Second "\Vorld War, 
immigration has ceased to be an important factor in population 
growth. Religiously the population of Malaya was divided as 
follows: Islamic-2,575,000 or 44 percent; Confucian-Buddhist 
-2,560,000 or 43 percent; Hindu-510,000 or nearly 9 percent; 
and Christian-120,000 or about 2 percent. Religious divisions 
ran along racial lines; the Malays and Malaysians are Moslems 
almost to a man, the Chinese are Confucianist-Buddhist, and 
2 The total population in 1957 was well over 7,000,000. Malaya is generally 
regarded as underpopulated, but T. E. Smith in his Population Growth in Ma-
laya: An Analysis of Recent Trends (London, 1952) sounds another note. 
"Although Malaya is a small country it does not yet suffer from the same popu-
lation pressure as Java, China, India and the Philippines. Nevertheless there 
must clearly be a fairly low upper limit to the number of years during which 
Malaya can absorb an annual population increase of this order without feeling 
acute indigestion. Over Malaya as a whole, the density of the population was 
estimated at 115 persons per square mile in the 1947 Census Report; and it 
must be borne in mind that the country includes very considerable areas of 
steep mountainside which are not likely to be opened up in the foreseeable 
future." Page 2. 
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the Indians are predominantly Hindu, with a small number 
of Moslems and Sikhs. 
The literacy rate for the whole population of Malaya, includ-
ing all ages, was 32 percent. It was highest among the Indians 
(40 percent) and lowest among the Malays (25 percent). 
Malaya had, and still has, what is sometimes called a "plural 
society." The inhabitants of Malaya were not culturally and 
economically integrated; on the contrary, they were divided 
into sharply separated racial communities. The native Malays 
were the rice growers and small-holder producers of rubber. 
The lower and middle positions in the government were their 
patrimony. Few were found in wage-earning employment, in 
the professions, or in commerce. About 70 percent of the In-
dians and Pakistanis were laborers, chiefly on rubber planta-
tions. A considerable number were in commerce and the 
professions. The Chinese were engaged in rubber cultivation 
both as laborers and as small holders, and they provided most 
of the laborers in the tin mines and a very large percentage 
of the factory workers. They also owned and operated tin 
mines, were strong in the professions, and very nearly dom-
inated the commercial life of the country. The Europeans 
held the top positions in the government, were large producers 
of tin and rubber, and played a leading role in finance and 
shipping. 
The economy of Malaya is heavily concentrated on the pro-
duction of rubber and tin for export. Malaya is the world's 
largest producer of tin and is second only to Indonesia in the 
output of natural rubber. These two commodities generally 
total over 80 percent of the value of all domestic exports and 
account for about a fifth of the national income. Singapore 
has a large entrepot trade. The Malayan per capita income is 
the highest in Asia ($250 in 1953). 
The British government planned a thoroughgoing reorgan-
ization of the government of Malaya after the war in the direc-
tion of unification and democracy. The Malay aristocracy would 
be deprived of their privileged positions and the constitutional 
patchwork replaced by two governments; a Union of Malaya, 
which would include all the territories on the peninsula and 
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the island of Penang, and Singapore. The latter was to be 
detached from the mainland and made a separate unit of gov-
ernment for two reasons. First, Singapore was a cosmopolitan 
free port, whose prosperity was in large part due to its entrepot 
trade. Its economic interests were not wholly tied up with 
Malaya. Secondly, exclusion of Singapore from the union 
would give a majority to the Malays, the racial community least 
politically conscious and least advanced economically, and thus 
make the proposed changes more acceptable to it. 
The British plans were based upon the assumption that it 
would require a campaign of heavy fighting to drive the Japa-
nese out of Malaya and that in this campaign British forces 
landing on the shores would be assisted greatly by Chinese 
guerrillas operating in the Japanese rear, with the Malay 
rulers, civil servants, and police giving passive if not active 
military aid to the enemy. The British prewar policy of 
"protecting" the Malays was regarded by the Chinese as unjust-
ifiable favoritism. With the record of Malay collaboration 
with the enemy and active resistance by the Chinese, the old 
British policy could not be restored. However, the British did 
not return to Malaya in the manner expected. The Japanese 
surrendered without the necessity of a campaign in Malaya; as 
a result the plan had either to be abandoned or carried out 
under unanticipated conditions. The British government de-
cided on the latter course. 
In pursuance of the decision to proceed with the plans, Sir 
Harold McMichael was sent to Malaya with essentially similar 
treaties for the rulers to sign. The sultans apparently felt that 
they had no alternative, for they all agreed to sign away most 
of the independence of their states and practically all of their 
own prerogatives. Strangely, the non-Malay communities, which 
stood to gain greatly by the proposed Malayan Union, did little 
or nothing in support of the proposal, but the response to it 
of the Malays, and especially of the Malay intellectuals, was 
immediate and strongly adverse. A United Malay National 
Organization (U.M.N.O., as it became popularly known) was 
formed under the leadership of Data Onn Bin Jaafar as a 
peninsular movement to oppose the union proposals. Other 
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organizations sprang up with the same purpose. Though the 
Malayan Union constitution was inaugurated in April, 1946, 
and nominally remained in force for two years, some of its 
more important provisions were never given effect, and negoti-
ations with the sultans and the U.M.N .0. for a revision of the 
constitution were begun almost immediately. Out of these 
negotiations emerged the new federation constitution which 
went into effect on February 1, 1948. 
·with the replacement of the union by the federation the 
Malay community had scored a victory over the non-Malay 
communities. The Malays were bitterly opposed to a demo-
cratic, unified government, for such a system would give the 
Chinese and Indians great influence in the government, if not 
control over it. The intellectual Malays had no love for the 
old feudal system, but they were unwilling to see it swept away 
if political reform should open the door to political power 
by the nonnative groups. They were caught in a dilemma. 
There was only a limited place for them in the old system, but 
they feared that a more democratic system would improve their 
position little, if any. Citizenship and the right to vote were 
the crux of the problem. In the union proposals the provisions 
for citizenship were quite liberal; under the federation consti-
tution they were more restricted. By excluding Singapore from 
the federation, the Malay electorate was given an additional 
advantage on the peninsula. 
The Malay nationalists were caught in a difficult position 
between the foreign rulers and the nonnative Chinese and 
Indian masses. They were torn between their desires and their 
fears. They desired self-government, but they feared that they 
could not obtain this without making political concessions to 
the Chinese and Indians which would give the latter great 
political power. The Chinese and Indians already had great 
economic power; the Malays hesitated to give them political 
power in addition, for that would give them almost complete 
domination of the country. As the Malays saw it, Malaya 
was their country and all others were intruders. They were 
bitter about the British policy which had encouraged the im-
migration of alien races to develop the tin and rubber indus-
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tries. The Malays felt that they had become stepchildren with 
little share in the prosperity of the country, that British policy 
had made it possible for the Chinese to take over the country 
economically. 
The Chinese community was reproached for having only an 
economic interest in Malaya but otherwise being wholly apa-
thetic to things Malayan. The Chinese answer to this charge 
was that by their hard work, thrift, and enterprise they had 
made modern Malaya-without enjoying any economic or other 
privileges as did the Malays. The latter had preference in 
government positions, and the best rice lands were reserved for 
them. As the Chinese saw it, the great weakness of the Malay 
was his narrow communal attitude and his obsession with the 
idea that the Chinese and Indians were determined to keep 
him down economically. They rejected the charge that there 
was any conscious or concerted attempt to exclude the Malay 
from commerce. The Chinese contended further that little 
inducement was offered them to become loyal Malayans, since 
they were practically denied citizenship in the states, and 
though all Chinese born in the Straits Settlements were British 
subjects, this citizenship meant little because it conferred no 
political rights. Their loyalty, the Chinese declared, could be 
won by giving them a better status. 
The Malays were obviously in a weak position to resist re-
forms. They had collaborated with the Japanese. Moreover, 
more than half of the population under the old governmental 
system was excluded from participation in government. The 
need for unification and democratization was obvious, especially 
in the atmosphere of the postwar world. The Malays were 
nevertheless able to defeat the union. They were in a powerful 
position because the traditional, existing feudal system favored 
them, and any attempt to impose a radically new constitutional 
system against their opposition would lead to chaos. They were 
also aided in their opposition to the union by a number of 
influential British who were former Malayan civil servants, 
including Sir Frank Swettenham, a former governor of the 
Straits Settlements. The British government very probably had 
also come to see the advantage of federation over union, 
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in that it favored the conservative Malays over the Chinese, 
among whom there was a strong radical element. The Malays 
hoped to put off democratization of the government until their 
economic and social position had improved. 
In June, 1948, the Communist insurrection began. Thus to 
the problem of communalism there was added militant Com-
munism. There had been sporadic violence and lawlessness 
before this, but now it became more general, continuous, and 
systematic. The purpose of the movement was to set up a 
Communist republic of Malaya. To cope with the situation, 
the government declared a state of emergency. 
The Malayan Communist party is an offshoot of the Chinese 
Communist party. It gained some strength and prestige in the 
mid twenties, during the period when Dr. Sun Yat Sen, in 
order to gain his ends, had resorted to collaboration with 
Soviet Russia. The organized terrorism which has disturbed 
Malaya for nearly a decade had its base in the Malayan People's 
Anti-Japanese Army. This group, recruited mainly from young 
Chinese, operated in the jungle behind a screen of agents in 
every village. Toward the end of the war they were supplied 
with arms by the British. The Communists burrowed deeply 
into this movement. After the war the British encouraged the 
development of labor unions; the Communists promptly in-
filtrated them. In 1948 the Communists turned to organized 
violence to achieve their ends .. Chinese Kuomintang leaders 
were killed in their homes, European planters were murdered, 
and police stations were attacked. The terrorism thus begun 
was prolonged over months and years. In April, 1950, an at-
tempt was made on the life of Sir Franklin Gimson, the gov-
ernor of Singapore, and in October, 1951, Sir Henry Gurney, 
British high commissioner to the Federation of Malaya, was 
assassinated. 
Though the number of guerrillas was estimated at only 3,000 
to 6,000, the campaign to suppress them has been costly. Some 
35,000 British soldiers and some air force units, together with 
a large number of extra police and special constables, were 
mobilized to fight the Communist guerrillas. The cost of the 
campaign in money was about $100,000,000 a year. 
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A number of factors explain why the war against the Com-
munists has been difficult and costly. Much of Malaya is still 
jungle, which is ideal for guerrilla warfare. The large rubber 
plantations offer much the same advantage. The British com-
manders said that fighting the guerrillas was like using a 
sledgehammer to crack a nut or like hunting for a needle in 
a haystack. In addition the guerrillas could make use of some 
500,000 Chinese who had squatted on the fringes of the jungle. 
During the depression in the 1930's Chinese laborers in tin 
mines and on the rubber plantations turned to the lands on 
the edge of the jungle for a livelihood. Under the Japanese 
occupation their numbers were greatly increased by thousands 
of Chinese who fled from the towns. The squatters were in the 
clutches of the bandits. Since they lived in areas where the 
police could not protect them, they were forced to furnish 
food, supplies, money, and information. The guerrillas also 
obtained recruits from the squatters. Thus no real progress 
could be made against the bandits unless something were done 
about the squatters. The solution was a resettlement program. 
The squatters were given small plots of land in accessible 
communities where they could enjoy the advantages of educa-
tion and social services. 
The resettlement of so many people was necessarily an ardu-
ous and expensive task. It also made for more bad feeling on the 
part of the Malays toward the Chinese. Ninety percent of the 
guerrillas were Chinese, but the Chinese community did little 
to help suppress them. Few Chinese joined the police force 
of the federation. And now the government was spending huge 
sums on the community which was economically least needy. 
TOWARD SELF-GOVERNMENT 
Malaya's problems are indeed formidable. While still fighting 
to suppress a Communist insurrection, the multiracial society 
is proceeding with a rapid democratization of its government. 
This may seem a dangerous undertaking, yet an argument fre-
quently made is that the battle against the Communists cannot 
be won without the active aid of the whole Chinese community, 
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and the allegiance and support of the Chinese cannot be won 
unless they are given citizenship and the right to participate 
on equal terms with the Malays in a democratic government. 
Sometimes it is made to appear very simple: that the Commu-
nist disturbances will subside almost immediately after political 
reforms have been instituted. 
The Federation of Malaya, which was set up in 1948, com-
prises eleven units: the nine Malay States and the Settlements 
of Penang and Malacca. At the head of the government is the 
high commissioner appointed by the British crown. He is 
assisted by a deputy high commissioner and a federal executive 
council. The federation agreement also provided for a legis-
lative council composed of 75 members, of whom 50 were 
unofficial, 9 were the presidents of the state councils, 2 from 
the settlement councils, and the remainder were ex officio and 
official members. While the majority of the members were 
unofficial, they were nominated by the high commissiont!r to 
represent the various racial and interest groups of the country. 
The federation agreement also established federal citizenship 
"designed to draw together with a common loyalty all those 
who can be said to regard Malaya as their true home." 
The federation agreement provided that "as soon as circum-
stances and local conditions [would] permit," legislation would 
be introduced for elections to the federal legislature and to 
the state and settlement legislative councils. In pursuance of 
this purpose, municipal elections were held in 1951 in Penang, 
Malacca, and Kuala Lumpur, and in 1952 the legislative council 
passed a law providing for the election of village councils 
throughout the federation. 
A step in the direction of responsible government was taken 
in 1951, when Sir Henry Gurney, the British high commis-
sioner, broadened the central secretariat to include three Ma-
lays, a Chinese, and a Ceylonese. Dato Onn Bin Jaafar, the 
chairman of the United Malay National Organization and a 
leading advocate of early self-rule for Malaya, was made head 
of the department of home affairs. The new appointees directed 
their departments, but they were responsible to the high com-
missioner. 
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Another step forward on the road to democratization was a 
citizenship law which became effective in September, 1952. 
By this law some 1,100,000 Chinese, which was between 50 and 
60 percent of the federation's Chinese population, acquired 
citizenship. Of the Indian population, 180,000-about 30 per-
cent-acquired citizenship. The Indians and the Chinese were 
not altogether happy about the provisions of the law. The 
law did not automatically grant citizenship to all persons born 
in Malaya, as the non-Malays demanded, but only to second 
generation non-Malays. 
After these progressive steps the British government seemed 
to hesitate. Oliver Lyttelton, colonial secretary, in the house 
of commons in July, 1952, warned against moving toward self-
government in Malaya too rapidly, stating that there was not 
yet enough fusion and unity to make self-government successful. 
He expressed the belief that the establishment of an effective 
system of self-government would take a decade or two. He 
declared that an immediate grant of full self-government would 
soon be followed by bitter racial strife, conflict, and confusion. 
Early in 1954 the colonial secretary rejected a request from 
the leaders of the Alliance formed by the U.M.N.O. and the 
M.C.A. (the Malayan Chinese Association) for direct talks in 
London on federal elections and constitutional issues. In 
September, 1954, five members of the British parliament 
visited Malaya and made a statement that Malaya should not 
set a target date for self-government. 
The political leaders of Malaya reacted strongly to these 
declarations. The strongest Malay party, the U.M.N.O., and 
the large Chinese organization, the M.C.A., had already formed 
an alliance in order to present a common front. They were 
now joined by the Malay Indian Association (M.I.A.). Sir 
Cheng-lock Tan, president of the powerful M.C.A., in Decem-
ber, 1953, issued a strong statement in protest to the trend of 
the British pronouncements. He demanded self-government 
for Malaya within "a reasonable time." He declared that if the 
transfer of power was delayed too long, the people might be 
provoked into impatience and hostility, and the contention that 
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national unity must precede self-government and that com-
munal antipathies made such unity impossible would be in-
terpreted as a policy of "divide and rule." The idea that the 
Chinese monopolized the wealth of Malaya, he declared, was 
a myth; they actually controlled less than 20 percent of the 
rubber industry and 25 percent of the tin mines. Big business 
was almost entirely in European hands, asserted Sir Cheng-lock. 
Regardless of the official British views on the feasible rate of 
progress toward self-government, events from 1952 moved 
rapidly and irresistibly toward that end. In the Kuala Lumpur 
municipal elections of that year the U.M.N.O. and the M.C.A. 
formed a local alliance and won nine of the twelve seats. The 
alliance was so successful that it was extended to the municipal 
election campaigns throughout the country. In March, 1953, 
the U.M.N.O. and the M.C.A. announced an agreement for 
the extension of the alliance to the general elections for the 
federal legislative council. In August of that year the Alliance 
held a national congress which adopted a resolution making an 
independent state within the British Commonwealth and full 
responsible democratic government its goal and demanding that 
elections to the federal legislature be held in 1954. Tengku 
Abdul Rahman, president of the U.M.N.O., and Sir Cheng-
lock Tan, president of M.C.A., had accepted the challenge of 
Colonial Secretary Lyttelton and were seeking to prove that 
the Malays and the Chinese could cooperate for constructive 
purposes. In this connection it should be noted that this move-
ment was in no small measure due to the work of Malcolm 
MacDonald, who since 1946 had served the British government 
as commissioner general for Southeast Asia. He instigated the 
formation of the Communities Liaison Committee, which by 
its studies, recommendations, and work did much to bring the 
leaders of the various races together. 
In 1954 another step forward was taken. The legislative 
council was enlarged to 98 members, of whom 52 were to be 
elected. Moreover, after the elections to the legislative council 
the members of the executive council would be appointed in 
consultation with the leaders of the group or groups command-
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ing a majority of the elected members, thereby creating a sort 
of limited responsible government. In the elections held in 
July, 1955, the Alliance, of which the Malay Indian Association 
had also become a member, won 51 of the 52 elective seats. 
As a result of this triumph, the leader of the U.M.N.O. and of 
the Alliance, Tengku Abdul Rahman, was named chief min-
ister by the high commissioner. 
Chief Minister Rahman and his Alliance now pressed hard 
for a timetable for independence within the Commonwealth. 
A Federation of Malay Constitutional Conference met in Lon-
don in January, 1956, attended by representatives of the Malay 
rulers, the Alliance, and the United Kingdom. It was an-
nounced on February 6 that an agreement had been reached. 
"Every effort" would be made by the parties to enable Malaya 
to achieve independence within the British Commonwealth "if 
possible" by August, 1957. In the meanwhile, Britain was to 
speed the turnover of full internal self-government as rapidly 
as possible, reserving control of foreign relations and defense 
until full independence was achieved. A treaty of defense and 
mutual assistance would regulate the special relations between 
the United Kingdom and the Federation of Malaya. Under 
the terms of this treaty the United Kingdom would be given 
the right to maintain in the federation the forces necessary to 
fulfill its Commonwealth and international obligations. In 
January, 1957, London announced that such an agreement had 
been signed. Under its terms the federation is to receive 
£20,000,000 ($56,000,000) in financial assistance. 
A draft constitution for independent Malaya was published 
in February, 1957. The constitution aims to provide a com-
mon nationality for the future, but during a transition period 
the Malays will continue to enjoy certain special privileges 
with respect to Malay reservations and quotas for admission to 
public services, eligibility for scholarships, and the issuance of 
permits and licenses. The draft constitution further provides 
that Malay shall be the national language, but with English 
also the official language for a decade. The supreme head of 
the federation will be the senior among the rulers of the nine 
constituent states. The parliament will consist of a house of 
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representatives of one hundred members, entirely elected, and 
a senate of twenty-two elected and eleven nominated members. 
Malaya would become a dominion within the Commonwealth. 
SINGAPORE 
It was felt that to incorporate this large island-city, whose pop-
ulation was 80 percent Chinese, in the federation was politically 
unwise. As a result of this separation, Singapore's problems 
and development must be traced independently of the fed-
eration. 
The legislative council was reconstituted in 1951 with a 
membership of 25. Of the 16 unofficial members, 4 were 
nominated by the governor, 3 were named by the Chamber of 
Commerce, and 9 were elected by constituencies. Only a frac-
tion-48,000-of the persons qualified to vote had registered, 
and of these only 52 percent actually voted. In 1953 automatic 
registration was introduced, whereby the number was increased 
to 300,000. In 1954 a commission was appointed, with Sir 
George Rendel as chairman, to advise on the amendment of 
the constitution. The commission recommended changing the 
name of the legislative council to legislative assembly and in-
creasing the number of elective members to 25. These recom-
mendations were adopted by the government, and elections 
under the new arrangement were held in April, 1955. The 
results surprised everyone. Five main parties ran candidates. 
Three of these (the Progressives, the Democrats, and the Alli-
ance) were rightwing, and two (the Labor Front and Peoples' 
Action Party) were leftwing. The Labor Front won I 0 seats; 
the Progressives, 4; the Peoples' Action Party, 3; the Alliance, 
3; the Democrats, 2; and independents, 3. The left wing 
won its victory on promises of repealing the emergency regula-
tions, the immediate achievement of independence, and the 
creation of a socialist society. 
The governor called upon David Marshall, the unofficial 
leader of the Labor Front, to form a government. He made 
a coalition, not with the Peoples' Action Party, but with the 
Alliance. With the support of two Labor Front members ap-
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pointed by the governor and the three ex officio members, 
Marshall had behind him only 18 of the 32 members of the 
legislative assembly. Marshall had a short and stormy career 
as chief minister. The extreme left made war upon him and 
his government. The life of the city was crippled by a series 
of strikes aided and abetted by the Chinese middle-school 
students. Student strikes and violence are a strange phenom-
enon of Singapore society. The students rioted against national 
military service in May, 1954, and they struck on the eve of 
the 1955 elections against the government's refusal to register 
their newly organized Students' Union. In May they aided 
the bus strikers and furiously attacked the police. 
Marshall, the first chief minister, hoped to achieve self-
government for Singapore, and the union of Singapore with 
Malaya. Tengku Abdul Rahman, the chief minister of the 
federation, rejected the advances for union. He apparently had 
no desire to endanger the present favorable political develop-
ments on the peninsula by bringing into the federation this 
urban center with its large Chinese population and its strongly 
leftist, if not Communist, tendencies. Marshall also failed in 
obtaining self-government for Singapore. He headed a dele-
gation to London for a conference like that which had brought 
success to Rahman and his federation delegation only a few 
months earlier, but Singapore was a different story, due pri-
marily to its position as an important military base. The British 
government offered extensive concessions, but not enough to 
satisfy Marshall, who said he wanted the whole loaf or none. 
Britain offered to replace the present constitution with one in 
which the legislative assembly would be enlarged by 25 seats 
and which would provide full responsible government. Mar-
shall was willing to concede to Britain the right to maintain 
the military base and to retain control over external affairs, 
but no powers over internal security unless and until the Singa-
pore government should completely fail to maintain order. 
The British argued that external defense and internal security 
were inseparably intertwined, that internal disorder would af-
fect the security of the military base, and that therefore Britain 
must have emergency powers with respect to the maintenance 
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of law and order. On this issue the negotiations broke down. 
Marshall's emotional temperament and the lack of unity in 
his delegation were contributing factors. In conformity with 
the declaration he made before leaving for London that he 
would resign if he failed in his mission, Marshall quit as chief 
minister in June, 1956. He was succeeded by Lim Yew Hock, 
a seasoned labor leader. Lim is less spectacular than Marshall 
but a more effective administrator. He seems to be determined 
to put Singapore's house in order and then press for self-
government. 
MALAYAN PROBLEMS 
The chief problem which confronts Malaya is that of trans-
forming its multiracial, "plural" society into a Malayan nation. 
Malaya's political leaders contend that democracy and self-
government will aid the process of amalgamation-indeed, that 
it is a necessary condition. Marshall and Rahman have also 
argued that for Malaya it is either nationalism and independ-
ence, or Communism. While there is much validity in the 
first contention, it is also true that popular elections can be 
very divisive. Closely connected with this general problem of 
nation building are others, such as citizenship and the right 
of suffrage, education, and the future relation of Singapore 
to Malaya. 
The Chinese and Indians fear that they will not be accorded 
equal rights, equal justice, and equal opportunities with the 
Malays in an independent Malaya. At the moment Malays 
have a great political advantage in the federation, and they are 
loath to surrender this until their economic condition has 
much improved. Some 1,600,000 people in 1955 had the right 
to vote in the federation. Of these, 350,000 were non-Malays. 
Because of their participation in the Alliance, the non-Malays 
were accorded more generous treatment in the distribution of 
seats in the legislative council (17 of the 52 elective seats) 
than their voting strength would warrant, but still much less 
than their percentage of the total population. As the Malays 
see it, the Chinese have the tremendous advantage of having 
most of the productive property of the country, by far the 
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largest number of the more educated people, and nearly all of 
the important economic contacts. To grant the Chinese polit-
ical power while they are still economically and socially back-
ward would be to commit communal suicide. In effect, this 
means that the Malays are demanding that the Chinese aid 
the Malays in entering the world of trade and finance, and 
that the government expenditures on education and social 
services primarily for Malays be greatly increased.8 The Chi-
nese, of course, can have little interest in independence for 
Malaya if the qualifications for citizenship are going to be such 
as to restrict suffrage to a small number of their community. 
They want the right of citizenship extended to all persons 
born in Malaya and making it their home. 
The Malays feel that their predicament was created by the 
encouragement by the British rulers of the non-Malay immi-
gration. How to solve this problem is the Malay's chief con-
cern. The Malays have thought of ways in which the position 
of the non-Malays, and especially the Chinese, can be reduced. 
Legislation of recent years has already made it difficult for Chi-
nese who were born in Malaya or have long been resident 
there to reenter the country. To exclude the Chinese from 
citizenship is no longer possible. The prohibition of further 
Chinese immigration and the encouragement of Indonesian 
immigration might help redress the balance somewhat. The 
incorporation of Sarawak, Brunei, and British North Borneo4 
into the federation would decrease the proportion of Chinese 
in the total population, though it would not increase the Malay 
element very much. The expansion of the federation in this 
3 For example, the Selangor branch of the U.M.N.O. in 1956 submitted a 
memorandum to Tengku Abdul Rahman opposing citizenship by birth for the 
non-Malays, Chinese as a national language, the recruiting of physicians from 
Hong Kong, and the conduct of lotteries by the Malay Chinese Association (the 
proceeds of which were being used for social services in the Chinese community). 
They also demanded that half of the positions in any new industry be reserved 
for the Malays. 
4 The three British-controlled states in North Borneo. Sarawak, with an area 
of 50,000 square miles and a population of nearly 600,000, was governed for 
nearly a century by the Brooke family. Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, the last of 
the "white rajas," ceded the territory to Britain as a crown colony in 1946. 
Brunei, with an area of less than 2,500 square miles and a population of about 
60,000, is a sultanate under British protection. It is rich in oil. North Borneo, 
a crown colony, has an area of nearly 30,000 square miles and a population 
approaching 400,000. 
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manner is an idea which Rahman has endorsed and which the 
British government has instructed its commissioner general for 
Southeast Asia to promote. A solution to the Malay's problem 
might be found in the union of Malaya with Indonesia. The 
success of Indonesian nationalism naturally made a marked 
impact on the Malays, since the vast majority of Indonesians 
are of the same race and religion, and many Indonesians have 
settled in Malaya. The Malay Nationalist party broke away 
from the U.M.N.O. in 1946 on the issue of the use of the 
Indonesian flag, but it was unable to gain much of a following. 
There are also about 700,000 Malays in the southern part of 
Thailand who are by no means happy in their minority status, 
a situation which might in the future lead to an irredentist 
movement. The solution of becoming a part of Indonesia is 
not very attractive, as Malaya would be lost in a much larger 
unit. In the last analysis, there remains only one real solution, 
and that is the development of a Malayan outlook on the part 
of all the races and their amalgamation into a nation. Though 
this solution is in many ways unpalatable to the Malays, they 
are coming to recognize it as the only feasible one. 
Probably the most powerful instrument at hand to forge a 
Malayan nation is a national or public educational system with 
facilities for giving all of the children at least a common-school 
education. Such a program runs into a number of difficulties, 
aside from the formidable problem of finding the funds to 
finance it. These difficulties were recently summarized as 
follows: 
"Malaya's problems of education are unusually intricate be-
cause of the diversity of schools and the large backlog of chil-
dren, adolescents and adults without the advantages of even 
elementary education or literacy. The Federation's schools, 
classified according to the language of instruction, are Malay, 
Chinese and Indian (known as vernacular schools), and Eng-
lish. All types have primary schools, but only the English and 
Chinese offer secondary courses. They have diverse manage-
ment and financing-there are schools maintained by govern-
ment, non-profit schools to which government gives financial 
aid, and private schools wholly dependent on their own re-
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sources. English schools are the only ones attended by children 
of all races. 
"There is little cross-over from one type of primary school 
to another. The only formal bridge is between Malay and 
English schools-special classes in the latter give intensive train-
ing in English to enable selected Malay pupils to join the last 
primary classes. Almost no pupils go directly from the vernac-
ular primary schools to the government or aided English sec-
ondary schools. The Chinese primary schools lead to the Chi-
nese secondary schools. There are large variations in the 
qualifications of teachers and the facilities for training them, 
and consequently in the level and quality of teaching."5 
For a long time the only education really available to the 
Chinese was what the Chinese community itself provided. After 
1920 the Chinese schools were brought under government 
supervision and inspection, and a modest system of subsidies 
was introduced. vVhile some Chinese students attended the 
subsidized English schools, four times as many (1951) attended 
Chinese schools. Somewhat the same division existed among 
the Indian and Malay children. This produced cultural divi-
sions within the communities. Moreover, the poorly paid 
Chinese teachers in the Chinese schools, most of them China-
born, were strongly leftist. An authority on the Chinese of 
Malaya states that these teachers, "Communists almost to a 
man, passed on their doctrine to their pupils in spite of all 
the precautions taken."6 This explains the revolutionary ac-
tivity, especially in Singapore, of Chinese school students. 
The Chinese dissatisfaction with the inadequate opportun-
ities offered their children and the desire to preserve Chinese 
culture led to the establishment of a Chinese university in 
Singapore in 1954, with Lin Yu-tang as its first chancellor.7 
5 The Economic Development of Malaya. Report of a Mission organized by 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Singapore, 
1955), 102. 
6 Victor Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free? (Stanford, Calif., 1954), 153. 
Purcell is a former member of the civil service of Malaya and assistant director 
of education in charge of Chinese schools. 
7 Lin Yu·tang ran into trouble and resigned before "Nanyang University," as 
it was called, opened its doors in 1956. He declared the troubles leading to his 
resignation were of Communist instigation. 
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Graduates of the Chinese schools lacked sufficient knowledge 
of English to be admitted to the University of Malaya. 
The discussion of the educational problem has tended to 
turn Malaya into a "cockpit of aggressive cultures." Malay 
and English are the official languages of the country; hence 
it was planned to use Malay as the medium of instruction in 
the national primary grades and English in the secondary 
schools and in the higher institutions. This implied the elim-
ination of Chinese schools, which is sharply resented by the 
Chinese, who fear the extinction of their culture in Malaya. 
To most Chinese "Malayanization is anathema, in view of 
the absence of a culture, or even a society, which can as yet be 
called Malayan."8 The Chinese demands will require tri-
lingualism for the Chinese children-a rather heavy burden. 
In Singapore there are demands that all education in the 
primary schools be bilingual, and in the secondary schools, 
trilingual. There is logic behind this demand, since the Chi-
nese constitute about 80 percent of the population, English is 
the language of commerce, and Malay (including Indonesian) 
is the language of the nearly 90,000,000 people which live in 
the region of which Singapore is the commercial center. 
The relation of Singapore to the federation is an unsolved 
problem and will undoubtedly continue to be so for some 
time. At the time of the formation of the federation it was 
thought unwise politically to include Singapore, because of its 
preponderantly Chinese population, but to exclude it is eco-
nomically unsound. It is true that Singapore thrives on its 
large entrepot trade, which makes it one of the greatest ports 
in the world, but it could be given the status of a free port in 
the federation. Singapore is, and will continue to be, the 
leading commercial, financial, and cultural center of Malaya, 
whether it is in the federation or not. A joint coordination 
committee, established in 1953 under Malcolm MacDonald, at 
the time commissioner general, reported that there are fifty-one 
8 Chinese Schools and the Education of Chinese Malayans. Report of a Mission 
Invited by the Federation Government to Study the Problem of Education of 
Chinese in Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, 1951). Quoted by Purcell, 156-57. 
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subjects with respect to which consultation and coordination 
are highly desirable. Tengku Rahman, chief minister of the 
federation, has shown little enthusiasm for admitting Singapore 
to the federation, for obvious reasons. He declared in January, 
1957, that there would be no merger of Singapore with the 
federation. He pointed out that in independent Malaya, Malay 
will be the official language, Islamism the religion, and a 
Malay the paramount ruler-conditions unacceptable to the 
predominantly Chinese population of Singapore. 
The suppression of Communist terrorism continues to be the 
first problem of Malaya. Tengku Rahman offered the Com-
munist guerrillas a general amnesty, but on condition that the 
Communist party be dissolved. He met with the Communist 
leader, Chin Peng, in December, 1955, but the talks collapsed. 
Some people have naively assumed that as soon as Malaya 
becomes independent, "Communism will be destroyed by a 
twist of the hand." How serious the problem of Communist 
influence is was evident again in October, 1956, when the Singa-
pore government began a campaign against Communist influ-
ence and agitation in its schools. It ordered the dissolution of 
the powerful Chinese Middle Schools Students Union as a 
"Communist Front Organization," and also ordered the dis-
missal of two teachers and the expulsion of 140 students. A 
student revolt ensued, and student riots spread into various 
parts of the city. Thirteen persons lost their lives and over a 
hundred were injured before the riots were brought under 
control. Police were rushed into Singapore from the federation 
to help quell the riots. 
The struggle against Communism will not have been won 
with the suppression of the bandits. Infiltration and subversion 
may be more difficult to meet than terrorism. And there is 
always the possibility that Peiping may at any moment take 
a more active and direct interest in the Communist movement 
in Malaya than it has yet done. 
While Malaya is a very productive dollar earner and its per 
capita income is considerably higher than that of its neighbors, 
there is, nevertheless, concern over its economic future. Malaya 
has "too many eggs in the same basket." The economy of the 
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country is highly dependent on rubber and tin, but chiefly the 
former. The producers of these commodities complain that 
their products are taxed too heavily. Export taxes on rubber 
provide much of the public revenue. A drop of one cent in 
the average price of rubber means a loss of two million Malay 
dollars in export duties and about twelve million Malay dollars 
in gross national income. Competition with synthetic rubber 
tends to drive the price of natural rubber down. For all of 
these reasons the estates have lagged behind in replanting trees. 
The government is seeking to encourage both the estates and 
the small holders to replant at a faster rate and to replace low-
yielding with high-yielding trees. Malaya must import much 
of its staple food, the country producing less than half of its 
total rice requirements. "Grow more food" programs and 
campaigns have so far not been successful. The soil of Malaya 
is not well suited to large-scale mechanical production, and it 
is not especially fertile. 
Malaya, like its neighbors, very much needs industrial expan-
sion. The mission of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development concluded in its report that "By and large, we 
are favorably impressed with Malaya's economic potentialities 
and prospects for expansion. There remains, nevertheless, a 
serious question whether rates of economic progress and addi-
tions to employment opportunities can move ahead of or even 
keep up with the pace at which the population and the labor 
force are growing."9 
9 The Economic Development of Malaya, 26-27. 
............ 
·· .. 
CHAPTER 7 
BURMA 
Land of Contradictions 
THE LEADERSHIP of the Burmese government is, at one and 
the same time, passionately socialist and devoutly Buddhist. 
Socialism has a greater foothold in Burma at the present time 
than it has ever before had in any Far Eastern country. At 
the same time Buddhism is receiving more official support in 
Burma today than it has received in any land in modern times. 
This philosophical contradiction is nowhere better illustrated 
than in the fact that one man, U Win-presently Burmese 
ambassador to the United States-served until late 1955 as both 
minister of national planning and minister of religious affairs 
and culture. 
It is difficult to conceive of two philosophies more basically 
opposed than Buddhism, devoted to escape from the world, 
and socialism, seeking to make the world as enjoyable as pos-
sible for the great mass of men. Yet Burma in recent years has 
been host to the Asian Socialist Conference, in January, 1953, 
and to the Sixth Great Buddhist Council, or Sangayana, which 
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met in two-year session from May, 1954, through May, 1956. 
The first of these meetings chose Rangoon as the site for its 
permanent secretariat. For the second, the government of 
Burma constructed a mammoth assembly cave on grounds 
of more than one hundred acres; four hostels, each to accom-
modate one thousand monks; a refectory capable of feeding 
fifteen hundred monks at a time; and an international Buddhist 
library at a cost of $4,620,000-not including labor. 
The present drive to gain maximum popular participation 
in the establishment of a welfare state (pyidawtha) in Burma 
has engendered immense support among the masses. Likewise, 
Buddhism is undergoing a revival among the Burmese people, 
following a temporary eclipse in the immediate postwar period. 
Besides seeking to encourage the faith for its own sake, the 
Burmese government obviously hopes by the revival of Bud-
dhism to build up resistance to communism in Burma. But if 
its efforts are really successful in checking the spread of com-
munistic ideas, they may also cause the Burmese to lose interest 
in building socialism. The very fact that both Buddhism and 
socialism are espoused by many of the same people in Burma 
today is an obvious indication that intellectual coexistence is 
possible between the two philosophies, but in the long run one 
or the other will emerge triumphant-or a new composite 
philosophy of some sort will be formed. 
Burma is a relatively large country with an area of nearly 
262,000 square miles. Geographically it is isolated. Overland 
communication with India is difficult because of formidable 
mountains and jungle-covered ridges, high mountains and vast 
stretches of hilly country keep Burma and China pretty well 
separated from each other, and mountains form a natural 
boundary with its eastern neighbor, Thailand. But Burma is 
easily accessible by sea, and as a result this Mongoloid people 
has been strongly influenced by the culture of nearby India. 
The heart of the country is the central Irrawaddy-Chindwin 
river valley and its delta, in which is located Rangoon, the 
capital and largest city. 
In 1941 Burma had a population of 16,800,000. Of this 
number about two-thirds were Burman. Important ethnological 
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groups are the Karens and the Shans. The former constitute 
nearly a tenth and the latter about an eighth of the total popu-
lation, which in 1957 was estimated at about 20,000,000. Before 
the Second World War there were over a million Indians in 
Burma, but their numbers since the war has been much less. 
The Chinese population in Burma does not exceed half a 
million. 
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM 
The history of Burma as a distinct political entity begins with 
the great ruler Anawrahta, who founded the early Burmese 
kingdom of Pagan in 1044. Anawrahta is important to the 
development of the Burmese national tradition in yet another 
way. It was he who established Hinayana Buddhism as the 
official religion of Burma. 
The kingdom of Pagan perished in 1287 before the Tartar 
armies of China's infamous Kubla Khan. The next four and 
a half centuries were marked by the absence of even the 
semblance of unity in Burma, except for the reign of Byin-
naung, 1550-1581. This era of disruption came to an end in 
1754, when Alaungpaya rose to defeat the last of the Mon 
kingdoms in northern Burma and established the last Burmese 
dynasty. Alaungpaya's Burma, like that of Anawrahta, was not 
a state in the modern sense. It was a feudal arrangement, but 
sufficiently unified to serve as the nucleus for the development 
of the present Burmese national state. 
The British conquest of Burma spanned sixty-two years. As 
the result of the attempted Burmese invasion of British India 
in 1824-1826, the British East India Company, acting for the 
throne, took possession of the Arakan and Tenasserim coastal 
strips of Burma. In 1852 the governor general of India was 
provoked into sending another expedition against Burma, the 
immediate cause of his action being the treatment of British 
subjects and shipping in Rangoon. The British as a conse-
quence acquired the remainder of coastal or lower Burma. On 
January 1, 1886, following Burma's defeat in the third Anglo-
Burmese War, Britain announced the annexation of the rest 
of Burma. Incorporated into the British Indian Empire, Burma 
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was administered as a province of India until 1937, when it 
became a separate colony. 
It is difficult to indicate the precise origins of nationalism in 
any land, and Burma is no exception. Although nationalism 
as a political force in Burma did not emerge until after the 
First World War, the seeds of its development were sown well 
before that time. British abolition of the traditional feudal 
institutions following the rebellion of 1886-1889, for example, 
created a vacuum from which some new allegiance inevitably 
had to spring. The introduction of commercial rice cultivation, 
which upset traditional village economic self-sufficiency, neces-
sitated a new sort of social integration. Increasing foreign dom-
ination of the country's economic life, including the growing 
stranglehold possessed on the nation's economy by immigrants 
from India, was an important element in stirring the Burmese 
to revolution. Culturally, too, the British made inroads on 
traditional Burmese habits. In particular, they withdrew official 
governmental support of the Buddhist religion. 
A number of external events also influenced the emergence 
of nationalism in Burma. Japan's victory over Russia in 1905 
gave vivid evidence that the white man was not invincible. 
The activities of the Congress party in India revealed that gains 
could be made against colonial domination by effective organ-
ization. The lofty phrases of American President Woodrow 
Wilson regarding national self-determination, made both dur-
ing and after the First World War, also inspired many a 
Burmese patriot. 
As in other parts of Southeast Asia, cultural nationalism pre-
ceded political nationalism. In Burma it assumed the organ-
izational form of the Young Men's Buddhist Organization, 
modeled in many ways after the Y.M.C.A. The step that 
bridged the gap between cultural and political nationalism in 
Burma was taken in 1921, when the General Council of Bud-
dhist Associations sought to direct nationalist sentiments into 
political channels, and openly declared home rule as its goal. 
Although nationalism grew in Burma throughout the twenties 
and thirties-Burma's first race riots in early 1930, directed 
against the Indians, marked a highlight of its growth-it was 
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not until 1935 that it assumed its present form. In this year 
there was organized at the University of Rangoon, traditionally 
a hotbed of political radicalism, a group of Marxist-minded 
students who called themselves the Thakins. Included among 
the Thakins were Aung San, later called the "father of the 
Burmese nationalist revolution" by his people; U Nu, inde-
pendent Burma's first premier; and Than Tun, subsequently 
the leader of the orthodox wing of Burmese Communism and 
architect of the postwar Communist revolt against the govern-
ment. The Thakins called for immediate and complete free-
dom for Burma, and advocated a radical economic program. 
In the urban areas they organized strikes, some of them very 
effective, and in the country they championed the cause of 
agricultural reform. 
Burma's first premier following separation from India, Dr. 
Ba Maw-still a contestant, though a weak one, in the Burmese 
political arena-led those Burmese who collaborated with the 
Japanese during the occupation of the country in the Second 
World War. Rangoon fell to the Japanese on March 8, 1943, 
with the aid of the "Burma Independence Army," led by Gen-
eral Aung San. Dr. Ba Maw remained as prime minister in the 
puppet government, Aung San was minister of defense, and 
Than Tun served as minister of communications. Serving as 
foreign minister for a year in the Ba Maw government was 
U N u, then known as Thakin N u. 
Nationalists like Aung San and U Nu had joined hands 
with the Japanese to oust the British from Burma because they 
were impatient for their country to achieve its independence 
from colonial rule. When Premier U Saw on a special mission 
to London in 1941 failed to obtain an unqualified British 
promise of postwar dominion status for Burma, no other action 
seemed possible. But Burma's young nationalists were to be 
sorely disappointed; it was soon evident that "Asia for the 
Asiatics" meant Asia for Japan. In response to this wholely 
unanticipated situation General Aung San converted his 
"Burma Independence Army" into the "Anti-Fascist People's 
Freedom League" and prepared to strike a blow at the Japanese 
occupation of Burma when the occasion arose. This came with 
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the British return to Burma, when Aung San led his A.F.P.F.L. 
forces in support of the liberation army. 
Relatively inconspicuous in the prewar years, U Nu joined 
hands with Aung San to undermine the puppet regime and 
aid the Allies in ousting Japan from Burma in the late years 
of the Pacific war. When Aung San and six of his cabinet 
associates were murdered in July, 1947, U Nu succeeded to 
the leadership of the new Burma. 
The first task facing U Nu was the completion in August, 
1947, of the formal arrangements which would make Burma 
independent once again. In October the Nu-Attlee agreement 
was signed by the British and the Burmese, and on January 4, 
1948, the sovereign Union of Burma, approximately the size 
of France, came into being, the third country in modern history 
to free itself completely from the British Empire. 
There is evidence that both U N u and Aung San would 
have preferred that Burma remain a member of the Common-
wealth, as did India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. But by 1947 this 
was no longer possible. The postwar plans for Burma devised 
by the Churchill government in England forced the nationalists 
to take such an extreme position in their demands for inde-
pendence that retreat was impossible. The British in their 
White Paper of May, 1945, offered only restoration of Burma's 
prewar status by 1948 to a people who had received a taste, 
limited though it may have been, of independence under the 
Japanese. 
DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALISM 
That the present rulers of Burma are thoroughly committed to 
socialism is beyond question. As youthful a ruling group as 
is to be found anywhere in the world today, the men who com-
prise the Burmese government are mostly graduates of Rangoon 
University in the 1930's who constituted the revolutionary 
Thakin group. Not only did they focus their sights on the 
ending of British imperial political control, but they also 
planned for the day when the new free Burma would expropri-
ate the alien capitalists and supplant their control of the 
nation's economy with direction by a native government. 
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When the young nationalists came to power in independent 
Burma in January, 1948, they proclaimed the socialist ideas for 
which they had propagandized since their student days. The 
constitution of the new Union of Burma, a curious mixture of 
Western liberal and Marxist ideas, proclaimed the right of the 
state to limit private property or to expropriate it in accord-
ance with the law. The state, moreover, was the owner of all 
land, and in free Burma there were to be "no large land 
holdings whatsoever." One-third of Burma's privately owned 
timber concessions were immediately nationalized, as was the 
British-owned Irrawaddy Flotilla Company, which controlled 
almost all of the inland water transport in prewar Burma. Prior 
to the actual attainment of independence a State Agricultural 
Marketing Board was created, which was to control the rice 
export trade, and an early step of the new Burmese government 
was to open the State Bank of Burma. Before the first year of 
independence was half over, the government announced a 
"Two Year Plan" for the economic development of Burma, 
which, among other things, provided for nationalization of the 
power industry as well as of all water and land transport facili-
ties and for establishment of certain state-owned basic industries 
as well as several consumer-goods industries. The plan also 
called for a land redistribution program. 
The goals of the "Two Year Plan" were too high. In the 
four years which followed the announcement of the plan, only 
a spinning and weaving factory was established. Burma had 
neither the capital nor the technical talent to set up overnight 
the sort of socialist economy envisioned by its young and in-
experienced leaders. Moreover, the various revolts by assorted 
brands of Communists and ethnic minorities which plagued 
the country during its first years of freedom did not provide 
the sort of environment in which Burma's socialists were given 
maximum opportunity to implement their schemes. As much 
as 40 percent of government revenues were diverted to military 
operations against rebels, who at one time controlled more 
than half of the country. 
The failure of the "Two Year Plan" of 1948 did not dis-
courage Burma's leaders. It did, however, lend a much needed 
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sobering influence to their economic thinking and policy 
making. Plans for an early and complete nationalization of 
the country's economy have been abandoned, and Burma today 
is not only encouraging internal private enterprise but also help 
from abroad. In August, 1949, even before the expiration of 
the "Two Year Plan," it was announced that "until such time 
as the State can undertake sufficient production," a number of 
industries previously earmarked for state ownership might be 
developed by private capital "either on its own or in partner-
ship with the State." Industries of importance to the security 
of Burma, like atomic energy and defense, were excluded from 
the change in policy, but private enterprise might now partici-
pate in such major Burmese industries as oil and mineral ex-
traction, railway transport, electric power, coal mining, and 
several others. 
A second change in Burmese economic policy came in 1952-
1953, when the Industrial Development Corporation was estab-
lished to direct future government-sponsored industrial de-
velopment of the country. Allocated more than two million 
dollars by Rangoon for 1953-1954, the corporation soon com-
menced construction of a brick and tile factory, and announced 
plans for a steel rolling mill with a capacity of 20,000 tons a 
year. Other projects included the establishment of salt, jute, 
and paper and pulp factories, as well as a cement plant in which 
the government would have as its partner the private Burma 
Cement Company. 
The general policy of the government is to contract with a 
Western corporation to construct a factory and operate it for 
a few years, and, after having trained personnel to run it 
efficiently, to turn it over to the government. A Scottish drug 
company, for example, is constructing a pharmaceutical plant 
on such a contract. These Western capitalist companies are 
thus aiding Burma in establishing socialism. One of the odd, 
contradictory things to be seen in Rangoon is a New York 
capitalist corporation helping Burma plan a socialist society. 
If the Burmese government has slowed down the pace of its 
nationalization of industry, it is attempting to increase the 
tempo of its land nationalization program. Passed by the Bur-
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mese parliament in October, 1948, the Land Nationalization 
act has as its goal the abolition of landlordism and the redistri-
bution of the land to the cultivators. Implementation of the 
program was begun in January, 1949, in selected "experi-
mental" areas, but it could not be continued because of the 
rebel hostilities. Later resumed in a single township near Ran-
goon, it was not until 1953 that land redistribution in Burma 
really began in earnest, and even then at a much slower pace 
than was anticipated. Close to seven million acres of land had 
been redistributed by mid 1956, representing about one-twelfth 
of the total scheduled for redistribution. Present plans for a 
"new order" among Burmese peasants call for completion of 
the current phase of Burma's land distribution program by 
1962, with high hopes of achievement. 
Another agricultural goal of the government was the restora-
tion of production to the prewar level by 1956-1957. A five-year 
plan for agricultural and rural development was drawn up for 
this purpose in 1952, and an Agricultural and Water Resources 
Development Corporation was created to supervise the plan. 
An ultimate rice production increase of one and three-quarter 
million tons was aimed at, and to achieve this, the government 
sought to rehabilitate two and a half million acres of paddy 
land thrown out of cultivation through war and civil insurrec-
tion, to bring an additional five hundred thousand acres of 
new paddy land under irrigation, and to improve cultivation 
methods by the use of fertilizers and improved seed strains. 
By 1960 Burma's socialist leadership hopes that the 1938-1939 
over-all gross output of the land will be exceeded by about 
30 percent.1 
Whatever the achievements, Burma at the end of a decade 
of struggle still faces very great difficulties. The country's 
population has increased by 21 percent since the Second World 
War, but the gross national product is still only 81 percent of 
what it was before that war. The mines at N amtu, normally 
one of the world's richest producers of silver, lead, and zinc, 
have reached only 20 percent of their prewar output. The 
1 Frank N. and Helen G. Trager, Burma: Land of Golden Pagodas (New York, 
1954), 31. 
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Yenangyaung oil fields, Burma's largest, are still not back in 
production after being blown up by the retreating British at 
the time of the Japanese invasion in 1942, and the Chauk 
fields produce about one-third of what they did before the 
Second World War. Burma's postwar rice export high is two 
million tons a year. The export price of rice, which earns 
about 80 percent of Burma's foreign exchange, fell from $168 
per ton in 1953 to about $100 a ton in 1955. Foreign-exchange 
reserves toppled from approximately $211,000,000 to about 
$92,000,000. 
BUDDHIST REVIVAL 
While socialism gained an increasing hold on the Burmese 
mind, Buddhism also received growing support from the gov-
ernment as well as among the people. In October, 1950, for 
example, three important religious bills were passed unani-
mously by the Burmese parliament. One of these was the 
Dhamma Chariya act, which established a pair of government-
sponsored ecclesiastical courts to restore order once more among 
Burma's more than fifty thousand Sanghas (monks), some of 
whom were believed unfit to wear the yellow robes of Bud-
dhism. The second act was the Vinissaya act, setting up the Pali 
University to coordinate monastery teaching of the language in 
which the great books of Buddhism are written. Most im-
portant of the three bills was the Buddha Sasana act, which 
provided for the establishment of a government-operated 
Buddha Sasana Organization to coordinate Buddhist activities 
in the country. In addition, the Buddha Sasana Organization 
was charged with the task of translating the Pali Tripitaka 
into Burmese as well as of sending missionaries abroad to 
propagate the faith of Gautama Butldha.2 The most conspicu-
ous example of official Burmese support of Buddhism in recent 
times, however, was the Sixth Great Buddha Council, which 
met in a two-year session at Rangoon in 1954-1956. The council, 
which brought together Buddhists from Thailand, Ceylon, 
Laos, Cambodia, and Burma, enjoyed the full support of the 
2 For a detailed account of these three acts, see John F. Cady, "Religion and 
Politics in Modern Burma," Far Eastern Quarterly, XII (1953), 158-61. 
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Burmese government, which met all of its expenses. Surely 
no further evidence need be summoned that the leadership 
of Burma is uniquely devoted to the Buddhist faith, despite 
its simultaneous passionate attachment to socialism. 
Burma's socialist-Buddhist contradiction is nowhere better 
symbolized than in the person of U Nu. A revolutionary who 
subsequently devoted himself to the effective establishment of 
socialism in his country as its first prime minister, U Nu is also 
an ardent Buddhist who, more than any other single person, 
is responsible for the present state support of Buddhism in 
Burma. Indicative of his religious nature is his frequently 
stated intention of eventually retiring from his worldly chores 
to devote himself to spiritual work or contemplation. He has 
often stated that he would like to retire to a monastery. 
It was U Nu who in 1950 went before the Burmese parlia-
ment in support of the Buddha Sasana act to plead, most 
dramatically, for funds for Buddhist missionary work at home 
and abroad. It was he, too, who initiated the drive to build 
Rangoon's Kabe-Aye, or \Vorld Peace Pagoda, which holds 
the share of the relics of Sariputta and Maha Moggallana, chief 
disciples of Buddha, which Burma received from India. U Nu 
it was, also, who, once when a representative of his was going 
to an international conference and asked for instructions, 
pulled a little religious book out of his pocket and told his 
countryman to read two verses every morning before breakfast. 
His support of a translation of the Buddhist scriptures into 
Burmese-they previously had been available only in Pali-
caused one writer to observe that Nu was "becoming to Bud-
dhist scriptures what King James was to the King James version 
of the Bible."a 
PROBLEMS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
One of the first problems U Nu had to face after independence 
had been achieved was the need for economic and social re-
habilitation. Before the Second World War more than twelve 
3 Robert Sherrod, "Man on a Rickety Fence," Saturday Evening Post, CCXXVII 
(April 23, 1955), 111·12. 
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million acres had been under rice cultivation in Burma. In 
the 1945-1946 season only six and a half million acres were 
devoted to the growing of rice, although during the next two 
years rice farming land increased by almost two million acres. 
Rice production in the year following the war's end was only 
2,770,000 tons, which was hardly sufficient to feed Burma's 
own population, let alone have an export surplus; in the years 
leading up to the Pacific war, British Burma had exported 
three million tons of rice annually, making it the world's prin-
cipal exporter of the grain. By the 1947-1948 season agricultural 
production had risen to 77 percent of the prewar average and 
the country exported 1,251,000 tons of rice, but this still left 
the leaders of newly independent Burma with a sizable eco-
nomic recovery problem. 
The status of Burma's oil and timber industries was similarly 
dismal, and the country's transportation facilities were in 
chaotic condition. In 1938-1939 Burma had sent abroad 651,000 
tons of petroleum; in 1947-1948 it exported no oil at all. Its 
exports of timber in 1947-1948 were in a somewhat better 
position; they were nearly half of what they had been in 
1938-1939. 
In spite of a variety of domestic insurrections, the Burmese 
recovery under the N u government was considerable. The crop 
output had increased to 81 percent of the prewar level by 
1952-1953, and the yield per acre had reached 96 percent. In 
the same season total acreage sown had increased to 85 percent 
of what it had been in the prewar years. Between 1950 and 
1952 the country's mineral production also improved, nearly 
doubling in this two-year period as internal security progres-
sively returned to the country, although in 1952 it was still 
only 12 percent of what it had been in 1939. Teak output 
was up, too-amounting in 1952, however, to only 25 percent 
of the prewar production. The gross national product (the 
value of all goods and services) had been $927,000,000 in 1938-
1939; in 1954 it had risen only to $741,000,000. 
The most important accomplishment of the government in 
terms of economic recovery was its resumption of rice exports, 
the bulwark of the Burmese economy. In 1953 Burma's exports 
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of rice totaled about 50 percent of the prewar level, with a 
value, at postwar inflated prices, of four times the 1939 figure. 
This factor more than anything else permitted the financial 
survival of Burma in the trying first years of its newly resumed 
independent existence. In 1954, however, for the first time 
since it attained its independence, Burma was forced to sell 
its rice at a price much below that which it sought, and even 
then it did not sell all its surplus. 
The price for Burmese rice dropped even lower in 1955, 
and Burma suddenly found itself faced with a serious balance-
of-payments problem. The government was thoroughly alarmed 
by this situation. Because of its heavy economic reliance on 
the receipts from a single export crop, Burma would be unable 
to fulfill its elaborate socialist plans if the demand for rice 
continued to drop. Moreover, were the pyidawtha, or welfare 
state, program to be abandoned at this time, it might well 
mean political suicide for the Burmese leadership and a tri-
umph for their internal Communist opponents. It was in 
apparent recognition of such realities that U Nu in the summer 
of 1955 asked far-and received-a $42,000,000 loan from neigh-
boring India, the second time within a year that India had 
come to Burma's aid because of its rice price difficulties. In 
late 1954, when Burma had found itself overloaded with rice, 
India had purchased nine hundred thousand tons of the surplus 
on what Nu called "our suggested terms." 
Foreign economic assistance, however, does not solve Burma's 
basic economic problem, which is to continue to sell its surplus 
rice at a high price until it is able to diversify its under-
developed economy to such an extent that it is no longer 
dependent on the export receipts from a single agricultural 
product. This the leaders of Burma realize, and they were 
exceptionally industrious in 1954 and 1955 in seeking out 
markets for their surplus rice while at the same time continuing 
to work for the economic advancement of their comparatively 
backward country. The moves they took to bolster their 
sagging rice exports, however, may prove more harmful than 
helpful in the long run. For in addition to attempting to 
increase the sales of Burmese rice to such countries as Japan 
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and India, they also looked for customers among the Commu-
nist lands. Probably nothing was more significant for Burma 
in 1955 than the emergence of Communist China, the Soviet 
Union, and the satellites as major customers for Burmese rice. 
Burma had tried elsewhere to dispose of its surplus rice. 
The United States would not take Burma's rice off its hands, 
however, because it had a rice surplus of its own-and a pow-
erful farm lobby. The Soviet Union and Communist China 
were willing, and so were Poland, Hungary, East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. The terms of the several Com-
munist rice barter pacts with the Burmese were essentially the 
same. For stipulated quantities of Burmese rice the Commu-
nist countries promised both goods and services-mostly heavy 
capital equipment, although some consumer goods also were 
pledged. The "services" consisted mainly of Communist tech-
nicians to be sent to Burma to teach the Burmese how to use 
the equipment supplied under the pacts. 
The Communists' intentions in concluding such agreements 
appear to have been purely political. With the exception of 
Communist China, none of the countries involved in the 
barter pacts could be said to be in need of Burmese rice. The 
U.S.S.R. and its allies, however, would like to draw Burma as 
close to the Communist bloc as possible, economically as well 
as politically. Even if the Burmese do not renew the several 
rice barter agreements with the Communist countries, the 
capital goods which they will receive under the present pacts 
will require replacement parts and associated equipment-all 
of which will have to come from Soviet bloc nations. A major 
result of Burma's economic agreements with the several Com-
munist countries would seem to be the prospect of a marked 
reorientation of Burmese trade toward the lands of the Soviet 
bloc. 
On the eve of the visit of Soviet leaders Nikolai A. Bulganin 
and Nikita S. Khrushchev to Burma in late 1955, U Nu an-
nounced that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to extend the duration 
of its rice barter pact with Burma, originally a three-year agree-
ment, to five years. The enthusiasm with which the Burmese 
premier greeted such a prospect was an indication of his strong 
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concern over his country's surplus rice; it was also, unfortun-
ately, an indication of his lack of perception of Soviet designs. 
The impact the barter pacts with the Soviet bloc countries 
would have upon the Burmese economy was evident within 
a year. Prior to the conclusion of these trade agreements, the 
Communist countries had accounted for only 3 percent of 
Burma's imports. By mid 1956 this figure had risen to 25 
percent and was increasing each month. From the U.S.S.R., 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and other Communist countries 
heavy capital equipment was flowing into Burma ostensibly 
to help that newly independent land in its efforts to modernize 
its backward economy. The Soviet bloc barter deals were not 
all milk and honey, however, as Burma's leadership is coming 
increasingly to realize. The main eye opener to date has been 
cement-cement which Burma has received in return for its 
rice and which has caused the government more headaches 
than it is willing to admit. In mid-May, 1956, cement literally 
was to be found everywhere along the Rangoon waterfront. 
As a New York Times correspondent described it: "It [the 
cement] is piled high in the warehouses, the docks are choked 
with it, and more ships are waiting to unload it when berthing 
room becomes available."4 Some ships, loaded with consumer 
goods badly needed by the Burmese, were kept waiting for 
weeks in the harbor. Other ships with important cargoes were 
informed of the tieup while still at sea and skipped the port 
of Rangoon. 
Cement was not the only commodity which Burma received 
in exchange for its rice and with which it was dissatisfied. 
There also were complaints about Czechoslovak whisky and 
beer, Communist Chinese toothpaste, Soviet vehicles, and 
other items. Burmese consumers bought Soviet bloc goods 
only when they had no other choice. Czech canned milk, they 
complained-for example-was watered and was much inferior 
to British and American canned milk. 
There was another side to Burma's discontent with the sev-
eral rice barter pacts with the Sino-Soviet bloc countries. This 
related to the subsequent appearance on the scene of cash 
4 New York Times, May 9, 1956. 
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customers whose orders for rice Burma could not meet due 
to its recently assumed commitments. An Indonesian order 
for one hundred thousand tons of rice followed almost on the 
heels of the conclusion of the barter agreements, and this was 
followed by an order from Pakistan, in the grip of famine, for 
sixty thousand tons. These orders Burma was just barely able 
to fill. Then came Malaya with an order of ten thousand tons, 
and Burma had to say no. Pakistan next came back with a 
request for more rice, but the Burmese had no more rice to 
sell to their Pakistani neighbors. So Pakistan went to Com-
munist China, where it bought the same rice the Chinese had 
received from Burma, or rice which Peiping felt able to sell 
to Pakistan as a consequence of the additional grain it had 
got from the Burmese. From Burma's point of view, the im-
portant thing was that China was receiving cash for rice for 
which the Burmese had to accept barter goods. 
Burma's leadership apparently was very much aware in late 
1956 that for every ton of rice that had to be shipped to the 
Communist bloc under one of the barter pacts, there was one 
less ton available for sale for cash with which it could buy 
what Burma wanted, not just cement, Czechoslovak canned 
milk, and Communist Chinese toothpaste. One Burmese of-
ficial flatly stated that the day of making barter deals with 
Communist countries was over. There were even indications 
that the Burmese were trying to get the Communists to call off 
the deals. The Communists, however, held a trump card. 
Burma had signed contracts setting up the several rice barter 
deals, and the Burmese were an honorable people. The dangers 
of long-term economic commitments with the Soviets and their 
allies were only too clear. 
Meanwhile, not only did Communist capital equipment flow 
into Burma, but also Soviet, Bulgarian, Czech, and Polish 
economic advisers to help the Burmese use the heavy goods 
acquired from the Soviet bloc as well as to build a new tech-
nological institute, a huge sports center, a hospital, a hotel, 
and an exhibition hall. In the spring of 1956 hardly a plane 
landed at Rangoon's Mingaladon airport which did not carry 
more Soviet technicians. This was economic infiltration, Soviet 
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style, in all its glory and with all its sinister intentions. There 
was genuine reason for Burmese alarm. There also was cause 
for American concern. 
The United States revealed its concern in mid 1956 by agree-
ing-finally-to buy ten thousand tons of Burmese rice in order 
that Burma might have one million dollars with which to pay 
American technicians who might otherwise have had to leave 
Burma, leaving a completely open field to the Soviets. This 
was only a small amount of rice, however, compared with the 
maximum of 1,600,000 tons of the grain Moscow had contracted 
to take under barter arrangements over the four-year period 
1956-1960. A loan of $25,000,000 (and another $17,500,000 in 
Burmese currency), reported imminent in early 1957, under-
scored United States concern. 
The extent of Burmese rice commitments to the Soviet 
Union and its allies was considerable. In the original July, 
1955, barter pact between Burma and the U.S.S.R. the Soviets 
had agreed to take only 150,000 to 200,000 tons of rice annually 
-this in exchange for Soviet machinery, goods, and technical 
and other services. In April, 1956, however, in formalization of 
U Nu's announcement of late 1955, the Soviet Union and 
Burma agreed to extend their trade pact, originally planned 
for only three years, to five years. The Soviets also agreed to 
increase the amount of rice they would take annually to four 
hundred thousand tons. The new trade agreement was signed 
on the occasion of the visit to Burma of Soviet First Deputy 
Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan. 
Communist China, meanwhile, had signed its own rice barter 
pact with the Burmese. In late December, 1955, Peiping agreed 
to take 150,000 tons of Burmese rice annually in return for 
Chinese exports of the same value. Before the several Commu-
nist countries were through bidding for its rice, Burma had 
committed itself to move a sizable share of its rice crop 
annually to Communist countries. The amount was half of 
Burma's total rice exports in the 1953-1954 season. 
So dissatisfied was Burma's leadership with the barter agree-
ments with the Soviet bloc as a result of their first year of 
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operation (1956) that it was decided to reduce considerably 
rice shipments to the Communists in 1957. Burma planned to 
sign contracts to export only 55,000 to 105,000 tons of rice to 
Communist countries in 1957, although under the several 
barter pacts it might ship up to 740,000 tons annually and 
although the 1957 rice surplus was expected to be greater than 
that of 1956. In addition, the Burmese would send approxi-
mately 165,000 tons of rice to Communist countries in 1957 to 
satisfy contracts signed in 1956 but not filled in that year. 
Burma's future trade relations with the Soviet Union, Commu-
nist China, and the satellites was expected to depend, in large 
measure, on how satisfied the Burmese were with the goods 
supplied in fulfillment of these obligations. 
Although the several rice barter agreements were concluded 
during the premiership of U Nu, it is clear that Nu's leading 
lieutenants, U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein, agreed in principle 
that conclusion of such pacts was a necessary move. There 
is evidence, however, that one of the several factors causing 
these men to disagree with Nu, which they did frequently, 
was the degree to which Nu committed his country to supply 
the Soviet Union and other Communist countries with Bur-
mese rice. This may have been one reason why N u was eased 
out of the Burmese premiership in early June, 1956, just as 
dissatisfaction with the barter deals began to be strongly 
evident. 
POSTWAR CIVIL DISTURBANCES 
Imposing though aspects of Burma's recovery have been, the 
record probably could have been more impressive had it not 
been for the series of domestic revolts which affiicted the nation 
beginning in 1948. These revolts combined three major ele-
ments of instability only too obvious in the political personality 
of postwar Burma. First to raise the standard of rebellion were 
the Communists, whose thinly disguised objective was control 
of the state for themselves. Also revolting against the central 
government were various groups of Burma's ethnic minorities, 
the most important of which were the Karens, who never did 
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favor the break with Britain for fear that reprisals would follow 
against them by the ruling Burmese majority. Finally, there 
were the brigands, armed gangs who found it difficult to 
return to a quiet settled life after the fury and excitement 
of the wartime years. 
When the Japanese or British were still about and consti-
tuted the common foe, Communists and non-Communists 
worked side by side in the nationalist revolution. When the 
common enemy bowed out of the picture, however, this unity 
quickly dissolved. In 1944, however, when the Japanese still 
occupied the country, Burma's varied revolutionaries banded 
together in an omnibus coalition called the Anti-Fascist 
People's Freedom League, which Aung San organized together 
with the Communist Than Tun. When the war ended, the 
A.F.P.F.L. emerged as the only political body of any signifi-
cance in Burma, comprising socialists, Communists, the army, 
peasant unions, student groups, and others. The unity this 
coalition represented was not to last long, partly as a result 
of personality conflicts among the various elements of its lead-
ership and partly because of the altogether different objectives 
of the socialists and the Communists. That the Communists 
sought more than just independence was never more evident 
than when they turned against U Nu in late 1947 for accepting 
the terms of the Nu-Attlee agreement, which hardly could 
have been much more generous but which they attacked as 
favoring British military and economic interests. Control of 
the machinery of state for themselves was the Communist objec-
tive, this goal becoming only too clear in 1948, when, appar-
ently on orders from outside Burma, the Communists rose in 
revolt against the government. 
If the A.F.P.F.L. was beginning to disintegrate, losing much 
of its former unity, the Communists also were to display a 
singular lack of common purpose. Led by two revolutionaries 
of rather strong personalities, the Communists themselves were 
divided into two competing groups, the ·white Flag Commu-
nists, or Stalinists, and the Red Flags, or Trotskyites. The 
able organizer Than Tun, who formed the A.F.P.F.L. with 
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Aung San in 1944, was at the head of the orthodox Stalinist 
Communists, and at one time he possessed very close contacts 
with Peiping. The extremely uncompromising and volatile 
Thakin Soe led the Red Flags. Ostensibly the two Communist 
groups were divided by their adherence to the rival Stalinist 
and Trotskyite interpretations of Marxism, but the real dif-
ference appears to have been in the realm of personality differ-
ences between their two leaders. As for the supporters of the 
two groups, a good many of them have been out-and-out 
dacoits, and others were shiftless adventurer types, attracted 
by the strong personality of either Than Tun or Thakin Soe. 
More than one observer has described Burma's postwar Com-
munist troubles as a bad case of "follow the leader" brigandry. 
There were times in 1949 when the Communists or other 
rebel groups controlled more of Burma than the government, 
whose area of dfective jurisdiction often did not extend much 
beyond Rangoon itself. By the fall of 1950, however, the tide 
had begun to turn, and since then the strength and effective-
ness of the various insurgents, including the Communists, have 
declined enormously. This has been matched on the govern-
ment's side by an increase in the size and fighting ability of 
the Burmese army. That the White Flags, the stronger of the 
two Communist groups, were beginning to see the handwriting 
on the wall was most evident when they made the proposal 
to U Nu that they form a coalition government with the 
A.F.P.F.L. Nu promptly turned down the Communist offer. 
After trying an alliance with Thakin Soe' s Red Flags, the Karen 
rebels, and the insurgent leftwing of the People's Volunteer 
Organization (onetime armed auxiliary of the A.F.P.F.L., a 
part of which revolted in 1949), Than Tun's forces began to 
shift from guns to propaganda in their offensive against the 
government. The failure to achieve success in this change of 
tactics, and the major military defeat the government forces 
inflicted on them in November, 1953, reduced the potency of 
the White Flags considerably. By March, 1956, when the 
military campaign against the insurgents was halted temporarily 
with the approach of the annual rainy season, both Com-
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munist groups were badly shattered. However, the Commu-
nists continue to possess considerable support among various 
elements in the countryside as well as among the youth of 
Burma. 
The Burmese army in its campaigns against the Communists 
had been able to split the foe into small units, but these small 
bands of insurgents, generally comprising from thirty to fifty 
men, have been able to continue to terrorize large areas of 
rural Burma. The government, though it once offered the 
insurgents a full amnesty if they would lay down their arms, 
has refused to negotiate with them-at least on a formal basis. 
There have been reports from time to time of private meetings 
between Communist leaders and cabinet members, but these 
have not been successful in ending the rebellion. The govern-
ment's amnesty offer, which failed to bring in many Commu-
nists, was withdrawn in late April, 1956. 
Burma's army has about 60,000 soldiers, and there is also a 
13,000-man military police. The Communist technique against 
these forces had been to strike quickly, in limited numbers, 
against villages unsympathetic with the Communists' cause and 
then to withdraw before the government forces arrived upon 
the scene. The government forces' numerical strength, train-
ing, and better weapons would undoubtedly wipe out the 
rebels if pitched battles were fought more frequently. 
Although considerably reduced in numbers over what they 
once were, Burma's Communist insurgents still comprise a 
serious security problem-although they are far less of a threat 
to the state than they once were. In mid 1956 it was still 
impossible to drive safely more than twelve miles from the 
capital city of Rangoon at night. Rail service between the 
major cities of Rangoon and Mandalay was disrupted at least 
once a week as a result of Communist work in blowing up 
bridges and tampering with the railroad tracks. The road from 
Rangoon to the important city of Moulmein is not even safe 
to travel during the day. Ambushes still occur throughout the 
country, and villagers in many areas are so terrorized by the 
insurgents that they do not tell the authorities of their move-
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ments. The threat to the state is diminished, but the threat to 
internal security remains. 
There were those in Rangoon in early 1957 who believed 
Burma's Communists had decided to step up their stalled 
guerrilla operations and wage an all-out nuisance campaign 
against the government. In late January, 1957, Communist 
rebels swept down on the city of Pegu, forty-five miles north 
of Rangoon, inflicting considerable property damage and kill-
ing at least twelve persons. The Communists had turned down 
an earlier amnesty offer and asked the government to end the 
eight-year-old civil war on their terms-which Rangoon authori-
ties refused to do. The Communists, as a consequence, at-
tempted to expand their campaign of violence as a means of 
exerting pressure on the government to accept their terms. 
The Communists were weak enough, however, that Burma's 
non-Communist leadership did not fear a military defeat at 
their hands. ·what Burma's rulers did fear was that the popu-
lace, increasingly critical of the government's failure to end 
the guerrilla warfare, might increase its support of the Burma 
vVorkers' and Peasants' party or other psuedo- or near-Com-
munist elements. This fear the Communist rebels sought to 
exploit as Burma's smoldering civil insurrection entered its 
ninth year. 
The Communists were not the only groups to revolt against 
the government in the postwar years. The Karens, one of 
Burma's larger minority groups and one which has feared 
repression from the central government from the very inaug-
uration of independence, took up arms against the state in 
1949 and have been allied with several of the other insurrec-
tionists at various times since then. Partly because of the 
effectiveness of government action against them and partly 
because more moderate Karens have assured them they will 
not be the subject of future discrimination, Karen rebels have 
been surrendering in increasing numbers since early 1954, with 
the result that nearly nine-tenths of Karen territory is now 
under government rule. Forceful action also has caused the 
surrender of many of the leftwing Peoples Volunteer Organ-
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ization rebels as well as members of other smaller insurrection-
ist movements. Peace is gradually being restored to Burma, so 
recently afflicted with so much domestic disorder. 
DEMOCRACY IN BURMA 
With the return of law and order in Burma, democracy's 
chances of success may be increased. Its present status, however, 
poses another of Burma's many contradictions. 
On paper, Burma is a parliamentary democracy. It has a 
two-house national legislature, comprising the 250-member 
chamber of deputies, forming the lower assembly, and the 
125-seat chamber of nationalities, the upper house. The cham-
ber of nationalities, modeled after its Russian namesake, is 
required by the constitution to allot a specified number of 
seats to representatives of the Shans, Kachins, Karens, and 
Chins, all of whom represent major minority groups in Burma. 
The other house is a popular assembly with representation 
based on population. The prime minister is responsible to 
the chamber of deputies, following the British parliamentary 
example. 
The largest party in the chamber of deputies today is the 
still powerful Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, which in 
the last general elections in April, 1956, won 169 out of 250 
seats. No longer the omnibus coalition it was in the early post-
war years, the A.F.P.F.L. is presently composed in the main 
of members of the Burmese Socialist party, who prefer to run 
under its label in order to capitalize on its still enormous 
prestige as the organ of the revolution. Associated with U Nu 
in the A.F.P.F.L.'s leadership during his first eight years' 
premiership were two of Asia's more competent political figures 
-U Ba Swe, who was Nu's minister of mines and defense as 
well as chairman of the 40,000-member Trade Union Congress 
of Burma, and U Kyaw Nyein, his minister of industry and 
secretary general of the A.F.P.F.L. Both were ardent socialists 
-Kyaw Nyein so much so that the London Economist once 
described him as a "more ruthless Stafford Cripps.'' 
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U Nu, U Ba Swe, and U Kyaw Nyein were generally pictured 
as a smooth-functioning triumvirate, collectively ruling Burma, 
with N u the philosopher-statesman heading the government, 
Ba Swe in charge of party organization, and Kyaw Nyein serv-
ing as chief socialist theoretician. But there were major differ-
ences which usually found Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein lining up 
against N u. Ba Swe and K yaw N yein, more doctrinaire social-
ists than Nu, sought to return to the more radical economic 
measures of the early independence years. In the realm of 
foreign affairs they felt that in its operation Burmese neutralism 
tended to advance the goals of the Sino-Soviet bloc at the ex-
pense of the democratic camp. Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein also 
were continually incensed by the highhanded way in which Nu 
disregarded cabinet views on foreign matters and frequently 
took actions which he knew the other leading members of his 
government opposed. 
The day of reckoning came for U N u in June, 1956, follow-
ing the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League's electoral vic-
tory of the preceding April. Nu, a good vote getter, particularly 
among the minority groups, who were less trusting of other 
A.F.P.F.L. leaders, was ousted as premier little more than a 
month after the election returns were in. His successor was 
his capable defense minister, U Ba Swe. Various reasons were 
given for Nu's departure from the post of premier. Some 
reportedly informed sources said Nu felt his policy of neutral-
ism in world affairs was a complete failure, yet his successor 
pledged himself to continue this very same policy, which he 
described as genuinely wise and in the best interest of the 
Burmese nation. The official explanation given for Nu's 
resignation was that he wished to devote his full energies to 
a reorganization and general house cleaning of his political 
party, the A.F.P.F.L. Nu reportedly felt that certain party 
weaknesses had been brought out in the April elections and 
that he should now devote his political talent to remedying 
these defects. It was indicated, however, that Nu would be 
available for consultative duties with the Ba Swe government. 
U Ba Swe was a singularly qualified individual and a man 
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highly representative of the new and independent Burma. Only 
forty-one years old at the time he ascended to the premiership, 
he nevertheless had behind him a lengthy career in politics. 
As minister of defense in the N u government, he had been 
responsible for the prosecution of the campaign against Burma's 
several insurgent movements, including the two Communist 
insurrections. He also was head of the influential Trade Union 
Congress of Burma and was vice president of the Anti-Fascist 
People's Freedom League. In addition, Ba Swe (known 
throughout Burma as "Big Tiger") had played an active role in 
the Asian Socialist movement, which made its organizational 
headquarters in Rangoon. Like U Nu, U Ba Swe was a Bud-
dhist and a socialist. He, too, saw no basic contradiction in 
these two rival philosophies and seemed equally devoted to 
both of them. Unlike Nu, however, Ba Swe was less a product 
of the British period, although he was well acquainted with 
the history, aims, and accomplishments of the British Socialist 
movement, and he was significantly influenced by the example 
of British political institutions. 
U Nu's claim that he was stepping down from the premier-
ship only temporarily proved to be correct. Only a little more 
than six months after Nu had been replaced as Burma's prime 
minister, a terse government announcement stated that he 
would resume that office. According to the announcement, Ba 
Swe would become one of three deputy premiers. On March 
1, 1957, U Nu resumed the office following repeated announce-
ments that he had already done so or was about to do so. 
The circumstances of Nu's return were no less mysterious 
than those surrounding his earlier departure from office. Per-
haps Nu really had resigned to reorganize the Anti-Fascist 
People's Freedom League, some observers thought. Others be-
lieved that the differences dividing N u, Ba Swe, and K yaw 
N yein had been resolved. Both of these interpretations left 
many questions unanswered, however. The most important 
consideration in Nu's return to power was the fact that he 
was an extremely skilled practitioner in the art of Burmese 
politics. Nu used his months out of power to mend political 
fences-and build some new ones. The differences among 
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Burma's key triumvirate of Nu, Ba Swe, and Kyaw Nyein 
remained, however. Nu's hold on political power, despite his 
comeback, is more precarious than generally believed. 
It is well to remember that the power of the A.F.P.F.L. gov-
ernment today rests as much on its armed strength as on the 
will of the people. Even though it enjoys much popular sup-
port, it would not exist long if it did not possess an army to 
keep down that segment of its citizenry, mainly the Commu-
nists, who would topple it by force if they could. 
Although the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League is far 
from professing totalitarian political beliefs, it is clear that 
Burma today is in many ways a one-party state. This situation 
derives from the fact that the major opposition to the gov-
ernment, Communism, is scornful of parliamentary methods, 
preferring shortcuts and direct action to slower constitutional 
methods. It is not, of course, primarily the A.F.P.F.L.'s fault 
that it has no real opposition, although its formidable organ-
ization, its control over patronage and welfare benefits, and its 
close association with the idea of pyidawtha undoubtedly help 
perpetuate this condition. Yet the condition is not encourag-
ing the growth of democratic government in Burma. 
A grave problem which Burma's leadership must face as it 
seeks the effective establishment of a democratic state is the 
fact that Burma is by no means a homogeneous nation. Indica-
tive of the seriousness of Burma's ethnic problem was the 
action taken by representatives of the important Shan minority 
at a January, 1957, regional conference. These Shan leaders 
passed a series of resolutions, the chief of which declared that 
the 56,000-square-mile Shan state (located on Burma's eastern 
border) should prepare for secession from the Union of Burma 
and establishment of a "separate existence" in 1958. Though 
permitted by Burma's constitution, this is not a move which 
Rangoon authorities are likely to permit. It will take all their 
ingenuity to prevent it, however, and, even then, they probably 
will not be able to put an end to Shan secession aspirations. 
Because of Burma's inexperience in democratic ways, it may 
well be that democracy will find the most fertile soil for its 
roots at the village level, where a system of local government 
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based on elections of local councils is being introduced today. 
It may prove the key to future effective popular rule. 
FOREIGN POLICY 
Still another contradiction is to be found in Burma's foreign 
policy. The Burmese leaders openly fear the return of Western 
imperialism, but less often do they express concern over the 
much more virile imperialism of Communist China. This atti-
tude is reflected in a most ambivalent foreign policy toward 
the United States and the Chinese Communists. 
Following their defeat by the Communists, remnants of the 
Nationalist forces in southwestern China fled into Burma, from 
where they occasionally made raids across the border. Such 
activities were taking place with official American approval, 
Burmese leaders claimed, or at least could be halted by the 
United States, to whom Chiang Kai-shek owed the existence of 
his regime on Taiwan. As a reprisal for this alleged American 
responsibility, Rangoon announced it wished an end of Amer-
ican aid to the country. This came about in June, 1953. 
China has received quite different treatment. Burmese Com-
munists, including Than Tun, have crossed the border to con-
fer with Chinese Communist authorities, and Communist 
cadres from Burma at one time poured in a continuing stream 
to China for training, yet the Burmese government made no 
public protest. Communist China, presumably, was not re-
sponsible for what happened in Communist China. 
Although U Nu stressed the fact of his country's neutrality 
in the cold war on virtually every possible occasion, he fre-
quently conducted himself in such a way as to suggest consider-
able naivete about the workings of international politics. In 
the summer of 1955 Nu made a trip to the United States. His 
visit to the Soviet Union in the fall of the same year was to 
have evened the balance; his neutrality demanded that since 
he had visited Washington, he must also pay a call on Moscow. 
Yet what he said in Moscow and in Washington indicated a 
strong partiality to the Soviet outlook. Although Nu spoke 
most kindly of his American hosts, he did not attempt to 
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identify himself with the main aims of American foreign policy. 
In Moscow, however, he and Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bul-
ganin issued a communique in which, among other things, 
they denounced the "policy of creating blocs" and agreed to 
base their relations on the five principles formulated by Indian 
Premier Jawaharlal Nehru and Communist China's Chou 
En-lai: nonaggression, noninterference in internal affairs, peace-
ful coexistence, cooperation based on equality and mutual 
economic benefit, and respect for each other's territorial integ-
rity and sovereignty. The Burmese premier also asked the 
U.S.S.R. for major help in Burma's efforts toward industrial 
advancement and requested the Soviets to buy greater quanti-
ties of Burmese rice, promising reciprocal Burmese purchase of 
Soviet goods. 
At U Nu's invitation, Soviet Premier Bulganin and Commu-
nist Party Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev visited Burma in 
December, 1955. Although the popular reception of Bulganin 
and Khrushchev in Burma was not as overpowering as that 
accorded them in India's major cities, there is much to indicate 
that they made a significant impression on the Burmese people. 
Excepting Khrushchev's ferocious tirades against the West, 
especially Great Britain, with whom Burma maintains cordial 
relations-and to which N u made no objection-the Russian 
leaders did their utmost to appear as warm, friendly, and sin-
cere men. As a consequence, it probably will be difficult in 
the future to convince the Burmese that the Soviet leadership 
is sinister. 
The Russians also apparently continued to charm U Nu. 
As they had done in Moscow two months previously, Premiers 
Nu and Bulganin issued a joint communique in Rangoon 
which seemed to indicate Burmese acquiesence in all the major 
publicly declared aims of Soviet foreign policy. In particular, 
the Burmese prime minister identified himself with three spe-
cific avowed aims of Soviet Far Eastern policy: the transfer of 
Taiwan (Formosa) to Chinese Communist control; resolution 
of the Indochinese problem "in accordance with the decisions 
of the Geneva Conference of 1954," the letter and spirit of 
which have been violated in numerous ways by the Commu-
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nists; and the reunification of Korea, the Communist northern 
half of which continues to refuse foreign inspection of its 
so-called "democracy." 
Taking their cue from the success of the American foreign-
aid program throughout the world and replying to U Nu's 
request in Moscow for Soviet economic help, the Russian lead-
ers took advantage of their Burma visit to offer the Burmese 
technological aid in seemingly generous portions. Specifically, 
the Soviets signed an economic agreement with the N u govern-
ment whereby the Russians promised to assist Burma in such 
important economic tasks as agricultural development, new ir-
rigation projects, and the establishment of a variety of indus-
trial plants. The Burmese agreed to pay for this help with 
rice; if not enough rice should be available to meet the sched-
uled payments, the Soviet Union agreed to permit deferment. 
In addition, the Russians offered to build and equip at Soviet 
expense a new technological institute in Rangoon. U Nu, who 
had frequently refused gifts from the West because they would 
seem to compromise Burmese neutrality, apparently had no 
qualms about accepting Soviet donations. 
The general reaction in Burma to the Soviet visit was favor-
able. Many important Burmese felt that the Bulganin-Khru-
shchev visit and the economic aid resulting from it was proof 
that Burma's policy of nonalignment in world affairs was paying 
off. Moreover, it was pointed out that the new Burmese eco-
nomic ties with the Soviet Union would help to solve the 
problem of Burma's rice surplus. As one Burmese businessman 
put it, "If we can make a deal, why shouldn't we? If the 
R;ussians are willing to give us what we need for something 
we can't get rid of, then let's take it."5 
U Nu's joining with the Soviet leaders in such declarations 
as those made in Moscow and Rangoon probably were not 
dictated by a pro-Communist outlook, regardless of the lack 
of wisdom evident in some of his actions. Yet Rangoon has 
not always spoken with one voice. The pronouncements of 
Kyaw Nyein, one of Burma's leading political figures and a 
powerful member of the present government, indicate a 
5 Quoted in New York Times, December 2, 1955. 
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considerably clearer comprehension of the realities of mid-
twentieth-century world politics. Chairman of the Anti-Colon-
ial Bureau of the Asian Socialist Organization as well as 
Burma's leading socialist theoretician, he has been a frequent 
outspoken critic of the "new imperialism" of the Soviet Union. 
Ba Swe also is more critical of the U.S.S.R. than Nu. 
If Burma's approach to its relations with the United States 
and China partook of the contradictory under N u, he yet was 
much concerned over American-Sino relations. N u sought 
diligently, for example, to bring Washington and Peiping 
closer together. Concluding a good-will visit to Communist 
China in December, 1954, the Burmese premier asked Pei-
ping's leaders to seek an "understanding" with the United 
States in order to reduce tensions in the Far East. On an earlier 
occasion he told Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in Ran-
goon that "we want to be friendly toward both sides." Nu, 
whose government was the first non-Soviet-bloc country to 
recognize Communist China, seemingly sincerely believed that 
the United States and Peiping could resolve their differences. 
But if these countries were not willing to work to reduce 
tensions between themselves, then he and his nation certainly 
were not going to align themselves with either side. In this 
policy U N u had the support of both U Ba Swe and U K yaw 
N yein, who agreed with N u that peace was possible only if 
coexistence replaced the cold war and its accompanying arms 
race. Ba Swe's and Kyaw Nyein's differences with Nu stemmed, 
not from disagreements over policy objectives, but rather from 
some of the ways in which Nu frequently seemed to manipulate 
this neutralism to the advantage of the nations of the Commu-
nist camp. 
That Nu's departure as premier was not the signal for a 
reorientation of Burmese foreign policy was stated by his 
successor, Ba Swe, upon his assumption of office. Much of this 
talk was designed to placate the ousted Nu, but even so, it 
was generally believed that Ba Swe would continue to pursue 
a neutralist foreign policy, although his means of implementing 
such a policy might differ from those of U Nu. 
Despite its concern for a revival of Western imperialism in 
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Southeast Asia, Burma under Nu was, nevertheless, a supporter 
of Western values in the field of foreign relations. In June, 
1950, Burma gave its backing, for example, to the Security 
Council resolutions calling for United Nations action against 
North Korea, although it claimed it was "not in a position to 
render any effective assistance." A close ally of Nehru's India 
and a key member of the Colombo Powers, Burma under both 
N u and Ba Swe has displayed a passionate belief in the right 
of all nations to run their own affairs. This applied to Chinese 
and Russians as well as Americans and Englishmen-and, of 
course, to Burma itself. In this respect Burma offered no 
contradictions whatsoever. 
U Ba Swe's assumption of the premiership, which included 
primary responsibility for the direction of foreign relations, 
was followed by the first open crisis between Burma and Com-
munist China. In July, 1956, The Nation1 an influential Ran-
goon newspaper, broke the story that Chinese Communist 
troops had infiltrated into Burma and had engaged in shooting 
incidents with Burmese army units. Burma's foreign office, 
seemingly somewhat reluctantly, announced on July 31 that 
much of what The Nation had said was true: Chinese Commu-
nist troops had set up outposts on Burmese territory. Accord-
ing to Ba Swe, Chinese forces had slowly moved into the border 
area of northern Burma over a period of two years. The 
premier did not consider the situation as serious and expressed 
the belief that removal of the Chinese troops could be settled 
by negotiations between the two countries. 
Three separate "invasions," or incursions, seem to have taken 
place. One of these reportedly consisted of some three thousand 
troops which in mid-October, 1956, were claimed by the Ran-
goon newspaper The Nation to be only nine days' march from 
the north Burma center of Putao (Fort Hertz). A second 
incursion took place in the wild and only partly settled border 
area of Kachin state in northern Burma. In early October, 
1956, Burma's premier stated that Burmese forces had recently 
probed this region and that "no Chinese troops were found 
anywhere." It was generally conceded by Burmese authorities, 
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although reluctantly, that there had been Chinese Communist 
troops in this area but that they had withdrawn. The other 
region into which Chinese Communist forces had moved was 
the former "Wa states" area, part of present-day Shan state 
(one of the members of the federal Union of Burma). Ran-
goon newspapers claimed that there were more than fifteen 
hundred Chinese troops in the northern part of the Wa states, 
but Ba Swe estimated the number at "around five hundred 
only." 
Burma protested the incursions into its territory to Peiping, 
but there were conflicting reports as to the Communists' re-
sponse to Rangoon's action. Negotiations were begun, however, 
and Ba Swe announced in early October that Communist China 
had agreed to withdraw its troops from the areas in dispute-
which the Rangoon newspaper The Nation later stated had 
not been done. China itself in August had admitted through 
Peiping radio that Chinese troops had occupied outposts in 
"disputed" Chinese-Burmese frontier areas, stating that these 
troops would not be withdrawn until a settlement had been 
reached. The Nation, which seemed to be forcing the Burmese 
government to release more information on the subject than 
it appeared inclined to do, claimed that the Chinese had sug-
gested to Burma that if the Burmese would withdraw their 
troops stationed along the northern frontiers in territory 
claimed by Peiping, China would remove its forces from the 
Wa states in Burma. The Nation noted that Chinese Commu-
nist maps included part of Burma's northern Kachin state as 
Chinese territory. What the Peiping leadership seemed to be 
saying, with apparently little shame, was that if Burma would 
recognize Chinese Communist claims to part of Kachin state, 
the Communists would withdraw their troops from the Wa 
states as a territorial quid pro quo. There were other reports 
out of Burma and Communist China that Peiping had indicated 
it would make no major concessions on the issue until former 
Premier U Nu visited China in late October, a visit he had 
been planning for some time. Communist Chinese Premier 
and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai also was scheduled to visit 
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Rangoon in December, 1956, and it was indicated that this 
might serve as the occasion for a final resolution of the border 
problem. 
Burma's frontier with China was defined in a 1941 treaty 
between the United Kingdom and the Chiang Kai-shek gov-
ernment. Upon achieving its independence, Burma believed 
it took over the territory previously governed by Britain. The 
border had never been properly demarcated in many areas, 
however, giving the problem an element of vagueness which 
the Communist Chinese obviously were seeking to exploit. 
It soon became apparent that Burma's leaders were willing 
to settle border differences with the Chinese Communists on 
terms less than favorable, if necessary. In November, U Nu, 
returning from his visit with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai in 
Peiping, disclosed that his country would relinquish its per-
petual lease of one hundred square miles of Chinese territory 
(known as the Namwan Assigned Tract) on Burma's northern 
frontier. Burma also would cede three villages in northern 
Kachin state to Peiping, Nu said. The Chinese, in return, 
would recognize Burma's claim to the rest of the territory 
inherited from the British. 
In spite of the willingness of the Burmese leadership to 
compromise, the December, 1956, visit of Chou En-lai to Burma 
did not result in a final settlement. The Burmese and Chinese 
premiers discussed the matter at length, but the statement they 
issued stated that the border dispute was near solution, but still 
unsettled. It was generally believed, however, that a final agree-
ment on the subject would soon be reached. 
But why did the Peiping leadership choose this time to raise 
the issue? There are several possible explanations. One is 
that China did not wish to raise the matter publicly at this 
time; it was The Nation) after all, which broke the story. Bur-
mese authorities obviously knew of the situation, but they 
gave no public notice of the problem until The Nation's story, 
which probably derived from leaks by officials who were dis-
contented with the government's tightlipped policy on the 
controversy. Such a move would have had the advantage of 
revealing the border situation without involving the Burmese 
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government. A second explanation is that Communist China 
may have sought actually to lay effective claim to certain terri-
tory before such territory had been under Burmese jurisdiction 
for sufficient time for it to derive legal validity from that factor 
alone. After all, Chinese maps, under Chiang Kai-shek as well 
as Mao Tse-tung, have shown a good part of Kachin state as 
Chinese territory. It also is possible that the Chinese move was 
designed to keep pressure on the Burmese government as a 
means of reminding the Burmese of the possibility of trouble 
with China if their foreign policy moved in a direction inim-
icable to Peiping. • 
The Burmese reaction to the situation, once it had been 
brought out into the open, was less clouded than the factors 
motivating the Chinese. U Nu, still his party's leader as head 
of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, stated in July, 
1956, that Burmese relations with the United States had shown 
"a tangible improvement." In the same speech Nu also noted 
that there were "stooges, spies and fifth columnists" aplenty in 
Burma who were working for "big powers" and "threatening 
Burma's independence." His remarks seemed aimed at pro-
Communist groups and individuals, elements of Burma's Chi-
nese minority, and persons associated with the Soviet and 
Communist Chinese embassies. A further indication that 
Burma might in fact be drawing closer to the United States 
was given in March, 1957, with the report that the Burmese 
government would accept a $25,000,000 loan and a $17,500,000 
loan in Burmese currency from the United States government, 
both repayable over a forty-year period. The possibility is 
strong that the United States and Burma will draw closer 
together in the years ahead. 
CHAPTER 8 
THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 
THE EVENTS of the last fifteen years have had immense conse-
quences for Southeast Asia in the realm of international rela-
tions. After a frustrating era of colonialism, when their relations 
with other nations and among themselves were directed from 
London, Paris, The Hague, and Washington, the countries of 
this part of the world gained in the years after the Second 
World War, among other aspects of national independence, 
the right to conduct their own foreign affairs. For the Philip-
pines, ruled first by Spaniards and then Americans, the ending 
of the colonial period marked the first time in nearly four 
hundred years that it had been able to direct its relations with 
other peoples. The era of external control of their foreign rela-
tions had not been nearly so long for the Burmese, Indochinese, 
and Malays, but in their eyes it had been long enough. The 
Indonesians, who had given birth to the empires of Srivijaya 
and Majapahit in the age before the Western penetration of 
Southeast Asia, also had had no control over their country's 
international relations since the effective establishment of 
Dutch rule in the islands. Thailand had never lost nominal 
direction of its foreign relations, never having been a Western 
colony, but its contacts with the rest of the world, particularly 
with its Southeast Asian neighbors, had been limited never-
theless. When the foreign office at Bangkok had cause to 
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concern itself with neighboring Burma or Indochina, for ex-
ample, it had been to far-off London or Paris that it directed 
itself, not Rangoon or Saigon. 
One of the consequences of the period of Western colonialism 
is that the political leaders of these lands are today lacking in 
experience in the art of foreign-policy determination and im-
plementation. If these leaders have seemed unnecessarily wav-
ering in some aspects of their foreign policies in the years since 
independence was gained, and unduly rigid in others, it is 
partially because of this inexperience. This factor also explains 
the naivete which has marked much of the foreign-policy out-
looks of these states in their first years of freedom. 
This conspicuous inexperience in foreign affairs is not the 
only legacy for Southeast Asia's international relations of the 
Western colonial period. Of equal importance is the sense of 
isolation which the long years of alien rule impressed upon 
these lands. During the Western colonial era the orientation 
of the average educated Burmese was to London, as that of 
his Indonesian counterpart was to The Hague. This orienta-
tion was by no means purely political; it was economic and 
cultural as well. Although there was great interest in other 
Asian peoples among intellectuals in these countries, there was 
little knowledge of them and even less contact. The legacy of 
this period of isolation cannot help but influence the political 
personality of Southeast Asia today. Nations, like individuals, 
do not readily escape from their past. The countries of South-
east Asia are no exception. Their foreign policies today display 
a strong imprint of the centuries of enforced isolation. The 
fact that few Southeast Asian cabinet members know their 
opposite numbers in the other countries of this part of the 
world is but a single example of the impact of this tradition of 
isolation. This situation is being remedied, but slowly. 
If the reality of present-day relations among the states of 
Southeast Asia is to be comprehended, the isolating impact of 
the division of the area into several separate vVestern colonies 
must be fully realized. Even before the beginning of the 
Western intrusion, intraregional relations were considerably 
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limited by the geography of the area-a geography of moun-
tainous islands and peninsulas, mitigated partially by calm 
seas. This mountainous terrain explains in good measure the 
historic division of the region into a multiplicity of small 
states. If relations among the peoples of Southeast Asia were 
restricted before the arrival of the vVest, they were limited 
even more by the arbitrary boundaries erected by the European 
imperial powers to separate their colonies. So effective was this 
isolation that no real contact can be said to have existed among 
the several nationalist movements in Southeast Asia, even on 
the eve of the Pacific war. Because each of the nationalist move-
ments was brought into being in opposition to colonial rule, 
there was a regionwide spiritual link among the various nation-
alist leaders, but this assumed no organizational form. 
The Second vVorld War greatly stimulated regional feeling 
in this part of the world. The creation of the Allies' Southeast 
Asia Command under Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten in 
1943 popularized the concept of Southeast Asia as a distinct 
region. The Japanese occupation also stimulated regional con-
sciousness, for this was the first time the area had ever known 
a single ruler. Moreover, Japan played a prominent part in 
the encouragement of regionalism by introducing various of 
the Southeast Asian nationalist leaders to one another. The 
Assembly of the Greater East Asiastic Nations, held in Tokyo 
in November, 1943, for example, was attended by President 
Jose P. Laurel of the Philippines, Prime Minister Ba Maw of 
Burma, and Prince Wan vVaithayakon of Thailand, present in 
place of Premier Phibun Songgram, said to be ill in Bangkok. 
This was the first meeting of these three prominent Asian 
leaders. 
SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONALISM 
In the years which followed the end of the Pacific war, several 
proposals for closer political collaboration among the peoples 
of Southeast Asia were put forward by indigenous leaders. No 
governmental international organization of the peoples of this 
part of the world took place, however, although an unofficial 
body called the Southeast Asia League was set up in Bangkok 
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in September, 1947. Organized by the Viet Minh agent Tran 
Van Giau, who came to Thailand in 1945 to build support for 
Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh movement in Vietnam, the South-
east Asia League was a front organization to cover up a variety 
of activities, including gunrunning, in aid of the Indochinese 
Communists. It included such well-known Southeast Asian 
Communists as Tran Van Luan, later to head the Viet Minh 
news service in Rangoon; Le Hi, then editor of the Viet Minh 
propaganda publication in Bangkok; and Prince Souvanna 
Vong, a prominent leader in the Communist movement in the 
Indochinese state of Laos. Several prominent Thai, including 
former Premier Pridi Banomyong, then Prime Minister 
Thamrong Nawasawat, and Tiang Sirikhand, Thailand's con-
troversial onetime deputy minister of interior, were associated 
in one way or another with the league, but they appear not 
to have been in on the Community conspiracy.1 
If the Communist-sponsored Southeast Asia League was the 
only postwar regional proposal to assume even tentative organ-
izational form, it was by no means the only one to be advanced. 
That none of the others ever came into being is not so sur-
prising when it is recalled that these countries have enjoyed 
the right to conduct their own foreign policy for only a few 
years. Yet there have been those Southeast Asian politicians 
who wanted closer political collaboration and who worked 
sincerely in its behalf. Such a leader was General Aung San, 
moving spirit of Burma's wartime guerrilla army and deputy 
head of the postwar interim government in Burma as well as 
president of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, the 
nationalist coalition which won independence for Burma. As 
early as October, 1945, at a moment apparently when he had 
lost hope that British gratitude for his belated military assist-
ance against Japan would result in the grant of freedom to 
Burma, Aung San called for an Asian "Potsdam Conference" 
to "plan a united campaign to achieve freedom within the 
shortest possible time."2 In January, 1947, further elaborating 
1 For a fuller account of the Southeast Asia League, see Richard Butwell, 
"Communist Liaison in Southeast Asia," United Asia, VI (1954), 146-51. 
2 New Delhi Hindustan Times, November 10, 1945. 
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this idea in a broadcast from New Delhi, he forecast the forma-
tion of an Asian Commonwealth, which would constitute a 
united Asian front "against imperialistic rule." Expanding 
what he meant by an Asian Commonwealth, Aung San de-
clared, "While India should be one entity and China another, 
Southeast Asia as a whole should form an entity-then, finally, 
we should come together in a bigger union with the participa-
tion of other parts of Asia as well." 3 Again in April the Bur-
mese leader called for greater regional cooperation, publicly 
urging the formation of a Southeast Asian economic union 
consisting of Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, Indochina, and 
Malaya.4 Burma's leadership in the attempt to establish a 
Southeast Asia league or union ended, however, with the 
tragic assassination of General Aung San in the summer of 
1947. The support of subsequent Burmese national leaders, 
U Nu and U Ba Swe, for their country's participation in the 
Colombo Powers grouping and their desire to improve relations 
with neighboring Thailand indicate a sincere wish on their 
part for friendship with other South and Southeast Asian coun-
tries, but this policy does not represent a continuation of Aung 
San's efforts to establish governmental organizational links 
among Burma and the lands to its east and southeast. 
In the early postwar years Burma was not the only South-
east Asian state in which projects for closer regional political 
collaboration were proposed. On July I, 1947, the then Thai 
premier, Thamrong Nawasawat, announced that Thailand and 
France would jointly sponsor the formation of a Pan Southeast 
Asian Union, which would include Thailand, Cambodia, Viet-
nam, and Laos, to begin with, and which later would be ex-
panded to embrace Burma, Indonesia, Borneo, and India. The 
union would concern itself primarily, according to Thamrong, 
with regional plans for the joint development of irrigation, 
fisheries, communications, and other such resources of the 
area. Public opinion in Bangkok, usually most apathetic, was 
opposed to the union from the start, the opposition parties 
leading the attack with charges that the Thamrong administra-
3 Edinburgh Scotsman, November 28, 1947. 
4 Singapore Straits Times, April 19, 1947. 
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tion was subservient to the French. The union never was 
formed, being killed in its embryonic stage by this almost 
instant reaction against it. 
The proposed union, however, did inspire the Communist 
Tran Van Giau and his colleagues to set up their Southeast 
Asia League, which was formed in September, 1947, and sup-
pressed two months later after the return of supporters of 
Field Marshal Phibun Songgram to power in Thailand. Phi-
bun's suppression of the league, together with his general aloof-
ness from posnvar movements to back the cause of nationalism 
in other Southeast Asian lands, has led some observers to 
state that the Thai premier-a known nationalist of strong 
convictions-has no wish to associate more closely with Thai-
land's neighbors. Such statements are far too strongly put. 
Like the leaders of Thailand's several Southeast Asian neigh-
bors, Phibun supports regional collaboration, if such coopera-
tion can be arranged in the form he wishes. His state visit to 
Burma in late 1955, his first such trip to a Southeast Asian 
country since assuming power in the 1930's, gave indication 
of his willingness to meet Burmese Premier U Nu at least 
halfway in the latter's efforts to improve relations between the 
two countries. Thailand's desire for closer relations with the 
Indochinese states, particularly Laos, also reveals Phibun's con-
cern for friendly association with neighboring countries. The 
visit of Laotian Prime Minister Kathay Sasorith to Thailand 
in 1955 was only one indication of the conscious efforts being 
made by the governments of both Thailand and Laos to 
strengthen the ties between them. 
On more than one occasion between 194 7 and 1950 Thai 
Premier Phibun Songgram expressed his anxious desire for a 
Southeast Asian defense pact. In October, 1949, he took the 
initiative in inviting Burma, the Philippines, and India to 
Bangkok for talks on political and economic matters in South-
east Asia. The conference was never held, however, because of 
lack of enthusiastic response from the invited states. Thailand 
itself participated in the Philippines-convened Baguio Confer-
ence of the following year, although it subsequently announced 
that it was not ready to join any Southeast Asian bloc. This 
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came after the Thai government had concluded a military 
assistance agreement with the United States in October, 1950, 
which apparently gave it the security it was seeking. Phibun 
thereafter gave up whatever limited ideas for regional collab-
oration he possessed until the Anglo-American declaration of 
April, 1954, calling for a Southeast Asian collective defense 
organization. The Thai premier quickly associated his country 
with that project, and Thailand was represented at the Sep-
tember conference at Manila which set up the Southeast Asian 
Treaty Organization.5 
Support for closer regional collaboration in Southeast Asia 
also was forthcoming in the postwar years from Ho Chi Minh, 
leader of the Communist-captured nationalist movement in 
Vietnam. In 1945, in the wake of the Japanese defeat, the 
Viet Minh leader sent a message to President Sukarno in 
Djakarta, asking the Indonesian nationalist to join with him 
in a common declaration of purpose in their mutual struggle 
against colonialism as well as to participate in the formation of 
a preparatory commission to organize appropriate machinery 
for future cooperation among the Southeast Asian countries.6 
Since nothing came of the proposal, it would appear likely that 
it was turned down by the Indonesians. It would seem highly 
plausible that Sukarno, already under attack from some Dutch 
quarters as being a Communist and hoping for support from 
the United States, would have been most cautious and circum-
spect in replying to Ho Chi Minh's overtures. 
Unlike those of Burma, the attempts of the Philippines to 
establish a regional organization in Southeast Asia did not end 
in the early postwar period. The island republic, in contrast 
to the former British colony, continued to propose a variety of 
plans for closer Southeast Asian relations long after it was 
apparent that nobody was really interested in the idea. The 
leader of the Philippines' efforts to draw the nations of this 
part of the world nearer to each other was General Carlos P. 
Romulo, who before the war advocated a Pan-Malay Union. 
5 The Southeast Asian Treaty Organization is examined in the next chapter. 
6 Harold Isaacs, in Phillips Talbot (ed.), South Asia in the World Today 
(Chicago, 1950), 165-66. See also Milton Sacks in the same work, pp. 206-207. 
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Following the New Delhi Conference of 1949, called by India 
to support Indonesia's bid for independence, he began working 
for an anti-Communist South and Southeast Asian bloc, which 
he hoped would include India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia, and 
New Zealand as well as the countries of Southeast Asia proper, 
with future American support also anticipated. Most of these 
countries did not want to align themselves with either side in 
the cold war, and so nothing much came of the Baguio Con-
ference called by the Philippines in the summer of 1950. The 
Philippines received an opportunity to revive its plans for a 
Southeast Asian regional organization in April, 1954, when 
American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Sir An-
thony Eden, British foreign secretary, jointly called for a col-
lective defense body in the area. Negotiations eventually re-
sulted in the Philippines serving as host to the conference 
which drafted the treaty for the organization. 
The most unreceptive of all the Southeast Asian lands to 
any form of regional political collaboration has been Indonesia. 
In April, 1951, when the suggestion was advanced that the 
Southeast Asian countries should be included in a Pacific pact, 
Foreign Minister Mohammed Rum declared that his govern-
ment had no intention of associating itself with any alignment 
inconsistent with Indonesia's foreign policy of "active neutral-
ity." Sunarjo, foreign minister in the Ali Sastroamidjojo cab-
inet which ruled the country from mid 1953 through mid 
1955, expressed himself in a similar vein on several occasions, 
indicating a desire for greater Asian-African cooperation rather 
than closer relations limited to the states of Southeast Asia. 
On one occasion in recent years, however, Indonesia has been 
seen to deviate slightly from what has otherwise been a most 
consistent foreign-policy line. This was early in 1951 when it 
sounded out the other Southeast Asian countries on holding 
a conference to discuss the conflict between Bao Dai, France, 
and the Ho Chi Minh revolutionaries, a conference which, 
probably because it failed to get the response Indonesia hoped 
for, was never held.7 
Another fence-sitting country with respect to regional col-
7 Paris Le Monde, February 3, 1951. 
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laboration has been the Indochinese state of Cambodia. On 
September 27, 1953, Penn Nouth, then Cambodian prime min-
ister, declared that the Southeast Asian lands, including his 
own, should sign a common defense pact in view of their 
common danger of foreign invasion. Yet two weeks earlier 
this same leader had told the Communist-led Viet Minh by 
radio that if it would get out of their kingdom, the Cambodians 
would not fight the Communists in neighboring Vietnam. An 
examination of Cambodian policy statements since 1950 will 
reveal that this wavering has been one of the most constant 
factors in the country's extremely flexible foreign policy. Be-
cause Cambodia, like Laos, was excluded from participation 
in the Manila Southeast Asian Treaty Organization Conference 
in September, 1954, by the terms of the Geneva agreement 
signed the previous July, it was not required to commit itself 
with respect to the \IV estern-sponsored Seato. There are strong 
indications, however, that if it had been forced to make such 
a decision, Cambodia would have declared in favor of remain-
ing outside the new regional defense grouping-despite its 
friendship with the United States and its strong reliance on 
American aid. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, formerly Cambodia's 
king, stated following his smashing electoral triumph in the 
fall of 1955 that Cambodia would follow a policy of neutrality. 
The trend toward neutrality in Cambodian foreign policy 
would seem to have strengthened since that time. 
PRIMACY OF NATIONALISM 
The most important thing to note about the several indigenous 
proposals for closer regional political collaboration, from Gen-
eral Aung San's suggestions to those of the Vietnamese Com-
munist leader Ho Chi Minh, is that they were, for the most 
part, made during the early postwar years. Although nobody 
ever seemed to want to second anybody else's plan, almost 
everybody had his own proposal. The unity of feeling created 
by the common experience of colonial rule was, no doubt, the 
basis of these several plans. With the attainment of independ-
ence, however, this unity began to wane. Nationalism com-
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menced to display its divisive tendencies. This, probably more 
than any other single factor, explains the continuously lessen-
ing appeal which political regionalism seems to have had for 
the leaders and peoples of Southeast Asia. 
There can be little doubt that this newly triumphant nation-
alism is the most singularly influential political factor in the 
region at the present time. ·where the old loyalties were pri-
marily to the village or the family, the present ones follow 
political boundaries to an increasing extent. And the primary 
objective of the nationalism which has so aroused them is 
political, economic, and social freedom-independence in all 
ways possible from the peoples of other lands. 
In the years before the Second World War one of the conse-
quences of this nationalism had been to bring its advocates in 
the several Southeast Asian lands closer together, spiritually if 
not in actual experience. Its hour of triumph, however, has 
revealed its inherent divisive tendencies. Closer political col-
laboration has not made progress in Southeast Asia in the 
years since the Pacific war, because adherence to such regional 
cooperation would lessen the freedom of action of the new 
national states-which freedom of action they wish to maintain 
above all other things. Rather than drawing closer together 
in the postwar years, these states are becoming increasingly 
differentiated, not only in their attitudes toward each other, 
but also in their approaches to larger world problems, such as 
the cold war, Chinese Communist expansionism, and other 
matters. The upheaval of the postwar years to fulfill the urge 
of nationalism brought with it civil war and economic dis-
location, but in spite of this, the leaders of the Southeast Asian 
states believe their fight for national independence was justified. 
They do not wish now to give up any of their newly acquired 
sovereignty to a regional supranational political entity. 
PAN .. ASIAN SENTIMENTS 
If divisive nationalism has served as a barrier to closer regional 
collaboration in postwar Southeast Asia, the same also might 
be said of quite an opposite tendency, that of thinking in Asia-
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wide terms. The idea of an all-Asian grouping, which has 
attracted some of Southeast Asia's leaders in recent years, is 
by no means a new one. It can be traced back to such ventures 
as the Russian-convened Congress of the Nations of the Orient 
at Baku in September, 1920, the Nagasaki Pan-Asiatic Con-
ference of 1926, and the 1934 Pan-Asiatic Labor Conference in 
Ceylon, among other events, its past sponsors including such 
distinguished Asian figures as J awaharlal Nehru. 
A large number of plans for closer political relations among 
the several Asian states were put forward in the postwar years. 
The unofficial Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 
March-April, 1947, in fact, was hailed in many quarters as 
the beginning of the establishment of some kind of Asian 
union. All of the Southeast Asian countries were represented 
among the thirty-one states sending delegates to the conference, 
but the unity of the many prominent Asians attending the New 
Delhi meetings appears to have been limited to an almost 
unanimous anti-European sentiment, moral support for the 
liberation struggles in those Asian lands not yet independent, 
and a widespread belief in the possibility of Asian neutrality 
in any future world war. The representatives of the Southeast 
Asian countries seemed very much afraid that integration into 
any Asia-wide bloc would be at the cost of their newly acquired 
political independence. A nongovernmental body called the 
Asian Relations Organization was set up by the conference, how-
ever, its work to be carried on by national units in the several 
countries of Asia. More than six years later the A.R.O. had 
succeeded in establishing national councils in only Burma and 
Malaya of the Southeast Asian countries. An East Asian Con-
ference in Djakarta, to include Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Viet-
nam, and Indonesia, was to have been called in 1948 prelimin-
ary to the next planned Asian Relations Conference in China 
in 1949, but neither the Indonesian nor the Chinese meeting 
ever took place. 
If the Asian Relations Conference of 194 7 did not itself 
result in the formation of a continuing Asia-wide organization 
of any importance, it did establish contacts which were to pro-
duce an all-Asian grouping of considerably more strength than 
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the A.R.O. In New Delhi in March-April, 1947, such Asian 
Socialists as Indonesia's Sutan Sjahrir, Burma's U Ba Swe and 
U Tun Win, and India's Jayaprakash Narayan met for the 
first time. They decided on this occasion that the formation 
of a South Asian Socialist organization of some kind was im-
perative, but circumstances were to prevent the establishment 
of such a body in the years which immediately followed the 
New Delhi Conference. In March, 1952, representatives of the 
Socialist parties of the three countries met in Rangoon, to-
gether with observers from the right and left wings of the then 
split Japanese Social Democrats, and plans were laid for the 
Rangoon Conference of 1953, expanded from a South Asian to 
an all-Asian conference "because the problems to be solved are 
Asia-wide." Full delegations from Malaya, Pakistan, Israel, 
and Egypt, as well as from Burma, Indonesia, India, and Japan, 
attended the Rangoon Socialist Conference in January, 1953, 
with observers present from other Asian lands, although there 
was no representation at all from such countries as China, Viet-
nam, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, or Laos. An Asia-
wide organization was set up, to be called the Organization of 
Asian Socialist Parties and comprising a conference (to be held 
every other year), a bureau (to meet twice annually), and a 
permanent secretariat (to be located in Rangoon). One of 
the major drawbacks of this organization at the present time is 
that only two of its national parties (the Burmese and the 
Israeli) are in power in their countries. 
Neither the Asian Relations Conference nor the Asian 
Socialist Organization set up by the Rangoon Conference of 
1953 represented collaboration of the governments of Asia. 
On only one occasion prior to 1955 did these governments 
gather together on an Asia-wide basis, and this was in January, 
1949, at the Indian-convened Indonesian Conference, follow-
ing the second Dutch "police action" of December, 1948, 
against the nationalist revolutionaries in the former Nether-
lands colony. This conference was called by Prime Minister 
Nehru of India, at the suggestion of the premier of Burma, 
U N u, to deal specifically with the Indonesian situation, and 
was attended by nineteen states, including Australia and New 
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Zealand. At its final session it passed a resolution calling upon 
the United Nations Security Council, among other things, to 
arrange for the complete transfer of power by the Dutch over 
Indonesia by January l, 1950, to the United States of Indo-
nesia. It is generally agreed that the action taken at New Delhi 
in January, 1949, was an influential factor in the ending of the 
Dutch-Indonesian war in the same year. 
The several suggestions for an Asian federation or union 
have been paralleled in the postwar years by a number of pro-
posals for a Pacific pact which would include the United States 
and other Western powers as well as the East Asian countries. 
Such suggestions have come, for the most part, from the late 
President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines, Chiang Kai-shek 
of the Nationalist Chinese regime on Taiwan (Formosa), and 
President Syngman Rhee of South Korea, thus partially ex-
plaining their lack of appeal to Southeast Asians, who regard 
Chiang and Rhee as unrepresentative of modern Asia. It was 
in line with such proposals that the Philippines called the 
Baguio Conference of 1950, which, though comprising only 
South and Southeast Asian states to begin with, was to have 
been expanded later, according to Philippine expectations. The 
Baguio meeting was a singularly ineffective gathering, its basic 
purpose from the Filipino point of view having been com-
pletely changed in order to attract such neutralist countries as 
Indonesia and India. Originally intended to be a conference 
to set up an anti-Communist alliance, it turned out to be a 
general discussion of economic and social questions, with Com-
munism a taboo topic. Typical of most of Southeast Asia's 
reaction to the Philippine overtures was Premier Nu's declara-
tion that Burma was not prepared to join any such union 
unless it were "sponsored by the right people at the right time" 
-neither of which conditions, by implication, was met by 
the Quirino plan. 
SOUTH ASIAN BLOC 
Still another kind of political association in this part of the 
world to be proposed in the postwar years was a bloc among 
the states of South Asia, which is generally defined to include 
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India, Pakistan, and Ceylon as well as Southeast Asia. In 
January, 1949, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, leader of the Cey-
lonese delegation to the Indonesian Conference in New Delhi 
and presently premier of Ceylon, proposed closer economic and 
political cooperation among India, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, 
and Ceylon. Nothing came of the proposal at the time, and 
it was not until April, 1954, that leaders of these five South 
Asian states met together, or so it was declared ahead of time, 
specifically for talks about relations among themselves. This 
was the result of an invitation extended by the then premier 
of Ceylon, Sir John Kotelawala, to meet in Colombo for such 
talks. Sir John called upon the countries of South Asia to 
unite in a "joint endeavor" to become an effective force in the 
preservation of world peace, expressing the hope that the 
premiers of the five lands would frequently come together for 
consultations along the lines of the meetings of the Common-
wealth prime ministers. So preoccupied were the five premiers 
with matters related to the Geneva Conference on Indochina 
then in session, and so divided in their views about some of 
them, that they ignored the main reason for the meeting being 
called in the first place, with the result that no standing 
machinery emerged from the conference. However, the Co-
lombo Powers, as the five states have come to be called, did 
gain recognition as a significant bloc in world politics. 
Meeting for the second time in Bogor, Indonesia, in late 
December, 1954, the premiers of the five Colombo Powers 
authorized the Indonesians to invite various Asian and African 
nations to a "peace conference" in April, 1955. Indonesian 
Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo had proposed such an Afro-
Asian conference at the first meeting of the Colombo Powers, 
but no definite date for the gathering was set at that time. 
Indonesian leaders immediately announced they hoped the 
April talks would "bring lasting peace to Asia by reconciling 
the conflicting viewpoints of East and West," which seemed 
quite a chore for a conference at which only the East would 
be represented. At their December meeting the Colombo 
Powers also decided to invite Communist China to the parley, 
which some doubting elements outside Asia thought might serve 
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to drive a further wedge between East and West rather than 
reconcile the two. On the other hand, there were those, more 
limited in number and vocal strength, who hoped this action 
might help start regularizing outcast Communist China's rela-
tions with the rest of the world and so bring closer together 
East and West, as the Indonesians had suggested. 
One thing was certain, however. The fact that the five South 
Asian countries decided to hold an all-Asian conference indi-
cated that the idea of a community of interests among the 
lands of Asia was by no means dead. The 194 7 Asian Relations 
Conference in India received much publicity as marking the 
beginning of closer Asian political relations, which, it is gen-
erally admitted, failed to materialize. Due partially to the 
Communist rise to power in Peiping, the projected second 
meeting of the conference in China in 1949 was not held, nor 
was a session convened at an alternative location. Likewise, the 
1949 Conference on Indonesia failed to produce any permanent 
machinery for closer collaboration, while the Organization of 
Asian Socialist Parties has been limited by the fact that there 
are no Socialist parties of any consequence in many lands of 
the Far East, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Pakistan, and Korea, not to mention mainland China and 
Taiwan (Formosa). Despite past failures, however, the idea 
of an Asian community persisted in the minds of such leaders 
as Jawaharlal Nehru, Ali Sastroamidjojo, U Nu, and others-
although some of these, like Dr. Ali, who undoubtedly thought 
Indonesia's leading role in holding the parley might raise the 
faltering prestige of his much-criticized government, clearly 
were not motivated by such thoughts alone. 
With respect to the composition of the Bandung Conference, 
it is worthy of note that not all the lands of Asia and Africa 
were invited. The Nationalist Chinese government of Chiang 
Kai-shek was conspicuously snubbed, which, though probably 
not justified, made more sense than the exclusion of some other 
countries, such as Israel, Nigeria, and the Union of South 
Africa. Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon were part of Asia in the 
eyes of the Colombo Powers-as was Turkey!-but not Israel, 
which had been part of Asia for the 1947 Asian Relations 
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Conference as well as for the Organization of Asian Socialist 
Parties. Indonesia's affinity with the Moslem lands of the 
Middle East was responsible for the exclusion of Israel, indi-
cating that the ties between the Southeast Asian archipelago 
republic and the Moslem Middle East are of consequence to 
the region's international relations. Also not invited were the 
rival regimes of north and south Korea, although north and 
south Vietnam were extended invitations. 
Significantly, the April, 1955, conference-which was held in 
the beautiful Indonesian city of Bandung-included African as 
well as Asian nations. This was but a continuation of the trend 
observable in the so-called Arab-Asian bloc's concern, inside 
and outside the United Nations, for the colonial countries of 
Africa and in the Asian Socialist Organization's establishment 
of an Anti-Colonial Bureau primarily to assist the several 
African nationalist movements in their efforts toward inde-
pendence. It is altogether possible that the world is heading 
toward a bipolarity somewhat different from its present two-
bloc anatomy: a bipolarity of Asia and Africa versus Europe 
and the Americas. Indonesia was reported on the eve of the 
first meeting of the Colombo Powers as desiring the creation 
of a permanent Asian organization, on the lines of the United 
Nations, to obviate Western interference in purely Asian 
matters. 
THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE 
Although the fact that the Bandung Conference was held indi-
cated that the idea of an Asian community of interests was not 
dead, the actions of the conference gave vivid proof that such 
a community still had a long way to go before it became a vital 
reality. If the Bandung Conference pointed out one thing 
above anything else, it was that there was not yet a true Afro-
Asian bloc-indeed, not even an Asian bloc! 
The delegates from twenty-nine nations, only sixteen of 
which were then United Nations members, agreed on many 
matters during the course of the conference. They agreed, for 
example, to condemn colonialism, which did not come as much 
of a surprise, considering the fact that anticolonialism was the 
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strongest bond among them. They backed Nehru's proposal 
that the testing of nuclear weapons be suspended. As was to 
be expected, they very strongly championed the cause of peace. 
And they backed Indonesian claims to Dutch-held West New 
Guinea, supported Yemen's pretenses to the British protectorate 
of Aden, and generally championed the cause of the Arab 
peoples of the Middle East, whether fighting for independence 
against the French in Morocco or Tunisia or seeking redress 
of the grievances of the Palestine refugees. 
If they concerned themselves vitally with Aden, however, 
they ignored the problem of Korea completely. And although 
they talked about the difficulties in Vietnam, they did not do 
or say anything which brought solution of these difficulties 
any closer. In short, their discussions were conspicuous for 
the fact that they concerned themselves with matters over 
which they had little direct control, as in the case of nuclear 
weapons, or which represented grievances against nations not 
in attendance at the conference-for example, the Dutch in 
West New Guinea, the French in North Africa, the British in 
Aden, and the Israelis and the problem of the Arab refugees. 
A pattern only too obvious at the April, 1954, meeting of the 
Colombo Powers was being repeated-the less the assembled 
nations could do about a given problem, the louder they talked 
about it. When it came to problems over which Asians could 
exercise some influence and for which they bore some respon-
sibility-Kashmir, Vietnam, and Korea, for instance-the dele-
gates spoke in more subdued terms. 
It was not, however, the fact that the Asian community 
failed to shoulder its responsibilities which was the most sig-
nificant thing about the Bandung Conference-it was, rather, 
that it was obvious that there was no real Asian community to 
begin with except on a superficial sentimental level. Asia at 
Bandung spoke with three voices, not including several brands 
of whispers. Loudest of these three voices at the outset of the 
conference was that of the pro-Western nations: the Philip-
pines, Thailand, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. They con-
demned Communism as the new imperialism and strongly 
defended their alliances with the West. In their attack upon 
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Communism they were joined, somewhat surprisingly, by Cey-
lon's Sir John Kotelawala, who called the first meeting of the 
Colombo Powers. Sir John, democrat but neutralist, charged 
that Communist policy aimed at converting the free nations 
of Asia and Europe "into satellites of the Soviet Union and 
Communist China." 
Ranged against the vocal pro-Western elements were the 
more soft-spoken Communist representatives. Chief Communist 
spokesman at the conference was China's sly and personable 
Chou En-lai. The Communists' sweet talk at Bandung failed 
to dim the perception of the pro-Western nations as to the 
real intentions of the Sino-Soviet bloc: the division and weak-
ening of the ranks of all who would oppose them-in Asia and 
Africa, as well as Europe and America. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the Communists' true colors were not perceived by all 
who attended the Bandung meeting-including, apparently, 
such a key Asian figure as U Nu. 
Finally, there were the neutralists, comprising most of the 
countries participating in the conference. Jawaharlal Nehru 
was the leading spokesman for this group, although he was not 
particularly conspicuous for guiding the conference's develop-
ment along the lines he wished. The neutralists, including 
U Nu and Ali Sastroamidjojo as well as Nehru, had hoped that 
cold-war alignments could be forgotten amid the triumphant 
unity of pan-Asian sentiments. They could not have been 
more wrong. The impact of the cold war pervaded almost all 
aspects of the Bandung meeting. There were the pro--Western 
elements, and the Communists, and the neutralists-and they 
succeeded in reaching no more agreement among themselves 
than these forces have accomplished in the world at large. 
The communique which the Bandung delegates presented at 
the conference's closing session was a facade of common views. 
There was no genuine meeting of the minds at Bandung-
despite the bond of anticolonialism-because deep divisions 
continued to afflict the so-called Asian community, divisions 
which reflected to a very great extent the tensions of the world-
wide cold war. 
The Bandung nations did agree to meet again in the future. 
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The details of the meeting were left up to the Colombo Powers, 
although there was much talk that the second session would be 
held in Cairo. It may well be, of course, that Bandung was 
the first step to closer Afro-Asian relations; a new bipolarity, 
as already noted, may be in the process of development. At 
the same time it should not be forgotten that the great hopes 
of an earlier all-Asian gathering, the 1947 Asian Relations 
Conference, failed of fulfillment. The same nice words were 
said in New Delhi in 194 7 as were heard in Bandung in 1955-
but nothing came of New Delhi. Indeed, there is good reason 
to believe that even the ranks of the sponsoring Colombo 
Powers were somewhat ruptured by the Bandung experience. 
Sir John Kotelawala's strong attack upon international Com-
munism visibly annoyed neutralist Jawaharlal Nehru, for ex-
ample. Even the unity of the Colombo Powers is by no means 
an assured thing. 
Although political cooperation has yet to assume organiza-
tional form in Asia-which it may never do-economic coopera-
tion among the lands of South Asia and the more highly in-
dustrialized of the British Commonwealth nations, together 
with the United States, already exists under the Colombo Plan, 
which originated at a meeting of the Commonwealth foreign 
ministers in the capital of Ceylon in January, 1950. The ob-
jective of the Colombo Plan is "to raise the standard of living 
by accelerating the pace and widening the scope of economic 
development in the countries of South and Southeast Asia by 
a cooperative approach to their problems, with special emphasis 
on the production of food." The members of the Colombo 
Plan today include Burma, Indonesia, Malaya, Vietnam, Laos, 
Cambodia, India, Pakistan, and Ceylon as well as the United 
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United 
States. 
BACKGROUND OF PAN-ASIAN SENTIMENTS 
In the years since the Second World War the lands of Southeast 
Asia, quite clearly, have shown considerably more interest in 
all-Asian and South Asian regionalism than they have in pro-
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posals for closer relations among themselves. No true Asian 
political bloc can be said to have emerged during these years, 
however. General Aung San never got beyond the overture 
stage of his proposed regional grouping before his untimely 
death, the Thai and Philippine conference attempts of 1949 
and 1950 were unqualified failures, and Indonesian indifference 
to closer regional relations could hardly be less encouraging. 
On the other hand, all the Southeast Asian lands did attend 
the Asian Relations Conference of 194 7, all except excluded 
Vietnam were on hand for the Indonesian Conference in 1949, 
and all turned out for the 1955 Bandung meeting. The Philip-
pines has shown great interest in a Pacific pact, although other 
lands, like Burma, have had doubts about both the timing and 
membership of such an alignment. Burma and Indonesia 
possess high regard for the Colombo Powers grouping, and the 
Socialists of these two lands are ardent in their support of the 
young Asian Socialist Organization. Colombo Plan member-
ship also has proved inviting to the Southeast Asian countries. 
Why have the Southeast Asian nations displayed so much 
more enthusiasm for South Asian and Asia-wide alignments 
than for closer ties among themselves? A partial explanation is 
to be found in the related factors of the large respect they have 
for their bigger Asian neighbors, particularly India under 
Nehru's leadership, and the little respect they hold for one 
another. A good part of the mechanics of the several Southeast 
Asian nationalist movements was modeled after the example of 
the Congress party in India. It is natural that these countries 
should continue to look to India for leadership after independ-
ence was attained, and they have been encouraged by Nehru's 
bid, sometimes revealed more strongly than at other times, 
to lead the way in foreign policy for the several lands of this 
part of the world. 
Allied with this has been the low regard most of the South-
east Asian political leaders have had for their comparatively 
powerless neighbors within the region. To Indonesian foreign-
policy makers the Thai are a fickle people who bend with the 
wind, as illustrated by their alliances under Phibun's leader-
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ship, first with Japan and now with Japan's recent enemy, the 
United States; the Thai scratch their heads in bewilderment 
at an Indonesian leadership under Ali Sastroamidjojo which 
is in tacit alliance at home with Communists, who seek the 
ultimate destruction of Indonesian independence; the Burmese 
think of the Philippines as a country of hardly any consequence 
in the world of power politics; and the Filipinos regard the 
Burmese as sitting on top of a powder keg, with a variety of 
potentially explosive dissident groups. 
The belief that all, or almost all, of history's wars have 
started in Europe, or have been started by Europeans, also has 
influenced the approach of Southeast Asia's leaders to the 
subject of pan-Asianism. A number of these lands are neutralist 
in their foreign-policy outlook-that is, they refuse to be 
drawn into either camp in the worldwide cold war. The 
feeling of a number of leaders is that they should all draw 
together and form a single Asian neutralist bloc. There is a 
feeling that all Asians are peace loving, or at least moderately 
so, and this has served to draw Burma and Indonesia, particu-
larly, toward a larger all-Asian alignment, especially since two 
of their Southeast Asian neighbors, the Philippines and Thai-
land, are possessed of nonneutral points of view, making alli-
ance with them rather difficult in the circumstances. 
Finally, the sense of Asian solidarity derives considerable 
impetus from the fact that all of the lands of Asia were at 
least partially subjected to the yoke of Western political, eco-
nomic, or cultural imperialism. Each of the present nationalist 
governments owes a major part of its backing to its anti-vVestern 
outlook. This is one of the reasons why the Southeast Asian 
lands of Indonesia and Burma have been as tolerant as they 
have of the conduct of Communist China. There is a feeling 
of kinship with Peiping, because these countries and China all 
represent facets of a successful continentwide revolution against 
Western domination. In a sense all are members of the same 
family, and in a family of this sort, as in families of individuals, 
the faults of the members are often glossed over, but the dis-
liked next-door neighbor can hardly ever do anything worthy 
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of commendation. China, Indonesia, Burma, and India are to 
be compared with members of a family, and the role of the 
suspicion-provoking neighbor is played by the recently im-
perial West. 
GLOBAL OUTLOOK OF THE NEW NATIONS 
It should not be thought, however, that the international rela-
tions of Southeast Asia are limited to relations with other Asian 
countries. Nothing could be more distant from the truth. 
Besides thinking in Asia-wide terms, the foreign-policy archi-
tects of Southeast Asia also have a distinctly global outlook, 
limited though it may be in many respects as a result of the 
long era of enforced isolation. 
The allegiance which these lands give to the United Nations 
as a focal point of their foreign policies is one example of this 
outlook. Indonesia and Thailand may disagree drastically on 
various aspects of their foreign policies, but both these foreign 
policies have cooperation with the rest of the world's nations 
within the United Nations as one of their major objectives. 
Burma, too, has strongly backed the United Nations, as wit-
nessed by its moral support of the police action in Korea, and 
the Philippines has similarly oriented its foreign policy with 
an eye toward closer cooperation at New York. Membership 
in the United Nations gives these young countries a position 
on the world stage out of all proportion to their economic and 
military power, thereby bolstering the national ego. At one 
and the same time it satisfies nationalist emotions and gives 
the foreign policies of these countries a distinctly global out-
look. There is, therefore, no conflict between their internation-
alism and their nationalism-the former in many ways feeds 
the latter. 
The general acquiesence of most of the Southeast Asian 
countries in the decisions of the so-called Arab-Asian bloc, 
functioning outside as well as within the United Nations, is still 
another example of the global outlook of these lands. The 
sponsorship of Indonesia and Burma, together with the other 
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Colombo Powers, of the April, 1955, Bandung Conference, as 
well as the participation of other states of the region in it, is 
an instance of the importance these countries place on good 
relations among the peoples of the Asian lands. Several South-
east Asian nations also are members of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, and countries 
like Burma and the Philippines have reaped considerable bene-
fits from this association. Moreover, each of the lands of this 
part of the world has associated itself with many of the spe-
cialized international agencies, such as the World Health Or-
ganization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the 
International Labor Organization. 
Indonesia, in addition, has interested itself very much in 
the other Moslem countries, as have certain Malay elements in 
Malaya. Malaya, furthermore, through its imperial ruler, the 
United Kingdom, is a member of the A.N.Z.A.M. strategic unit, 
together with Australia and New Zealand. Military, mutual 
defense, and economic agreements still tie the Philippines very 
much to the United States, and Indochina has yet to escape 
completely from the vestiges of French colonial rule. The 
Viet Minh in Vietnam clearly is a member of the Sino-Soviet 
bloc, thus determining the approach of its foreign policy to 
the rest of the world. 
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE COLD WAR 
It should be apparent from the foregoing analysis that the 
foreign policies of the several Southeast Asian states are alike 
in their approach to closer regional political collaboration in 
that they do not, for the most part, favor a regional link among 
themselves. These several foreign policies also resemble one 
another with respect to relations with other Asian lands. Each 
is premised on some vague kind of kinship with the peoples of 
the rest of Asia-and, Vietnam excluded, each looks to India 
to some degree for foreign-policy leadership, although there is 
considerably less unanimity concerning the proper attitude 
toward Communist China. Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Indochina all seek, or have sought at some time 
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in the postwar years, closer relationships with bigger, more 
powerful Asian states. The foreign policies of these several 
states have displayed their greatest differences-not in the realm 
of Asian relations-but in their approaches to the worldwide 
Russo-American cold war. 
The governments of the Philippines and Thailand have 
aligned themselves with the United States in its effort to con-
tain Communism within its present confines. These two 
countries were among the charter signatories of the American-
sponsored Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, organized at 
the September, 1954, Manila Conference. Malaya, through its 
colonial ruler, the United Kingdom, also is covered by this 
defense alliance, although there was a considerable amount of 
initial opposition to the pact in Malaya. When Malaya does 
attain its independence and becomes a member of the British 
Commonwealth, which it is scheduled to do on August 31, 
1957, it will enter a mutual defense pact with the United King-
dom. Under such a treaty the United Kingdom would have 
the right to station the Commonwealth strategic reserve in the 
Far East in Malaya and would provide British troops to help 
Malayan forces fight the Communists in the peninsula's con-
tinuing insurrection. A bloc led by Senator Claro M. Recto 
in the Philippines also has opposed the treaty, as does the pro-
Peiping Thai politician Pridi Banomyong, the former premier 
now attempting, from the soil of Communist China, to rally 
dissident elements in Thailand. 
At the other end of the spectrum from the Philippines and 
Thailand is the Viet Minh, ruler of north Vietnam by the 
Geneva agreement, which, as a member of the international 
Communist coalition, violently attacks the United States, al-
leged successor to the European colonial powers, as Southeast 
Asia's foremost enemy. 
Between these two extremes are to be found Indonesia and 
Burma. The Indonesians, suspicious of almost all of the 
outside world, are trying to walk a tightrope with few parallels 
in recent history; theirs is a policy of "active independence" 
in the cold war, this being defined by the Indonesian foreign 
office as a "positive approach of noninvolvement." As a con-
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sequence of this policy of neutrality, Djakarta has been cautious 
concerning American economic assistance because it might 
commit Indonesia to the side of the United States in its oppo-
sition to the Communists. Because China is a copartner in the 
great Asian revolution against vVestern dominance, however, 
the Indonesians have frequently watered down their so-called 
neutrality when Peiping has been involved. The Indonesian gov-
ernment of Ali Sastroamidjojo, for example, did not question 
the listing of China's Mao Tse-tung as an honorary chairman 
of the country's Communist party, although in the words of 
dynamic speechmaking President Sukarno, at least, the United 
States is a "liberal imperialist" nation seeking to interfere in 
other countries' affairs. 
Burma likewise espouses neutrality, but this would appear 
to be a bit more neutral "neutrality" than Indonesia's, despite 
the somewhat pro-Soviet joint statements issued by then Bur-
mese Premier U Nu and Soviet Premier Bulganin in Moscow 
and Rangoon in 1955. Burma seems to fear Communist China 
more than it sympathizes with it. A David-sized state in com-
parison with giant China, with which it shares a disputed 
border, Burma-which has been afflicted with a variety of 
uprisings at home-would like to avoid involvement in the 
cold war at almost all costs. There are some indications, how-
ever, that it realizes that involvement eventually may be neces-
sary. Ideologically, the Burmese would seem to incline toward 
the West; economically, however, Burma's several rice barter 
pacts with the Communist countries have drawn it dangerously 
close to dependence on the Sino-Soviet bloc. 
In all the countries of Southeast Asia there is considerable 
suspicion of both the Soviet Union and the United States. A 
good part of this suspicion stems, not unnaturally, from the 
efforts of both powers to build up blocs in support of them-
selves throughout the world. The element of right may be 
on the side of the United States in its cold-war struggle with 
the Soviet Union, but the American policy of seeking out alli-
ances with like-minded powers has not always been differenti-
ated by Southeast Asia's leaders from the more sinister policies 
of the Russians. The American search for allies has often been 
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misunderstood, whether a country is receptive to it, as the 
Philippines is, or whether it turns a cold shoulder to it, as 
Burma does. One thing is certain about Southeast Asians: 
they have no desire to be pawns in Soviet-American political 
maneuvering. Even a state like Thailand, in alliance with the 
United States, asks a big enough price for its support to dis-
qualify a description of it as a simple pawn-as the U.S.S.R. 
describes it. 
Of the two states, the Soviet Union is clearly the less trusted 
and the more feared, even though this fear is not always openly 
declared. Many Southeast Asians admire its economic accom-
plishments, but resent its efforts to interfere in their internal 
affairs through the medium of the Moscow-coached local Com-
munist party. 
China's position differs considerably from that of the U.S.S.R. 
It is recognized as a partner in the Soviet imperialist camp at 
the same time as it is admired as a coarchitect of the Asian 
revolution. This dichotomy confuses some Southeast Asian 
political leaders and partially explains their wavering in the 
shadow of a potential Chinese Communist thrust south. 
The close relations of Indonesia and Burma with India are 
a consequence of three factors primarily: traditional Indian 
leadership of Asia's fight to rid itself of colonialism, geography, 
and the fact that Indian foreign policy seems so sensible in the 
eyes of the leaders of present-day Burma and Indonesia. For 
Burma and Indonesia to be neutral all by themselves would 
require considerable strength and conviction. It is much easier 
for these countries to be neutral in the company of a large 
India. Burmese and Indonesian relations with India are based 
both on a genuine affinity of foreign-policy outlook and a 
gratitude that there is an India to lead the way along an 
admittedly precarious path. 
Japan's relations with Southeast Asia are colored both by the 
experiences of the war years and Tokyo's ties with the United 
States. Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia appear much more 
willing to normalize relations with former conqueror Japan 
than do the Filipinos or the Indonesians. The fact that the 
Philippines, a close ally of the United States, and neutralist 
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Indonesia have been reluctant to regularize completely their 
relations with Japan, while neutral Burma and pro-American 
Thailand have done so, would seem to indicate that cold-war 
considerations are secondary to the memories of the Second 
World War. 
Relations with the former imperial powers also differ among 
Southeast Asian countries. American-Filipino relations are 
genuinely cordial, while Indonesian resentment against the 
Dutch is very strong, particularly in light of the still unsettled 
West New Guinea controversy. The Burmese and the British 
remain on good terms, although they are not as close as Wash-
ington and Manila. The French, ousted from Indochina, are 
generally despised by their former colonial subjects. 
GREAT POWER INTEREST IN THE REGION 
Traditionally, China has held a position of suzerainty over 
much of the area, the Chinese regarding Southeast Asia as a 
proper outlet for their expansive tendencies. It is significant 
that no strong power has ever arisen in the region when there 
also was a strong China. The old Southeast Asian empires of 
Funan, Kambuja, Srivijaya, and Majapahit all achieved the 
zenith of their achievements when their strong northern neigh-
bor's strength was at a low ebb. Moreover, on at least two 
occasions in the past the establishment of a new regime in 
China has meant trouble for the states along China's southern 
border. Such was the case when the Mongols came to power-
so also was it in the early years of Ming rule. Mao Tse-tung's 
passionate espousal of the "rights and interests" of the Chinese 
living abroad, Communist China's policy toward minorities 
along its southern border (as evidenced by its "Thai Autono-
mous People's Government"), and Chinese leadership of Far 
Eastern Communism in general clearly indicate the possibility 
that still another new Chinese regime may begin its reign with 
an exhibit of expansionist tendencies. A participant in the 
Viet Minh's colonial-civil war with the French and anti-Com-
munist elements in Vietnam, the Chinese Communists also 
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have actively interfered in the area through their contacts with 
the overseas Chinese resident in the region. 
Chinese Communist policy toward Southeast Asia has seemed 
to comprise three elements: economic, military, and political. 
One of the most significant developments in the Far East in 
1956 was the emergence of the Chinese Communists as active 
participants in the sharpening trade-and-aid contest between 
the United States and the Soviet bloc in South and Southeast 
Asia. In May, 1956, Prince N orodom Sihanouk of Cambodia 
announced that his country would receive economic assistance 
from Peiping totaling $22,400,000. There also were reports 
that China was pressuring Laos to accept economic help from 
its big northern neighbor, and the Communist regime in north 
Vietnam had been receiving significant financial, material, and 
technical help from the Peiping government since its emergence 
in 1954. In addition to extending such aid, the Communist 
Chinese also have sought to expand their trade ties with the 
countries of Southeast Asia. Indicative of the success which has 
met Peiping's efforts was the announcement in the fall of 1956 
that Communist China had made its first purchase of rubber 
from the British crown colony of Singapore since 1 950-a 
purchase which amounted to more than two million American 
dollars. 
The Chinese Communist military threat to Southeast Asia 
has been an ever-present one. In 1956 United States military 
officials in the Philippines estimated that Communist China 
then had about a 2,500,000-man army south of the Yangtse 
River, where it could readily be used against the Southeast 
Asian countries. Some military units were used against a 
Southeast Asian state, Burma, although both the Burmese and 
Chinese governments strongly denied that their border difficul-
ties (which received considerable publicity in the summer of 
I 956) involved either an explicit or implicit military threat. 
But China's military strength and Burma's physical weakness 
unquestionably were major factors in both countries' thinking 
on the subject of the border question. 
Peiping did not confine itself to economic and military 
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weapons. Politically, the Communist Chinese leadership seemed 
not to let up in its efforts to persuade, enchant, deceive, and 
intimidate both the rulers and the ruled of Southeast Asia. 
The triumphant return of Chou En-lai from the Geneva Con-
ference on Indochina in the summer of 1954 was the occasion 
for the unveiling of the now famous "five principles" of peace-
ful coexistence. Chou, in both his 1955 appearance at the 
Bandung Conference and his 1956 visit to several of the lands 
of South and Southeast Asia, sought to win friends and dispel 
doubts as to Peiping's designs for domination. Throughout 
1955 and 1956 red carpet after red carpet was laid down in 
Peiping for the seemingly endless processions of political, eco-
nomic, and cultural delegations which journeyed from South-
east Asia to enjoy the ego-flattering receptions for which Mao 
Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and comrades were justly famous. Only 
too many of these visitors seemed not to realize that there might 
some day be an hour of payment for the hospitality of the 
brief present hour. Few seemed aware of Peiping's intentions 
to assert the territorial and political claims of the traditional 
Chinese state. 
The visit of Communist China's Chou En-lai to Southeast 
Asia in late 1956 provided additional evidence of Peiping's 
continuing concern for the state of its relations with the 
countries of this region. Chou visited Cambodia and Burma, 
in addition to Communist north Vietnam and the South Asian 
lands of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Ceylon. Indicative 
of the importance China attached to relations with Southeast 
Asia was the fact that Chou, busy premier and foreign minister 
of the world's largest national population, spent nearly a week 
in tiny Cambodia. In Cambodia, Chou strove to portray the 
Chinese and the Cambodians as equals. Chou seemed to be 
seeking to show the rest of Asia how well giant China could 
get along with its neighbors, big or small, neutralist, or even 
pro-West. This was an impression Chou also tried to create 
in Pakistan (a charter member of the anti-Communist South-
east Asian Treaty Organization) as well as in other countries 
he visited. In Cambodia, too, Chou asked that country's Chi-
nese minority of 250,000 to observe rigorously the laws of the 
International Relations 275 
kingdom and "to abstain from carrying on political activities." 
Chou met with criticism and challenges at several points on 
his late 1956 tour of Southeast Asia. Student placards in 
Burma's capital, Rangoon, proclaimed to the Chinese leader: 
"We greet you-with tears." In Cambodia, Prince Norodom 
Sihanouk, the leading political figure in that former French 
colony, told Chou that "noninterference" in the affairs of other 
nations was "the key to world peace." There was, quite clearly, 
a shift in sentiment in Southeast Asia in 1956 concerning 
Communist China. How strong a shift this was or how per-
manent it would be was not clear. The reasons for this shift 
were twofold: Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolt in 
the fall of 1956, which Chou endorsed; and the Sino-Burmese 
border controversy, which some Asians at least felt revealed 
the Peiping regime in its true light as an imperialist power. 
Other Asians, however-like the Ceylonese-drew closer to 
Peiping as a result of Chou's tour. Chou and Ceylon's premier 
signed on February 5, 1957, a pact of "peaceful cooperation 
and resistance against aggression and expansion of the im-
perialist and colonial forces." 
Southeast Asia's other large neighbor, India, also shows 
expansionist tendencies at the present time, as the large colonies 
of Indians in East Africa as well as Southeast Asia attest. "I 
am not thinking in terms of India as the leader of Southeast 
Asia or dominating the region," Prime Minister Nehru has 
said. But he also has declared that "in the modern world it 
is inevitable for India to be the center of the affairs of Asia, 
and in that term I include Australia and New Zealand and even 
Eastern Africa." India clearly is a much interested power in 
what takes place in Southeast Asia-as evidenced, for example, 
by its cease-fire proposals for Indochina in the spring of 1954 
and its subsequent chairmanship of the three-power team to 
watch against violations of the 1954 Geneva agreement in Viet-
nam. It was India, after all, which convened the unofficial Asian 
Relations Conference of 194 7 and the official Indonesian Con-
ference in 1949. New Delhi, moreover, has long been recog-
nized as a leader of the so-called Arab-Asian bloc. 
The United States and the Soviet Union, the two leading 
276 Southeast Asia 
powers in the great global cold war, also are vitally interested 
in this part of the world. In addition to the links it retains 
with the Philippines, America has developed close relations 
with Thailand in the post-Second World vVar years. Its ec-
nomic and military aid programs, operative to different degrees 
in various lands of the area, are a clear indication of American 
interest in Southeast Asia-as was the backing given France by 
the United States in the former's fight against Communism in 
Vietnam. That American concern for Vietnam has not lessened 
since the signing of the Geneva agreements in July, 1954, is 
evidenced by continuing United States political and financial 
backing of the anti-Communist south Vietnamese regime of 
Ngo Dinh Diem. Moreover, it is Washington which is today 
the most prominent advocate of a collective security system in 
Southeast Asia and the western Pacific. The United States, 
content to leave the fate of Southeast Asia to other parties in 
the early postwar years, is today keenly awake to the strategic 
and economic worth of this part of the world, as its post-1950 
policy toward the area has indicated. 8 
Russia, too, is very much concerned with happenings in 
Southeast Asia, although it has taken no known direct role in 
subversive activity in the area since the Calcutta conference 
of Southeast Asian Communists in February, 1948, which 
touched off a wave of revolts throughout the region. The 
Soviet Union has continued to be the capital of conspiratorial 
international Communism, however, and a material and moral 
supporter of Communist China. The Soviets' interest in the 
region has been no less because their political partner has 
acted in their behalf. 
If the Soviet Union has come to lean less conspicuously on 
subversive activities as a means of increasing its influence in 
Southeast Asia, this is because it now believes other methods 
may better achieve its aims. Its current tactic may best be 
termed a "fTiendship offensive" in its political phase and 
"peaceful competitive coexistence" in its economic aspect. The 
exchange of visits between then Burmese Premier U Nu and 
8 American foreign policy in Southeast Asia is treated in detail in the next 
chapter. 
International Relations 277 
Soviet leaders Nikolai A. Bulganin and Nikita S. Khrushchev 
in 1955 was an example of Moscow's new diplomatic offensive. 
Bulganin and Khrushchev also visited India and Afghanistan 
in 1955 as part of the same attempt to win friends for the 
Soviet Union in important Asian lands. The successful efforts 
of the Soviet Union and its allies to increase economic ties with 
various of the South and Southeast Asian countries, especially 
through the medium of barter agreements, is another instance 
of the "new look" in Soviet Asian policy. Burma by mid 1956 
was sending more than a quarter of its exports to Sino-Soviet 
bloc countries, and Indonesia in September, 1956, revealed 
the details of a sizable economic and technical aid agreement 
with the U.S.S.R. Under this agreement the Soviets promised 
to grant $100,000,000 worth of credit to Indonesia in the form 
of capital goods, machinery, and heavy industrial equipment. 
Moscow also offered to cooperate with Indonesia on the peace-
ful uses of atomic energy, with the Soviets promising to train 
Indonesian technicians in nuclear research. As result of the 
Soviet-Indonesian loan agreement, which followed by only one 
month a trade pact between the two countries, the Indonesians 
probably will have to purchase spare parts and replacements 
from the U.S.S.R. for many years to come. 
The 1955 visit of Soviet leaders Bulganin and Khrushchev 
to South and Southeast Asia took place against the background 
of a change in Soviet policy in the world at large. By its 
tactics at the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference in October, 
1955, the U.S.S.R. gave indication that it had been brought 
to the point of acceptance of the status quo in Europe, at least 
temporarily. In 1948, following the strengthening of the West-
ern position in Europe, the Soviet Union had turned its atten-
tion to Asia, where it helped kick off the several Southeast 
Asian Communist revolts which broke out in that year while 
also assisting in the rise of Communism to power in China. 
In 1955, as in 1948, the Soviets turned their eyes eastward as 
a consequence of a European stalemate and the prospect of 
more valuable advances in Asia. 
The political-military vacuum which had resulted in South 
and Southeast Asia from the withdrawal of the Western colon-
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ial powers was an obvious temptation to the imperialistically 
inclined Soviet Union. Southeast Asia also was an area where 
there was a stronger likelihood of success than in Japan or the 
European nations, which could hardly be called political 
vacuums in 1955 and which were, moreover, strongly com-
mitted to the side of the United States in the great cold war. 
By the inauguration of its friendship offensive in South and 
Southeast Asia in 1955 the Soviet Union sought to take ad-
vantage of the decline of Western power and influence in this 
part of the world. It also sought to utilize the large body of 
neutralist nationalist sentiment which flowered in many vital 
areas along the onetime strong British defense arc from Suez 
to Singapore. The Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to Burma, India, 
and Afghanistan was the curtain raiser of this offensive. A 
later act in the same important drama was the wooing of the 
key Middle Eastern nations of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. 
The Southeast Asians were at one end of the old British defense 
arc, the Arabs at the other. Soviet policy was essentially the 
same toward both areas-as it was toward India, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and Ceylon, lying between the widely separated 
fronts of Southeast Asia and the Middle East. 
The Soviet Union was only partly leading from a position 
of strength. If the Western position in South and Southeast 
Asia in 1955 was but a shadow of what it had been in the 
1930's, it was in many respects better in 1955 than it had been 
in 1948. Likewise, in the Middle East the West stood in a 
far stronger position in 1955 as a consequence of the establish-
ment of the Baghdad Pact-designed to protect the so-called 
"northern tier" against Soviet aggression and including as 
members Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and the United King-
dom-than it had three years earlier when the Iranian oil 
nationalization problem was occupying world attention and 
the Egyptians were agitating for the removal of British troops 
from the Suez Canal zone. Although the deficiencies of the 
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization loom largest in Western 
eyes perhaps, to the Soviets the mere establishment of such 
an organization, however limited in its infant stage, was a 
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significant setback. Moscow's change in tactics in 1955 to a 
wholesale wooing of the neutral nations of South and Southeast 
Asia (as well as of the Middle East) may be regarded as partly 
an effort to consolidate Asian neutralist opinion to offset the 
gains of the West-potential as well as actual-embodied in 
the establishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization 
and the Baghdad Pact. The aim of the Soviets was a neutral 
bloc of nations, stretching from Suez to Singapore and includ-
ing Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India, Afghanistan, Burma, and Indo-
nesia (among other states). The Soviets sought to establish 
an arc of neutralist countries where once stood, in proud con-
fidence, the British Empire South Asian defense arc. Although 
Moscow had not attained its goal in late 1956, partially as a 
consequence of its repressive action against freedom-seeking 
Hungary in the fall of that year, the Soviets are not known to 
give up easily and may be expected to continue their efforts 
to neutralize key Asian areas-to the psychological and strategic 
disadvantage of the West. There were indications in late 1956 
that the U.S.S.R. was closer to a victory in the Middle East than 
it was in Southeast Asia. Leaders of the Asian Socialist Con-
ference, which met in India in early November, stated strongly 
their objections to collaboration with the Communists through 
the medium of so-called "united front" governments. That 
the Soviets were meeting with at least limited success in South-
east Asia, however, was indicated by Indonesia's strong con-
demnation of the Anglo-French military action against Egypt, 
following Israel's attack on that Middle East nation, and the 
Indonesian foreign office's tardy disapproval of the Soviet 
invasion of Hungary. 
The South and Southeast Asian policy of the U.S.S.R. does 
not conflict with the long-term Communist goal of the estab-
lishment of the Soviet order throughout the world. It is, indeed, 
merely a means toward the attainment of that end. The Soviet 
Union is well aware that it is not possible to bring such nations 
as India, Burma, and Indonesia into the Communist camp at 
the present time. It is willing, therefore, to shift its efforts to 
the accomplishment of a more possible objective, the neutral-
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ization of the ring of nations which stretches from Suez to 
Singapore. Its ultimate aim of Communist conquest has not 
changed, however. Its short-term policy has merely been 
brought into line with political realities. 
Some observers in late 1956 felt that the U.S.S.R. was aban-
doning the "friendship offensive" policy of Bulganin and Khru-
shchev to return to hard-line Stalinist policies. Cited as evi-
dence were the repressive Soviet moves in Hungary and the 
repeated threats of Soviet military intervention in the Middle 
East. Such a change may be in the process of taking place, but 
it is more likely that the developments in Soviet foreign policy 
in late 1956 represented fewer changes than suggested by some 
observers. Certainly the Soviet's espousal of the Arab cause 
against the Anglo-French and Israeli military actions was most 
consistent with Moscow's policy of seeking Arab friendship. 
The anti-Soviet and anti-Communist rebellion in Hungary, 
moreover, served to underscore the slim prospects for new gains 
in Europe for the Soviet Union. The Hungarian affair, if 
fully appreciated by the Soviet leadership, pointed a finger at 
other areas of the world as the regions in which the U.S.S.R. 
should seek to register further advances. Soviet policy in the 
Middle East, therefore, was most intimately tied to develop-
ments in eastern Europe. Southeast Asia also would seem to 
qualify for new Soviet attention in the months and years ahead. 
An increase, rather than a reduction, in Soviet activity regard-
ing Southeast Asia should be expected. World opinion having 
been so opposed to the Soviet moves in Hungary, it would also 
seem that the Soviets will seek, as quickly and cleverly as pos-
sible, to replace the image of Russian tanks in Budapest with 
new pictures of the so-called "happiness twins"-Bulganin and 
Khrushchev-doling out smiles to the peoples of the backward 
Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. 
Although postwar attention has focused on the relations of 
India, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States with 
Southeast Asia, the strong probability of future closer relations 
between Japan and the countries of this region should not be 
overlooked. Japan remains Asia's most advanced industrial 
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power, and the economic problems which partly prompted 
Japanese expansionism in the 1930's and 1940's have worsened, 
rather than lessened, in recent years. In the thirties Japan 
made a tremendous impact on the economies of the Southeast 
Asian lands with its cheap manufactured goods; its seizure of 
the region in 1940-1942 was partly to acquire the vast raw 
material resources of the area. There is nothing to indicate 
that Japan is less interested in Southeast Asia today than it 
was in the thirties and forties. 
Japan's role in Southeast Asia has grown steadily in the 
last few years. The Burmese, for example, have shown them-
selves most pleased with machinery received under the repara-
tions agreement with Japan and with the technical experts 
who have come to Burma to assist in the use of this machinery. 
Burma, in need of help with its several development plans, 
has shown increasing interest in obtaining Japanese coopera-
tion in the fulfillment of these projects. The Japanese, for 
their part, are interested in renewing their influence in Burma 
as well as Indonesia, Thailand, Indochina, and the Philippines 
-for political as well as economic reasons. 
Britain's interest in the region is declining, creating new 
problems. With the withdrawal of the British from Malaya 
scheduled for August, 1957, there is increasingly strong feeling 
for greater self-government in adjacent Singapore, too. A 
thoroughgoing redefinition of that colony's status (including 
steps toward independence) is likely before 1960. The big 
question in Singapore's future concerns its predominantly Chi-
nese population, who incline increasingly toward support of 
the Peiping government of the Communist Mao Tse-tung. If 
the British leave Singapore, the Chinese Communists are likely 
to succeed them (in actual fact if not in name) . Neither the 
British nor the United States desire such a development, but 
it is not yet clear what they plan to do to prevent it. 
Since anticolonialism has swept almost all of the rest of 
Asia, it also may be expected to visit the three British posses-
sions on the island of Borneo: Sarawak, Brunei, and North 
Borneo. Philippine Moslem inhabitants of the southern island 
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of Mindanao took advantage of the visit of North Borneo's 
governor to Manila in January, 1957, to renew their agitation 
for the session of the British crown colony of North Borneo 
to the Philippines. If the British do give up their present 
holdings in northern Borneo, which seems unlikely in the 
immediate future, such Filipino claims to all or part of this 
area undoubtedly will meet with opposition from Indonesia, 
which rules the greater part of the large island of Borneo. This 
could lead to new intraregional bad feeling. 
Other nations also have played significant roles in the inter-
national relations of Southeast Asia. Australia was a champion 
of Indonesian independence in the second half of the 1940's, 
and in the 1950's it sent troops to Malaya to help the British 
repress the Communist rebellion in that territory. Egypt, even 
before the Suez crisis strengthened the great bond of anti-
colonialism between the Middle East and Southeast Asia, had 
embarked upon a policy of strengthening its relations with the 
nations of the Far East. Not only did Egypt recognize Com-
munist China, but it also was reported on the eve of the Suez 
crisis to be about to expand its diplomatic missions in Burma 
and Indonesia and to press for diplomatic ties with Cambodia, 
Laos, and Vietnam. Both Yugoslavia and Israel have been 
exceptionally active in seeking out Burma's friendship in the 
years since that ancient Buddhist country regained its inde-
pendence from the British. 
A political "low pressure" area historically, as noted in the 
opening chapter of this survey, Southeast Asia today would 
seem to have a major task before it if it is to avoid falling once 
more under foreign control. A power vacuum as a consequence 
of the withdrawal of the Western colonial powers, the region 
seems unable to invoke at the present time the sort of unity 
which might prevent outside interference. It ignores closer 
regional collaboration, preferring to seek the protection of 
bigger powers-which well may prove to be the key to its 
survival as an area of independent states, but which also could 
be the beginning of a new era of external domination. 
The problems facing Southeast Asia in the realm of inter-
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national relations today are obviously immense. It is regrettable 
that many of the leaders of these lands are not better prepared 
to meet them. This is one of the most unfortunate legacies 
of the colonial period-one which may prove decisively fateful 
to the Western cause in its conflict with the Communist con-
spiracy. 
CHAPTER 9 
AMERICAN POLICY IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
THE UNITED STATES has had responsibilities in Southeast Asia 
since 1899, when it acquired sovereignty over the Philippine 
Islands, but American interest in the region as a whole re-
mained slight until the eve of Pearl Harbor. The amount of 
American capital invested in the region was small. Senator 
Albert Beveridge, in 1899, predicted that Americans would 
swarm to the Philippines and American capital would flow to 
the newly acquired dependency in an ever-swelling stream, but 
this did not happen. The total amount of American invest-
ments in the region in 1941 was estimated to be $325,000,000, 
or only about 2 percent of the total of American foreign 
investments at the time. It is probably less than that today. 
The value of American trade with the region was more sig-
nificant, due in large part to the I 00 percent preferential tariff 
policy instituted by the United States in the Philippines in 
favor of its own trade, as a result of which about three-fourths 
of the external trade of the islands was artificially channeled 
to the United States. 
As a great industrial and military power, the United States 
has an interest in the region because it is an important source 
of strategic materials. Southeast Asia produces two-thirds of 
the world's tin and over 75 percent of its natural rubber. While 
its output of oil is not large in terms of total world production, 
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it is nevertheless of great strategic importance because so little 
oil is produced in South or Eastern Asia. In 1954 Free Asia 
(which for these particular commodities meant chiefly South-
east Asia) supplied the United States with 99 percent of its 
imports of copra, 91 percent of its natural rubber, 67 percent 
of its Manila hemp, 61 percent of its spices, and 58 percent of 
its tin. The loss of these supplies of strategic materials to the 
West would be serious but probably not irreparable. But 
free access to them by Communist countries would greatly 
strengthen the Red orbit. Before the war, the region also pro-
duced 65 percent of the world's copra, 40 percent of its palm 
oil, 85 percent of its pepper, 90 percent of its quinine, and 
70 percent of its kapok. Burma, Indochina, and Thailand are 
also capable of producing tremendous quantities of rice. Con-
trol of this surplus of the basic food of most Asians would 
greatly strengthen Communist economic and political power. 
The strategic importance of the region is great, if for no 
other reason than the extent of its area and the size of its 
population. The region covers some 1,650,000 square miles of 
land spread over a large section of the globe, with a population 
of about 175,000,000. Half continental and half peninsular 
and insular, it lies astride the great trade routes of the eastern 
world. The strategic importance of the region, and of Indo-
china in particular, became painfully apparent in the Second 
World War. Once in Indochina, Japan was in a position to 
overrun Southeast Asia almost at will, and to threaten Australia 
and India. Today Communism has a foothold in Indochina, 
backed by China, a great continental power, whose territory 
adjoins it. This is a situation far more alarming than that of 
1941. It is true that China's striking power is in some respects 
more limited than that of Japan. For example, it lacks naval 
power and is not yet as highly industrialized. But it possesses 
certain advantages, such as its geographic position contiguous 
to Southeast Asia, and in the nearly 10,000,000 Chinese living 
in the region, China has something Japan did not have. Among 
these millions of Chinese there is abundant material for the in-
filtration and subversion which Communists use so effectively. 
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Undoubtedly the region is of great importance in world 
politics; President Eisenhower in a press conference in March, 
1954, declared it to be of "transcendent importance." The free 
world cannot afford to have any more territory and people go 
over to the Communist world if the balance of power is to re-
main in its favor. The economic gain to the Communist bloc, 
and the corresponding loss to the free world, would be serious, if 
not disastrous, if this region should move into the Communist 
orbit. The psychological advantage to the Communist world 
would be great, for nothing succeeds like success. Communist 
control of Southeast Asia would strategically endanger our 
"defense perimeter," the offshore island chain which stretches 
from Japan to the Philippines. 
OBSTACLES TO AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 
Unfortunately Southeast Asia is a region in which American 
diplomacy faces numerous and difficult obstacles, especially in 
combating Communism. The entire region, with the exception 
of Thailand, was until recently subject to Western colonial 
rule. In the long struggle for independence there naturally 
developed a strong anti-Western feeling. The Philippines, 
Burma, Indonesia, and very recently, the peoples of Indochina, 
have acquired their independence, but the colonial issue is 
not yet dead. Malaya and Borneo remain under British rule, 
and Indonesia is bitterly contesting Dutch control over West 
New Guinea. Because American sentiment has been tradition-
ally anticolonial, the Southeast Asians expected outright sup-
port from the United States in their struggle for independence. 
Many Southeast Asian nationalists feel that American support 
of their cause was feeble and vacillating. 
There is among the peoples of the region a cultural reaction 
to Western penetration. This is quite evident from the revival 
of Buddhism in Burma and Thailand and the irreconcilable 
Darul Islam movement in Indonesia, which seeks by violence 
to establish a theocratic Islamic state. The collision of Western 
with Eastern culture has had an extremely disturbing effect 
on the minds and feelings of many of the Southeast Asians, 
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and has caused hostility not only towards Westerners but also 
tension between groups within countries. In addition to this 
there is the clash of the ideologies of communism and democ-
racy. All of this makes for hostility toward the Western world 
and for disunity within the nations. 
Another important factor in the situation is the presence of 
large alien population groups: between eight and ten million 
Chinese, a million or more Indians, a few hundred thousand 
Europeans, and a scattering of Arabs. These groups constitute 
a disturbing social factor because they control a large part of 
the economic life of the region, they are not easily assimilated, 
and they are, for the most part, nationals of large and powerful 
neighboring countries. Nearly every country in the region has 
passed legislation discriminating against these alien elements 
with the object of helping their indigenous nationals improve 
their economic position. 
Still another factor which must be noted is the low level 
of living in the region. Its total population is about 15 percent 
greater than that of the United States; its combined national 
income is only 3 percent of that of the American people. There 
are areas, such as Java, central Luzon, and the Red River Delta, 
where the population pressure is intense. The last named area 
has a "nutritional density" of 475 persons per square mile of 
cultivated rice land. ·wherever the population pressure is 
severe, there almost invariably is a center of grave social and 
political unrest. 
It is wholly understandable that people living under these 
conditions would ascribe their poverty to foreign exploitation. 
The presence of prosperous foreign enterprises and numerous 
affluent aliens in the midst of their poverty-stricken society 
seemed to point to but one explanation. To people in their 
condition, Marxism seemed to explain nearly everything. 
Moreover, the nationalist leaders found the Marxist theories 
useful in arousing resentment against foreign rule. In contrast 
with the nationalist revolutions in the West, which were 
middle-class movements, those in Southeast Asia (with the ex-
ception of the Philippines) are headed by intellectual proletar-
ians. The result is a strong socialistic inclination in all of these 
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countries, the phenomenon of weak governments attempting 
vast socialistic programs. In view of the political and administra-
tive inexperience of these peoples, it is surprising that the results 
have not been more disastrous. Though their leaders have 
unlearned and learned a great deal about economics, the sus-
picion of foreign capital is still strong. The political leaders 
of Southeast Asia regard the economics of their country as 
"colonial," and they are determined to make them national 
in as short a time as possible. This accounts in large part for 
their socialistic fervor. Important sectors of their economies 
are foreign owned. Moreover, the economic life of these coun-
tries is heavily dependent on the export of a few commodities. 
In 1954-1955 rice constituted 76 percent in value of the total 
exports of Burma, and in the other countries of the region 
the percentages of chief exports were as follows: Indonesia-
rubber, 38, petroleum, 25, tin, 7, and copra, 6; Philippines-
copra, 31, and sugar, 26; Thailand-rice, 33, and tin, 21; Malaya 
-rubber, 60, and tin, 23. 
Americans are often surprised and shocked that Asians are 
not repelled by the cruelties of Communism as we are. There 
are some explanations for the Asian attitude. Asians are not 
instinctively repelled by the cruelties of Communism because 
they live in the midst of malignant poverty, with its attendant 
suffering. Many of them have experienced nothing but suffer-
ing and have lived with it all their days. They are inured 
to it. Moreover, their religious systems have not tended to 
make them as sensitive to suffering as have the teachings of 
Christianity. Furthermore, Communist theory, however falla-
cious it may be, offers much that is attractive to Southeast 
Asians, and they are prepared to overlook some of the cruelties 
in practice. Communism offers a simple explanation of the 
causes of the plight of the colonial peoples through Lenin's 
theory of imperialism, the idea that poverty is not inevitable, 
the concept of a planned economy, and political techniques 
suitable for backward peoples.1 Moreover, Communist belief 
1 Max Mark, "Nationalism versus Communism in Southeast Asia," South-
western Social Science Quarterly, XXXIII (1952), 135-47. 
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in the inevitability of a proletarian victory seems to have a 
strong attraction for the Asian mind, which is intensely pre-
occupied with the idea of fate. 
The peoples of Southeast Asia were led by their nationalist 
leaders to believe that with independence their living condi-
tions would immediately improve. This has not happened. In 
general, the trend has been in the other direction; in some 
countries there has been serious deterioration. In Indonesia, in 
which is found half of the population of the region, the level of 
living is considerably below what it was in 1938. In spite of 
this deterioration, school attendance, and especially college 
enrollments, have boomed, pouring large numbers of intel-
lectuals into a market which can absorb very few of them. It 
is not surprising, therefore, to find young intellectuals turning 
in frustration to dictatorship and totalitarianism as the only 
solution to their difficult problem. 
In conclusion, it must be pointed out that there is little unity 
in Southeast Asia, either regionally or within the countries 
individually. Nearly every country has significant minorities, 
both religious and ethnic. In Malaya, where the native Moslem 
has become a minority in his native country, the divisions are 
sharp. It will take history a long time to merge the three 
leading communities of Malaya into a nation. Developments 
in Indonesia indicate rather clearly that the Dutch had not yet 
succeeded in molding the peoples of the myriads of islands into 
a real unity, for when the Dutch withdrew, the seeming unity 
of Indonesians fell apart. It is much the same regionally. The 
population of one state is predominantly Christian; that of 
another, Moslem; that of several, Buddhist; and Malaya has no 
majority for any one faith. Because they were ruled for long 
periods by different powers, these countries were drawn in 
different directions culturally. The absence of political and 
cultural unification enabled the Western powers to establish 
their control originally, and today the region is again a power 
vacuum. The colonial administrations have been replaced by 
weak, independent states, the economy of most of the region 
has deteriorated, the work of well-trained, experienced colonial 
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officials and able foreign entrepreneurs has been taken over by 
untrained, inexperienced natives. Social and civil unrest, insur-
rection and armed strife, and political ineptitude have rendered 
the region exceedingly vulnerable to direct and indirect Com-
munist aggression. Even if there were no threat of external 
aggression, the situation would be acute, for in several of these 
countries the forces of disintegration are strong. With their 
societies open to Communist infiltration and subversion, the 
situation is very serious. The region is utterly lacking in eco-
nomic and military power with which to defend itself, and 
what is worse from the vVestern point of view, it seems to lack 
the will to defend itself. Large sections of the population are 
not aware of the existence of the threat to their security. 
AMERICAN POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
With respect to American policy in Southeast Asia, a distinction 
must be made between our policy with respect to the Philip-
pines and our policy with respect to the rest of the region. Our 
Philippine policy was one of cultural and commercial assimila-
tion and a rapid preparation for self-government and independ-
ence.2 That these policies involved contradictions is apparent, 
and they have left some unsolved problems. The United States 
is pledged to defend the islands, and for this purpose it has 
been granted a number of military bases. Since the Philippine 
Islands are a part of Southeast Asia, the United States pledge 
to defend them gives it a strong interest in the defense of 
the region. 
Before Pearl Harbor the United States manifested little 
official interest in Southeast Asia apart from the Philippines. 
American imports of rubber and tin and a few other commodi-
ties of the region were considerable, which led our government 
to oppose schemes to restrict rubber and tin production. The 
United States also had a diplomatic controversy over access of 
American capital to the right of the exploitation of the oil 
resources of the Netherlands Indies. When in 1940 the Japa-
2 American-Philippine relations are discussed in Chapter 3. 
American Policy 291 
nese occupied Indochina and put severe pressure on the Dutch 
to make extensive commercial concessions, the United States 
became aroused and gave the countries with responsibilities 
in the region some diplomatic support in resisting Japanese 
demands. 
Little has yet been made public about American diplomacy 
with respect to the region in the Second ·world War. It is 
well known that President Roosevelt held strongly anticolonial 
views and that he was especially critical of French policy in 
Indochina. He apparently was strongly inclined to oppose the 
return of the dependency to French rule except as a trust 
territory under the proposed trusteeship system. Of the Dutch 
he was not so critical, probably for the reason that blood creeps 
where it cannot walk. 
The Netherlands Indies, exclusive of Sumatra, was included 
under General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area 
command. Dutch New Guinea became a base for the next leap 
northward, but beyond that, Morotai in the northern Moluccas 
and Tarakan and Balikpapan, the oil ports on the east coast 
of Borneo, were the only parts of the Nether lands Indies re-
captured by the forces of this command. General MacArthur 
had proposed, immediately after the Borneo campaign, to move 
on to Java "and restore the Dutch Government under Van 
Mook, which would have rapidly brought law and order there 
as it had done in New Guinea." This plan for a further thrust 
into Java was, according to General MacArthur, "for some 
reason never understood, peremptorily called off and forbidden 
from Washington, in spite of my insistence of its complete 
success with little loss." MacArthur further declared that the 
cancellation of this movement "was one of the grave mistakes 
of the war and ultimately resulted in the chaotic conditions 
which followed in that part of Indonesia. It completely 
violated the basic principle of American foreign policy to sup-
port the orderly development of dependent areas toward self-
government. "3 
3 Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur: 1941-1951 (New 
York, 1954), 275. 
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Though the reasons for this action by Washington have not 
been revealed, some seem quite obvious. It may be adequately, 
if not wholly, explained by the need of all available forces for 
an early move on Japan proper. Shortly before the capitulation 
of Japan, the Netherlands Indies was shifted from General 
MacArthur's area to that of Admiral Mountbatten. Washing-
ton probably felt that it had a large enough area of responsi-
bility in the Philippines, China, and Japan. Also, in the back-
ground there may have been a reluctance, and even fear, of 
becoming involved in restoring the former colonial govern-
ments in these territories. It is interesting to speculate on what 
might have happened had this change of plans not been made. 
One can hardly avoid the conclusion that the United States 
narrowly escaped being drawn into a situation which would 
have been embarrassing at home and abroad. As it was, our 
government did not escape all embarrassment in Indonesia or 
in Indochina, or even in the Philippines. It was caught in an 
awkward position. It could ill afford to alienate the Dutch 
and the French, whose cooperation in Europe it needed badly, 
yet it wished to win the good will of the nationalist movements 
in Southeast Asia and to use its influence to end colonialism 
wherever it had outlived its usefulness. In Indochina the situa- · 
tion was desperate; the war there seemingly could not be won 
either with or without the French. The outcome was not 
happy. The United States gave too little aid to win the good 
will or gratitude of the nationalist leaders, but enough to 
offend the colonial powers. 
From 1948 on, the United States government became in-
creasingly concerned about Communist activity in Southeast 
Asia. In 1950 (February 27) Secretary of State Dean Acheson 
declared in a public address that the countries of that region 
"find themselves in the path of a main thrust of Soviet sub-
version and expansion," but he was nevertheless unfavorably 
disposed toward the idea of an Asian defense pact. In May, 
1949, he turned down a suggestion that such an alliance be 
formed. In July, 1950, President Everett Case of Colgate Uni-
versity and Raymond Fosdick of the Rockefeller Foundation 
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were appointed to assist Ambassador Philip C. Jessup on Far 
Eastern policy. Jessup himself later visited the countries of 
Eastern and Southeast Asia, and on February 13, 1950, pre-
sided over a conference in Bangkok of all chiefs of United 
States missions in the region. 
Much thought was given in 1950 by the state department to 
United States policy with respect to Southeast Asia. The Case-
Fosdick recommendations have not been made public, but 
Fosdick unofficially gave his views in an article in the New 
York Times. 4 He depreciated military power as a solution, 
and emphasized economic and social aid and diplomatic sup-
port for the peoples of Asia in their aspiration "for freedom 
and justice and more abundant living." The United States 
should make the just and humane purposes of this revolution 
"its own and become the friend and counselor of revolutionary 
Asia." 
Acheson made one of his most important policy addresses 
as secretary of state on January 12, 1950. His views were in 
many respects similar to those of Fosdick. He warned against 
the obsession with military considerations in seeking solutions 
to Asian problems. American policy toward the region must 
recognize the revulsion of Asian peoples "against the acceptance 
of misery and poverty as the normal condition of life," and 
"revulsion against foreign domination." He declared that the 
basic interests of Americans and Asians are the same, that the 
United States stood ready to help the peoples of Asia to 
improve their social and economic conditions, but that Amer-
ican assistance can be effective only when it is the "missing 
component in a situation which might otherwise be solved." 
The United States could not furnish all the components that 
might be required. "It cannot furnish determination, it cannot 
furnish the will, and it cannot furnish the loyalty of a people 
to its government." This remark probably reflected the bitter 
experience of the United States in China. He also implied 
that, except for the Philippines, Southeast Asia was not re-
garded as an area vital to the security of the United States 
4 February 12, 1950. 
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which this country would fight to defend, except in conformity 
with its obligations as a member of the United Nations. 
Ambassador Jessup on his visit to Asia indicated an increas-
ing concern about the situation in Southeast Asia and espe-
cially Indochina. He declared in Singapore on February 6, 
1950, that armed aggression against Indochina would be re-
garded as a grave matter. In January, Communist China and 
Soviet Russia announced their recognition of Ho Chi Minh's 
regime; on February 7 the United States announced the recog-
nition of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. A few days later the 
Export-Import Bank granted Indonesia a $100,000,000 loan. 
At Bangkok on February 12, on the eve of the conference of 
American diplomats to discuss the situation in the region, 
Ambassador Jessup indicated that the United States govern-
ment was sympathetic with the idea of an Asian military alli-
ance. According to the official communique, the conference 
considered the problem of how the United States could best 
implement its announced policy "to support the independence 
and nationalist aspirations of all Asian peoples." 
It is clearly evident that a new and more active American 
policy was rapidly taking form in these days. On February 
16, Secretary Acheson made his fighting speech on "total 
diplomacy," in which he declared that the only way to deal 
with Russia was "to create situations of strength." The United 
States must be prepared to meet wherever possible all thrusts 
of the Soviet Union "and at the same time to create those 
economic, political, social and psychological conditions that 
strengthen and create confidence in the democratic way of 
life." A week later, Washington announced that a special 
economic mission would soon be sent to Southeast Asia under 
the leadership of R. Allen Griffin. In July a military survey 
mission under John Melby was sent to Southeast Asia. Military 
and economic aid began to flow to Southeast Asia in increas-
ingly large quantities. For the fiscal year 1954 the total United 
States aid to Indochina alone was over $800,000,000, nearly all 
of it for arms and military supplies. Substantial amounts also 
went to Thailand and the Philippines. On August 30, 1951, 
the United States and the Philippines signed a mutual defense 
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treaty, and on September 1 the United States, New Zealand, 
and Australia signed the A.N .z. U.S. pact. 
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE 
The cns1s which developed in Indochina in the spring of 
1954 was a painful experience for the American people and 
the Eisenhower administration in particular. In the 1952 cam-
paign the Republicans had flayed the Roosevelt and Truman 
administrations for the loss of China to the Communists and 
for getting the United States into a war in Korea which Amer-
ican forces, under the conditions imposed upon them, could 
not win and which threatened to go on forever. Moreover, 
the Eisenhower administration had cut military expenditures, 
contracted the armed forces, and reduced American troops 
abroad. Having taken credit for ending the war in Korea, it 
could hardly justify entering another and similar one in Indo-
china. But the loss of Indochina to the Communists would 
also be embarrassing in view of the capital which the Repub-
licans had made of the American diplomatic disaster in China. 
Moreover, the United States had become deeply involved in 
the war in Indochina. In the last months the United States was 
bearing about 80 percent of the cost of the military operations 
in that unhappy country. 
Secretary Dulles was determined not to lose any more terri-
tory to the Communists, but the policies of Secretaries Hum-
phrey and Wilson tended in an opposite direction. The secre-
tary of state himself had promised that the United States would 
not again become bogged down in local wars. Caught in the 
vortex of conflicting policies and forces, Dulles in desperation 
proclaimed his "instant, massive retaliation" threat.5 This out-
burst was understandable under the circumstances, but its 
effects were bad. It frightened and alienated our friends, and 
provided our enemies with propaganda. When the military 
situation steadily worsened and the French at long last decided 
to get out of the war in Indochina at once, the administration 
II See James Reston's interview with General ·walter Bedell Smith in the 
New York Times, October 10, 1954. 
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apparently seriously considered the idea of sending American 
troops into the conflict. The Vice President on April 6, in 
an off-the-record, off-the-cuff speech, declared that if the French 
withdrew from the fight, the United States would have to dis-
patch forces to Indochina. As the leader of the free world, 
the United States could not afford a further retreat in Asia. 
Dulles' replies to the press, when questioned about the issue, 
were a bit equivocal. The President kept his balance. He 
repeatedly pointed out the seriousness of the situation, but 
he made direct participation by American troops in the war 
conditional upon Allied support and the approval of congress. 
The decisive factor, however, seems to have been the oppo-
sition, on military grounds, of General Ridgeway, army chief 
of staff. The attitude of the senate was not very constructive. 
Most senators were opposed to direct military intervention, but 
also to making any concessions which would help reach a 
compromise settlement. 
The secretary of state now engaged in a piece of sudden 
and unilateral diplomacy. ·without ascertaining in advance 
whether he had the support of congress, the French, or the 
British, he went to Europe and publicly appealed for a "united 
action" policy to stop Communist aggression in Indochina. The 
result was a public rebuff. Because of political sentiment at 
home and Commonwealth ties, as well as a determination to 
attempt a peaceful settlement with the Communist countries, 
the British government refused "to give any undertakings" for 
military action "in advance of the results of Geneva." The 
European foreign offices feared that Dulles wanted to scuttle 
the Geneva Conference, but it is quite clear that he wished only 
to strengthen the anti-Communist position in order to get a 
more favorable settlement. "\Vith this rebuff, the secretary of 
state returned to "\\!ashington, and the Geneva Conference 
ground to a conclusion without active American participation. 
Though the United States was not actively present at Geneva, 
American military strength and American sentiment had much 
to do with the final settlement. The Communists did not dare 
to press their demands too far, lest they drive France into the 
arms of the United States and arouse America to large-scale 
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intervention. The Geneva agreements meant in effect the 
practical withdrawal of France from Indochina, the withdrawal 
of the Communist Viet Minh forces from Cambodia and Laos, 
the temporary division of Vietnam at about the seventeenth 
parallel, and a plebiscite in two years to determine the future 
status of the whole. 
In Indochina, American diplomacy suffered a setback. China 
won a puppet state with important mineral resources, a stra-
tegic location, and 13,000,000 people. The plebiscite scheduled 
for July, 1956, has not been held, chiefly because of the refusal 
of the Diem government to cooperate in holding it. It does 
not look as if the elections will be held soon, if ever. Vietnam 
thus joins Germany and Korea as divided countries-victims of 
the titanic struggle between Communism and the free world 
for the strategic areas of the globe. 
The President, who in his press conference had stated it 
might be necessary to work out a modus vivendi with Russia, 
was philosophic about the Geneva truce, and the secretary of 
state was both philosophic and somewhat chastened. In his 
press conferences the President talked about American partner-
ship with other nations rather than of American leadership. 
In a press statement of July 23 Dulles declared that the "im-
portant thing from now on is not to mourn the past but to 
seize the opportunity to prevent the loss in Northern Vietnam 
from leading to the extension of communism throughout 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific Southwest." He stated that there 
were two lessons which the free nations should learn from the 
past; namely, "that resistance to communism needs popular 
support, and this in turn means that the people should feel 
that they are defending their own national institutions," and 
"that arrangements for collective defense need to be made in 
advance of aggression, not after it is under way." 
THE MANILA CONFERENCE-SEATO 
The United States now proceeded without delay to call the 
conference which it hoped would draft a security plan for 
Southeast Asia to prevent further Communist expansion in 
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that region. A conference was called and held within a matter 
of weeks. On September 8, eight countries signed a Southeast 
Asian Collective Defense Treaty. There had been rumors of 
proposals to form a Southeast Asian defense organization from 
1947 to 1953. In those years the British, French, Dutch, and 
Australian governments were interested in creating such an 
organization, but the United States was lukewarm to the idea. 
In May, 1951, a military conference was held at Singapore, at 
which the United States was represented by observers. It was 
agreed to exchange information. In January, 1952, the chiefs 
of staff and other high-ranking military officers of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and France, together with repre-
sentatives of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, met in 
Washington for a series of talks described by the American 
defense department as a continuation of the Singapore discus-
sions. It was reported that the military leaders discussed the 
pooling of their air, land, and sea forces in case of a Chinese 
Communist attack on territories held by Western or pro-
W estern nations. Further talks were held at the Pentagon in 
March, but no organizational arrangement was set up. Some 
months later, Prime Minister Churchill proposed to the in-
coming Eisenhower administration the formation of a Southeast 
Asian defense pact, similar to Nato, but Washington was not 
ready for it. 
In seeking to create "a dependable barrier to further Com-
munist expansion" in Southeast Asia, Dulles took on himself 
a formidable task. He had to find a formula for the defense 
of the region which would win the acquiescence, if not the 
enthusiasm, of France, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Cam-
bodia, Laos, Vietnam, Pakistan, India, and other neutralist 
countries of Southeast Asia as well as the various factions of 
the United States congress. The difficulties encountered at 
Manila reveal many of the problems which American diplo-
macy confronts in Southeast Asia. 
It is clear that if Seato is to be effective psychologically and 
militarily it must have the support of a large number of 
Asian states. Suspicion of the West is strong, and the slogans 
of "Asia for the Asians" and "the peace of Asia should be 
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maintained by Asians" have a compelling appeal. Unfortun-
ately, the attempt to enlist Asian states in the movement and 
to give it an Asian character was not successful. The idea of 
the defense treaty originated in the West, was advocated chiefly 
by the United States, and received the support of only three 
Asian states, namely, Pakistan and Thailand, which were 
already receiving military assistance from the United States, 
and the Philippines, which is regarded by Asians as an Amer-
ican satellite and on whose territory the conference was held. 
The three Indochinese states might have joined at the time 
if the terms of the Geneva truce agreement had not precluded 
it, but Cambodia and Laos have since turned neutralist in 
their foreign policy. As it is, there is little about Seato which 
is truly Asian. Whatever power the pact can have will neces-
sarily come from the Western members. 
The treaty could not be given a broader Asian base for a 
number of reasons. The American policy of not extending 
recognition to Communist China and of continuing to recog-
nize the Chiang regime as the government of China, while the 
British government, for one, adopted the opposite policy, made 
it impossible to include either Nationalist or Red China. 
Moreover, the inclusion of Formosa would dispel any hope of 
ever getting India, Burma, or Indonesia to join. To avoid 
these difficulties, Hong Kong and Formosa were excluded from 
the operation of the treaty. Japan could not be included as 
a member either, for all the countries of Southeast Asia pro-
foundly distrust her, and Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines 
were still wrangling with her over reparations. Thus to include 
some states or regimes would have wrecked the chances of 
getting a treaty at all, and the inclusion of others would have 
barred all hope of getting the later adherence of any other 
countries in the region. The result was a small and weak 
Asian base for the pact. 
Then there was the problem which no secretary of state can 
ever forget when he is negotiating a treaty, namely, that of 
getting an international agreement which will be acceptable 
to two-thirds of the membership of the United States senate. 
To insure approval by the senate and to avoid becoming 
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involved in any war between India and Pakistan, Dulles wished 
to have the treaty state specifically that it was directed against 
Communist aggression. The inclusion of such a statement 
would have alienated neutralist India and several of the South-
east Asian states beyond any hope of future adherence to the 
pact. Britain opposed it. As a compromise, it was agreed that 
the United States could attach a memo to the treaty expressing 
its own views.6 It was probably also out of similar considera-
tions that the obligations of the defense treaty were made not 
automatic, as in Nato, but merely consultative, though vulner-
able states like Thailand and the Philippines strongly pleaded 
for the former. 
Under the terms of the treaty, the signatories undertake, 
"separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective 
self-help and mutual aid" to "maintain and develop their 
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and 
to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from 
without against their territorial integrity and political stability" 
(Art. II) . They further "undertake to strengthen their free 
institutions and to cooperate with one another in the further 
development of economic measures, including technical assist-
ance, designed both to promote economic progress and social 
well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts 
of governments towards these ends" (Art. III). 
From a military point of view, Article IV constitutes the 
heart of treaty. In case of aggression by means of armed attack 
in Southeast Asia against any of the parties, the signatories 
agree to meet "the common danger in accordance with its 
constitutional processes." By separate protocol the states and 
territories of Cambodia, Laos, and free Vietnam are designated 
as falling within the scope of the treaty, though these are not 
parties to it. However, no action will be taken on the territory 
of any of these states except "at the invitation or with the 
consent of the government concerned." The delegates to the 
6 The statement of "Understanding" of the United States attached to the 
treaty is to the effect that in case of an armed attack which is not a Communist 
attack "in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or 
territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereinafter designate," 
the United s.tates is ~mder no oblig~tion to act under the terms of the treaty. 
The reservatwn apphes only to Article IV, paragraph 1. 
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Manila Conference were well aware that the chief threat to 
the region might not be direct attack but infiltration ·and 
subversion. They therefore further agreed that if the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of the parties in the 
treaty area or the three states of Indochina "is threatened in 
any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened 
by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the 
area, the Parties shall immediately consult in order to agree 
on the measures which should be taken for the common de-
fense." Since the treaty is so definitely consultative in character, 
a council so organized as to be able to meet at any time is 
provided for in Article V. 
States not original signatories may be invited to adhere. 
Article VII provides that "any other State in a position to 
further the objectives of this Treaty and to contribute to the 
security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the 
Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty." 
These are the chief provisions of the Southeast Asia Collec-
tive Defense Treaty. It is hardly necessary to add that, like 
all other defense treaties to which the United States is a party, 
it is carefully drafted so as not to conflict with the obligations 
of the parties under the Charter of the United Nations, or the 
responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 
At the suggestion of President Magsaysay of the Philippines, 
the conference also drafted a declaration called the Pacific 
Charter, which proclaims the principle of "equal rights and 
self determination of peoples." It is not clear what good this 
anticolonial declaration will do. It is not likely to make the 
treaty more acceptable to neutralist countries. Seato members 
emphasize that part of the declaration which states that they 
"will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-
government and to secure the independence of all countries," 
while the Asian doubters draw attention to the qualifying 
clause "whose people desire it and are able to undertake its 
responsibilities." If it made Asians aware of the dangers of 
Communist imperialism, it would have some value, but most 
Asians think only in terms of Western imperialism. As former 
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Premier Mohammed Ali of Pakistan once said, "they are 
worried by a disease they are getting rid of and ignoring the 
one with which they are threatened." ·where colonialism still 
exists, as in Malaya and North Borneo, the declaration may do 
harm by putting pressure on the British to grant self-govern-
ment faster than these plural societies can be prepared to 
receive it, and thus lead to more disorder, which can only help 
the Communists. Nor will the declaration do anything to 
solve the complicated problem of West New Guinea. 
ASIAN RESPONSE TO THE TREATY 
The Indian response was unfavorable from the beginning. 
Long before the Manila Conference met, V. K. Krishna Menon, 
Indian delegate to the United Nations, denounced the pro-
posed collective security action as "an incipient and embryonic 
infringement of our peace area approach." Mrs. Pandit, Nehru's 
sister and herself a leading Indian diplomat, dismissed Seato 
with the quip that it was "a Southeast Asian Alliance minus 
Southeast Asia." Prime Minister Nehru described the treaty 
as an interesting and odd document which seeks to give pro-
tection to countries which do not want it. "Asian problems," 
he declared, "Asian security and Asian peace are not only 
discussed but treaties are drawn up in regard to them chiefly 
by non-Asian powers." He felt that the treaty would have the 
effect of halting "the process of calming down" begun by the 
Indochina settlement and of increasing tension and unrest in 
the world. He also criticized the economic aid provisions of 
the treaty and contrasted them with the Colombo Plan, which 
is without military implications. He wished to know whether 
economic measures of the treaty would supplant, rival, or dupli-
cate the efforts now being made under the Colombo agree-
ments. Even before the Manila Conference was called and 
Sea to was drafted, Nehru was given the opportunity of putting 
his "peace area" idea into something like specific form. Chou 
En-lai, prime minister of Communist China, on his return 
home from the Geneva Conference visited New Delhi for 
conversations with the Indian leader. In a joint Chou-Nehru 
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statement issued on June 28, 1954, the two prime ministers on 
behalf of themselves and their governments affirmed faith in the 
five principles of mutual respect, nonaggression, noninterfer-
ence, equality, and peaceful coexistence. From New Delhi, Chou 
went to Rangoon, where he won prime minister Nu for this 
policy. The Burmese and Chinese premiers made their affirma-
tion of faith in a joint statement similar to the one made by 
Nehru and Chou in New Delhi a few days earlier. Nehru wished 
to conciliate Communist China, whereas he seemed convinced 
that the American policy was one of provocation. A few 
months later, after a visit to China, Nehru declared in parlia-
ment that Chou and he had agreed on the principle that 
"everything possible should be done to remove fear and appre-
hension from men's minds so as to produce an atmosphere 
which is more helpful in the consideration and solution of 
problems.''7 
It is difficult to believe that the Indian prime minister accepts 
all of Communist China's assurances at face value. Aware of 
the military weakness of India and Southeast Asia and opposed 
to Western intervention in any form in the region, he may 
feel that the best policy for India is to get commitments from 
Peiping against aggression and intervention in Asia and to 
serve as mediator between China and her neighbors. 
A view quite the opposite of that of Nehru and Menon was 
expressed by the Straits Times) an English-language newspaper 
published in Singapore. It declared the day following the 
signing of the treaty at Manila that "The situation in South-
east Asia is transformed by the simple fact that there is a 
treaty at all. Security at once is immeasurably strengthened . 
. . . The Treaty's economic clauses, and the Pacific Charter 
which has been written into the preamble, affirm Seato's noble 
purpose. It is no longer the old imperialism which threatens 
the rights and liberties of Asian peoples. Colonialism every-
where is departing decently. Seato stands between Southeast 
Asia and the imperialism of a new and vicious creed." 
Prime Minister Ali of Indonesia, the largest country in the 
treaty area, reacted strongly to the Manila defense treaty. 
7 New York Times, November 23, 1954. 
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Almost immediately he went to India to confer with Nehru 
about creating an All-Asian alternative to Seato's military-
economic commitments to ensure peace for the region. Later 
he visited Premier Nu in Burma to confer with him on the 
same subject. As a result of Ali's initiative, a Colombo Powers 
conference met in Java to make plans for an Afro-Asian con-
ference. As an immediate measure to counter the Manila 
treaty, Ali proposed a mutual nonaggression treaty with Com-
munist China. 
BANDUNG CONFERENCE 
If Prime Ministers Nehru and Ali Sastroamidjojo expected 
an unqualified triumph for their ideas of foreign policy at 
Bandung, they were disappointed. A neutralist bloc was not 
created; indeed, neutralism won few unalloyed victories at 
the conference. Anti-Communists showed remarkable strength 
at Bandung. Led by such able parliamentarians as Romulo of 
the Philippines and Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon, the anti-
Communist countries defeated any plan Communist China and 
some neutralist countries may have had of making the white 
man's colonialism or imperialism seem the principal menace 
confronting Asia and Africa. In the final communique of the 
conference not just Western imperialism but "colonialism in 
all of its manifestations" was condemned. The conference 
avoided endorsement of the "five principles" of Chou and 
Nehru; instead, it adopted ten principles, among which was 
included "Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself 
singly or collectively in conformity with the Charter of the 
United Nations." The use of the term "coexistence" was re-
jected, and instead the phrase of the preamble of the Charter 
of the United Nations, "live together in peace with one another 
as good neighbors," was adopted. 
The conference may not have met the high expectations of 
the neutralists, but it was, nevertheless, a historic meeting. It 
was a great diplomatic gathering from which the \Vest, so long 
dominant in world affairs, was excluded. There was the feeling 
that at long last the destiny of Asia was being determined in 
Asia, that Asia was free. The debates were of a high order and 
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the proceedings were carried on with decorum. Asians and 
Africans felt their stature increased. 
While the conference did not turn out as badly as Americans 
feared it might, it did take a position on a number of matters 
which have not made American foreign policy easier. The 
Asian-African countries wield a considerable influence in the 
General Assembly of the United Nations because of their num-
bers. The conflict between the anticolonial, underdeveloped 
countries and the technologically advanced Western states in 
the United Nations has been sharper as a result of the Bandung 
Conference, and the United States not infrequently finds itself 
in an embarrassing position on certain issues. For example, 
the conference declared its support of the Arabs against Israel, 
of Indonesia against the Netherlands on the West New Guinea 
issue, and of Yemen against the British in Aden and the pro-
tectorates in the southern parts of Yemen. The Asian-African 
bloc made its influence strongly felt in the Suez Canal conflict 
in the United Nations in 1956-1957. 
The prime minister of Communist China won few victories 
on the floor of the conference, but he nevertheless achieved 
some diplomatic gains for his country. The traditional Chinese 
principle of indelible nationality was a cause of serious friction 
between China and the countries of Southeast Asia, for in 
accordance with it, China claimed the allegiance of all persons 
of Chinese descent born abroad, no matter how many genera-
tions removed from China. Indonesia, and the Netherlands 
before it, had long sought to get China to give up the claim of 
Chinese nationality for persons of Chinese descent born in 
Indonesia and continuing to live there. A dual nationality on 
the part of so large a part of its population was a matter of 
serious concern to the Indonesian government. At Bandung, 
Chou entered into an agreement with Indonesian Premier Ali 
under the terms of which the Communist Chinese government 
accepted broad limitations on this principle. There was gen-
eral rejoicing at first among Indonesians over this diplomatic 
victory, but upon closer analysis and after second thought their 
enthusiasm cooled. It was discovered that under the agreement 
many persons who under Indonesian law were Indonesian 
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nationals again became Chinese nationals. The agreement 
created some uncertainty and confusion. However, Indonesians 
who are not completely blind to the methods of Communism 
know that many ways remain open by which Communist China 
can intervene in the internal affairs of Indonesia, such as in 
family relations between Chinese in Indonesia and Chinese in 
China, and in using Indonesian-Chinese whose loyalty is to 
Peiping. 
Chou created a sensation on the last day of the conference 
when he issued a statement that the Chinese people were 
friendly to the American people and did not want a war 
with the United States. He declared that the Chinese govern-
ment was willing to enter into negotiations with the United 
States government to discuss the question of relaxing tensions 
in the Taiwan (Formosa) area. Probably because of the 
attacks on Communism on the floor of the conference, Chou 
felt that he had to take a concilatory attitude. He had already 
given the conference delegates the impression of mildness, 
friendliness, and great reasonableness. With this offer Chou 
confirmed that impression and won supporters for the position 
of his government. When the United States government re-
ceived the Chou offer with considerable reserve, there was 
rather general disappointment among the delegates to the 
conference. Chou also had given support to the stiff anti-Israel 
resolution which was adopted by the conference, thereby win-
ning the favor of the Arab states. 
REORIENTATION OF AMERICAN POLICY 
United States policy in Southeast Asia underwent something 
of a change in 1956. A number of factors may account for the 
shift. The United States government was undoubtedly influ-
enced by the "new look" in Russian foreign policy which fol-
lowed the Geneva "Summit" Conference of July, 1955.8 The 
Soviet shift involved more than a change of manner from 
s See the statement by Secretary Dulles to the senate foreign relations com-
mittee in support of the administration's foreign-aid program. New York 
Times, May l, 1956. 
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growling to purring; it was accompanied by an announcement 
of willingness to provide technical assistance and agricultural 
and industrial equipment to underdeveloped countries. When 
Bulganin and Khrushchev visited India in the closing months 
of 1955, they paid Burma the high compliment of including 
it in their itinerary. This was followed by an agreement to 
provide technical assistance and equipment in exchange for 
Burma's surplus rice, which was not readily finding a market. 
Russia also offered, as a gift, to build and equip an industrial 
institute. In September, Djakarta announced an agreement 
between the Soviet and Indonesian governments whereby the 
former is to extend the latter a credit of $100,000,000 at an 
interest rate of 2~~ percent and with repayment in 12 years. 
The specific projects were still to be determined, but equip-
ment and training in atomic-energy research was prominently 
mentioned. 
The beginning of a change in United States policy is evident 
in a proposal made in October, 1955, by John B. Hollister, 
director of the International Cooperation Administration, to 
the meeting of the consultative committee of the Colombo 
Plan countries at Singapore. Hollister proposed the establish-
ment of a center for nuclear research and training, with the 
promise that the United States would contribute substantially 
toward its construction and operation. Some months later a 
mission of atomic specialists was sent to confer with officials 
and scientists in the free Asian countries about the proposed 
project. By its bomb tests in the South Pacific the United 
States had alienated Asian public opinion; it now hoped to 
change this unfavorable sentiment by offering to help Asian 
countries use the atom for constructive purposes.9 In March, 
1956, Secretary Dulles attended a Seato conference in Karachi 
and visited several Asian countries. Indonesia seems to have 
been selected for special treatment on this trip. The anti-
colonial theme, so dear to President Sukarno and most Indo-
9 The American offer was renewed and made more specific at the meeting 
of the consultative committee of the Colombo Plan countries at Wellington, 
New Zealand, in December, 1956. The United States government declared it 
was prepared to contribute about $20,000,000 to the establishment of a center 
at Manila. 
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nesians, was played up very effectively (though stretched a bit). 
Shortly after his departure Dulles cabled President Sukarno, 
"You are grappling with the same problems that our own 
nation faced nearly two hundred years ago and which are still 
a vivid part of our tradition. I believe that only those who 
have gone through the process of transformation from being a 
colony can understand the problems that are involved. You 
and we have had a common experience which we can share 
with a special sense of fellowship." On behalf of President 
Eisenhower the secretary invited President Sukarno to visit 
the United States. The latter accepted with alacrity. He 
visited the United States in May and was given an enthusiastic 
reception.10 
At about the same time the United States government seemed 
to be groping for a new attitude toward neutralism. President 
Eisenhower at a press conference on June 6 made a statement 
in which he declared that military alliances were not always 
an advantage to the United States and involved a risk for the 
country entering them. That same evening Vice President 
Nixon in a speech followed the President's train of thought, 
explaining that uncommitted nations wanted time for economic 
development and "are not going to be frightened into alliances 
with the West by military power, nor can their allegiance be 
purchased by dollars." Reactions by America's allies to the 
President's statement apparently were immediate and strong, 
for the White House on the next day issued an explanatory 
statement. The President did not believe that association for 
10 The invitation to President Sukarno was a good diplomatic move, though 
not without its drawbacks, coming at the time it did. The Thais and Filipinos 
were surprised and hurt at the rousing reception given a "neutralist" head of 
state and began to make unfavorable comparisons. The Dutch were unhappy 
because to them it seemed to put the American stamp of approval on the 
recent unilateral denunciation of the economic and financial agreements signed 
at The Hague Round Table Conference with the encouragement of the American 
representative there. It also made more difficult a movement of Indonesian leaders 
to restrict President Sukarno's role. Because parliament had not been elected, 
it had had little moral authority, and Sukarno was able to assume a position 
of political leadership without responsibility to cabinet or parliament. Now 
that elections had been held and parliament had a mandate from the people, 
tlle time had arrived to put an end to tlle anomaly, but the president's warm 
reception in the United States increased his already great prestige and made 
it more difficult than ever to control him. 
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mutual security with the United States will involve any country 
in added danger, but, on the contrary, will provide added 
security on the basis of mutuality and scrupulous respect for 
the independence of each. In disparaging military alliances, 
the President apparently meant only to disparage alliances 
with Communist countries, "great powers which have shown 
an aggressive disposition." A few days later, Secretary Dulles 
declared neutrality to be immoral. Vice President Nixon visited 
the Philippines and some of the countries of South and South-
east Asia in July. In speeches and statements at Manila and 
Karachi he was back on the old theme of the immorality of 
neutralism and warned against trade agreements with the 
Soviet bloc. 
It is evident that a change of attitude, at least, had taken place 
in Washington, however badly the government spokesman ex-
plained this change. The right of neutrality was recognized, and 
aid was promised to countries even if they did not align them-
selves with the West; and instead of stressing the military aspects 
of defense, the government began to emphasize the need for eco-
nomic and social progress in the underdeveloped countries. 
With respect to East-West trade policy a relaxation had also 
set in. When the United States government in the United 
Nations opposed the actions of Israel, France, and Great Britain 
with respect to Egypt in the closing months of 1956, the United 
States became almost popular in the countries of South and 
Southeast Asia. However, that popularity began to decline 
when the United States government began to press for a basic, 
permanent solution to the problems of the Near East. 
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
The drive against Western foreign rule has been practically 
won throughout most of Southeast Asia; the reestablishment of 
Western domination is unthinkable and impossible. But the 
peoples of the region have not yet succeeded in establishing 
strong and efficient, to say nothing of democratic, government. 
Their societies are far from healthy. There is disillusionment, 
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Asians, but it will take some time for these measures to become 
noticeably effective. 
Thailand and the Philippines, as well as Australia and New 
Zealand, wanted armed forces placed in the area of immediate 
danger, but the United States would not go along with this. 
It did not wish to tie down its troops at various points in the 
treaty area; it chose rather to "rely largely upon mobile Allied 
power which can strike an aggressor wherever the occasion 
may demand," in the belief that this capacity will deter aggres-
sion. The policy of not stationing troops or maintaining bases 
in the region is less likely to alienate neutralist countries. For 
Seato to be made acceptable to noncommitted Asia, the United 
States and its allies must convince these peoples that their 
intentions are strictly defensive. 
This may still leave the Seato powers, and especially the 
United States as the country with the largest forces in the 
area, the problem of determining whether to incur the risk 
of precipitating a global war, with the possibility of atomic 
warfare, by an attack on China in case of overt aggression by 
Communist China or aggression by another state, say north 
Vietnam, backed by China. Certainly the world, and not only 
Asians, would be shocked at the bombing of China in retalia-
tion for infiltration and subversion in one of the countries of 
Southeast Asia.11 It is not inconceivable that due to these 
considerations the great military striking power of the United 
States might be rendered immobile and thus not deter infiltra-
tion and subversion, or even aggression. If China and Russia 
reach the conclusion that the danger of massive retaliation is 
not great, they will be tempted to risk local thrusts. It would 
seem that the only alternative to a war with Communist China, 
probably supported by Russia, is to become involved again in 
a local war with conventional weapons like that of Korea and 
Indochina. These are not pleasant alternatives. 
Southeast Asia is not going to be saved from Communism 
11 General Maxwell D. Taylor, army chief of staff, expressed the view before 
the senate armed services subcommittee that "small wars" are more possible 
now that mutual deterrence "of atomic weapons has lessened the likelihood of 
general war." Other military specialists hold that nuclear weapons will be used 
in any war, and that the Communists know this and therefore will not start 
a war of any size. See New York Times, July 27, 1956. 
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unless its peoples and governments have the desire and the 
will to be saved from it. This will at the moment does not 
seem to be strong. But desire and will are not sufficient; there 
must be the capability to defend itself from Communism, both 
internally and externally. The region must be made capable 
of defending itself. Can this be done? 
The problem was sharply stated by Syed Amjad Ali in an 
address while he was Pakistani ambassador to the United States: 
"The illiteracy and poverty of the hundreds of millions of 
Asia stares at the better living conditions of the Free World. 
. . . [The mass of Asians are] not only illiterate but uncertain 
about the value of democracy. Asia, the oldest inhabited 
continent, is today overcrowded .... Unlike Europe, this spec-
tacular increase in manpower has not been accompanied by a 
corresponding increase in production nor are there any avenues 
of migration to new colonies. Hence the population, which is 
already desperately poor, is getting poorer. The problem of 
democracy is to give these people something to struggle for, 
to give their life a dignity out of which will come a desire to 
preserve individual freedom. "12 
The level of living in Southeast Asia is extremely low. The 
contrast with the United States is startling. The figures com-
piled for 1949 by the statistical office of the United Nations 
show that the per capita annual income in the United States 
was $1,453; in the same year the figure was $36 for Burma, 
$36 for Thailand, $44 for the Philippines, and $25 for Indo-
nesiaP These figures are only approximations, it is true, but 
they nevertheless reveal extreme differences in the levels of 
living. All of the available social statistics, such as the per-
centage of illiteracy, birth and death rates, and food consump-
tion, emphasize this startling contrast. And the disparity in 
living levels is increasing, not decreasing. 
This is what gives Communism its strong attraction for many 
Asians. In nearly every Western country the levels of living 
12 New York Times, February 20, 1955. 
13 National and Per Capita Incomes of Seventy Countries in 1949, E"pressed 
in American Dollars (New York, 1950). 
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are higher, and generally considerably higher, than in Russia; 
but in Asia, with the exception of Japan, the levels of living 
are much lower than in the home of Communism. What im-
presses many South Asians about Communism in China is that 
already marked economic advances have been registered, and 
that confusion has given way to discipline and order. A terrible 
price has been paid for this, especially by certain sections of 
the population, but to people living under conditions of malig-
nant poverty, the price may not seem very high. 
The problem was succinctly stated by the Indonesian am-
bassador to the United States, Mukarto Notowidigdo, in an 
address before the American-Indonesian Chamber of Com-
merce in New York on January 14, 1954. "The future develop-
ment of the political as well as the economic stability of the 
world obviously," declared the ambassador, "cannot rest on a 
solid basis when so significant a part of the world as Southeast 
Asia remains unstable, uneasy, and a source of increasing 
social discontent. The significance of the danger inherent in 
the failure of economic developments in Southeast Asia to keep 
pace with those in other parts of the world has not been fully 
appreciated by the West. The emphasis of the Western Powers 
has been on achieving a military balance of power. They have 
neglected the even more basic problem of the balance of 
power with respect to Southeast Asia. The danger stems from 
a number of factors. First is a psychological one-the achieve-
ment of substantial progress in Communist countries cannot 
fail to exercise powerful attraction on underdeveloped coun-
tries whose rate of progress has not been so rapid. In the 
second place, a nation which has no sound economic base is 
vulnerable both politically and militarily because it cannot 
retain the loyalty of its population when it does not satisfy 
their basic needs and their aspirations for the future. The 
consequence of this economic unbalance is to create pressures 
which may tend to attract underdeveloped countries to a 
system which, in a similar stage of development, has apparently 
succeeded in some degree in meeting the problems which they 
have not begun to solve." 
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To promote economic progress and social well-being, great 
reliance is being placed on technical assistance and economic 
aid. It has been said that the peoples of Southeast Asia have 
no ills which a full stomach cannot cure. Assuming the basic 
truth of this statement, though the problem is by no means 
as simple as that, much has to change before the peoples of 
Asia can enjoy an adequate diet, good health, and a few of 
the amenities enjoyed by the masses in the West. Profound 
changes must take place in the inherited social and religious 
attitudes, the political climate, and the social structure. The 
environment has to change before economic development can 
flourish. There must be more than just discontent with their 
social conditions if a people are to achieve substantial material 
progress. A mere desire for economic progress is not enough, 
there must also be the determination to achieve it. It is true 
that the introduction of superior techniques of production 
help to change the environment, but this is a slow process. 
The process is also accompanied by dangers. Education, better 
hygiene, and medical facilities are basic necessities if the society 
is to be more effective in production. But since they can be 
extended more easily than the economy can be developed, their 
extension is accompanied, at least in its early stages, by two 
effects which make the general problem more difficult, namely, 
a rapid rise in the population and a rapid rise in the level of 
expectations. Americans have too easily assumed that with 
technical assistance and economic aid the peoples of under-
developed areas would soon be able to enjoy better living con-
ditions, but we have already learned not to expect results 
immediately. 
Though the pressure of population in Southeast Asia is not 
as great as in China and India, it is, nevertheless, severe enough 
to present grave obstacles to economic progress. On Java, in 
central Luzon, and the Red River delta of north Vietnam the 
pressure of many people weighs heavily on the productive 
capacity of the land. Modern developments in medicine and 
disease control have brought about a marked decrease in the 
death rate in these countries, but a drop in the birth rate 
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waits upon a change in the social environment.14 The result 
is an explosive population situation. Population is increasing 
in the countries of Southeast Asia at a rate of 1~ to 2 percent 
annually. To keep the production of food abreast of the pop-
ulation increase is no small task. Even though Indonesia and 
the Philippines are 80 percent agrarian, these two countries 
have been rather large importers of rice and are only now 
succeeding in attaining self-sufficiency in this staple of con-
sumption. To improve the level of living, production must 
increase more rapidly than the population. To date, food 
production has barely kept up with the rapidly expanding 
population, but the purchasing power of Asians is so low that 
there has developed a glutted market. While many Asians are 
starving, rice is deteriorating in warehouses. 
The contrast between Southeast Asia and the United States 
in this respect is indeed startling. The number of people in 
the United States engaged in the production of food has steadily 
fallen, until now it is less than 15 percent of the population; 
yet the food supply, in spite of governmental restrictions on 
the acreage of some crops, outruns the demand, and huge 
surpluses pile up. The truth of the matter is that the United 
States can produce rice more cheaply than the Asian peasants, 
and the 1,000,000 tons of surplus in this country help to 
depress the price of this important export commodity of Burma, 
Thailand, and South Korea, and thus create economic diffi-
culties in these countries. Wheat and barley provide the same 
amount of nutrient as rice at half the price, but they cannot 
compete with the latter on the Asian market because Asians 
much prefer their customary diet. Should Asians develop a 
taste for the cheaper imported cereals, Asian agriculture would 
face enormous difficulties. 
Southeast Asia does not have the capital to finance its eco-
nomic development; its per capita income is so low that little 
14 The death rate in Ceylon declined from 31.2 in 1921 to 12.6 in 1950, 
but the birth rate continued as high as ever, at between 34 and 41 per thousand 
of the population. Though Ceylon is not in Southeast Asia, conditions there 
are very similar to those which prevail in some of the countries of Southeast 
Asia. 
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discontent, dissension, corruption, governmental weakness, and 
inefficiency. These conditions facilitate the penetration of the 
government by the Communists, who themselves work hard to 
help create weakness and disorder. They then take over as 
the bearers of order. This happened in China and in northern 
Vietnam, and the big question is whether this Communist 
success is going to be repeated in other countries of the region. 
The discussion of the question of how much the West and 
the colonial powers have contributed to producing the present 
situation is no longer profitable. It is necessary to deal with 
the situation as it is. 
It is clear that the advance of Communism in Southeast 
Asia cannot be checked by a military alliance alone, but the 
military problem had become so acute by 1954 that it had 
to be given priority over the economic. Unless the line is 
held militarily, the West cannot assist the governments of these 
countries in working at the solution of the economic and social 
problems. However, the chief danger is not direct attack, but 
infiltration and subversion, with Moscow and Peiping using 
local residents and nationals (Chinese and indigenous persons) 
to spearhead the troublemaking. The conference of the Seato 
members which was held at Bangkok in February, 1955, gave 
this difficult problem careful consideration. The council, in 
the communique issued at the conclusion of the meeting, de-
clared that it recognized the gravity of the situation, that the 
threat "demands special efforts in all aspects of the national 
life," that there was "agreement on the need for cooperation 
among the member governments to assist one another in 
combating the subversive activities of international commu-
nism," and further that the council had decided "to arrange 
for continuing consultation and mutual assistance and to make 
it possible for each member government to draw upon the 
experience of the others in dealing with this danger." This is 
good so far as it goes, but it does not seem to go very far in 
meeting an immediate and dire threat. Of course, the Seato 
powers rely upon the individual and collective efforts of the 
governments in promoting "economic progress and social well-
being" to destroy the attraction of Communism for Southeast 
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saving or capital accumulation is possible. The capital will 
have to come from the outside, which would seem to offer a 
golden opportunity to Americans and the United States gov-
ernment to join in fruitful cooperation with these countries. 
These countries desire technical and economic assistance, but 
they are afraid of it. They fear a return of "colonialism." By 
"colonialism" these peoples do not mean merely political 
subordination of their country to another; they mean by it 
dependence upon Western countries in any form, whether 
political, economic, or cultural. As a result of the many years 
of agitation against what their political leaders called exploita-
tion by foreign capitalists, they have come to regard all capital-
ism as a hidden form of colonialism. They regard their econ-
omy as colonial because it is highly dependent upon a few 
export commodities to a few highly industrialized countries. 
They regard their low living levels as a phase of colonialism. 
Because of these sentiments, governments of Southeast Asian 
countries are loath to induce private foreign capital to invest 
in their countries. And government aid, to be acceptable, must 
be without strings attached. It will be recalled that an Indo-
nesian government fell in 1952 because it had signed an agree-
ment for economic aid from the United States in the amount 
of only $8,000,000. The agreement contained a mild clause 
linking Indonesia with the free world, but it was considered 
a departure from the policy of neutralism, and the cabinet was 
overthrown. Burma in 1953 renounced American economic 
aid for somewhat the same reasons. When the Burmese gov-
ernment first accepted American aid, critics accused it of selling 
the country to capitalist America, and for a paltry sum. During 
the early years of the Indonesian Republic the United States 
contributed loans and grants to the extent of $200,000,000; 
during the last five years the amount has been only $30,000,000. 
At present, Indonesia is again receiving assistance from the 
United States, but only in the form of technical cooperation 
in the amount of $8,000,000. The Philippines and Thailand, 
members of Seato, and Cambodia, Laos, and south Vietnam 
receive large amounts of military as well as smaller sums for 
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technical cooperation assistance.15 In the election campaign in 
Cambodia in 1955, former King Norodom Sihanouk was 
charged by his opponents with having sold the little kingdom 
to the United States in a secret treaty granting the latter mili-
tary bases in Cambodia. In the election in September, 1955, 
the former king won a resounding victory, but since then he 
has taken a neutralist line. 
Under the provisions of the Mutual Security act of 1955 the 
President was granted a special fund of $200,000,000 to be 
used primarily for projects contributing to economic develop-
ment of the Asian region as a whole. This fund is available 
for obligation until June 30, 1958. 
SUMMARY AND PROSPECTS 
There is grave danger that the 175,000,000 people of Southeast 
Asia may be lost to the free world. This loss would come near 
to tilting the balance of power in favor of the Communist bloc. 
The United States, as the leader of the free world, must do all 
that it can to prevent this from happening, not simply out of 
national pride or out of a desire to win a victory over a rival or 
enemy, but because of what this would mean for the Southeast 
Asians and for the world. 
American policy in Southeast Asia has been based upon the 
deterrence of aggression by the threat of massive retaliation, 
collective security, technical assistance, economic aid, and mili-
tary support. Unless the potential enemy should commit a 
clear, single, outrageous act of aggression, the United States 
15 Under the Mutual Security act of 1955 the countries of Southeast Asia 
were to receive during the fiscal year 1955 assistance as follows: 
Military Assistance Technical Total 
Direct forces Defense Cooperation 
support support 
Indonesia .................... $8,000,000 $ 8,000,000 
Philippines ................ $ 2,300,000 $ 19,700,000 6,500,000 28,500,000 
Thailand .................... 8,200,000 31,800,000 5,500,000 ~5,500,000 
Indochina .................. 38,200,000 379,300,000 7,500,000 425,000,000 
For the fiscal year 1957, appropriations for technical cooperation in the countries 
of the region were as follows: Indonesia, $8,000,000; Philippines, $5,900,000; 
Thailand, $4,600,000; Cambodia, $2,500,000; Laos, $1,500,000; and Vietnam, 
$5,000,000. 
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could not resort to massive retaliation because of the unfavor-
able reaction it would produce in Asia and the whole world. 
Resort to massive retaliation would also involve the risk of a 
global nuclear war. Moreover, by putting so many of its eggs 
in the nuclear basket, the United States has weakened its 
capacity for engaging in a limited war, if it should now find 
that engaging in this kind of war is the only alternative to 
enemy aggression or global atomic war. Seato is weak. It is 
for the region but not of it. It lacks strength because there 
are few Asian states in it, the few Asian states who are in it 
are weak, and there is little agreement among its 'Vestern 
members. The strongest cornerstone of Seato, namely, the 
American-Philippines military relationship, is weakening be-
cause of the friction which has developed between the two 
countries over jurisdiction in the American bases in the islands. 
From the point of view of American objectives in the region, 
the situation has not improved since 1954. Elections in Burma 
and Indonesia gave the Communist parties increased strength 
in the national parliaments. Cambodia and Laos adopted a 
markedly neutralist policy in the same year. Malaya has been 
promised early independence, and leftist elements in Singapore 
have been causing more trouble with increasing insecurity. 
Under the conditions prevailing, no great value can be attached 
to the British air and naval bases on the key island of Singapore. 
Moreover, Russia and China have begun an active cultivation 
of the countries of the region. Burma has made several barter 
deals with Communist countries; Russia has extended Indo-
nesia a $100,000,000 credit; and China has entered a trade 
and economic aid agreement with Cambodia. Khrushchev and 
Bulganin have visited Burma; Chou En-lai continued the 
assiduous cultivation of the countries of the region by a visit 
to Cambodia and Burma in November and December, 1956; 
leading statesmen of Southeast Asia have visited Russia and 
China; and Mao Tse-tung has promised to visit Indonesia. 
Economic conditions in the countries of the region have im-
proved little, if at all. 
The United States must place its chief reliance on technical 
assistance and economic aid. Because of south Vietnam's key 
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position, its formidable problems, and the danger of imminent 
collapse, the United States has had to put enormous sums of 
money into that small country. It is amazing what obstacles 
have been overcome, but its position, nevertheless, remains 
precarious. There is danger that the peoples in the region, 
and Americans too, will become discouraged with the slow 
progress in economic development, especially in the early 
stages. Great gains cannot be expected at once, or even very 
soon. Once the groundwork has been laid and attitudes have 
undergone change, an entrepreneurial spirit will develop, in-
novations will become easier, and the people will desire a 
higher standard of living and will be prepared to make sacri-
fices for it. Economic development will then be self-generated, 
with American capital accelerating the process with marginal 
assistance. 
The thermonuclear stalemate in world politics has brought 
about a shift in thinking from armaments to ideology, from the 
material to the spiritual. This ought to be to the advantage 
of the United States if it knows how to present this side of its 
character in an effective manner. There are other good reasons 
why the United States should be careful not to limit its help 
to technology and capital. There is no guarantee that if these 
peoples win the struggle against- poverty, they will be demo-
cratic and peace loving. Advancement in technology is not 
inevitably accompanied by peaceful attitudes. Better economic 
conditions and scientific and technological progress do not 
necessarily make "nice" people, as the recent examples of 
Germany, Russia, and Japan prove. Technology produces social 
changes, and this aspect of the problem should receive far 
greater emphasis in technical assistance programs than it now 
does. Americans must give aid in such fields as education, 
journalism, labor movements, democratic political organization, 
women's movements, and civic activities, in order to make 
certain, so far as it is possible, that the economic changes 
will produce a democratic society. This will require great skill 
and human understanding on the part of the Americans sent 
to give this assistance, for Asians are even more suspicious of 
cultural than economic imperialism. 
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Mention must be made at this point of certain American 
policies which Indonesians, Malayans, and other Southeast 
Asians find difficult to understand. The economic life of Indo-
nesia and Malaya is to no small extent dependent upon a few 
major exports, principally tin and rubber, which account for 
about two-thirds of her foreign exchange. The price of these 
commodities fluctuates greatly. The price of tin was 78 cents 
a pound in June, 1950; 183 cents in February, 1951; 85 cents 
in December, 1954; 95 cents in October, 1955; and 106 cents 
in December, 1956. The price of rubber varied even more: 
17.5 cents a pound in December, 1949; 31 cents in June, 1950; 
78 cents in December, 1950; 20 cents in December, 1953; 45 
cents in September, 1955; and 37 cents in December, 1956. 
Indonesians and Malayans point to the encouragement of 
synthetic rubber production and the heavily subsidized tin 
smelter in Texas to process Bolivian ore imports as evidences 
of an official policy on the part of the United States government 
to beat down the price of rubber and tin. These peoples are 
inclined to associate their economic difficulties with deliberate 
American policy. Apropos of this problem, the Ceylonese 
delegate in 1956 at the conference on the General Agreement 
on Tariff and Trade at Geneva declared that if the Western 
countries cannot provide better than erratic markets for rubber 
and other primary commodities, the underdeveloped countries 
would have to turn to the Communist bloc. The Communist 
countries would very likely welcome this opportunity, as 
foreign trade is becoming their chief instrument of policy in 
underdeveloped countries. 
Indonesians find it difficult to reconcile what they believe to 
be official American policy in this matter with the offer of 
technical assistance and economic aid. Because wages on the 
rubber plantations are low and the bulk of their rubber and 
tin go to the United States, Indonesians see in this situation 
another case of "colonialism." \\Then they contrast their low 
wages with the high American incomes, they are easily con-
vinced that they are being exploited. This is a bad situation 
and ought to be remedied. The Indonesian government would 
like to see the prices of its export commodities stabilized at 
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what it regards as a fair level by means of an international 
commodity price agreement. The United States is reluctant to 
enter into any such agreement, and it may not be the best 
answer to the problem, but our government should show a 
willingness to join in seeking a solution to a real problem. 
Likewise, by selling our surplus agricultural commodities in 
the region, we alienate important elements in these countries 
and create apprehension. The American people are going to 
have to consider the necessity of bringing their domestic and 
foreign policies in line with each other. As it is now, certain 
aspects of our domestic policy tend to neutralize our foreign 
policy. The ban on the shipment of strategic goods to Commu-
nist countries has also caused resentment. This policy has had 
results adverse to Western interests. It has not only been a 
cause of friction in this vital region (and elsewhere) , but it 
has probably also forced the Communists to develop their own 
production of the embargoed items. Fortunately, the United 
States is relaxing its stand on this matter. 
That American technical assistance and economic aid is 
making an impression in South Asia is apparent from the 
fact that the Soviet Union is now offering technical assistance 
to countries of the region. The natural American impulse 
will be to try to head this off. It would be unwise to urge 
these governments to reject the proferred aid. Maybe Amer-
icans should welcome it, as they should welcome increased 
trade between South Asian countries and the Soviet Union. 
Communist countries-and this is especially true with respect 
to the Soviet Union-are not regarded by the peoples of South-
east Asia as exploitive or imperialistic, because they take no 
goods out of the region nor put any capital in, and no Russians 
are to be seen. In this they have a tremendous advantage 
psychologically. It is not likely that the Communist countries 
would permit much trade, but as it is, the United States oppo-
sition plays into the hands of the Communist propagandists. 
Trade might very well cause friction to develop between the 
Communist and Southeast Asian countries. Burma's experi-
ences with barter agreements with Communist countries indi-
cate that increased contacts may lead to friction. 
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There remains the difficult problem of creating in Southeast 
Asia a regional community with a common will and purpose. 
There must develop the conviction that their survival as inde-
pendent countries can be assured only by common action 
against all encroachments on their territorial integrity and 
political independence. In this connection the question rises 
of whether to carry on our programs directly, on the basis of 
bilateral agreements, or channel all of our technical assistance 
and economic aid through the Colombo Plan and the United 
Nations. The neutralist countries would be less suspicious of 
United States motives, and more convinced that Americans are 
genuinely interested in their welfare, if the latter were to 
become our policy. Our present policy has a tendency to divide 
the nations of the area into two opposing groups; action 
through the United Nations or the Colombo Plan might be 
more effective in developing a regional community spirit. 
American policy in Southeast Asia is made more difficult 
because of United States policy toward Japan and China. The 
peoples of this region still fear Japan; they are not convinced 
that the Japanese have been really converted and are now 
peaceful. They fear an economically strong Japan; they dis-
trust the American policy of mobilizing and integrating Japa-
nese resources with those of the free world. When the Japanese 
peace treaty was negotiated, Australia, New Zealand, and the 
Philippines urged and obtained security pacts with the United 
States designed to insure them against a recurrence of Japanese 
aggression as well as Communist military expansion. Indonesia 
and the Philippines signed the Japanese peace treaty, but did 
not ratify it because its terms precluded reparation payments 
except in services. Burma, as well as these two countries, de-
manded reparations so large that Japan could not possibly pay 
them without a long economic servitude. Burma and the Phil-
ippines have finally settled for a greatly reduced amount, and 
Indonesia may also gradually scale down its demands to a point 
where Japan may agree upon a settlement. But distrust of 
American policy in building up Japan as a bulwark against 
Communism remains. 
It would be very unfortunate if this situation should con-
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tinue much longer, for the solution of Japan's problem is in 
no small measure dependent upon greatly increased commercial 
relations with Southeast Asia. Japan cannot live without 
extensive foreign trade, and commercial relations with the 
mainland of China will be only on Communist terms. As an 
Asian nation which has made remarkable progress in technology 
and economic development, Japan can offer the countries of 
Southeast Asia a great deal. In an address to the National 
Press Club in Washington on August 30, 1955, Mamoru Shi-
gemitsu, the foreign minister of Japan, made a significant 
suggestion. After a brief statement on the thorny reparations 
question, he asked if it were not possible for the United States 
government to devise "an over-all plan of economic develop-
ment of Southeast Asia which will, in the course of its imple-
mentation, also help dispose of the reparations issue .... We 
only desire to coordinate, to our mutual advantage, our policy 
with yours. In short, it is our desire to foster our economic 
strength, profiting from the American aid plan for Southeast 
Asia so that we may become better qualified to work together 
with the United States in stabilizing this critical theatre in the 
global struggle now raging between the free and fettered 
nations." 
The diversity of policy among the Seato powers as well as 
among the countries of the region with respect to China is 
a divisive factor. American effort to prohibit trade in strategic 
materials with China has caused strained relations with Ceylon, 
a country more inclined to be pro-West than neutralist, and 
caused a great deal of resentment in Indonesia. The refusal of 
the United States to recognize the Chinese Communist regime 
and the continued support of the Nationalists on Formosa is 
widely condemned among South and Southeast Asians. The 
Ceylonese ambassador to the United States declared at a con-
ference held under the auspices of Johns Hopkins University 
(August 8 to 11, 1955) that the continued control of the veto 
in the Security Council of the United Nations by the Chiang 
Kai-shek government was "an affront to Asian democracy." He 
further declared Formosa to be a militarily occupied island. 
Until a unified policy with respect to China is arrived at, 
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extensive cooperation between the United States, Thailand, 
and the Philippines on the one hand, and Burma and Indo-
nesia on the other, will not be possible. Burma, if it did not 
hold the United States responsible for the continued presence 
of Chinese Nationalist troops on her soil, did assume that the 
American government could exercise enough control over 
Chiang Kai-shek to force him to remove these troops. The 
Nationalist forces in north Burma were not only causing 
domestic difficulties, but they threatened to involve Burma in 
serious trouble with Communist China. It was probably the 
latter consideration which led Burma to renounce further 
American aid. 
The American diplomatic problem in Southeast Asia is 
indeed formidable. The United States must find a policy 
which is acceptable to a number of states without and within 
the region whose policies in Eastern Asia differ from ours, 
especially with respect to China, but also with respect to 
Japan. It is almost impossible to do anything positive in the 
region without alienating as many countries as are won. By 
arming Pakistan, we alienate India; by continuing to protect 
Chiang, we irritate and embarrass Burma; by making Japan 
its chief Asian ally, the United States made several countries 
of Southeast Asia resentful and apprehensive. The United 
States must seek to equate Asian anticolonialism with its own 
anti-Communism. This is no easy matter, for it may require 
a change in American policy with respect to China and For-
mosa. Most Asians regard American policy as a continuation 
of Western imperialism-a form of colonialism. Asians fear 
war. The United States will do well to talk less about force 
as a deterrent to aggression. The United States government 
is wisely emphasizing working through the United Nations, 
though this is accompanied by difficulties. Because of the 
structure of the General Assembly, with each member state 
having one vote, the United Nations gives states which are 
weak socially, economically, and militarily a tremendous polit-
ical power. Southeast Asia has a population somewhat larger 
than the United States, but in 1956 it had six votes in the 
General Assembly, and may in the not too distant future 
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acquire two more, while the United States has only one vote. 
Frequently these states take an unreasonable position on cer-
tain matters. Nevertheless, more can be achieved through the 
United Nations than outside of it. In fact, attempts to bypass 
the United Nations would hopelessly weaken our position in 
the underdeveloped, anticolonial world. 
Asians dread war, and especially the prospect of nuclear 
warfare, even more than Westerners. American spokesmen 
talked too much about force as a deterrent to aggression, while 
Communist leaders were talking peaceful coexistence. Chou 
En-lai is going to great lengths to assure Southeast Asians of 
Chinese peaceful intentions. The American nuclear bomb tests 
in the Pacific have stirred up the Asian fear of war, and 
unfortunately, associated atomic war with the United States. 
All of this strengthens Asian sentiments of neutralism. Even 
President Eisenhower has said repeatedly that there is no longer 
an alternative to war. Asians feel the same way, but unlike 
the President, they feel that military alliances provoke war. 
It will be difficult to wean most Asians from this point of 
view. Americans should remember that neutralism once held 
a strong appeal for them, and that not so many years ago. 
In conclusion, it should be pointed out that recent events 
are by no means all to the disadvantage of the United States. 
Developments in the satellite states in eastern Europe, espe-
cially Russia's cruel repression of the anti-Communist revolt 
in Hungary, must have at least raised doubts in the mind of 
Asians as to the peaceful nature of Communism. Likewise, 
recent developments in Tibet, with Chinese Communist plans 
to settle 5,000,000 Communists there, and the controversy 
between Communist China and Burma over border territory 
cannot help but arouse suspicion. The Communist-power bloc 
is no longer monolithic; it is beginning to show serious cracks. 
The breakup of the two-power bloc system into a number of 
relatively independent power blocs is not to the disadvantage 
of the United States, but may in fact make its problems less 
difficult. 
The diplomatic problem of the United States in Southeast 
Asia is indeed difficult, but it is not hopeless. 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
THE POLITICAL INSTABILITY in most of the countries of South-
east Asia-especially the deterioration of economic conditions 
in Indonesia and the civil war in that unhappy land-is favoring 
the Communist cause by enabling the Communists to play on 
political rivalries, to intensify disruption, and to spread dis-
illusionment with democratic or non-Communist systems. Indo-
nesian President Sukarno's determination to allow the Com-
munists a role in the government obviously also works in their 
favor. The arrival in Indonesia of ten ships from the U.S.S.R. 
in early 1958 to replace Dutch vessels which formerly provided 
the transportation for this large insular country, and the con-
tinuing possibility of military equipment from Communist 
countries for putting down rebellions in the outer islands, are 
grave developments for the West. 
Indonesia's announcement in December, 1957, claiming ter-
ritorial jurisdiction over all of the waters between its thousands 
of islands was undoubtedly intended to exclude communication 
without its consent through the numerous sealanes traversing 
this vast area.l The Indonesian claim, if successfully main-
tained, would greatly reduce the effectiveness of the Southeast 
Asian Treaty Organization. 
Security problems of Southeast Asia and their relation to the 
world situation were critically reexamined by the Seato council 
of ministers at its fourth annual meeting, which was held in 
Manila March ll-13, 1958. Pate Sarasin, Thai diplomat and 
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statesman who in 1957 became the organization's first secretary 
general, declared in his report to the council that the Asian 
members of Seato during the year had had to face continued 
efforts of Communists to infiltrate their trade unions and their 
governments. In its final communique the council declared 
that Seato had become "a bulwark which has enabled the coun-
tries protected thereby to proceed in peace with their programs 
of national development." It was of the opinion that collective-
security measures had resulted in the diversion of the emphasis 
of Communist activities from the military to the nonmilitary 
field. Subversion was recognized as "the most substantial cur-
rent menace." 
The council emphasized economic and cultural activities. 
Economic problems and progress in the area were reviewed. 
During 1957 more than $700,000,000 for economic purposes 
was provided for the Asian members of Seato, principally by 
the United States. It was agreed to continue and to expand 
Seato's program of cultural activities, which includes round-
tables, scholarships and fellowships and the appointment of 
professors at universities of the Asian members, and traveling 
lecturers. 
The United States and the Philippines announced that they 
intended to establish a defense college in the latter country, 
which would be open to members and nonmembers of Seato. 
The council's communique did not mention Indonesia; it 
was agreed that Seato's policy with respect to that country 
should be one of strict noninterference. That developments in 
Indonesia were seriously discussed cannot be doubted, for the 
situation there is of the utmost gravity for the free world. A 
Communist or pro-Communist regime in Indonesia would iso-
late Australia, render Singapore's naval base useless, provide the 
Communist bloc with a rich source of tin, rubber, and other 
strategic commodities, and open the region wide to Chinese 
Communist influence. The West is confronted with a series of 
1 The Indonesian government declared that "the delineation of the territorial 
sea, with a width of 12 nautical miles, shall be measured from straight lines 
connecting the outermost islands of the Republic of Indonesia." New York 
Times, international edition, January 18, 1958. 
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dilemmas in regard to the situation in Indonesia. Inaction may 
in the end lead to a Communist triumph, but action even 
of the mildest sort would further alienate Asian neutralists, 
while positive action might bring on Communist intervention 
and produce another Korea or Indochina. Djakarta has for 
some time sought arms from the United States, but the latter 
has been understandably reluctant to furnish the Sukarno re-
gime with arms with which to build up strength to crush the 
opponents of its policies. The Indonesians subsequently have 
sought to acquire military supplies (about $200,000,000 worth) 
elsewhere, and Foreign Minister Subandrio has indicated the 
existence of Communist offers on excellent terms. It is also 
reported that Communist China has offered a $20,000,000 loan 
on a long-term basis for industrial purposes. 
Rather than give the Communist bloc an excuse or even an 
opportunity for intervention, the West may well prefer to give 
the Indonesian government indirect aid in putting down the 
revolt. In this case, smoldering opposition and guerrilla war-
fare may in the end drag the Sukarno regime down. But in this 
event there is no guarantee that it would be replaced by a gov-
ernment better disposed toward the West. 
The Indonesian government apparently regards American 
policy as interventionist. President Sukarno in his numerous 
speeches has insinuated that the United States was behind the 
rebel movement. John M. Allison, the American ambassador 
to Indonesia, was in January, 1958, transferred to another diplo-
matic post after he had been in Djakarta less than a year, pre-
sumably for the reason that he disagreed with his government's 
policy with respect to Indonesia. On February 11 Secretary 
Dulles stated that he would like to see in Indonesia "a govern-
ment which is constitutional and which reflects the real interest 
and desires of the people."2 The Indonesian foreign minister 
immediately responded to the secretary of state's comments that 
he did not think that it was "to the advantage of the United 
States to get involved with domestic issues in any Asian country, 
since this may also provoke other big powers to act in the same 
2 New York Times, int. ed., February 12, 1958. 
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manner."3 Progovernment and leftist papers accused the United 
States of interfering in Indonesian issues and backing the rebels. 
INDONESIA 
Increasing dissidence in the outer islands, here and there break-
ing out into open defiance, forced out the Ali Sastroamidjojo 
cabinet in March, 1957. President Sukarno promptly declared 
a state of war and siege, and in April he appointed a cabinet 
with Djuanda as prime minister. The cabinet, which contains 
a number of extreme leftists, is more presidential than parlia-
mentary. In fact, since the resignation of the Ali ministry, 
parliament has functioned ineffectively, with barely a quorum 
in attendance. The president was authorized by parliament to 
establish the national council which he had advocated as his 
plan for a "guided democracy," and in accordance with his 
previously expressed views, he included Communists in its mem-
bership. 
Colonel Maludin Simbolon, commander of the territorial 
army in North Sumatra, who in December, 1956, declared the 
autonomy of his area, found himself outwitted. The central 
government reestablished its control in the area by a counter-
coup under Colonel Djamin Gintings. Lieutenant Colonel 
Vantje Sumual in North Celebes fared better. He, too, declared 
his area autonomous, but the central government was unable 
to unseat him easily. 
Throughout 1957, efforts were made by the moderates to 
effect a compromise between Djakarta and the dissident areas 
in the outer islands and to bring about a reconciliation between 
Sukarno and Hatta. The latter, who is a native Sumatran, is 
regarded by the peoples of the outer islands as representing 
their point of view and as a guardian of their interests. The 
high point of these efforts was a national conference in Djakarta 
in September, 1957, attended by leaders of the central govern-
ment and of the disgruntled and rebellious outer islands. Hopes 
centered around a possible reconciliation between the president 
and his former vice president. The estranged leaders signed a 
3 New York Times, int. ed., February 14, 1958. 
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joint statement in which they pledged to work with the Indo-
nesian people in striving to realize the ideals of the proclama-
tion of independence in 1945. While this vague statement of 
''agreement" really did nothing to solve the crisis, it did slow 
down the widening of the breach between Djakarta and the 
outlying regions. The conference also made an attempt to 
solve another of Indonesia's persistent problems, namely, the 
disunity in the army. A seven-man commission was named, 
with Sukarno and Hatta as members, to arrive at a solution. 
The military participants in the conference, which included 
many "rebel" colonels, took an oath pledging to obey uncon-
ditionally the decisions made by the commission. 
President Sukarno and Hatta were unable to implement their 
basic joint statement of September. They met twice, one time 
with the president calling on Hatta. A third meeting of the 
two leaders was postponed. Before this meeting was to have 
taken place, the central government made its decision to use 
force against the "countergovernment" which had been set up 
in Sumatra. With this decision, reconciliation between the two 
leaders probably vanished for good. Sukarno was apparently 
desirous of having Hatta back in the government, or at least 
he was willing to take him back to appease the peoples of the 
outer islands, but he was unwilling to accept the former vice 
president's conditions. According to reports, Hatta insisted 
upon the exclusion of Communists from the government, the 
dissolution of the national council, and the formation of a 
presidential cabinet with the approval of parliament. It was 
also rumored that he demanded amnesty for the leaders of the 
countergovernment. 
In the closing months of 1957 Indonesia made its fourth at-
tempt to secure from the General Assembly of the United Nations 
a resolution requesting the Netherlands to renew negotiations 
with it for the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesian ad-
ministration. A month before the vote on the resolution was 
taken, Foreign Minister Subandrio declared that Indonesia 
would take West New Guinea by force if its current appeal to 
the United Nations were unsuccessful. In late October, about 
the time this statement was made, the first wave of the anti-
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Dutch campaign began. Youths began painting Dutch-owned 
automobiles and buildings in Djakarta with the slogan, "We 
are now ready to take West New Guinea by force." President 
Sukarno in a speech in Lombok declared it was not necessary 
to attack West New Guinea; Indonesia could obtain control of 
the disputed territory by attacking Dutch interests in Indonesia 
and boycotting Netherlanders. The place to carry on the strug-
gle for West New Guinea was not the United Nations or Wash-
ington, but Indonesia.4 Not long before the vote was taken 
in the assembly, the Indonesian foreign minister warned the 
Netherlands and the West that the Dutch attitude was "very 
dangerous" and might lead to unforeseen and even explosive 
events in the international field. "If we are forced to abandon 
our present preoccupation with peaceful, constructive activities, 
and, instead, concentrate on building up our physical strength, 
the prevailing fundamentals of our foreign relations may change 
in character, too."5 
With the failure of the passage of the resolution on November 
29, the anti-Dutch campaign was stepped up.6 Dutch-owned 
KLM planes were forbidden to land in Djakarta, Indonesian 
personnel of Dutch enterprises went on a 24-hour strike, and 
later practically all of the Dutch enterprises were taken over 
by the native personnel or by the government. The produc-
tion or distribution of newspapers, journals, or other publica-
tions in Dutch, including those imported, was prohibited, as 
well as the display of films with Dutch subtitles. The Nether-
lands-owned KPM fleet which engaged in interisland shipping 
was first taken over by the government, but just before the 
company was to collect insurance from Lloyds for its loss, the 
ships were returned but forbidden to engage in Indonesian 
traffic. The Indonesian government first attempted (but with-
out success) to charter ships from Japan to meet the urgent 
need for interisland transportation. Later, ten ships were ob-
tained from the Soviet Union. 
4 Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, November II, 1957. 
5 New York Times, int. ed., November 21, 1957. 
6 The resolution had strong support but failed to obtain the necessary two-
thirds vote. The vote was 41 for, 29 against, with II abstentions. The United 
States abstained from voting. 
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Nether landers left Indonesia in droves. Of the 250,000 Dutch 
nationals in the islands in 1949, about 175,000 had either 
repatriated or left the country by January 1, 1956. It was 
estimated that there were still about 50,000 Netherlanders in 
Indonesia in October, 1957, when the bitter anti-Dutch cam-
paign began. About half of these were repatriated within the 
next few months. 
Dutch consular offices in Indonesia were ordered closed on 
December 5, as well as the cultural, military, and information 
sections of the Netherlands mission in Djakarta. Further credit 
transfers to the Nether lands were prohibited. 
The Indonesian actions were a severe blow to the Dutch, 
whose investments in the former dependency are estimated at 
one and a quarter billion dollars. The repatriation of so many 
people to the crowded lowlands created difficult physical prob-
lems, as well as some psychological ones, for many of these 
people are Eurasians who had never been in the Nether lands 
before. 
A few months before the vote on the vVest New Guinea 
resolution in the General Assembly of the United Nations, the 
Australian and Netherlands governments issued a joint state-
ment of a common policy with respect to New Guinea. The 
two administering countries agreed to cooperate in the adminis-
tration of the "geographically and ethnographically related" 
territories of the large island, and stated that they were deter-
mined "to promote an uninterrupted development until such 
time as the inhabitants . . . will be in a position to determine 
their own future" in accordance with the "interests and inalien-
able rights" of the inhabitants under the United Nations 
Charter. 7 The statement was in effect a denial of Indonesia's 
claim that West New Guinea is really Indonesian. Ali Sastroad-
midjojo, the head of the Indonesian delegation to the United 
Nations, branded the statement an attempt to influence the 
peaceful solution of Indonesia's claim. 
Increasing dissatisfaction with the trend of affairs and deep-
ening concern over the direction of President Sukarno's leader-
ship finally led to the formation of an opposition government. 
7 New York Times, int. ed., November 7, 1957. 
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In the closing months of 1957 more and more of the dissidents 
gathered at Padang in the western part of Sumatra. The group 
included a considerable number of military leaders, but also 
outstanding political leaders. It included the president of the 
Bank of Indonesia and two former prime ministers, N atsir 
and Harahap. As president of the Bank of Indonesia, Sjafruddin 
Prawiranegara had fought for a sound economic and financial 
policy, had warned about the dwindling gold reserves, and had 
pleaded for greater consideration for foreign capital. The dis-
satisfied leaders deliberated for weeks and finally organized a 
council. 
An attempt was made on November 30 to take the life of 
President Sukarno. He escaped uninjured, but the hand gre-
nade thrown at him killed eight people and wounded a number 
of others. Apparently the attack unnerved the president, for 
about a month later he went on a six-week Asian-African "rest" 
tour. 
The revolutionary council on February 10, 1958, issued an 
ultimatum to President Sukarno and Prime Minister Djuanda, 
with five days in which to comply with its terms. The council 
demanded that Mohammad Hatta and Sultan Hamengku Bu-
wono of Djokjakarta be named to form a new cabinet to be 
compdsed of "men of integrity and free of atheistic influence," 
this cabinet to function until the next general elections in 1960. 
The council demanded that Sukarno return to his constitu-
tional position as president. The ultimatum, which was called 
a Charter in Defense of Freedom and Justice, was preceded by 
a long preamble in which the grievances and political views 
of the group were set forth. The Djuanda cabinet was charged 
with actions hostile to the legitimate desires of the outer regions 
and with disastrous economic and financial policies culminating 
in the abrupt liquidation of Dutch economic activities. Sukarno 
was accused of having gone abroad not to recuperate his health 
but to try to purchase arms from the Soviet bloc, "apparently 
to crush the popular movements." The Sukarno-Djuanda re-
gime was charged with seeking "to strengthen the Communist 
position in the government while intensifying atheistic influ-
ence in the community, and to disrupt friendly relations with 
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the Western world in order to bring Indonesia closer into the 
Soviet bloc."8 
The Djuanda cabinet rejected the ultimatum and ordered 
the dishonorable discharge of four colonels associated with the 
council. President Sukarno returned from his "rest" trip on 
February 16, and that evening the government ordered the 
arrest on treason charges of the prime minister of the counter-
government, Sjafruddin, and five of its ministers. 
The control of the rich oil fields of Sumatra, exploited by 
American and British-Dutch companies, became of the utmost 
importance to both government and rebels. The oil companies 
provided the central government with 60 percent of its total 
foreign-exchange income. One of the first acts of the rebel 
government after the expiration of the ultimatum was to order 
the oil companies to cease all shipments of oil to Java and all 
payments of other revenues to the central government. By con-
trolling the production and shipment of the central Sumatra 
oil, the rebels would be able to exert tremendous economic 
pressure on the central government, but they made little mili-
tary or administrative effort to enforce their demands. The 
government went into action against the rebels in the middle 
of March. Its navy blockaded the rebel ports, and the air force 
landed parachute troops at Pakanbaru, the oil center, with little 
difficulty. The rebels offered little resistance. Their strategy 
may be to make tactical retreats and bleed the government white 
with guerrilla warfare. The war has been called "a very civil, 
civil war," with remarkably few losses on either side. 
At the beginning of April the outlook for the rebels appeared 
dark. They had apparently expected to be joined by Colonel 
Barlian., the military commander of the vital region of South 
Sumatra, and by the Achinese in the north of Sumatra and by 
other known pockets of discontent throughout the islands. Nor 
did they receive political aid from Mohammad Hatta or the 
sultan of Djokjakarta. The countergovernment movement fell 
between two stools: it tried to be both a regional and a national 
movement, but failed to be either sufficiently to rally real sup-
port to its cause. In spite of these facts, there is little cause for 
8 New York Times, int. ed., February 11, 1958. 
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optimism on the part of the central government. Sjafruddin 
was probably not far from the truth when he declared that his 
regime was much stronger politically than the Djakarta govern-
ment under President Sukarno, though far inferior militarily. 
He also feared Soviet intervention after the Korean model. 
"We do not want to be killed by Russians," he declared. "We 
started the revolutionary government to prevent Indonesia from 
being colonized by Russia through Sukarno. Sukarno was dead 
set to rule Indonesia like a dictator under Russia and ignore 
the Constitution. He was always trying to get authority without 
taking responsibility."9 
Even if the central government succeeds in crushing the 
present rebellion, the chief issues of anti-Communism, regional 
autonomy, Sukarno and his "guided democracy," economic de-
terioration, and incompetence and corruption will remain un-
solved. 
THE PHILIPPINES 
The dynamic and honest President Magsaysay died in a plane 
crash on March 17, 1957. He was succeeded by Carlos P. Garcia, 
the vice president. 
A hot presidential political campaign ended in the election 
in November of Garcia, who was the candidate of the Nation-
alist party. His leading opponent was Jose Yulo, the Liberal 
party candidate. The surprising feature of the campaign was 
the remarkable showing made by Manuel Manahan, a young 
independent candidate who declared his complete dedication to 
the policies of the late President Magsaysay. Claro M. Recto, 
who was also a candidate, ran far behind. Garcia's success in 
the election did not extend to his running mate, Jose P. Laurel, 
Jr. The latter was defeated for the vice-presidency by Diosdado 
Macapagal, the candidate of the Liberal party. Recto and 
Laurel were frequently critical of the United States and of the 
pro-American policies of Magsaysay. The election campaign 
was hard fought; large sums were spent. 
The economic situation in the Philippines remains unfavor-
able. The trade imbalance is serious; imports steadily and in-
9 New York Times, int. ed., March 22, 1958. 
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creasingly ran ahead of exports throughout 1957. The foreign-
exchange situation is alarming. In December, 1956, the inter-
national reserves of the central bank stood at $288,000,000; 
in December, 1957, they had declined to a record low of 
$145,000,000. The government budget remains out of balance. 
About 2,000,000 persons are unemployed. A favorable factor 
in the situation is the increasing physical volume of production. 
To help meet the situation, President Garcia at the end of 
1957 proclaimed a program of austerity. In March, 1958, he 
announced his intention to visit the United States to seek aid 
in the form of a $300,000,000 loan to be used for developmental 
projects. 
VIETNAM 
The competing Communist and non-Communist states of north 
and south Vietnam registered economic gains in 1957 and the 
early part of I 958, but both still had sizable tasks before them. 
North Vietnamese Premier Phan Van Dong announced on 
April 17, 1958, that the socialized economic sector was now "the 
leading force." Nguyen Van Tran, deputy chief of the state 
planning board, declared two days later that particular attention 
would be paid to the collectivization of agriculture during the 
next three years. Cooperative agricultural methods, involving 
mutual-aid teams, previously had represented the government's 
main efforts on behalf of collectivization.1° Considering the 
reaction produced by the Communists' land-reform program, 
the policy to push collectivization could provoke resistance. 
The land-reform program, on the other hand, was ultimately 
carried out in spite of opposition. 
Industrialization in north Vietnam has shown progress, with 
help from the other Communist-bloc countries, but so far 
emphasis has been on light industry. According to north Viet-
nam's premier, production in the heavy-industry sector in April, 
1958, was only 76 percent of what it had been before the war. 
The premier also asserted that chronic famine conditions in 
north Vietnam had been fundamentally ended, while the Soviet 
10 See Theodore Shabad, "Economic Developments in North Vietnam," Pacific 
Affairs, XXXI (March, 1958), 46-47. 
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Union has claimed that Ho Chi Minh's government had a suf-
ficient surplus in 1957 to ship some rice to Indonesia and 
India.U The claim of rice self-sufficiency would appear to be 
debatable in view of the past record of this part of Vietnam 
with respect to food production-exports notwithstanding. 
Both Vietnams were alike in many ways in 1957 and early 
1958 economically. Each continued vitally dependent upon its 
friends abroad to lend it assistance. In one extremely im-
portant respect, however, they differed-in their approach to 
economic development. North Vietnam apparently devoted a 
much larger proportion of its budget to development purposes 
(which, if continued, could prove the difference in the im-
portant economic competition between the two states) . Ameri-
can aid, moreover, has produced dissatisfaction in south Viet-
nam as a result of the limited emphasis given by the United 
States to industrialization there. 
South Vietnamese rice exports in 1957 failed to make the 
recovery desired by the government. Rubber continued to 
experience the uncertainties of a fluctuating market. The prob-
lem of unemployment persisted, and there were predictions of 
a worsening situation in 1958. Envy and discontent mounted 
among south Vietnamese farmers over the large share of the 
budget allocated to the resettlement of refugees from the north. 
There were bright spots in the economy, however, such as the 
dedication of a large cotton-spinning factory in Saigon in early 
February, 1958 (described by Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho 
as the first in a series of projects that would become operational 
in that year) . 
North Vietnam in early March, 1958, offered to discuss trade 
and a reduction of troops in the two parts of the country, but 
President N go Dinh Diem declined, terming the move propa-
ganda. The Soviet Union and Communist China supported the 
north Vietnamese, both charging the United States with re-
sponsibility for the rejection. 
The United States also was the subject of attack in south 
Vietnam in the fall of 1957 in the form of apparently Com-
munist-instigated bombing raids against Americans. Although 
11 Shabad, 48. 
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Communist terrorism and sabotage has been largely eliminated 
in south Vietnam, President Ngo Dinh Diem stated in March, 
1958, that there had recently been a renewal of such subversion 
and that "all necessary measures" were being taken. "All neces-
sary measures," if they followed the pattern of the past, could 
represent highhanded authoritarianism on the government's 
part. 
CAMBODIA 
Parliamentary elections were held in Cambodia on March 24, 
1958, for the second time since the 1954 Geneva accords which 
ended the Indochinese war. The outcome of the 1958 vote was 
no different from that of the 1955 elections: the Popular Social-
ist Community party of Prince N orodom Sihanouk (formerly 
king and four times premier of his country) won all the seats 
contested. Only one other party even participated in the elec-
tion, the People's party (Communist), and four of its five candi-
dates failed to gain even a single vote. Sim Var, who had been 
premier previously and who is opposed to the Communists 
within his country, became prime minister in April. 
There were no indications in early May, 1958, that Prince 
N orodom Sihanouk, who has a record of popping in and out 
of the premiership like a jack-in-the-box, had any immediate 
intention of resuming office. Sihanouk had stepped down from 
the premiership in 1957 for the fourth time. He remained, how-
ever, the country's most important political figure, genuinely 
popular with the Cambodian masses and the real power behind 
both throne and premiership. Such one-man, one-party rule 
would not seem to be in Cambodia's best interest in the long 
run-despite the fact that in 1957 the prince made some of the 
strongest statements against Communism he has ever uttered. 
Cambodian economic growth continued in 1957; trade in-
creased over the previous year, with imports and exports more 
in balance as a result of a substantial rise in the export of rice. 
Foreign-aid programs were a major factor in this growth, with 
the United States the largest single source of such assistance 
and the Soviet Union, Communist China, and Japan also con-
tributing in a significant fashion. This aid more than exceeded 
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the annual budget of $50,000,000, making Cambodia in this 
respect the best aided country in Southeast Asia. United States 
assistance in fiscal year 1957 amounted to some $39,000,000, a 
major American project being the construction of a road to 
connect the capital Pnompenh with the new ocean port France 
is building at Kompong Som on the Gulf of Siam. Kompong 
Som is Cambodia's first deep-sea port, and when the road to it 
is completed (probably sometime in 1959), Cambodia's de-
pendence on communications by river through Vietnam will be 
greatly lessened. 
LAOS 
Communist control of the northern Laotian provinces of Phong 
Saly and Sam Neua came to an official end on November 18, 
1957, when the leader of the formerly insurgent Pathet Lao 
symbolically handed over the two territories to a representative 
of the king. The national assembly on November 2 had form-
ally approved a pact between the government and the Pathets 
ending the more than three years of sporadic fighting which 
had followed in the wake of the 1954 Geneva Conference. 
The agreement provided that the Communist Pathet Lao 
were to be represented in the cabinet and that about 20 percent 
of the Pathet troops were to be integrated into the army. The 
remainder of the rebels were to be placed on a reserve status 
and returned to their homes. 
Two Communists subsequently were added to the govern-
ment: one (Prince Souvanna Vong, leader of the Pathets and 
half-brother of Premier Souvanna Phouma) as minister of 
planning, reconstruction, and urbanism, and the other as min-
ister of religion and fine arts. Fifteen hundred Pathet soldiers 
were integrated into the army as agreed, although pro-West 
Chief of Staff Colonel Ouan Rathikoun stated that it would 
take two years to reindoctrinate all of them. 
The agreement with the Pathet Lao also provided that the 
Pathets be permitted freedom of political activity on the same 
basis as any other group. The Communists quickly organized 
themselves into a National Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Hak Xat) 
and contested elections held May 4, 1958, to enlarge the national 
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assembly from 39 to 59 members. Twenty-one seats actually 
were at stake (the extra one representing a vacancy caused by 
death), and the Front put up thirteen candidates and backed 
eight others from sympathetic factions. 
The returns occasioned quite a stir in the West, as the Com-
munists placed nine of their thirteen candidates in office, in-
cluding Prince Souvanna Vong. Four members of the neutralist 
Santiphab faction, which had an electoral alliance with the 
Patriotic Front, also won. The results occasioned the possibility 
of a leftist bloc of as many as twenty-one legislators in the as-
sembly, including deputies previously elected. Nonleftists still 
possessed a majority, but their lack of cooperation in the past 
left little room for optimism. The cause of the electoral defeat 
of the rightwing parties would appear to be the widening gap 
between them and the masses, especially in the rural areas, and 
their failure to form electoral alliances (as the leftists did) . 
Elections for an entirely new assembly will be held in late 
1959 or early 1960, and a comparably strong showing by the 
Patriotic Front and other leftist factions could result in a 
majority for them. 
Prince Souvanna Vong and his supporters called for a reduc-
tion in the size of the Laotian armed forces and less American 
military aid during the campaign. Candidates of the Patriotic 
Front also were reported as indicating to the voters that they 
would resume their revolt if not elected.12 The Communists 
also made charges of corruption by government officials involv-
ing United States aid-charges which were not without sub-
stance. American aid to Laos has averaged $40,000,000 a year 
since 1954, and there has been large-scale graft partly as a result 
of an unrealistic exchange rate, corruption in the issuance of 
import licenses, and unskilled administration. The aid program 
came to a virtual standstill in early 1958 because of a reexami-
nation of the exchange rate as well as various procedural mat-
ters. Construction of new roads, agricultural improvements, 
and the supply of commodities to curb inflation represented 
accomplishments of the United States aid program in 1957 
despite this corruption. The impact of American assistance 
12 New York Times, May 4, 1958. 
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may be expected to be more impressive in the future if the 
necessary reforms are accomplished-and if the Communists do 
not come to power. United States aid and its effectiveness could 
be a major factor in the determination of the important 1959 
or 1960 elections. 
THAILAND 
The political rivalry among Phibun Songgram, Sarit Thanarat, 
and Phao Sriyanon came to a head in the form of a bloodless 
coup d'etat staged by Sarit September 15, 1957. Phibun fled to 
Japan, and Phao to Switzerland. Following elections for a new 
national assembly on December 15, Sarit (reportedly very ill) 
named Lieutenant General Thanom Kithachon as premier and 
in January, 1958, departed for the United States for one year's 
stay for treatment of cirrhosis of the liver. By the spring of 
1958, as a result of the developments of the past six months, all 
of the big three of Thai politics a year earlier were out of the 
country: Phibun and Phao in exile, and Sarit in the hospital 
in the United States. The consequent power vacuum, with a 
figurehead premier, may prove tempting to one or more of 
Sarit's ambitious army supporters (among others). Thailand 
continues a highly unstable political entity. 
Sarit's coup apparently had its roots in two considerations: 
a fear within army ranks that Phi bun was maneuvering to better 
Phao's position at the expense of Sarit, and a desire among 
Sarit's followers for a larger share of the spoils. Sarit was aided 
in his action by growing popular dissatisfaction with Phibun 
and, even more so, Phao-in large part because of charged 
irregularities in the February, 1957, elections. Although utiliz-
ing this discontent, Sarit and his supporters did not make their 
move as a result of pressures deriving from it. For all practical 
purposes, the September, 1957, change of governments was 
merely a switch in the seating arrangements. 
The December voting was billed as Sarit's answer to the 
charges that the February elections were corrupt. The mildly 
socialist Unionist party, led by Sukit Nimanhemin, won more 
of the 160 contested seats than any other party: 45. Former 
premier Khuang Aphaiwong's conservative Democrats won 39, 
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and the comparatively well organized extreme leftist parties 
only 15 (a drop of 6 seats compared with their February total); 
independents won 61 seats. Sukit's Unionists, rather than being 
permitted to form a government, were absorbed into Sarit's 
own newly formed National Socialist party. 
After the September coup, Sarit had asked Pote Sarasin, secre-
tary general of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization and 
former Thai ambassador to the United States, to be premier of 
a caretaker government. Pote accepted, but when asked to serve 
as premier after the December voting, he declined, stating 
that the elections would have no meaning "if I, not elected, 
took office."13 Named by Sarit to the premiership as second 
choice, as a result, was a 46-year-old career army officer, Thanom 
Kithachon, commander of the key First Army. Thanom claimed 
that he was "too green," but he accepted the post anyway. A 
loyal supporter of Sarit and strongly pro-West, Thanom is 
politically inexperienced and may not be able to meet any 
serious challenge to the authority of the ailing and absent Sarit. 
Such a challenge probably would not come from the Thai 
leftists-who have virtually no influence in either the army or 
the police, and apparently little among the voters as well. The 
antileftist trend of the December, 1957, balloting was repeated 
in provincial byelections March 30, 1958, when the opposition 
Democrats (14), Sarit's National Socialists (9), and inde-
pendents (3) won all of the 26 seats contested. The elections 
were held under a law providing that provinces reaching 50 
percent literacy elect all of their national assembly representa-
tives instead of having half appointed. Sarit's party, following 
the March voting, maintained a comfortable majority (97 
elected and 105 appointed) in the 291-seat assembly. 
The Thai economy continued stable throughout 1957, rice 
exports reportedly setting a postwar record (one and a half 
million tons). Expectations, however, were that the 1958 sur-
plus would be down, perhaps by as much as one-third. The 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development gave 
a major boost to the Thai economy in September, 1957, with 
the announcement of a $66,000,000 loan to help finance the 
13 The Economist (London), January 18, 1958. 
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giant Yanhee hydroelectric project on the Ping River 260 miles 
northwest of Bangkok. 
MALAYA AND SINGAPORE 
The Federation of Malaya became independent on August 31, 
1957. It is now a member of the British Commonwealth and 
remains linked to the United Kingdom by a defense treaty. 
Shortly after receiving its independence, it was admitted to 
membership in the United Nations. Tengku Abdul Rahman, 
who previously had been chief minister, became the country's 
first prime minister, while Sir Abdul Rahman, ruler of one of 
the Malay states, was elected constitutional monarch for a five-
year period. Tengku Rahman's cabinet of eleven members 
included three Chinese and an Indian. 
The Malayan Communist party on September 1 offered to 
end its war against Malaya in return for legal recognition. This 
was two days before the federation government made a new 
and "final" offer of amnesty to the Communist guerrillas. Few 
Communists took advantage of the offer; desultory guerrilla 
warfare continues. 
With respect to foreign policy, Prime Minister Rahman de-
clared that Malaya is not yet prepared to join Seato. He criti-
cized the countries of Southeast Asia for concerning themselves 
"with problems outside of their own sphere," for being inclined 
"to dance to the tune of the bigger nations." He suggested that 
the Southeast Asian leaders "should make more efforts to study 
the situation around them and try to build up understanding 
and unity among the nations which are so closely identified in 
interest and outlook. Otherwise these small nations will look 
elsewhere for support and protection and the full meaning of 
independence will be lost."14 
In Singapore, due to receive internal self-government in 1959, 
Chief Minister Lim Yew Hock continued his offensive against 
Communists and extreme leftist elements in trade unions, 
farmers' groups, and student organizations. A number of Chi-
nese private schools were closed, and supervision of the re-
14 New York Times, int. ed., February 9, 1958. 
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mainder was tightened. The Chinese principal of a large 
Chinese high school was deported. The legislative assembly in 
October, 1957, approved a bill creating a status of Singapore 
citizenship whereby the electorate was nearly doubled. 
Chief Minister Lim told a group of American editors and 
radio-station owners in February, 1958, that a merger of Singa-
pore with Malaya was inevitable, but the following day Prime 
Minister Rahman of the federation told the same group that 
there could be no merger until the people in Singapore became 
more Malayan-minded. 
Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo may soon form an as-
sociation. Sir Anthony Abell, governor of Sarawak and high 
commissioner for Brunei, on February 7, 1958, formally pro-
posed an association with a central authority to deal initially 
with defense, external relations, internal security, and com-
munications. 
BURMA 
The internal-security situation in Burma improved in 1957 and 
the first half of 1958, as Communist, Karen, and other insurgents 
surrendered in increased numbers. Domestic security still posed 
a major problem for Premier U Nu and his government, how-
ever, although there was growing optimism as a result of the 
mounting surrenders. 
Nu himself in June, 1957, had proclaimed the priority of 
restored law and order over further socialization of the national 
economy. His program called for a retrenchment of welfare-
state measures and more joint ventures with private Burmese 
and foreign businesses (with the government as a "sleeping 
partner," as Nu put it). Declaring that it was presently im-
possible to bar foreigners from participation in the develop-
ment of the Burmese economy, Nu added that when it is pos-
sible to do so, "I will be the first to exclude them." 
Despite this brake on socialism and the improved internal-
security situation, Burma's economy in early 1958 still was a 
long way from solving the multitude of problems facing it. 
Burma exported two million tons of rice in 1957, a postwar 
record, but failure of the rice crop in certain areas indicated a 
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probable drop of nearly 50 percent in the surplus for export 
in 1958. Foreign-exchange reserves, meanwhile, fell in 1957, 
despite loans from the United States, India, the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Soviet Union, 
Japan, and West Germany. 
Burma's improved domestic-security situation should provide 
the government with an opportunity for genuine progress in 
the field of economic development and diversification. The 
surrender of the various brands of insurgents, however-par-
ticularly the Communists-does not mean that the evolution 
of a viable Burmese state will proceed without obstacle. Deputy 
Premier and Defense Minister U Ba Swe told 500 surrendering 
Communists in Arakan in February, 1958, that the government 
would bear them no ill will and would do everything possible 
to rehabilitate them, but whether democratic rehabilitation is 
likely is open to serious question. If the Communists are willing 
to "behave," U Nu's government is prepared to treat them as a 
regular political party.15 There is no reason to believe, however, 
that the Communists will be any less Communist in Rangoon 
and the villages than in the bush. They may even threaten 
to resume their rebellion against the government if they are not 
successful politically, as the "rehabilitated" Communist Pathet 
Lao were reported doing in the campaign for the May 4, 1958, 
elections in neighboring Laos. 
The Communists' prospects for overt political gains could be 
enhanced by divisions within the ranks of the government party, 
the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League. Premier Nu as-
sumed the additional portfolio of minister of home affairs in 
late April, 1958, allegedly replacing the prior holder of that 
office as a result of factionalism within the A.F.P.F.L. Nu also 
reportedly ordered the arrests of some members of the party on 
criminal charges. Certain Burmese newspapers in May, 1958, 
charged that the United States had given Deputy Premier Kyaw 
Nyein $600,000 to use in an effort to oust Nu as premier. Kyaw 
Nyein claimed the charges were part of a campaign against him 
by supporters of Nu. 
15 See Robert H. Estabrook, "Burma's Role," in Washington Post and Times-
Herald, November 30, 1957. 
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The Communists could take advantage of such rivalries to 
advance their cause at the expense of the A.F.P.F.L., seemingly 
wearying after ten years of independence. 
No settlement had been reached, as of May, 1958, of Burma's 
border controversy with neighboring Communist China. China's 
Chou En-lai had stated in July, 1957, that agreement in prin-
ciple had been achieved, but nine months later the dispute still 
was unsolved. 
THE CONTINUING COMMUNIST CHALLENGE 
The Soviet Union and Communist China continued their 
efforts in 1957 and the first half of 1958 to capitalize on the 
political and economic problems and inadequacies of the coun-
tries of Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia. The Indonesians 
had sought military equipment from the United States, but 
when the American government refused, arms-purchasing mis-
sions were sent to countries of the Communist bloc. President 
Sukarno announced in early April, 1958, that negotiations 
with Yugoslavia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia had resulted in 
Indonesia's purchase of an undisclosed number of Soviet-built 
MIG jet fighter aircraft and Ilyushin bombers as well as small 
arms and other war goods. Indonesian pilots, it was reported 
later the same month, would undergo training in these aircraft 
in Egypt-itself a recipient of Soviet military and other types of 
assistance. 
The Communists also supplied Indonesia with ten ships in 
the spring of 1958 to help replace Dutch vessels which formerly 
engaged in the republic's interisland trade. There also were 
charges, not substantiated, of considerable Communist involve-
ment in Indonesia's civil difficulties. Philippine Defense Secre-
tary Jesus Vargas, for example, charged that Soviet technical 
advisers in Djakarta were really military experts helping the 
Sukarno government in its struggle against the Sumatran and 
other rebels. 
The United States had been asked to supply arms by those 
in revolt against Djakarta as well as by the Djakarta government, 
refusing both requests. Communist China, nonetheless, accused 
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the United States in May, 1958, of supplying the Indonesian 
rebels with "a continuous stream of arms," and the Soviet 
Union charged that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was 
"instigating the overthrow of the legitimate government of 
Indonesia." 
President Eisenhower, however, had told a press conference 
in April that "our policy is one of careful neutrality." Dulles 
previously had proclaimed that the official policy of the United 
States was to provide arms only for internal police protection 
within or for a fight against aggression from without. 
The first phase of the Indonesian civil war ended in the late 
spring of 1958 with successful military action by the govern-
ment against the rebels on Sumatra (with the dissidents sub-
sequently intensifying their activity in the eastern part of the 
island country) . The danger of an internationalization of the 
conflict had fortunately been avoided-at least for the time 
being. The possibility continued, however, that foreign inter-
vention might still mark the civil struggle in the months and 
perhaps years ahead. 
The Soviet diplomatic offensive was not limited to the Indo-
nesian question or to attacks upon the United States and its 
allies, although these certainly were focal points of Communist 
propaganda. On the eve of the March, 1958, meeting of the 
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization in the Philippines the 
Soviets coupled a strong denunciation of the alliance with a 
vague proposal for establishment of an atomfree zone and a 
system of collective security in Asia and the Far East. The 
Soviet Union also urged members of the alliance to refuse 
American missiles and weapons, threatening powerful retalia-
tory blows if such bases were ever used against the U.S.S.R. or 
its allies. 
The December, 1957, Afro-Asian conference in Egypt was 
also part of the Soviet diplomatic campaign among the newly 
independent peoples of Asia (and Africa). The meeting was 
billed as another Bandung conference, but its delegates were 
for the most part unofficial, they were overwhelmingly Com-
munist sympathizers, and the Soviet Union itself (not present at 
Bandung) was the major voice at the gathering. Communist 
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China and the other Asian Communist states also were repre-
sented, and there were "observers" from five eastern European 
satellites. The Soviet delegation was reported as offering the 
assembled peoples economic and technical aid "to the best of 
our capabilities," but there was no confirmation of such a pro-
posal in Soviet reports of the Cairo conference. 
As of early 1958, the Communist bloc's assistance efforts in 
Southeast Asia were still relatively modest (excepting, of course, 
in north Vietnam, which was in large part supported by such 
help) .16 Indonesia had been accorded credit amounting to 
$110,000,000 and Cambodia a grant of $22,000,000, with Burma 
a partner to a series of rice-barter deals with various Com-
munist countries as well as a recipient of several "gift" projects 
for which it will make the U.S.S.R. a return "gift" of rice over 
an extended period. The Philippines, Thailand, south Viet-
nam, Malaya, and Laos received no Communist assistance what-
soever. Bloc supply of aircraft and arms to Indonesia, however, 
indicated the Communists' willingness and ability to move to 
meet the needs, real or self-styled, of Southeast Asian govern-
ments. There were those, indeed, who feared that Indonesia 
might become another Egypt or Syria in terms of Soviet military 
and other aid. Such a Communist approach to Indonesia could 
have an enormous impact on all Southeast Asia. 
16 Information based on a United States Department of State study released 
January 3, 1958, and carried January 4 in the New York Times. 
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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
IN WRITING this book the authors have drawn on their many years 
of study of the region, based on government documents and publica-
tions, books, journals and newspapers from the countries of South-
east Asia, and personal contacts and visits. 
Before the Second World War very little was written on the 
region in English, but m the last two decades many excellent 
studies have appeared. 
GENERAL 
Professor Brian Harrison of the University of Hong Kong is the 
author of the first general history of the region, Southeast Asia: A 
Short History (Macmillan, London; St. Martin's Press, New York, 
1954. 268 pp.). It was soon followed by a much longer study by 
Professor D. G. E. Hall, History of Southeast Asia (Macmillan, 
London; St. Martin's Press, New York, 1955. 808 pp.). Professor 
Hall was for many years at the University of Rangoon and is 
now at the University of London. It is to be hoped that we shall 
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The geography of the region is described by Professor E. G. H. 
Dobby of the University of Malaya, Southeast Asia (Wiley, New 
York, 1951. 415 pp.). For an illuminating examination of the 
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Cora DuBois, Social Forces in Southeast Asia (University of Min-
nesota Press, Minneapolis, 1949. 78 pp.). 
The problems of developing democratic governments in the 
countries of the region is ably discussed by Rupert Emerson in 
Representative Government in Southeast Asia, with supplementary 
chapters by W. H. Elsbree and Virginia Thompson (Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1955. 200 pp.). The important 
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Chinese communities in the region are comprehensively treated by 
Victor Purcell in The Chinese in Southeast Asia (Oxford, London 
and New York, 1951. 801 pp.). The author was for many years a 
member of the Malay Civil Service and in charge of the Chinese 
bureau. Southwards from China (Hodder, London, 1952. 200 pp.) 
by Woodrow Wyatt is a survey by an English journalist. 
The New World of Southeast Asia by Lennox A. Mills and 
associates (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1949. 450 
pp.) gives a survey of the political developments in the countries 
by a number of specialists. For an Australian view of the same 
subject, see W. Macmahon Ball, Nationalism and Communism in 
East Asia (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2d ed., 1956. 
222 pp.). 
BURMA 
For background and the prewar developments, see D. G. E. Hall, 
Burma (Longmans, London and New York, 1950. 184 pp.), and 
John Christian, Modern Burma: A Survey of Political and Eco-
nomic Development (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1942. 
381 pp.). The former is an English, the latter an American scholar. 
Colonial Policy and Practice by J. S. Furnivall (New York Uni-
versity Press, New York, 1956. 568 pp.), first published by Cam-
bridge University Press, 1948, analyzes and appraises British policy 
in Burma and compares it with the policy of the Dutch in the 
East Indies. This is an unusual book, one of the best on colonial 
policy. Mr. Furnivall was a member of the British Civil Service in 
Burma and is now adviser to the government of Burma. 
For a Burmese view and statement of events and developments, 
see the following by Premier U Nu: Burma Under the japanese 
(Macmillan, London, 1954. 44 pp.); The People Win Through 
(Society for the Extension of Democratic Ideals, Rangoon, 1952. 
63 pp.); From Peace to Stability (Ministry of Information, Ran-
goon, 1951); and Towards Peace and Stability (Ministry of Informa-
tion, Rangoon, 1951). 
See Frank N. Trager, Toward a Welfare State in Burma: Eco-
nomic Reconstruction and Development, 1948-1954 (Institute of 
Pacific Relations, New York, 1954. 60 pp. mimeographed), for an 
account of the basic policy of Burma's government. 
INDOCHINA 
For the background of French colonialism in the region, see the 
excellent study by John F. Cady, The Roots of French Imperialism 
in Eastern Asia (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1954. 
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322 pp.). The Struggle for Indochina by Ellen J. Hammer (Stan-
ford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1954. 342 pp.) is the most 
comprehensive account of developments in Indochina since the 
war. For an excellent account of the regime in the north, see 
The Viet Minh Regime by Bernard B. Fall (Institute of Pacific 
Relations, New York, rev. ed., 1956. 200 pp. mimeographed). A 
useful volume on Indochina is Conflict in Indo-China and Inter-
national Repercussions: A Documentary History, 1945-1955 (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1956. 265 pp.), edited by Allan 
B. Cole. 
INDONESIA 
Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago by Bernard 
H. M. Vlekke (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1943. 
439 pp.) is a splendid work by a leading Dutch historian. Mention 
has already been made of the unusual volume by Furnivall on 
British colonial policy in Burma and Dutch policy in the East 
Indies. The Dutch East Indies by Amry Vandenbosch (University 
of California Press, Berkeley, 3d ed., 1942. 446 pp.) brings the 
political developments of Indonesia up to the Second World War. 
For a detailed account of the revolution, see George MeT. 
Kahin's Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Cornell Uni-
versity Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1952. 490 pp.). The Birth of Indonesia 
by David Wehl (Allen, London, 1948. 216 pp.) is a shorter but 
a very good account of the revolution by an English journalist. 
For an extreme Dutch view of the revolution, see Indonesia by P. S. 
Gerbrandy (Hutchinson, London, 1950. 224 pp.). Gerbrandy was 
the wartime prime minister of the Netherlands government in 
exile. For a sociological study of postwar Indonesia, see Indonesia 
in the Modern World by Justus M. Van der Kroef (Masa Baru, 
Bandung; Heinman, New York, pt. I, 1954. 308 pp.; pt. II, 1956. 
386 pp.). 
MALAYA 
Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule by Rupert Emerson 
(Macmillan, New York, 1937. 536 pp.) is a comparative study of 
British rule in Malaya and Dutch administration in the East Indies. 
For brief but good histories of British rule in Malaya, see Malaya: 
Outline of a Colony by Victor Purcell (Nelson, London, 1946. 151 
pp.) and Malaya and Its History by R. 0. Winstedt (Longmans, 
New York, 1951. 158 pp.). British Rule in Eastern Asia by Lennox 
A. Mills (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1942. 581 
pp.) contains an analysis of British administration by a political 
scientist. 
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For a critical treatment of British policy in Malaya during the 
"emergency" see Malaya: Communist or Free (Stanford University 
Press, Stanford, Calif., 1954. 288 pp.) by Victor Purcell. Malayan 
Problems, from a Chinese Point of View (Tannsco, Singapore, 
1947. 182 pp.) by Sir Cheng-lock Tan represents the point of view 
of most Chinese in Malaya. The author is the foremost leader of 
the Chinese community. 
THE PHILIPPINES 
The best and most comprehensive study of the political develop-
ments of the Philippine Islands is Joseph Ralston Hayden's The 
Philippines: A Study in National Development (Macmillan, New 
York, 1942. 984 pp.). Professor Hayden was a political scientist, 
secretary of the Woods-Forbes commission, and the last vice gov-
ernor general under American rule. An interesting book on Amer-
ican administration of the islands is The Philippine Islands by W. 
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(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1928, 1945. 412 pp.). 
For background, read Land and People in the Philippines by 
Joseph E. Spencer (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1952. 
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and diplomat, has written several books on events in his country 
since the Second World War: Crusade in Asia: Philippine Victory 
(Day, New York, 1955. 309 pp.) and I Saw the Fall of the Philip-
pines (Doubleday, New York, 1942. 323 pp.). 
For a critical view of American policy in the Philippines in the 
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stein (Farrar, Straus, New York, 1947. 276 pp.). For a similar view 
by a Filipino, see Betrayal in the Philippines by Hernando Abaya 
(Wyn, New York, 1946. 272 pp.). 
THAILAND 
For Thailand before the Second World War the following will be 
found useful: Sir Josiah Crosby, The Cross-roads (Hollis and Carter, 
London, 1945. 174 pp.); Kenneth P. Landon, Siam in Transition 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1939. 328 pp.); Virginia 
Thompson, Thailand, the New Siam (Macmillan, New York, 1941. 
865 pp.). 
For postwar developments, see Bangkok Editor by Alexander 
MacDonald (Macmillan, New York, 1949. 229 pp.). MacDonald, 
an American, published an English newspaper in Bangkok for 
about a decade after the end of the war. See also Brief Authority 
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(Harper, New York, 1956. 290 pp.) by Edwin F. Stanton, who 
served as American ambassador in Thailand for a period in the 
early 1950's. Some Aspects of Siamese Politics by John Coast (Insti-
tute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1953. 58 pp. mimeographed) 
gives the views of an Englishman warmly sympathetic with Asian 
revolutionary movements. 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Little has yet been published in this field. The following titles 
are suggested: Philips Talbot (ed.), South Asia in the World Today 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1950. 248 pp.); Philip W. 
Thayer, Southeast Asia in the Coming World (Johns Hopkins 
Press, Baltimore, 1953. 306 pp.); W. H. Elsbree, japan's Role in 
Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940-1945 (Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1953. 182 pp.); Werner Levi, Free 
India in Asia (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1952. 
161 pp.); Franz Michael and George E. Taylor, The Far East in 
the Modern World (Holt, New York, 1956. 724 pp.); Harold M. 
Vinacke, Far Eastern Politics in the Postwar Period (Appleton-
Century-Crofts, New York, 1956. 497 pp.). 
UNITED STATES POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
See Miriam S. Farley, United States Relations with Southeast Asia, 
1950-1955 (American Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 
1955. 81 pp. mimeographed) and John Kerry King, Southeast Asia 
in Perspective (Macmillan, New York, 1956. 309 pp.). 
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